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Abstract 
Corporate governance has attracted significant interest in the post-Enron era, following incidences of 
corporate fraud and collapses. Some of this attention has been witnessed in the proliferation of 
corporate governance codes of best practices and reforms. Following the agency theorisation, 
corporate governance codes and reforms are generically inclined. However, institutional 
configurations differ across contexts. (Neo-)Institutional theory posits that institutions influence 
corporate governance. Corporate governance practices, in turn, affect their institutional structures. 
Equally, organisational and social actors moderate and are compelled by these institutional 
boundaries. Drawing on these perspectives, this study investigates the inference of the distinct 
institutional context of developing countries, for corporate governance reforms. It expounds the 
implications of these evolving structures for the dynamism and procedures involved in such 
transformational schemes, in a bid to contribute to the theorisation of institutional reproduction.  
 In this respect, a constructivist position is adopted by exploring the views of key stakeholders 
in the Nigerian corporate context. Against this backdrop, the study employs a qualitative method 
approach, involving in-depth interviews supported by documentary evidence, to fulfil its aim. In line 
with the description of salient stakeholders in corporate governance reforms, such key stakeholders 
include: regulators and policy makers, listed companies and other notable players, within the corporate 
governance context of Nigeria – a central economy in Africa. 
 The findings are several. First, the study highlights that corporate governance reforms are 
motivated by the interface and alignment of established institutional logics, informed largely by the 
prevalent influence of a compendium of large family founders, regardless of supposed external 
pressures. Second, the expectations of the universally driven corporate governance reforms are found 
to contradict the dominant corporate governance performance in Nigeria, reflecting a complexity in 
application. Third, the mode and approach to corporate governance reforms in Nigeria are principally 
determined by internal legitimation, including: endogenous factors, social ratifications and path 
dependence, from established corporate governance structures. Lastly, corporate governance reforms 
are disclosed to be moderated primarily by informal mechanisms, as opposed to the more structured 
techniques of developed countries. Correspondingly, employment of such a framework of performance 
is advocated in the realisation of an institutionally informed corporate governance reform scheme in 
Nigeria, whereby the predominance of family block-holders could positively provide an avenue for 
tailored change through proper integration of their influence. In the main, the study forges a debate 
on the practice and policy that “a fit for all” corporate governance reform’s procedure is yet to be 
achieved. In this vein, theoretically, the study provides a model for understanding the 
institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms within maturing fields, as in Nigeria. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction and background to the study 
    1.1 Emergence of corporate governance reforms 
 Corporate governance has received renewed attention in recent years. Incidences of 
corporate improprieties since the last decade and the attendant repercussions, such as the 
governance and financial crises, are considered to be some of the motivations of this heightened 
interest (Deakin and Konzelmann, 2003; Coffee, 2005; Zona et al., 2013). Particularly, evidence 
includes high-profile cases such as; Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, Parmalat, Freddie Mac, 
Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock, Merrill Lynch. These occurrences have been attributable, inter alia, 
to weaknesses in corporate governance standards and specifically internal structures in these 
organisations (Dedman, 2002; Dewing and Russell, 2004; MacNeil and Xiao, 2006; Solomon, 2013). For 
instance, the collapse of Enron was cited as a result of failings in internal controls and safeguards in 
corporate governance at these corporations (Deakin and Konzelmann, 2004). Inevitably, the need to 
reinforce corporate governance mechanisms has become imperative.  
 In the aftermath of these occasions of corporate scandals, a variety of measures have been 
proposed, to curtail any recurrence. One major response to these events is the worldwide 
proliferation of heightened corporate governance regulations from the last decade (Dewing and 
Russell, 2004; Keasey et al., 2005). These additional controls are meant to direct managerial behaviour 
in accordance with expectations and impose new responsibility on corporate executives and the board 
(Aguilera, 2005). This is seen as necessary to resolve conflict, maximize shareholder value and increase 
accountability (Aguilera, 2005). Some of these corporate controls have emerged in the form of the 
initiation of codes of conduct or principles of best practice for companies (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004, 2009). Although the first code of corporate governance dated back to 1978, in the USA, 
followed by a second country, Hong Kong, in 1989, however, the need for codes of good governance 
had never prompted such level of attention noticed from the start of the 20th century1 (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009). For instance, the Cadbury code (1992), published from the 
recommendations of the Cadbury committee on ‘financial aspects of corporate governance’, 
represents such an attempt. As a response to demands to raise standards in corporate reporting, the 
recommendations of the Cadbury code also provided a frame of reference for corporate governance 
in the UK (Stiles and Taylor, 1993; Canyon and Mallin, 1997), to make explicit the United Kingdom (UK) 
corporate governance principles (Dedman, 2002; Solomon, 2013).   
 Following the Cadbury code, corporate governance codes have risen significantly in countries 
across the globe (Hermes et al., 2007). The Cadbury code cited as a model (Sheridan et al., 2006) also 
                                                             
1 ‘The U.S. was one of the first nations in the world to concern itself with the governance of its publicly-listed corporations. 
But it stopped well short of developing authoritative general standards of corporate governance.’ (Haskovec,2012:6). 
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acted as a trigger2 for such emergence (Van den Berghe, 2002). Some of these are: the Italian Preda 
code (1999, 2000); German corporate governance code; Baums report (2001) and Cromme code 
(2002-3); US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002); the Russian code of good governance (2002); Swedish code 
of corporate governance (2004); among others (Cromme, 2005; Schmidt and Brauer, 2006; Clarke, 
2007; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). These developments were targeted at broadly regulating 
corporate governance practices (Dedman, 2002; Khanna et al., 2006). In this respect, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’, was 
initiated in 1999 (updated in 2004).3 These principles, simply referred to as ‘best practices’, are 
basically intended to provide an international benchmark for corporate governance across the globe 
(OECD, 1999). Universally, they serve as the basis for the promulgation of consequent corporate 
governance improvements (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). Subsequently, transnational 
organisations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and the European Commission (EC), have aided the development and 
worldwide diffusion of these best practices (Khanna et al., 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
 Developing countries have equally had to adopt good governance principles. In this respect, 
inevitably aligning their corporate governance practices with the ‘global best practices’ (Coombes and 
Watson, 2001; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). Accordingly, in line with global diffusions of codes 
of good governance and corporate governance reforms in the developed countries of Europe, North 
America and emerging Asia Pacific, developing African countries also issued codes of good governance 
in recent decades. Some of these include the acclaimed King report on corporate governance in South 
Africa (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) and other good governance principles and requirements widely 
proposed in African corporations (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016; Waweru and Prot, 2018). These 
reforms were also found to be driven by, among other rationales, the need to forestall corporate 
failures, protect shareholders’ interest, and the symbolism of good governance practices (Okike and 
Adegbite, 2012; Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014; Waweru, 2014). However, despite these perceived 
benefits, these codes were considered to have been principally informed by initiatives in the 
developed countries. The OECD principles have notably spurred the developing countries to launch 
corporate governance codes of best practices (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). For instance, in 
Egypt, the code of corporate governance for listed companies in 2005 and the code of corporate 
governance for state-owned enterprises in 2006, are mainly based on the OECD guidelines (African 
                                                             
2The present global interest in corporate governance advancements was cited to have been precipitated by the launch of 
the Cadbury code in 1992. As stated by Van Den Berghe (2002) though, corporate governance reform spurred some attention 
in the mid-1980s – following the initiation of the principles and recommendations of the American Law institute in 1984 and 
the Treadway Commission in the US in 1987 – however, it did not become a global phenomenon until the launch of the first 
UK corporate governance code (Cadbury code) in 1992.  
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Corporate Governance Network (ACGN), 2016). Likewise, most of the recommendations of these 
codes were viewed to primarily mirror the underlying tenets of corporate governance principles, such 
as the Cadbury code (1992), in the UK4 (Dedman, 2002; Marx, 2009; Krenn, 2014). The OECD and 
similar transnational bodies, such as the IMF and World Bank, referred to as ‘agents of convergence’ 
(Adegbite et al., 2013), have thus been adjudged to simultaneously aid the promotion of the Anglo-
American (shareholder) system of corporate governance (see Soederberg, 2003). As Coombes and 
Watson (2001) contend, such a corporate governance model, usually prescribed in corporate 
governance reforms, is the one that prevails in the United States (US) and UK. While this prioritises 
shareholders’ interests, a prevalent feature of these two preceding corporate environments, it does 
not consistently capture the situation in all organisational settings (Coombes and Watson, 2001; 
Young et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013). Therefore, the introduction of such codes of best practice 
into other contexts can be considered to largely follow the ‘taken-for-granted’ assumption about their 
compatibility. Their applicability to the exigencies of the developing contexts, as is the case of the 
advanced countries, where these codes were initiated, has thus likewise been presupposed.   
1.2 Neo-Institutional perspective on corporate governance reforms  
 In spite of the rise of these regulatory controls, corporate misdemeanours have continued to 
occur. This is evident from renewed cases of business frauds in the post-Enron era and following the 
global financial crisis in 2008, involving corporations, including those in the developing countries, with 
their attendant impact on firms globally. The basic supposition about and the adequacy of the 
prevailing understanding of organisational workings is, accordingly, considered to be undermined 
(McCahery and Armour, 2006). Corporate governance reforms are intended to engender good/best 
practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). However, as contended by 
institutional theorisation, corporate governance is not context free (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Filatotchev et al., 2013), whereby, corporate governance practices are entrenched in their institutional 
structures (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2010). For instance, as Coffee (2005) discovered, 
different systems of corporate governance are characterised by dissimilar types of scandals. In this 
vein, Zona et al. (2013), in explaining the emergence of corporate scandals, acknowledge this as being 
more of the consequence of external factors associated with complex institutional dynamics.  
 As projected by the neo-institutional theory (Maguire et al., 2004; Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005; Harmon et al., 2015; Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016), organisational reproduction largely 
embodies the interplay of social agents within institutional structures. Corporate governance reforms, 
                                                             
4 Some of the recommendations of the SEC code also include: responsibilities of the Board, independent directors, 
directors’ remuneration, tenure and re-election of directors, insider trading, etc. 
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as a form of modification, constitute procedures by which organisational mechanisms can be 
reproduced (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Szabó, 2017). These procedures are identified to 
significantly involve the activities of actors such as executives, stockholders, regulators, government, 
policy makers and other economic and social participants (OECD, 1999). In this regard, institutional 
factors such as values, beliefs and norms, impact on corporate governance performance (Aoki, 2001; 
Scott, 2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Thus, endogenous factors are also basically central to any of 
such advancements. For instance, legitimation not only involves how people act, but also what propels 
such action (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Likewise, efficiency is considered as the ability to satisfy 
organisational functions, albeit within institutional constraints (Oliver, 1991; Roberts and Greenwood, 
1997). Hence, the expected efficiency and/or legitimation from corporate governance reforms is 
considered as not only dependent on subjective endogenous variables, but also relational variables. 
The neo-institutional theory has been successfully employed in studies involving diffusion or adoption 
of corporate governance practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The neo-institutionalism perspective 
equally offers a framework for understanding the implications of institutional dynamics for attempts 
at corporate governance reforms, in the developing contexts.   
    1.3 Institutional contexts of developing countries 
 Unlike developed nations, the developing Africa nations encompass relatively disparate 
institutional structures (Coombes and Watson, 2001; Young et al., 2008). For instance, the United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC, 2013), describes the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) nations as a fragile and 
weak governance zone, where the public sectors’ actors are unable or unwilling to provide effective 
management and provision of basic public services for their citizens. These are regions whose state 
structures lack the capacity to provide the functions needed for poverty reduction and development 
(UNGC, 2013). The prevalence of failing and dysfunctional institutions, such as underdeveloped capital 
markets, is noted in the developing contexts (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Waweru, 2014). Furthermore, the 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries are characterized by inefficient legal infrastructures, leading to weak 
enforcement of rules (Ahunwan, 2002; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; McGee, 2009; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; 
Adegbite, 2012b). ‘In addition to having a weak judicial system, developing countries are found to be 
unlikely to have administrative agencies that can handle issues, such as accounting standards, financial 
disclosures and stock market listing rules, that benefit from detailed rule making and non-legal 
administrative enforcement’ (Prowse 1998:16). These weak institutional conditions have impacted on 
corporate governance advancement in this region, to a large extent (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; 
Okike 2007; Mensah et al., 2003; Mangena et al., 2012). Effective corporate governance regulation 
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requires robust institutional complements, as obtained in the developed contexts (Baums, 1993). 
However,  
 “In a less evolved regulatory, legal and institutional environment, information asymmetries 
are more severe, contracting costs are higher because standard practices have not been 
developed, enforcement of contracts is more problematic because of weak courts, market 
participants and regulators are less experienced, and the economy itself is likely to be 
undergoing more rapid change than in developed countries” (Clarke, 2015: 12).  
 
 Nonetheless, the diffusion of practices, codes of corporate governance and reforms, 
inferences from the developing contexts, especially the Sub-Saharan Africa countries are 
comparatively lacking. Previous studies on the adoption of codes and good governance reforms have 
mostly focused on the developed countries of the European nations and the Asian Pacific (Dedman, 
2002; Kaen, 2003; Cromme, 2005; Murphy and Topyan, 2005; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; 
Nakamura, 2006; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). In spite of the globalisation of corporate scandals and the 
consequential reforms, there have been differing positions on addressing corporate governance 
issues. For instance, from one such perspective, the failure of corporate governance is contested as 
more the failure of institutional arrangements underpinned by popular paradigms, such as market 
fundamentalism (Sun et al., 2012). In this respect, to address the crisis and forestall future occurrences 
of corporate scandals, it is advocated that corporate governance seeks a balance between economic-
social goals and individual-communal goals (Sun et al., 2012). In this vein, the impact of the developing 
contexts, on the establishment of tailored corporate governance reforms, becomes salient. Although, 
in recent times, there has been relatively budding corporate governance literature and studies within 
the developing Sub-Saharan Africa context in this respect (Rossouw, 2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; 
Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite, 2012a; Ojeka et al., 2017), an understanding of the institutional 
variants portrayed by the developing contexts, for such attempts at corporate governance reforms, is 
as yet unclear.  
 Corporate governance regulations in developing countries depict distinct specificities. For 
instance, although a prevalently family concentrated (block-holding) ownership structure is also 
reported in other countries, such as Japan, Germany and some European nations (Nakamura, 2006), 
the social and/or institutional setting in which such ownership structure is exercised within the 
developing contexts, differs (Ahunwan, 2002). Also, this form of ownership structure in corporations 
in these contexts does exert higher managerial control on corporate management (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). In a study of listed companies in Bangladesh, while mandatory reporting of 
corporate governance codes is found to have a significant positive association with firm size, firm 
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profitability and firm multinational parents, it however has a significant negative association with the 
ownerships (Das et al., 2015). According to Clarke (2015), in developing business environments, 
investors often have less interest in the strategic goals of the enterprise but focus on short-term 
returns. Thus, the interests of outside investors are not usually formally represented in the governance 
of corporations (Clarke, 2015). Equally, as Balgobin (2008) asserts, when the peculiarities of small 
states are considered, it is particularly difficult to derive an encompassing definition of corporate 
governance. Against this lacuna, this research seeks to understand how corporate governance reforms 
align with these countries’ specific realities and contexts. 
Using Nigeria as a case, this research is thus hinged upon the question: How are corporate 
governance reforms institutionalised within the peculiarities of the developing institutional 
contexts? 
    1.4 Research context and agenda: Why Nigeria? 
 Nigeria presents as a useful case study. Stake (1995) and Bryman and Bell (2011) posit that 
researchers should base a case study where learning is expected to be greatest. Nigeria remains a 
central economy in Africa (IMF, 2014, 2017) and also the most populous nation on the continent 
(Commonwealth, 2015). In this vein, the corporate governance environment of Nigeria represents a 
model of prevailing situations in other developing countries, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
nations – a region also comparatively noticeably budding in the neo-institutional theorisation 
literature (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Abor and Fiador, 2013; Daodu et al., 2017; Kusi et al., 2018). 
Especially, within this region, the institutional structures are densely intertwined with socio-cultural 
elements (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Mangena et al., 
2012; Adegbite, 2015; Waweru, 2014), thus representing an environment with profound implications 
for governance reforms. Further, the Nigerian corporate governance system has largely been 
subjected to varying external pressures, including global bodies, such as the IMF, rating agencies, and 
the AfDB (Adegbite et al., 2013).  
 In 2003, in line with the global trends, the first corporate governance code in Nigeria, known 
as the ‘Code of Best Practices on Corporate governance in Nigeria’ (SEC code, 2003), was initiated 
through the recommendations of the Committee on Corporate Governance, instated in 2001. This 
code (revised in 2011), spelt out the best practices to be complied with by publicly listed companies 
and other multiple stakeholder companies registered in Nigeria (SEC code, 2011). The UK Cadbury 
code (1992) and the OECD principles have mainly informed the perception of good governance 
practices in Nigeria (Okike and Adegbite, 2012). In Nigeria, for instance, ‘the committee on corporate 
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governance of public companies’ affirms one of the terms of reference in drafting the Code of Best 
Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria (SEC Code, 2003), thus:  
“To examine practices in other jurisdictions with a view to the adoption of international best 
practices in corporate governance in Nigeria” (p 2).  
This is also consistent with the rationale for the launch of the SEC code. As stated by the Committee 
for the Constitution of the SEC code (2003): 
“Companies perceived as adopting international best corporate governance practices are 
more likely to attract international investors than those whose practices are perceived to be 
below international standards” (SEC Code 2003: 2). 
Nonetheless, as Okike (2007), argues ‘whilst adherence to good corporate governance standards is 
imperative, in Nigeria, however, such code of best practices must reflect the peculiar socio-economic 
and political environment.’  
 Following the introduction of the SEC code in Nigeria in 2003, other codes of good governance 
and reforms were also launched in the Nigerian corporate environment. Some of these are the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) code (2006), National Pension Commission (PENCOM) code, and the National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) code. Also, recently, along this line, is the initiation of the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN), by the 2011 FRC Act, to draft and administer the National Code 
of Corporate Governance5. However, findings by Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) reveal overlaps in the 
recommendations of these codes. According to their study, the resultant multiplicity of the codes of 
good governance in Nigeria, created complexity (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Consequently, this 
difficulty is demonstrated, by companies, through either outright non-compliance with some of the 
provisions of these codes or selective compliances. On reflection, Nigeria has, equally, had its fair 
share of corporate scandals and fraudulent practices, despite the reforms of the last decades. For 
instance, the Nigerian subsidiary of the Cadbury confectioner (Cadbury Nigeria Plc) was involved in a 
substantial financial falsification between 2002 and 2005.6 This was attributed largely to weak 
shareholder activism and inconsistent compliance and enforcement procedures characterising the 
Nigerian corporate mechanism (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). Also, a three-year report (2014-2016) by 
the Banking and Systems Payment Department of the CBN on the incidences of banking frauds in 
Nigeria shows a significant increase in Internet and electronic frauds by individuals, which is linked to 
                                                             
5 The FRCN – National Code of Corporate Governance, 2016, <http://www.financialreportingcouncil.gov.ng/corporate-
governance/> Accessed 15-08-17. 
6 Nigeria fines Cadbury unit for false accounting. Reuters. April 11, 2008 <https://www.reuters.com/article/cadbury-
nigeria-sec-idUSL1181158820080411>Accessed 15-08-17. 
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the economic hardship in recent times (Punch, July 3, 2017).7 However, notwithstanding the localised 
causes of these challenges and misdemeanours, the corporate governance reform agenda has 
generically evolved across the globe.  
 Along this line, the perceived benefits of the Nigerian code of corporate governance, 
notwithstanding, the compatibility of such best practices, inspired primarily by developments from 
the developed contexts, within the Nigerian corporate and institutional structures, has been 
questioned (Okike, 2007). Notably, attempts at corporate governance in Nigeria, in the past decades, 
have failed to achieve the intended goals (Ahunwan, 2002; SEC code, 2011; Bello, 2016). Within this 
context, some studies have thus attempted an explication of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. 
For instance, Okike and Adegbite (2012) and Akinkoye and Olasanmi (2014) investigated the rationale 
for code creation or adoption, and level of compliance with codes of corporate governance among 
Nigeria companies, respectively, while Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) reviewed the different codes in 
Nigeria. However, “corporate governance is ultimately the outcome of interactions among multiple 
stakeholders” (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003: 449). Economic agents and social actors notably are central 
to organisational reforms (George et al., 2006; Misangyi et al., 2008). Along this line, evaluating the 
views, opinions and experiences of key social actors within organisational fields, in instituting 
corporate governance reforms, is imperative. Yet the dynamics involved in the institutionalisation of 
corporate governance reforms, within the developing institutional context, are relatively basically 
disregarded. The nascent literature, thus, reveals a lacuna with respect to assessing these 
transformational undertakings. However, the explanation of the implication of such noted profound 
social interplays, alongside the dense interlace of contextual variables for the procedural of 
institutional reforms, remains uncharted.  
 As the biggest consumer market in Africa (Commonwealth, 2015), Nigeria represents a 
concentration of economic power in Africa. A contextualisation of the corporate governance 
innovations in this setting will present a reference for the African continent and possibly the 
developing countries at large. This is important in promoting corporate viability and sustainability in 
consequently advancing economic development in these nations. This study therefore advances the 
neo-institutional theorising of corporate governance reforms in weak institutional settings such as 
Nigeria, while offering implications for similar contexts. Essentially, this should promote effective 
corporate governance improvements, accounting for the peculiarities within this developing 
institutional context.  
                                                             




Page | 10  
 
1.5 Research Aim 
Against this backdrop, this study critically investigates the corporate governance reforms’ procedures 
in the Nigerian institutional environment, with a view to understanding the implication of the 
dynamics within the developing context, for the institutionalisation of such organisational reforms. 
In line with this, the study is directed by the following research questions. 
1.6 Research Questions 
• What are the motivations for corporate governance reforms in Nigeria and how can 
institutionally driven corporate governance reforms be achieved?  
• What are the challenges (implications) of the Nigerian corporate governance system for the 
attempts at corporate governance reforms? 
•  How are corporate governance reforms ratified and regulated within the Nigerian 
institutional context? 
1.7 Research Relevance: Contributions and significance 
 First, the study is motivated by the need to advance the theorisation of institutional 
reproductions within the neo-institutionalisation space, to align with past studies (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006;  Misangyi et al., 
2008; Esharov and Smith, 2014; Tost, 2011; Hoefer and Green, 2016; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; 
Young et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2008; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Chizema and Shinozawa, 2012; 
Filatotchev et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Clarke, 2016; Haxhi and Aguilera, 2017; Imerman, 
2018). Whereas these studies have looked at institutional reproductions/change from a broad 
contextual viewpoint, this study enables a precise explanation of the procedures of organisational 
innovations, within a targeted institutional context. Thus, this study contributes theoretically, in 
essence, to the neo-institutional perspective on the institutionalisation of corporate governance 
reforms, providing insights from a maturing organisational field. Against this background, the study 
offers a model which promotes the understanding of organisational transformations, within a 
developing institutional context, such as Nigeria.  
 Second, the study contributes to the literature, in conceptualising organisational 
reforms/change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; 
Lawrence et al., 2009; Judge et al., 2010). Specifically, the study provides a bridge between the 
diffusion of practices and the actual establishment of organisational transformation, in attempts at 
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corporate governance reforms. Previous studies (Adekoya, 2011; Adewuyi and Olowookere, 2013; 
Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014; Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016; Ojeka et al., 2017) have mainly focused 
on investigating the diffusion of corporate governance principles, implementation and impact, or 
challenges to these undertakings. Thus, this study expands knowledge by enabling a systematic 
explication of the transitional phases, at institutional reforms, within the developing Sub-Saharan 
Africa organisational field. In this respect, insights regarding the motivation, challenges, legitimation 
or rationalisation, and prospects for the institutionalisation of the corporate governance reforms 
within this developing context, are enabled.  
 Third, in comparison with developed countries, corporate governance research in developing 
countries and most especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is budding within the neo-institutional framework 
(Okike, 2007; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite and Nakajima 2012). Thus, this study mitigates this 
paucity by broadening the perspective on corporate governance reforms, within this sphere. To this 
end, this study expands discussions on the alignments of national institutional contexts with attempts 
at promoting best practices in corporate governance reforms (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 
2009; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013), specifically 
in the developing country (Okike and Adegbite, 2012). This offers explicit scenarios that would 
enhance insights beyond the context of the investigation into organisational innovations, while 
providing a useful link between theory and practice. 
 Further, the study advances practice and policy in the diffusion and harmonisation of 
corporate governance principles, thus extending comparative perspectives in the international 
discourse on regulatory measures (Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Adegbite et al., 2013). A key contribution is 
in investigating the implications of the peculiarities of the emerging and developing institutional 
contexts for the widespread intentions of a universal corporate governance reform’s approach (Reed, 
2002; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; Liew, 2007; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Adekoya, 2011; 
Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Filatotchev et al., 2013; Biswas, 2015; 
Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). This research is also significant to corporate governance policy, by 
aiding the contextual analysis of good governance propositions or recommendations from the 
perspective of a developing organisational context. Hence, international bodies, policy makers and 
agencies such as the OECD, ICGN, World Bank, IMF, AfDB, the European Union (EU) and other 
transnational organisations at the forefront of corporate governance developments, are offered 
comparative perspectives on the agenda of the diffusion, convergence and/or uniformity of corporate 
governance best practices. The research is likewise relevant to corporate governance regulators, 
policy makers and practitioners in the developing countries – especially in Africa – in promoting 
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efficient and institutionally informed corporate governance reforms. Particularly, this knowledge is 
important for instituting a corporate governance system tailored to the exigencies of the Nigerian (and 
assuredly the Sub-Saharan Africa region) context, whilst also establishing an internationally accepted 
reputation. 
1.8 The Structure of the Thesis 
In addressing the research aim and objectives, the rest of this thesis is structured into seven chapters 
as follows: 
• Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theories: -  
The second chapter involves the review of the extant literature on corporate governance and 
corporate governance reforms, both theoretical and empirical. In order to achieve the in-depth 
evaluation of pertinent issues, as necessary, the chapter also promotes understanding regarding 
corporate governance mechanisms, diffusion of governance principles and corporate governance 
reforms. Proceeding within the neo-institutional theoretical framework, the chapter provides a review 
of the conceptualisation and perspectives on organisational studies and corporate governance 
reforms, in order to situate this investigation. Finally, the chapter culminates with a scrutiny of related 
studies from the developing Sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria. This extant review reveals the gap in 
knowledge, which the study attempts to bridge, in relation to past studies.  
 
• Chapter Three: Methodology: -  
The chapter discusses the methodological paradigm or approach. This includes the ontological and 
epistemological perspectives. It highlights the research technique and methods, the research design, 
in-depth interviews and archival research, and the justification for this choice. The data collection and 
data analysis procedures are also outlined.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations 
and ethical considerations, while it also provides an overview of the findings chapters. 
 
• Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven: Analysis, Findings and Discussions: -  
Chapters 4-7 of the thesis outline the findings in relation to the research aim and questions. This 
includes the relationships amongst the themes and categories emanating from the data analysis. In 
this respect, the section provides interpretations of the insights from the data analysis, which involves 
critical analysis of the relationships and trends between themes, sub-categories and categories. The 
explanations of these relationships constitute the findings, analysis and discussions. The findings are 
outlined and discussed drawing on insights from the conceptual, theoretical background to the study, 
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past studies and relevant literature. The section ends with a further discussion of the major themes 
from the findings chapters.  
 
• Chapter Eight: Conclusion Chapter: Summary of thesis and Contributions: - 
The chapter provides an account of the study in line with the findings and discussions. This involves 
the ‘meaning making’ of emerging issues and interrelationships between themes and categories 
revealed in the findings. A critical perspective on the interpretations of the trends emerging from the 
findings is situated within the relevant studies and literature to reveal the contributions. These are 
outlined as contributions to the neo-institutional theory, the corporate governance literature, and the 
practice and policy.  Also, within the chapter, the limitations of the study are outlined. In conclusion, 
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Chapter 2- Literature review 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the extant and related literature to this study. The chapter is divided 
into four parts and structured as follows. In an effort to provide a platform for the study, the first 
section (Part A) offers a review of the extant literature regarding the evolution of corporations, 
corporate governance structures, controls and reforms. The second section (Part B) provides a scrutiny 
of the corporate governance literature on the evolution and diffusion of governance principles, 
corporate governance reforms across different economic contexts, and the convergence debate. 
Proceeding within the neo-institutional theoretical framework, the third section (Part C) provides a 
critical evaluation of perspectives on organisational studies, in order to situate this investigation. This 
segment seeks to justify the adopted theoretical stance for the research. Finally, in Part D, the chapter 
culminates with a scrutiny of related studies from the developing Sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria, in 
light of the current propositions, outlining the research agenda. 
2.1        PART A:  Corporate governance and corporate governance reform: A conceptualisation 
2.1.1 The theory of the firm and the rise of corporations 
 The theory of the firm states that the firm operates to coordinate inputs in order to yield 
outputs, for the purpose of maximizing profit or more accurately, create value (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). “A firm consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction 
of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” (Coase, 1937: 393). In those cases where a very short-
term contract would be unsatisfactory, a firm is likely therefore to emerge (Coase, 1937). A firm 
therefore serves as a ‘nexus for a set of contracts’, which delineates the rights and obligations of the 
respective participants in the activities of the organisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Nonetheless this position of the theory of the firm to articulate the nature 
and purpose of the firm, the morality of the idea of the firm as a hierarchical form, has been queried 
as giving the employer a unilateral right to exert his will, over his employees (Lee, 2018).  
 Under this set of contracts, in modern corporations (firms), the entrepreneur or manager 
raises funds from investors, which in turn needs the specialised skill of the manager to generate funds 
on his investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Within the firm, the complicated market structures are 
replaced by entrepreneur coordination, which directs production (Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). Thus, instead of a host of market transactions, the defining characteristic of a firm is in the 
“team use of inputs and a centralised position of some parties in the contractual arrangements of 
other inputs” (Farrar, 2008: 32). As Jensen and Meckling (1976) further maintain, the rights and 
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behaviours of individuals in the organisation, including those of managers, will be affected through 
the contracts – implicit or explicit – and the allocation of costs and rewards among these participants 
will, in turn, be specified by these rights.  
2.1.2 The separation of ownership and control 
 The structure of modern corporations epitomises the situation of entrepreneurial 
relationships, stipulated by the theory of the firm, correspondingly (Berle and Means, 1932). The risk 
bearers (capital providers), as residual claimants, will suffer the most if the firm fails, and as a result, 
they tend to diversify their holdings across many firms (Fama, 1980; Walsh and Seward, 1990). This 
invariably leads to dispersed ownership. Such situation, as Berle and Means (1932) cited, results in the 
‘separation of ownership and control’. From this viewpoint and within the set of contracts of a firm, 
management and risk bearing – which are the functions normally attributed to the entrepreneur – are 
treated as separate factors (Fama, 1980). (As Fama (1980) declares, such diffused ownership of 
securities can be beneficial in terms of an optimal allocation of risk bearing). Hence, the capital 
providers sign a contract that specifies how such a fund will be used. However, due to the inability to 
predict future contingencies, a complete contract cannot be designed, thus resulting in the emergence 
of residual rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These rights, which give managers the power to make 
decisions on behalf of the owners (entrepreneur) about matters not stated in the contract, are thus 
inadvertently allocated to managers, as the decision makers in the corporation (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The association of the principals and the 
agents satisfies the condition described as a ‘pure agency relationship’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Such relationships, as professed, are prone to problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996). Conversely, a differing argument is given in the case of family firms, where there is a greater 
combination of ownership and control. While there is tendency for such a governance structure to be 
detrimental in the long run, large family firms may perform better in the short run, from the 
exploitation of resources and institutional voids (Peng et al., 2018). 
 In light of the agency theory, under the condition of separation of "ownership" and "control" 
and more specifically, the separation of residual risk bearing from decision functions (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b), the decision process is left in the hands of professional managers whose interests may 
not always conform to the value maximization objective of the residual claimant (shareholder) 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Myers, 1983; Lai et al., 2017). Managers 
(agents) are, thus, considered to be in the position to exploit shareholders – or lately stakeholders – 
in dispersed ownership corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998). Although 
controlling shareholders typically appear to be able to monitor managerial misalignment arising 
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from possible dissimilar interest (Bozec and Dia, 2017), this view, however, is based on an underlying 
assumption of ‘managerial opportunism’ (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Nonetheless, the separation of 
decision and risk-bearing functions persist in organisations partly because of the benefits of 
specialisation of management and partly through the common approach to controlling the problems 
caused by such a condition (Fama and Jensen (1983a). Hence, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) queried, 
‘How then do suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profit to them? or How do 
owners ensure that managers do not use the money in bad projects?’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 737). 
As La Porta et al., (2000) state, ‘corporate governance, to a large extent, is a set of mechanisms 
through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders’ (p. 4). Thus, 
from the agency theory viewpoint, the main purpose of corporate governance is to provide 
shareholders with the assurance that managers will try to achieve outcomes that are in these owners’ 
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
2.1.3 Corporate governance and good governance: An overview  
 The explanation of corporate governance has been attempted through varying descriptions. 
These differing definitions can be recognised, on the one hand, as reflecting the cross disciplinary 
nature, or on the other hand, as portraying the disparate viewpoints, on the subject matter. In this 
vein, equally, the multifaceted nature of corporate governance is indicated. For instance, the finance 
viewpoint by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is reflected in their definition which states that, “corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment” (p.737). Similarly, a strong political view is reflected in such a 
definition of corporate governance as “the structures, processes, and institutions within and around 
organisations that allocate power and resource control among participants” (Davis, 2005: 143). In this 
regard, corporate governance has defied a consensual definition, thus assuming diverse 
interpretations. However, basically, corporate governance can be viewed to represent ‘the means by 
which organisational mechanisms are structured and the processes are managed, in order to attain 
envisioned goals’. In this respect, corporate governance has simply been described as ‘the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury, 2002: 1). Regarding the central theme of this 
study – corporate governance reforms – an elaborate view by the OECD states; 
“Corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate 
affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are 
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set and the means of attaining these objectives and monitoring performance” (OECD, 1999: 
9).         
If the aforementioned definition is to be decomposed into its major constituents, corporate 
governance can be said to involve specifically the rights and responsibilities of different participants 
(actors) in line with the organisational objective(s). However, in an expansive view, the 
conceptualisation is extended beyond the organisation, its purpose or internal functions, to 
encapsulate other interfaces. For instance, such a relational view (which corresponds with the 
inclinations of this study) posits corporate governance as ‘the whole set of institutional, legal, cultural 
and other arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, 
how that control is exercised’ (Blair, 1995).  
 Similarly, as with corporate governance, the notion of ‘good’ corporate governance has 
instigated different attempts at explanation. Particularly, the term ‘good’, in this respect, tends not to 
conform to a singular description (Filatotchev et al., 2007). As Filatotchev et al. (2007: 9) assert “any 
notion of ‘good’ corporate governance certainly implies mechanisms to ensure executives respect the 
rights and interests of company stakeholders, as well as ensuring that stakeholders act responsibly 
with regard to the wealth invested in and generated by the enterprise.” Nonetheless, drawing on the 
notion of the drive for efficient organisational processes, along with conformity to institutionalised 
rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), good governance can also be considered as ‘the achievement of 
organisational proclivities in conformity with accepted social norms or set standards.’ Globally, 
international communities, such as the OECD and the World Bank have especially attempted to 
provide a template of what good corporate governance should entail (see OECD, principles of 
corporate governance, 1999, 2004). Essentially, the adoption of Transparency, Accountability, 
Responsibility, Independency, and Fairness (TARIF) principles has widely been acknowledged as the 
global best standard of corporate governance and equally Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
practices (Wibowo and Gunawan, 2015).  Nonetheless, despite the globally supported ‘good’ 
governance practice, deviations are disclosed across contexts, while the same practices that are 
considered legitimate in one community can be perceived as illegitimate in another (Lee and 
Lounsbury, 2015). Research has further advanced the understanding of why corporate governance 
practices may defer across national contexts. In this respect, Aguilera et al. (2018), suggest that as a 
firm’s governance discretion increases, deviance from established practices may occur through over 
or under conformity with prevailing governance standards. Nonetheless, in this respect, better 
corporate governance is intended to improve operating performance in several related ways:  
 1. With better oversight, managers are more likely to invest in value-maximizing projects and 
be more efficient in their operations.  
 
Page | 18  
 
 2. Fewer resources will be wasted on non-productive activities (perquisites consumption by the 
management, empire-building, shirking).  
 3. Better governance reduces the incidence of tunnelling, asset-stripping, related party 
transactions, and other ways of diverting firm assets or cash flows from equity holders.  
 4. If investors are better protected and bear less risk of losing their assets, they should be 
willing to accept a lower return on their investment. This will translate into a lower cost of capital for 
firms and hence higher income.  
 5. The availability of external finance may also be improved, allowing firms to undertake an 
increased number of profitable growth opportunities (Love, 2011: 45). 
2.1.4 Corporate governance mechanisms and corporate controls  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that the problem of inducing the “agent” towards 
maximizing the “principal’s” welfare is general and exists at every management level in firms. From 
this standpoint, financial economists argue that much of the subject of corporate governance 
concerns the constraints that managers put upon themselves or the shareholders put upon them, in 
order to ensure that their funds are not misused (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Clarke, 2007). For 
instance, as La Porta et al. (2000), states, ‘corporate governance, to a large extent, is a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the 
insiders’ (p.4). Although, the view that corporate governance can sufficiently guarantee outsider 
investors such protection from expropriation by insiders, is arguable. To this extent, to guarantee that 
providers of finance obtain a return on their investment will involve the principal establishing 
appropriate measures (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 In this respect, corporate governance mechanisms do involve some measures that are put in 
place to align the divergent interests of providers of capital (investors or stakeholders) and managers, 
in a firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Kumar and Zattoni, 
2017). On the other hand, these measures encompass frameworks which can aid the reduction of 
information asymmetry and alleviate agency problems (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). There has also been evidence that profitability can increase when internal and external 
mechanisms are present (Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Equally, most governance research has 
conceptualised governance mechanisms as deterrents to managerial self-interest, underlying agency 
theorisation (Daily et al., 2003). Along this line, corporate governance mechanisms embody those 
structures that ensure that firms are run effectively to maximize shareholders’ value and thus basically 
involve establishing appropriate controls (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Aguilera, 2005).  These are specified to involve internal and external mechanisms in the form of 
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corporate and market controls (Walsh and Seward, 1990). In a public company, the Board of Directors 
(BoD) is technically responsible for the design and implementation of the internal mechanisms (Walsh 
and Seward, 1990). These measures usually include efficient board committees, effective 
compensation contracts, internal controls, adequate disclosures, etc. which provide active monitoring 
of executives (Dalton et al., 1998; Weir et al., 2002; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012; Bozec and Dia, 
2017); however, external control (market for corporate control), such as hostile takeovers, product or 
labour market competition threat of legal sanctions, and other regulatory measures, are imposed on 
companies to either discipline executives or complement internal control measures (Manne, 1965; 
Fama, 1980; Bhagat et al., 1990; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Goldstein, 2000; Dedman, 2002; Aguilera, 
2005).  
 In this respect, there are some agreements that corporate governance mechanisms can serve 
as deterrents to the expropriation of outside shareholders (Westphal, 1998). Poorly performing 
managers can be disciplined through threat of displacement imposed by the market for corporate 
control (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). At one end of the debate for corporate control are the external 
measures, such as hostile takeover. Hostile takeover, as a means of corporate control, can help 
discipline or replace managers that fail to utilise company assets, effectively (Manne, 1965; Jensen, 
1993; Clarke, 2007). In addition, external monitoring mechanisms, such as leverage and firm size, 
also influence earnings management practices (Wimelda and Chandra, 2018). As proponents of hostile 
takeovers argue, such a threat will make erring executives act in the interest of shareholders (Manne, 
1965; Jensen, 1986; Goldstein, 2000), as it serves as an efficient deterrent to managers, if they become 
entrenched (Manne, 1965; Jensen, 1986). In addition to the market controls, the implication of 
internal mechanisms for relieving agency crisis has also been professed (Blair, 1995). For instance, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued for the establishment of appropriate incentives for the agent. As 
they stated, incurring such costs designed to limit aberrant action by the agent can enable the principal 
to limit deviations from his interest.  Certain mechanisms, such as concentrated shareholdings by 
institutions or by block-holders and outsider representation on corporate boards, are also employed 
to increase managerial monitoring and so improve firm performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
Further, according to the logic of agency theory, when a firm’s board is composed of outside directors 
who are neither officers of the firm nor have substantial linkages to the firm, then corporate 
performance should be higher (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). However, the debate about the degree of 
effectiveness of these measures is still ongoing (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Blair and Stout, 2001; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Bosse and Phillips, 2016).  For instance, a meta-analysis of the impact of 
independent outside directors on firm performance does not show consistency with such a hypothesis 
about an increase in performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton and Dalton, 2011). On the other hand, 
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while corporate governance mechanisms inarguably enable some level of protection to be dispersed 
among shareholders, to some extent, their adequacy is contested.  
2.2 PART B:  Corporate governance reforms across the globe 
2.2.1 Legal regulations and corporate governance   
 The legal environment – described by both legal rules and their enforcement – are particularly 
important for the size and extent of a country's capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997). The relative 
effectiveness of national and international authorities over company sustainability practices is 
influenced by the legal system in place and needs to be considered in policymaking (Hörisch et al., 
2017). The corporate governance system of countries is primarily connected to the legal framework 
and company law. ‘Most countries have adopted their legal systems through occupation or 
colonization by one of the European powers to which they owe the origin of their laws’ (La Porta et 
al., 1997: 1131-2). Common law represents English law, made by judges and subsequently 
incorporated into legislature (La Porta et al., 1997). French, German and Scandinavian laws, on the 
other hand, are part of the scholar and legislator-made civil law tradition (David and Brierley, 1985; La 
Porta et al., 1997). All outside investors need to have their rights protected, as without this no rational 
person will finance a firm without a strong reputation (La Porta et al., 2000). As specifically noted:  
“When investors finance firms, they typically obtain certain rights or powers that are generally 
protected through the enforcement of regulations and laws. Some of these rights include 
disclosure and accounting rules, which provide investors with the information they need to 
exercise other rights. Protected shareholder rights include those to receive dividends on pro-
rata terms, to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders' meetings, to subscribe to new 
issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, to sue directors or the majority for 
suspected expropriation, to call extraordinary shareholders' meetings, etc. Laws protecting 
creditors largely deal with bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, and include measures 
that enable creditors to repossess collateral, to protect their seniority, and to make it harder 
for firms to seek court protection in reorganization” (La Porta et al., 2000 pp.6-7).  
 The nature of the obligations that managers have to the financiers, and the differences in the 
interpretation of these obligations, usually dictate the variations in corporate governance systems 
across countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In many countries, the possibility of the expropriation of 
minority shareholders and creditors is usually present, so investors’ protection thus becomes crucial 
(La Porta et al., 2000). In countries in which investors’ protection is weak, ownership concentration 
leads to efficient governance mechanisms (Pisano et al., 2017). Nonetheless, the expropriation of 
minority shareholders should be prevented by the prevailing legal mechanisms (Johnson et al., 2000). 
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A good legal environment raises the willingness of potential financiers to surrender their funds in 
exchange for securities, as it indicates their protection against expropriation by entrepreneurs; it 
hence expands the scope of capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997). One possibility of the critical 
elements that have given the “common law” nations a comparative advantage over the “civil law” 
world, is that substantive differences in corporate law may matter far less than differences in 
enforcement practice (Coffee, 1999). Also, Turk Ariss (2016) find that the common versus civil law 
distinction does matter for firm financing in developing countries but in the opposite direction 
previously documented for developed countries. In developing countries, stronger laws are associated 
with greater debt financing, as due to less efficient capital markets, firms are less able to resort to 
equity issuance compared to developed countries (Turk Ariss, 2016). 
  In turn, the strength of the incentives to assert legal remedies rather than the availability of 
legal remedies themselves, may determine enforcement (Coffee, 1999). Good legal rules should be 
those that can be enforced by a country (La Porta et al., 2000). The strategy for reform is not to create 
an ideal set of rules, but rather to enact the rules that can be enforced within the existing structure 
(La Porta et al., 2000). However, richer countries are usually found to enforce laws better than poorer 
countries (La Porta et al., 1997). In developing markets, the costs of interpreting statutes and verifying 
the circumstances of specific cases are usually high (Glaeser et al., 2001). Therefore, in such a context, 
enforcement by regulators may then be a more efficient way to protect property rights, as judges may 
not be sufficiently motivated to enforce legal rules (Glaeser et al., 2001).  
2.2.2 Evolution of codes of good governance and reforms   
 Codes of good governance are described as a set of ‘best practice’ recommendations, which 
serve as regulatory measures, generally employed to address deficiencies in shareholders’ protection 
in a country’s legal or corporate governance system (Dalton et al., 1998; Cuervo, 2002; Chizema, 2008; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Krenn, 2014). These codes specify the 
structures and processes by which good governance is achieved (Talaulicar et al., 2017). They are 
usually regarded as negotiations between multiple stakeholders, such as states and the investors, 
mainly targeted at improving shareholders’ rights (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000; Fernandez-Rodriguez et 
al., 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). As Daily et al. (2003) assert, 
such measures often serve as regulatory controls that are typically activated when internal 
mechanisms for controlling managerial opportunism are inadequate. In accordance with agency 
theory, codes of good governance should serve as part of those external mechanisms that will align 
the interests of the executives with those of the owners (Krenn, 2014). For instance, following the 
agency theory tenets, corporate governance codes require the BoD to be able to regulate company 
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management, by playing an active supervisory and independent role (Cuomo et al., 2016). Codes of 
good governance ultimately attempt to improve the firm’s overall corporate governance, especially 
when other mechanisms fail to guarantee adequate protection of shareholders’ rights (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Thus, they have become popular as means of improving accountability and 
transparency in corporations (Mallin, 2013; Cuomo et al., 2016).  
 The worldwide creation and/or diffusion of codes of good governance, varies across countries 
in their years of issuance, mode of adoption and implementation (See Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009). There emerge two major approaches to implementation 
or compliance with corporate governance codes. At one end of the debate is the argument for a soft 
law or self-regulation alternative to corporate governance practices (de Bos et al., 2018), while at the 
other end of the debate is the advocacy for the rule-based, statutory and more legislated system of 
improvement to corporate governance practices (Proimos, 2005; Mallin, 2013). The soft law or 
voluntary method of implementation normally represents the more popular approach (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The implementation of these codes is mostly either through the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach or through legislation, as in the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Dewing and Russell, 
2004; MacNeil and Xiao, 2006; Seidl et al., 2013). The diffusion of corporate governance codes of 
conduct has equally precipitated debates regarding the appropriate mode of implementation within 
the developing African context (Nakpodia et al., 2016).  
 The UK corporate governance environment, with its ‘comply or explain’8 principle, introduced 
through the Cadbury code (1992), typified the principle-based approach to good governance (Denis 
and McConnell, 2003; Jones and Pollitt, 2004). This involves the voluntary ‘comply or explain’ principle, 
which represents the prevalent mode of implementation of these codes in most countries (Dedman, 
2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Jones and Pollitt, 2004). On the other hand, the US is often cited as 
an example of a context with a rule based, regulated approach to corporate governance reforms, 
especially with the passage of the SOX in 2002 (Jones and Pollitt, 2004; Balgobin, 2008; Gupta et al., 
2013). The basis for the principle-based approach is cited as allowing firms some flexibility to choose 
the corporate governance structure that best fosters their objectives (Cuomo et al., 2016). According 
to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) UK, Corporate Governance code (2016),  
“It is important that companies provide clear and meaningful explanations when they choose 
not to comply with one of the provisions of the code, so that their shareholders can understand 
the reasons for doing so and judge whether they are content with the approach the company 
                                                             
8 As stated by the FRC, 2010 “The UK Corporate Governance Code identifies good governance practices, but companies can 
choose to adopt a different approach if that is more appropriate to their circumstances” (FRC, 2010:5). 
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has taken. There may be many good reasons why a company may choose not to comply and 
an explanation does not imply poor governance.”9  
This approach is thus expected to provide a means of instituting a standard for corporate governance, 
whilst also allowing companies to avoid inflexible corporate governance performances (Dewing and 
Russell, 2004; MacNeil and Xiao, 2006; Seidl et al., 2013). But firms aiming to decrease the monitoring 
capacity of the board at times are found to use the code flexibility opportunistically, which is followed 
by subsequent underperformance (Shaukat and Trojanowski, 2018). Also, there has been reported 
misuse of the explanation of non-compliance by companies in the UK recently, whereby rhetorical 
construction seems more inclined towards misleading explanations (Shrives and Brennan, 2017). 
Nonetheless, this flexibility is expected within specified recommendations and intended uniformity of 
governance principles (Solomon, 2013). This should engender countries’ compliance with the 
universally acclaimed good governance practices and unified corporate governance structures 
(Soederberg, 2003; Khanna et al., 2006). 
 As aforementioned, international institutions, such as the OECD, World Bank etc., have been 
at the forefront of promoting the creation and worldwide diffusion of corporate governance best 
practices (Cuomo et al., 2016). After 2004, as a reaction to corporate governance scandals, some 
institutions – such as the OECD and International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) – started to 
revise their codes or to issue codes targeted at different types of firms (Cuomo et al., 2016). However, 
these international bodies have equally been cited as promoting the Anglo-American system of 
corporate governance (Soederberg, 2003). As a result, the current good governance codes are 
commonly held as containing a wide variety of traditional shareholder model’s (market-centred) good 
governance tenets (Krenn, 2014; Rhee, 2018). This normally include provisions regarding board 
composition, director and auditor independence, treatment of shareholders, executive compensation 
schemes, expansive financial reporting and disclosures, among many other topics (Krenn, 2014). 
Hence, these provisions principally build upon the agency theory logic, a central principle of the Anglo-
American style of corporate governance (Krenn, 2014).  
2.2.3 Diffusion of corporate governance codes: Towards efficiency and legitimation rationales 
 The upsurge in governance codes has focused the awareness of policy-makers, practitioners 
and researchers on improvements in corporate governance mechanisms (Van den Berghe and 
DeRidder, 1999). As Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), state, ‘the development and adoption of a 
                                                             
9 FRC <https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code> 
Accessed online 15-01-2017. 
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code of good governance is defined as a country’s innovation signalling the country’s commitment to 
improve its corporate governance system’ (p. 416). The significant rise in governance reforms is also 
noted as a wider implication of the increase in globalisation (such as trade liberalization and 
internationalization of economies) (Coffee, 2005; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Undermined by 
the worldwide incidences of corporate scandals, proper functioning of governance systems also 
becomes vital for global capital markets’ integration (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Thus, the 
creation of corporate governance codes can involve three hierarchical levels: international, national 
and individual firm level (Cuomo et al., 2016).  
 Historically, organisational theorists have argued that the adoption of an innovation or a new 
practice is generally motivated by efficiency or legitimation rationales (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997; Strang and Macy, 2001). Similarly, in a survey across 
different European countries, the creation and adoption of codes and subsequent reforms were found 
to be induced by efficiency and/or legitimation pressures regarding good governance practices 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Equally, in developing countries, the 
corporate governance code issuances have been cited as being similarly prompted (Okike and 
Adegbite, 2012; Waweru, 2014). Particularly in Nigeria, the launch of the CBN and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC, 2003) codes are stipulated to be inspired by the efficiency and 
legitimation rationale, respectively (Okike and Adegbite, 2012). To this end, corporate governance 
reforms are, basically, considered as the adoption or development of codes of good governance, 
providing means of improvement (and/or legitimation) of a country’s corporate governance system 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). 
Nonetheless, such corporate governance structures promoted in the Anglo-American system of 
corporate governance are not found to foster many performance related results in the African context 
(Kusi et al., 2018).  
2.2.3.1  Efficiency perspective 
 Efficiency, simply defined, is ‘the quality of doing something well and effectively’ (Longman, 
2009). Becht et al. (2002) and Murphy and Topyan (2005) assert that a corporate charter is regarded 
as efficient only if it yields the highest possible pay-out for all the parties involved. Agency theory 
posits that due to the separation of ownership from control, outside investors (shareholders) are 
susceptible to being expropriated by the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). 
Therefore, managers may not always act in the interest of shareholders (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen, 1986). From this viewpoint, corporate governance usually entails 
the quest for controls that would secure the investments of the outside (dispersed) fund providers 
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(owners) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). Along this line, corporate governance 
advancements have similarly emphasised the improvements to such mechanisms.  
 As efficiency thesis posits, organisations as rational actors may be inclined to adopt a practice, 
in order to receive the gains or benefits that may accrue from such innovation (Thompson, 1967; Blau 
and Schoenherr, 1971; Strang and Macy, 2001; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). In light of the efficiency 
thesis, in relation to codes issuance and governance reforms, Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), define codes 
of good governance as the provision of best practice recommendations regarding board 
characteristics, in order to compensate for deficiencies in the legal system regarding investors’ 
protection. Also, these codes of good governance are described as an “attempt to improve a firm’s 
overall corporate governance, …to guarantee adequate protection of shareholders’ rights” (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004: 418). There are, however, generally mixed results in studies investigating 
the effect of codes in guaranteeing the efficiency of corporate governance and firm performance (see 
Bhatt and Bhatt, 2017; Zorn et al., 2017). In this sense, underlying these recommendations are 
basically the arguments to deliver systematic oversight functions in aligning the interests of executives 
with those of the shareholders, ultimately for accountability purposes (Monks and Minow, 2004; 
Aguilera, 2005). Thus, efficiency, with regard to corporate governance reforms, can be considered to 
relate to these expected improvements, from such adoptions of codes.  
2.2.3.2  Legitimation perspective 
 Suchman (1995) describes legitimation as the process whereby an organisation justifies to an 
ordinate system its right to exist. “Legitimacy is thus a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 547). The legitimacy thesis on innovation 
diffusion suggests that practices are adopted because of their emergent ‘taken-for-grantedness’ that 
is socially expected (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008: 2). In this respect, recently more attention has been 
focused on investigating the role of social spectators or evaluators in legitimacy judgments (Tost, 
2011; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Hoefer and Green, 2016). Signalling effects for companies more 
committed to transparency generally indicate positive reactions to declarations of compliance. 
(Martinez- Blasco et al., 2017). However, such signalling effects no longer make sense 
once corporate governance reports are mandatory (Martinez-Blasco et al., 2017). Thus, while 
legitimacy is possessed objectively, it is still created subjectively (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 
1995). Nevertheless, while corporate governance reforms are intended to provide efficiency, in line 
with the legitimacy theory, they are also expected to provide a form of rationalisation of a country’s 
corporate governance system. In this light, the legitimacy of codes of corporate governance thus 
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derives, in part, from the fact that they represent what is usually considered “best practices”, 
particularly universally (Seidl et al., 2013). The latter will ensue by creating the perception of 
compliance with generally acceptable standards or ‘doing the right thing’ (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  
 From the aforementioned viewpoint, corporate governance innovations have adopted a 
global perspective. Diffusion theory has generally not enabled explicit accounts of the role of local 
pressures, in shaping attempts at improved corporate governance practices (Westphal et al., 1997; 
Claessens et al., 1999b; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Hermes et al., 2007). There is a general underlying 
assumption about the unhindered integration of these propositions of ‘good’ governance practices, 
thus the emergent comparability across national contexts. Notwithstanding, beyond the international 
(universal) motivations, the endorsement of these propositions within different institutional contexts 
is also noted as integral, in such organisational reform schemes (Coglianese, 2007; Shipilov et al., 2010; 
Tost, 2011; Filatotchev et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2017). To this end, a distinction is specified in the 
literature regarding the global requirement of good practices (international legitimation) and the 
involvement of pressures and influences within national contexts, in corporate governance 
performances (local legitimation). As Das et al. (2015) specifically noted, in Bangladesh, the adoption 
of codes of corporate governance is negatively impacted on by the form of ownership in listed 
companies. Mainly, in the developing contexts, ownership structure of corporations, and social and 
political structures evidently have significant influences on corporate governance and the 
implementation of innovations (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Lodh et al., 2014; Humphries and Whelan, 
2017).  
2.2.4 Implication of codes of corporate governance across the globe: Shareholder and 
stakeholder-oriented countries  
 
An overview 
 The literature on the worldwide diffusion of codes of good governance and the 
implementation of corporate governance reforms, has predominantly been patterned into two major 
divides. These are based on their corporate governance system, i.e. shareholder (market-based) and 
stakeholder (bank-based) models, on the one hand (Cuervo, 2002; Murphy and Topyan, 2005; 
Hoskisson et al., 2018), or on their legal system and corporate finance, such as common law and civil 
law - ‘long- term investors - systems - countries’ (La Porta et al., 2000; Murphy and Topyan, 2005; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Along this line, the international 
comparison of corporate governance culture generally involves the comparison of the UK and US on 
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the one hand and Germany and Japan on the other, as prototypes of common law (market-based or 
shareholder) economies and civil law (bank-based or stakeholder) economies, respectively. Thus, 
most country level investigations into the diffusion of codes and corporate governance reforms have 
also naturally been based on these clusters (see La Porta et al. 2000; Kaen, 2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Dore, 2005; Murphy and Topyan, 2005; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Harrigan, 2014). Studies 
have shown that bank-based economies adopt good governance innovations more as a symbolic 
rationale (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). On the other hand, 
market-based countries initiate corporate governance reforms mostly based on an efficiency rationale 
(Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Just as their legal systems do (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000), corporate 
governance systems in developing countries have usually followed the ideology of their developed 
colonial countries. In this respect, the adoption of corporate governance reforms, in a context such as 
Nigeria, has thus evolved in line with the UK prototype, as a former colony, and equally the universal 
trends (Ahunwan, 2002; Okike and Adegbite, 2012). Noticeably, the newly released exposure draft of 
the Nigerian corporate governance code, is principally focused on protecting shareholders and 
significantly the principles are targeted at improving the role of the BoD in corporate accountability 
(Nigerian code of corporate governance, 2018 draft).  
  
2.2.4.1  Corporate governance reforms in shareholder countries  
 In the UK, the Cadbury code (1992) was introduced as a response to public outcry over cases 
of fraud and financial misdemeanour in the early 1990 (Dedman, 2002). In line with this, the Cadbury 
code provides guidelines for best practices aimed at board’s and director’s independence, to which all 
UK-listed organisations are expected to conform (Daily et al., 2003). Essentially, the efficiency criteria, 
with respect to corporate governance reforms, relate to the proposed intention of these reforms 
towards: the protection of shareholders (investors) rights, restructuring the BoD for effective 
oversight function and for firms’ accountability (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005). Following the Cadbury 
code (1992), other corporate governance codes were also introduced into the UK corporate 
governance system. These include: The Hampel report (1998); The Turnbull report (1999); The Higgs 
report (2003); The Tyson report (2003); The combined code (2003, 2006); The Smith Report (2003) 
etc. (Keenan, 2004). In this respect, the major reforms in the UK corporate governance – which 
triggered similar reforms in many other countries – as targeted by the recommendations of these 
codes, broadly relate to: 
• ‘Comply or explain’ principle. 
• Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Duality. 
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• Creating board independence (emphasising having Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) as part of 
the board). 
• Formulation of and increasing the effectiveness of board committees (e.g. Audit committee; 
Remuneration committee; Nomination committee etc.). 
• The role and responsibility of institutional investors in promoting good governance in 
companies. 
• Effective directors’ remuneration.  
• Improving internal control.  
(Dedman, 2002; Weir et al., 2002; Solomon, 2010) 
 
In this respect, evidently these recommendations emphasise the importance of separating the role of 
the CEO and the Chairman (CEO Duality). The principles likewise stress having a sufficient number of 
NEDs on the board, which could have a significant positive impact on the board’s effectiveness; also, 
the importance of having board committees is highlighted, especially in the Cadbury report (1992) 
(Weir et al., 2002). The need to avoid excessive remuneration of company executives and relate 
payment to performance also forms part of the focus of the reforms, particularly the Greenbury report 
(1995). The Turnbull report, on the other hand, focuses on reviewing the effectiveness of internal 
control and providing a frame of reference in this regard (Turnbull Report, 1999), while the combined 
code also re-emphasises the need for accounting and audit committees (Solomon, 2010). In addition, 
in all the UK corporate governance recommendations, prominence is placed on maintaining a 
voluntary approach to corporate governance, where executive actions are guided by principle rather 
than rule (Dewing and Russell, 2004). 
 In this line, although it has been contested whether corporate governance structures promote 
shareholders or stakeholders value maximization or not (Kusi et al., 2018; Zhong et al., 2017), 
nonetheless corporate governance reforms in the shareholder context are noted to relate primarily 
to accountability, shareholders’ value and firm performance (Mallin, 2013). Against this background, 
the evaluation of corporate reforms is also reported to be based on the impact on firm performance 
(Solomon, 2010). Research into corporate governance reforms in the UK and US has thus mainly 
focused on issues relating to improvement to corporate governance internal mechanisms (Weir et al., 
2002). Some studies find that the recommendations of the Cadbury code and the combined code 
produced significant changes in board related issues in the UK (Laing and Weir, 1999; Dedman, 2002). 
They discover that since the Cadbury code, the number of NEDs on the board of UK quoted companies 
has increased. Their findings also show that increases in sub-committees and audit remuneration are 
reported, while CEO duality is found to have reduced (Laing and Weir, 1999). While in the UK corporate 
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governance codes and their recommendations have received wide acceptance and compliance 
(Dedman, 2002; Dewing and Russell, 2004; Sheridan et al., 2006), this is not found to automatically 
reinforce firm performance. For example, no better performances are found in companies that 
completely comply with the recommendations of the Cadbury code, than in companies with partial 
compliance (Weir et al., 2002). Also, other studies in relation to the impact of the reforms on company 
performance have shown mixed results. For instance, while Laing and Weir (1999) find a negative 
relationship between the increase in board independence and firm performance, Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990) do not find any relationship between an increase in director’s independence and 
firm performance. Nonetheless, Peasnell et al. (2005) investigated the impact of outside directors on 
earnings management in UK firms. They find that an increase in NEDs on the board is negatively 
proportionate to the likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals in order to 
avoid reporting losses. Also, Dedman (2002) examined how agency problems may have been 
mitigated by corporate governance, upon compliance with the Cadbury Code. While Dedman’s study 
does not find any empirical evidence of an association between board structure and firm value, there 
is some evidence that compliance with the Cadbury recommendations enhances board oversight 
(Dedman, 2002). Nonetheless, a study by Katmon and Farooque (2017) reveals an emerging trend of 
the internal governance mechanisms, in lessening earnings management, being outperformed by the 
disclosure quality.  
 In the US, on the other hand, the SOX, enacted in 2002, just like the Cadbury code, was 
launched following cases of corporate scandals10, particularly Enron’s collapse (Cuomo et al., 2016). 
The SOX is considered the most extensive set of business regulation in the US since 1934 (Murphy and 
Topyan, 2005). The SOX and other regulations have been targeted at internal control, enhancing the 
validity of financial information, making public boards more independent (Harp et al., 2014). Alongside 
this is improving management oversight, external auditing and corporate governance practices (Cohen 
et al., 2010).  In the US, the SOX is considered to have resulted in the establishment of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which allows new funding for the SEC and helps to safeguard 
stock investment (Murphy and Topyan, 2005). Harp et al. (2014) investigated the impact of the SOX 
and other standards and regulations enacted in the US from the early 2000s, on the practice in relation 
to the quality of disclosure, in the pre- and post-regulation period. They find that following the 
enactment of the SOX and emergence of more stringent corporate standards, the corporate 
information/disclosures become more consistent (Harp et al., 2014). Cohen et al. (2010) on the other 
hand, studied the effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms on the interaction of auditors 
                                                             
10 Most especially, the Act emerged as a reaction to the Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen cases of corporate 
impropriety in the US, in 2001, which were widely attributed to corporate governance failures in these companies. 
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with the audit committees, board and internal auditors, and the general effect on the audit process. 
They find that auditors report that the corporate governance environment improved considerably in 
the post-SOX era, with audit committees being more active and diligent.  Their investigation shows 
that differences in corporate governance determine the levels of quality of disclosures in the pre-
regulation period, while with SOX and the emergence of more stringent corporate standards, the 
information environment becomes more consistent.  
 Generally, in fostering the protection of (dispersed) shareholders, corporate governance 
reforms in market-based corporate governance contexts (such as the UK and US) are directed 
primarily at efficiency motives (see Kishore, 2017; Katmon and Farooque, 2017; Price et al., 2018). For 
instance, Weir et al. (2002) discover that several reports on the governance of UK companies (e.g. 
Cadbury, Hampel, Greenbury) have focused attention on the importance of the internal governance 
mechanisms, particularly board structures and board sub-committees. 
    2.2.4.2        Corporate governance reforms: Perspective from stakeholder countries 
 In contrast to shareholder systems, studies have revealed that most corporate governance 
innovations in stakeholder-oriented countries are mostly inclined towards the legitimation of 
corporate governance practices (Kaen, 2003; Dore, 2005; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Thus, corporate 
governance reforms in the stakeholder environments, such as Germany and Japan, have likewise 
mimicked the tenets of the prevalent shareholder model (Schilling, 2001; Kaen, 2003; Riehmer and 
Hemmelrath, 2003; Cromme, 2005; Nakamura, 2006). For instance, the improvements in the German 
governance structure reflect the main recommendations of the SOX, such as the oversight of auditors 
and corporate governance at listed companies (Cromme, 2005). Prior to this period, corporate 
governance issues were of secondary importance in Germany, as German companies relied mainly on 
funding through retained earnings and loans, resulting in a strong interdependence of industry and 
bank (Cromme, 2005). For instance, as Cromme (2005) asserts, the introduction of the German 
corporate governance code has marked the beginning of the modernisation of the German corporate 
governance system. The introduction of the law on control and transparency in business – known as 
KonTraG – in 1996, in the wake of the advancing globalisation of the economy, marked the beginning 
of such revolution in the German corporate governance system (Cromme, 2005). In this respect, the 
focus on shareholders’ interest has become increasingly prominent, with the emergence of active 
institutional investors (Schilling, 2001). An empirical analysis of German listed firms over the period 
2002-2012, finds a higher level of compliance, which significantly increases shareholder value 
(Kaspereit et al., 2017). 
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 The German reform which requires publicly traded companies to provide on a yearly basis a 
declaration of compliance and/or an explanation of any noncompliance (comply or explain), provided 
a statutory basis for the German corporate governance (Riehmer and Hemmelrath, 2003; Cromme, 
2005). The launch of the code is considered a major advancement in the German corporate 
governance practice, especially in the improvement of investors’ protection and the development of 
the capital market, as opposed to the usual dominance of bank or creditors in the system (Cromme, 
2005); however, the German corporate governance system is still considered a prototype of 
stakeholder orientation (Bottenberg et al., 2017). In this regard, the reform has also fostered the 
increase in international competition for investment (Schilling, 2001; Riehmer and Hemmelrath, 2003; 
Cromme, 2005). Specifically, the code serves as a guideline to both German and international 
investors, setting out a transparent and comprehensive image of the German corporate governance 
system (Riehmer and Hemmelrath, 2003; Cromme, 2005). As a voluntary set of rules, adopting the 
‘comply or explain’ principle, the code has helped in identifying the level of compliance and the extent 
of divergences (Riehmer and Hemmelrath, 2003) towards fostering a culture of transparency, 
especially in capital market dealings (Riehmer and Hemmelrath, 2003; Cromme, 2005). In this respect, 
the German corporate governance ‘Codex’ is cited to help fulfil regulatory and data requirements to 
identify and estimate risk issues, leading to increased risk awareness (Michelberger, 2017). 
  Also, the Japanese corporate governance reforms have largely resulted in eliminating the 
prevalence of Japanese banks, thus giving individuals greater choices in investing, by catering more 
for the needs of public investors (Kaen, 2003; Nakamura, 2006). Like Germany, Japanese banks had 
considerable dominance in the Japan corporate governance environment, as both the major creditors 
and the shareholders of many of their client firms. However, due to implementation of the various 
market-based corporate governance practices and reporting requirements reform, the over-
dependence on banks dwindled (Nakamura, 2006). This is purported to have changed distributional 
outcomes by favouring shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders (Dore, 2005). Likewise, the 
Japanese government implemented several capital market liberalization measures facilitating firms to 
access public capital markets (Nakamura, 2006).  
 In line with this, the Japanese reforms resulted in the removal of restrictions that prevented 
banks, insurance companies, and investment houses from competing with one another (Kaen, 2003). 
Also, the reforms gave individuals greater choice in investing, by catering for the needs of public 
investors, as opposed to the survival of the keiretsu11, while eliminating the supremacy of Japanese 
                                                             
11 “The keiretsu is a network of affiliated companies (industrial grouping) formed around a central company or bank and 
connected through cross-ownership and relational contracting” (Kaen, 2003: 199). 
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banks in the corporate governance system (Kaen, 2003). For example, firms can in principle issue 
straight (unsecured) corporate bonds without collateral, which was unacceptable in the 1990s before 
the reforms (Nakamura, 2006). Such adoption of stock option plans in the Japanese context was, 
nonetheless, not found to result in much improvement in firm performance (Hasegawa et al., 2017). 
However, one of the main impacts of the reforms was reflected in the increased protection of 
investors’ rights among firms, through information disclosure and transparency (Nakamura, 2006). In 
Japan, as a measure to improve the disclosure of relevant information for investors, many aspects of 
the commercial code, the Securities Exchange Law and other laws were also revised. All these reforms 
have contributed towards the orientation in increased shareholders value (Schilling, 2001). Against 
these insights, corporate governance reforms across the globe are considered to basically mirror 
attempts at the homogeneity of practices and systems, in line with the market-based (shareholder) 
governance structure. 
2.2.5 Convergence or divergence view of corporate governance reforms and practices?  
 In light of the foregoing, the stipulated worldwide convergence of corporate governance 
practice has triggered divergent debates among scholars. These relate notably to views regarding a 
shift towards the Anglo-American (shareholder value) model of corporate governance practices (see 
Van den Berghe, 2002; Toms and Wright, 2005; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed, 2009; Krenn, 2016). The proponents of such convergence thesis have claimed that 
convergence of corporate governance systems is inevitable. Convergence, in the context of corporate 
governance, refers to increasing isomorphism in the governance practices of public corporations from 
different countries (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). One major case for convergence is that, despite 
emphasised institutional differences among recent scholarship, the global competition has forced 
convergence (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). Further Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that 
the trend in corporate governance, since the nineteenth century, indicates a deeper tendency towards 
convergence, in corporate governance (practice), capital market and law, among countries across the 
globe. However, in contrast, factors inhibiting convergence are, in turn, found to be related to 
fundamental divergences between the major legal systems of the world and the political power, 
development of capital markets and the acceptance of the stakeholder model (Reid, 2003). 
 As aforementioned, such drive towards convergence is, however, cited to be promoted by 
transnational organisations such as the OECD, ICGN, World Bank, among others, at the forefront of 
the campaign for the adoption of corporate governance best practices (Soederberg, 2003; Khanna et 
al., 2006). Such homogeneity is contended to be the only outcome, as a sturdy alternative to the US 
(shareholder) model of governance has, generally, not succeeded (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). 
Similarly, Guillen (2000) states that the introduction of the international standards and the drive 
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towards convergence have reflected a shift towards the promotion of the Anglo-American or ‘market-
oriented’ system of corporate governance. However, the study further argues that countries might 
develop governance models that complement their laws, institution, politics and positions in the 
global economy (Guillen, 2000). Equally, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) state that hindrances in national 
corporate governance systems may prevent such a shift towards a single system of governance 
practice. They posit that countries have different corporate structures, which are influenced by the 
systems that were in existence earlier (noted as path dependence) (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). In 
addition, corporate rules, within institutional contexts, are acknowledged to strongly influence 
corporate structure. These corporate rules, likewise, depend on the existing corporate structure in 
such contexts (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). In a similar vein, Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) cite that 
although convergence in capital and product markets may have generated some changes in corporate 
governance systems in countries across the world, these changes are however limited by institutional 
‘embeddedness’ and polity. Thus, scholars have argued that, rather than convergence, adoption of 
best practices by countries may be creating ‘hybrid’ practices (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009; Adnan 
and Tandigalla, 2017). Thus, the imposition of new corporate governance practices is hypothesised 
not to yield the intended policy or performance outcome, where the ideal corporate governance may 
rather be firm or institution-specific. Other researchers have also contended that increasing 
uniformity of practice is likely to lead to hybridization, rather than result in convergence (Pieterse, 
1994), whereas economic institutions merely tend to adapt foreign practices to fit local institutional 
contexts (Djelic, 1998; Vogel, 2003; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Khanna et al., 2006; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). 
Also, as Krenn (2016) indicates, the extant review of the literature does not support either the 
predictions of convergence or divergence advocacy. Instead, the findings reveal that within and 
between corporate governance systems, convergence and divergence dynamics can coexist and lead 
to increased heterogeneity in firms (Krenn, 2016). 
 Thus, contingent on these positions are reflections of the institutional alliances of corporate 
governance practices. Legitimacy theorists (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) posit that a social 
contract exists between the business organisation and its respective society. As La Porta et al. (2000) 
assert, common law countries tend to have the strongest protection of outside investors – both 
shareholders and creditors – whereas civil law countries have weaker protection (La Porta et al., 2000). 
In this regard, the motivation for corporate governance improvements could be precipitated based on 
the institutional proclivity for such action. In this vein, the evaluation of the pattern of corporate 
governance reforms in the shareholder and stakeholder countries discloses, to an extent, some degree 
of disparity. The focus of corporate governance reforms in the stakeholder (civil law/bank-oriented) 
countries, such as Germany and Japan, notably reveal a shift in practice towards the Anglo-American 
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(shareholder/common law/market-oriented) system (Schilling, 2001; Nakamura, 2006; Barker and 
Chiu, 2018). However, corporate governance reforms in market-based economies, such as the UK and 
US, indicate a disposition towards the improvement of the overall efficiency of corporate governance 
mechanisms and practice (Harp et al., 2014). In line with this, a review in this respect (Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2008), suggests that:  
‘the issuance of codes in civil law countries are prompted more by legitimation reasons than 
by the determination to dramatically improve the governance practices of national companies’ 
(Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008: 2).  
 To this extent, other contrary positions to the convergence view, in relation to the institutional 
‘embeddedness’ of corporate governance practices, have also emerged in the literature (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Chizema, 2008; Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Organisations operate within social 
frameworks of norms, values and taken-for-granted assumptions, to which they are expected to 
conform through institutional pressure (Fernando and Lawrence, 2014). Such an act of conformity is 
argued to be rewarded through responses such as increased ‘legitimacy, resources and survival 
capabilities’ (Scott, 1987). Likewise, the institutionalist approach to corporate governance, like 
legitimacy theory, advocates that organisations do not operate in isolation, but continuously 
interrelate with their society (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 2010; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014; Fan 
and Zietsma, 2017). Therefore, the practicality of organisational processes could depend, in many 
respects, on the social, cultural or institutional configuration of the context (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Judge et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Krenn, 2017). This 
demands a revisit of the mainstream theoretical underpinning of corporate governance reforms, 
providing opportunity to critique the agency theory in terms of cross-national applicability and a 
subsequent exploration of institutional theorising of corporate governance reforms. 
2.3 PART C: Theoretical underpinning of organisational variations, corporate governance and 
corporate governance reforms 
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This theoretical discourse aims to redirect focus from the generic disposition of corporate governance 
reforms on the dominant agency theory, to a more contextualised perspective in instituting change, 
across differing organisational contexts. In this respect, the central argument is based on the neo-
institutionalisation perspective on reproduction. The neo-institutional theory affirms the significance 
of actors, in such institutional formations or modifications, which are underscored within the 
institutional logic, entrepreneurship and work concepts. Nonetheless, beyond the foregoing, differing 
national contexts present notable peculiarities. This study seeks to extend the neo-institutional 
theorisation by enabling explicit explanations of interfaces and interplays across the developing 
organisational fields. To this end, the implications of the institutional structuration, conventionalities 
alongside local legitimations (from both social and organisational actors), for attempts at 
transformations, form the core argument of the conceptualisation below, culminating in the research 
gap, by exploring specifically the Sub-Saharan Africa and Nigerian situation. 
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2.3.1  Rethinking the rationalisation of corporate governance reforms 
2.3.1.1  Agency relationship and problem  
 From the perspective of agency theory, company managers and shareholders are in a fiduciary 
relationship, where the managers are the ‘agents’ of the shareholders, who are regarded as the 
‘principals’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). The firm is considered as a nexus 
of contract between different factors of production, who aim to realise their own interests (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This form of contract results mainly from the need 
to enhance the efficient organisation of team production (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Eisenhardt, 1985). 
It is simply a contractual structure, with no authoritarian control involved, which is subject to 
continuous renegotiation with the central agent or the firm’s owner (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). The 
risks undertaken by most agents are limited by the contract structures of organisations, which specify 
either fixed payoffs or incentive payoffs related to specific measures of performance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b). The residual risk – the difference between the inflows of resources and promised 
payments to agents – is borne by the residual claimants with the rights to net cash flows (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b). Such a relationship between the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents) 
of a corporation, is described as a ‘pure agency relationship’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (p.308). 
 The agency problem is stated as an inevitable outcome of the contractual arrangement of the 
firm, in the separation of finance and management (or ownership and control) (Coase, 1937; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Eisenhardt, 1989; Kumar and Zattoni, 2017). Thus, 
according to agency theorisation, such a problem is due to a rise in agency relationship as a result of 
the conflicting interest between the stockholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). Also, such a crisis presents as an outcome of risk sharing resulting 
from the different attitudes of the principal and agent to risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, whether 
this assumption presently and generally applies, has been a topic of debate in corporate governance. 
For instance, as argued, the rise of institutional investors over the past several decades has led to an 
increased concentration of equity ownership, which has transformed the corporate landscape and, in 
turn, the governance problems of the modern corporation (Bebchuk et al., 2017). Also, as the 
stewardship theory contends, managers can actually be self-motivated (Miller and Sardais, 2011; Fan 
and Zietsma, 2017). As the perspective of managers’ stewardship posits, executives can be even more 
inclined than the owners to act in the interest of the company (Davis et al., 1997).  Given the necessity 
to serve their own interest, such as advancing their career, a natural affinity for their responsibility, 
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managers could more willingly act in the best interest of their organisations and the owners (Lane et 
al., 1998).   
2.3.1.2  The dominant perspective on corporate governance efficiency and reforms 
 Different postulations are often employed in explaining divergent perspectives in corporate 
governance research; however, the agency theory remains dominant (Daily et al., 2003). As Walsh and 
Seward (1990) contend, agency theory presents as an important framework to help researchers 
understand the nature of the conflict between owners and managers, as well as its possible resolution. 
Corporate governance reforms are similarly inclined in light of the agency theorisation (Coombes and 
Watson, 2001; Soederberg, 2003; Dore, 2005; Krenn, 2014, 2017). The modern corporation epitomises 
the situation of entrepreneurial relationship (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Thus, in accordance with the 
underlying agency theory assumption (of managers’ opportunism), each factor of production in the 
firm is motivated by its own self-interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998). Therefore, 
managers (agents) will not always act in the best interest of the stockholders (principals), if both 
parties aim to maximize their utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). In effect, based on the 
condition of ‘separation of ownership and control’ (Berle and Means, 1932), self-interested CEOs can 
conceal selfish actions when owners do not have perfect information about CEO’s behaviour and firms 
bear the cost (Bosse and Phillips, 2016; Panda and Leepsa, 2017). Thus, the need for the control and 
mechanisms that will monitor or steer executives’ activities in protecting the interest of the owners 
(usually dispersed) become increasingly significant (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fligstein and Shin, 2007). As 
such, corporate governance studies have focused largely on how to resolve the issues resulting from 
agents’ and principals’ relationships (Rediker and Seth, 1995). In this light, nearly all modern 
governance researches are theorised as restraints to managerial self-interests (Daily et al., 2003).  
 Therefore, from the agency theory perspective, corporate governance is usually regarded as 
mechanisms – and by extension any reforms thereto – mainly deployed to promote answerability by 
company executives (managers) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this light, corporate governance 
principles advocated across the globe are considered to promote, basically, improvements to the 
shareholder (outsider) system (Soederberg, 2003; Krenn, 2014). For instance, a preference for 
outsider-dominated boards illustrates the agency theorisation position of corporate governance 
reforms (Dalton et al., 2007). Such independent directors with no linkage to the firm are hypothesised 
to provide better oversight to corporate executives and corporate performance (Dalton and Dalton, 
2011; Bosse and Phillips, 2016). Further, the recommendations of universal corporate principles, such 
as the OECD, have also aligned with such reasoning. This is largely portrayed in principles revealed as 
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largely predictions for the basic mitigation of the concerns of the shareholder model.12 To this extent, 
effective corporate governance innovations have typically been defined by the degree of improving 
such mechanisms in order to control agency problems (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Cohen et al., 
2007). 
2.3.1.3  Corporate governance reforms: Agency theory delimitation and universality 
 As aforementioned, the essential features of the agency problem are that the interests of the 
principal and agent diverge, and the principal has imperfect information about the agent’s 
contribution (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). Corporate governance and reforms are reinforced by the 
agency theorisation of corporate governance (Soederberg, 2003; Udayasankar et al., 2005; Krenn 
2014, 2015). This logic prioritises the protection of shareholders’ interests as the guiding principle for 
corporate managers and boards of directors, which is ideologically rooted in agency theory (Joseph et 
al., 2014). Agency theory undeniably represents a dominant paradigm of economic organisation and 
management research (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). Nonetheless, agency theory is argued to have 
allowed limited theoretical perspectives in governance studies (Hirsch et al., 1987; Deakin and 
Konzelmann, 2004). For example, within agency-grounded research, governance effectiveness is 
considerably associated with the structural characteristics of the firm’s governance mechanism and 
ownership structure (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014). However, cognitive 
evaluation theory describes how external controls could rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for 
behaving appropriately, thus actually having the opposite of their intended effect (Wei et al., 
2017). The proposed improvements in corporate governance principles represent the centralities of 
the shareholder system inspired corporate governance reforms (see Cadbury code, 1992; The 
combined code on corporate governance, 200313). Equally, legitimation is expected to be achieved by 
following these precepts (Seidl et al., 2013). However, these principles have not invariably resulted in 
efficiency nor guaranteed the perennial attainment of legitimacy, as supposed (Dalton et al. 1998; 
Dalton and Dalton, 2011). By implication, this suggests the likelihood of other variables underlying 
organisational performance or evaluation. Likewise, other than the efficiency of internal mechanisms, 
corporate governance performance is argued to be largely dependent on infrastructural and socio-
political factors (La Porta et al., 2000; Fiss and Zajac, 2004). Evidently, beyond the resultant effect of 
organisational techniques, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms is acknowledged 
to be contingent upon a number of other factors (Filatotchev et al., 2013; Pemer and Skjølsvik, 2018). 
                                                             
12 Such corporate governance principles, which emphasise; 1) the advocacy for NEDs on the board, 2) Duality of CEO and 
Chairman, 3) Board compositions,4) Expansive corporate disclosures, 5) Executive Remunerations etc., are viewed to 
exemplify this position (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
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Likewise, with the global diffusion of good governance codes, the constituents of corporate 
governance reforms have spanned a diverse interlace of organisational and institutional systems (Fiss 
and Zajac, 2004; Pemer and Skjølsvik, 2018). Thus, corporate governance reforms (instrumental 
and/or symbolic) are affirmed as not being isolated from contextual variables (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). 
 Against this backdrop, the contextualisation of organisational functionalities becomes 
inevitable (Thornton et al., 2012; Humphries and Whelan, 2017). Nonetheless, agency theory is argued 
to explicate corporate governance mainly in terms of relationship between shareholders and 
executives (Filatotchev et al., 2013). The perspective is stated to restrict attention to mostly two actors 
(shareholders and managers), whereby institutions have played a relatively limited role (Filatotchev 
et al., 2013). This standpoint is considered inadequate in addressing organisational challenges, 
especially given the spate of corporate scandals and collapses in the past decades (Cuomo et al., 2016). 
Particularly when tested in the non-Anglo-Saxon (American) context, this perspective can at times be 
constraining (Aguilera, 2005). Despite the dominance of agency theory over the years, its applicability 
across diverse issues in corporate governance is thus considered limited (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Udayasankar et al., 2005; Chizema and Buck, 2006). Organisations as open systems, influence and are 
affected by factors beyond the interplay of a company’s internal environment (Filatotchev et al., 
2013). As Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest, “the incidence of radical change, and the pace by 
which such change occurs, will vary across institutional sectors because of differences in the structures 
of institutional sectors” (p.1023). Institutions are constituted of “cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour” (Scott, 1995: 33).  In 
this vein, agency theory is stated as not enabling sufficiently elaborate insights, especially into 
comparative corporate governance concerns (Roe, 1994; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Judge, et al., 2010). 
The micro-level governance focus is contested to give relatively little attention to the influence of 
contextual variables in corporate governance reforms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, 2005; Lee 
and Taeyoung, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2017). Along these lines, perspectives have emerged in the last 
few decades as an alternative in theorising corporate governance and its reforms, particularly in 
accounting for the distinctiveness across institutional domains (Cuomo et al., 2016; Imerman, 2018).  
As Globerman et al. (2011) assert:  
“One needs to understand the institutional framework in which organizations operate in order 
to understand the rationale for and consequences of specific corporate governance models, as 
well as the likelihood that specific governance reforms will be adopted and prove effective” 
(p.1). 
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In a similar vein, the legitimacy of corporate governance practice is cited to be institutionally construed 
(Judge et al., 2008). Legitimation is embedded in such endogenous factors as beliefs, values, schema 
and mores (Suchman, 1995). In this respect, in a bid to highlight how organisations align within 
different contexts, scholars have employed alternative theoretical explanations. 
2.3.2 The institutionalisation of organisational innovations: Alternative theorisation and 
 conceptualisation 
2.3.2.1 The Institutional perspective on corporate governance reforms 
 There is no doubt that agency theory has been seminal to understanding the significance of 
the internal environment of companies for the manifestations of external mechanisms. The agency 
theory’s explication of the dynamics within corporations has notably precipitated the wider outlook 
on the impact of environmental factors on corporate governance (see Wei et al., 2017). The 
prevalence of the theoretical perspective notwithstanding, agency theorists have regularly been 
challenged to fully acknowledge the non-universality of agency problems and how to address this (see 
Hill and Jones, 1992; Dalton et al., 2007; Bosse, and Phillips, 2016). However, as Granovetter (1992) 
states, “modern economists who do attempt to take account of social influences typically represent 
them in an over-socialized manner” (p.31). Such over-socialization has produced an agent that is too 
complex for the sort of analysis historically typical of agency theory, considering the recent explosion 
of research in the behavioural sciences (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). Institutional theory maintains the 
significance of organisations’ settings for their functionalities (Aoki, 2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Scott, 2004). In contested institutional change, firms’ social structural context plays a central role in 
the processes (Krenn, 2017). Institutional theory has thus emerged to alternatively expound the 
implication of institutional elements and influences in corporate governance and reforms (Oliver, 
1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hatch, 1993; Hatch and Schultz, 2002). The interplay of institutions 
and firm level actors is enabled in this respect (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). As such, the perspective 
has gained wide acceptance in the last decades as a contending alternative to agency theorisation. In 
particular, one of the major drivers of the upsurge in organisational research is stated as the necessity 
to provide meaning to corporate governance processes across diverse national contexts (Cuomo et 
al., 2016). Inevitably, institutional theory has become popularly espoused to explain the innovation, 
diffusion, institution, complementarity, maintenance or reproduction of organisational processes or 
structures (Scott, 2001, 2004; Aguilera, 2005; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2008; Lee and 
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2.3.2.2  Universal propositions and perception on corporate governance reforms  
 Corporate governance reforms relate to processes “designed to improve the corporate 
governance system by recommending a comprehensive set of norms.” (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004: 418). Regardless of the varied codes across different countries, they nonetheless, basically, 
suggest similar principles (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). These 
recommendations include, explicitly or implicitly:  
1) best practices regarding the role, composition and responsibility of executives and the 
BoD; 2) relationships with shareholders (stakeholders); 3) clarity of responsibilities 
between the Chairman and the CEO; 4) the need for timely and quality information 
provided to the board; 5) auditing and disclosures; 6) balanced and explicable financial 
reporting; and 7) maintenance of a sound system of internal control (O’Shea, 2005; 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009; Krenn, 2014). 
Arguably, these commonalities indicate how the effectiveness (and/or legitimation) of corporate 
governance procedures are operationalised (Charkham and Simpson, 1999). Likewise, in essence 
these recommendations suggest a group of predetermined suppositions for corporate governance, 
across the globe. For instance, Hermes et al. (2007) discovered that the contents of some countries’ 
codes in Eastern Europe vary. In this respect, they suggest that domestic forces relating to country-
specific characteristics of corporate governance systems may have been responsible for these 
disparities (Hermes et al., 2007). Thus, although it can be hypothesised that the main objective of the 
corporate reforms through adoption of codes of good governance is to provide ‘good governance’, as 
the wording implies, the attainment of this goal can be contested to be relational. To this extent, 
corporate governance principles are also expected to provide legitimation of corporate governance 
practices, on the other hand. Thus, a cogent attainment of such an objective will be given to contextual 
interpretations. The objective of best practices in companies, relates differently within institutional 
settings. For instance, in countries with weak protection of investors’ rights, the potential benefits for 
the economic system associated with the reinforcement of ‘good governance’ practices are greater 
than in countries with a strong protection of investors’ rights (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  
Nevertheless, the complementarities of these dissimilar institutional configurations towards 
corporate governance reforms are still largely ambiguous. Such insights are especially advocated in 
differing models from those of the prevalent, and relatively more investigated, shareholder Anglo-
American models (Young et al., 2008; Filatochev et al., 2013; de Bos et al., 2018), whereby, based on 
the legal system and institutional characteristics in a specific country, the performance of corporate 
structures, such as corporate boards, ownership structure, and executive incentives, may differ 
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(Filatotchev et al., 2013). However, the efficiency view of corporate governance reforms from the 
agency theory perspective assumes the efficacy of practices and mechanisms to be uniformly defined. 
For instance, this supposition is reflected through cited broad recommendations, such as the duality 
of chairman and CEO, BoD, emphasis on corporate disclosures, internal controls, etc. These 
propositions largely reflect the underlying assumptions of control or monitoring in shareholder 
(outsider-dominated) systems. Hence, by inference, all corporate governance systems are either 
assumed to be comparable with, or expected to conform to, the workings of the shareholder models. 
However, agency theory is argued to ‘fail to sufficiently explore how corporate governance is shaped 
by its institutional embeddedness’ (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), whereby ‘corporate governance’ is 
ingrained in the institutional domain (North, 1990; Scott, 2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Judge et 
al. 2008). In a survey of African banks, corporate governance structures as promoted 
recommendations, such as CEO duality, non-executive members and large board size, rather lead to a 
reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization (Kusi et al., 2018). In this regard, 
the notion of effectiveness, for instance, within agency theory is contested to be too narrow to be 
applied to corporate governance across different settings (Filatotchev et al., 2013). Zattoni et al. 
(2017) find that while the type of legal system is insignificant, the efficacy of board structures is likely 
to be contingent on the specific national context. Unsurprisingly, several studies (e.g. Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Cromme, 2005; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Judge et al., 2008; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010; Uddin et al., 2017) have continued to seek to explain, in this vein, the 
diffusion of codes and administration of corporate governance principles or reforms in varied settings.   
 In a similar vein, with the emphasis on how national ‘models’ embody a coherent institutional 
logic, institutional theory has equally been critiqued to lean towards a perspective too abstract for the 
conflicts and coalitions between stakeholders at the firm level (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
Nonetheless, with the increased interdependence of corporations and society, a deeper explanation 
of the micro-level operation has increasingly mandated the requirement for an expanded, or macro 
level, elaboration of corporate governance processes (Davis and Thompson, 1994). For instance, along 
these lines, Donaldson (2012) contends; 
“Agency theorists’ accounts presume straightforwardly that principals have a justified claim 
or entitlement to their property and that agents are justified—have authority—to act on 
behalf of the best interests of their principals. With this in mind, it is not surprising that agency 
theory is frequently used with substantial normative force in attempts to justify corporate 
governance reform, such as pushing for nominating rights for shareholders and for better 
executive pay structures that align the interests of executives and shareowners. A one-size-
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fits-all tool for understanding corporate governance from a normative perspective may be 
unwise or impossible, especially given the complexity of organizational phenomena and 
human values underlying organizational life” (p. 263). 
In this respect, in an effort to understand the externalities of firms’ dynamics, the institutional 
theorisation of organisational techniques necessarily gained prominence (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
However, regardless of the precedents, the theorisation of corporate governance remains an evolving 
debate. Moreover, no single or mixed perspective(s) could be declared to offer an exacting 
condensation of corporate governance. To provide an exhaustive account of corporate governance 
conceptualisations will thus be both impracticable and beyond the objectives of this research. Further, 
essentially, this study relates to the institutionalisation of organisational reforms (change or 
reproduction), with a perspective on the evolving organisational fields. Such explanation is identified 
to be contextualised within the ideologies of (neo)-institutional theorisation and thus pursued from 
an ontological stance. The independence-performance relationship is argued to be significantly 
moderated by national-level institutions (Zattoni et al., 2017).  
2.3.3 Articulating an external view of the firm in governance reforms: (Neo-)Institutional theory 
perspective on organisational reproductions 
2.3.3.1  Institutional perspective: Institutional maintenance or conformity 
 Institutional conceptualisation of organisational studies offers valuable insights into 
organisations’ environments, relations and reactions to institutional processes (Oliver, 1991), whereby 
the perspective has been regenerated for the articulation of organisational structures and behaviours 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; March and Olsen, 1989; Scott, 2003). 
Institutional theory has advanced from the literature on the sociology of organisations and 
organisational behaviour (Cohen et al., 2008). In recent times, the theory has been adopted for 
analysing management concerns across varying organisational contexts (Wright et al., 2005; Young et 
al., 2008; Haxhi and Aguilera, 2017). It emphasises the interactions between different governance 
parties and how they maintain their forms to all relevant parties (Cohen et al., 2008). In this respect, 
board interlocks and industry peers can have the potential to facilitate institutional change, continuity 
and resistance to change (Krenn, 2017). However, historically, institutional theory has more usually 
been adopted as an explanation for the similarity (‘isomorphism’) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and 
stability of organisational arrangements in a given field (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). As a result, 
within given domains, organisations have been considered to be homogeneous, whereby they are 
increasingly organised around rituals of conformity to wider institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
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 From this viewpoint, institutional theorisation of transformations, within organisational 
contexts, has normally been associated with inertia forms (Chizema and Buck, 2006). As such this 
normally undermines the supposed continued differentiation of national systems in international 
corporate governance (Chizema and Buck, 2006). Stated as a consequence of social norms being taken 
for granted, a commonly held view of the mainstream institutional perspective is that organisational 
behaviours are being patterned and reproduced (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). To this end, 
organisations have typically been considered as conforming and institutional structures as resilient 
prescriptions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Westphal et al., 1997; Scott, 2001). As Scott (2001) states; 
“Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. They are 
composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (p. 48). 
Along this line of reasoning ‘diffusion studies have thus originally investigated the introduction and 
adoption of an innovation’ (Strang and Soule, 1998: 267). Isomorphic change has often been argued 
to be facilitated by the proclivity of managers to increase their organisations’ effectiveness (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). In this instance, actors unwittingly accepted the prevailing template as appropriate, 
right and the proper way of doing things, as the organisational field became infused with a taken-for-
granted quality (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In this context, institutions are generally understood 
as patterns, shared systems of meaning and associated prescribed behaviour (Scott, 2008a; Stenling, 
2014). Hence, the recognition of organisations as compliant in the adoption of a restricted range of 
socially approved organisational templates (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Scott, 2001; Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006). Correspondingly, the convergence theory has proclaimed analogous patterns of 
organisational practices, simultaneously occasioned by the universal diffusion of corporate 
governance principles (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Nonetheless, postulating the homogeneity of 
reproductions and consequent similarity in organisational structures and forms (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), the theory of isomorphism acknowledges the structural determinants of the range of choices 
perceived as rational (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Also, the literature on the spread of 
innovations has given due consideration to both formal and informal organisational structures, that 
sometimes compel "unanticipated consequences" to ensue from intended organisational activities 
(Selznick, 1949).  
 Thus, historically, institutional theorisation has basically focused upon explaining how 
institutionalised structures of meaning affect organisational processes (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006), in this regard, failing to admit the significance of social actions or actors’ inclinations for such 
institutional archetypes. In this sense, it rather disregards the possible interests and influences of 
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organised actors. The dynamics and actions of institutional agents have been significantly identified, 
with respect to the outcomes of organisational structures (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Maguire et 
al., 2004). Notably, this ideology underpins the theoretical viewpoints advanced by neo-
institutionalism. Central to neo-institutional theories, such as institutional entrepreneurship, and 
institutional work, among others, is the acknowledgement of the role of social agents in organisational 
reproductions (Maguire et al., 2004; Wijen, 2010; Harmon et al., 2015). For instance, Misangyi et al. 
(2008) proposes that institutional reproductions should primarily involve institutional logics, 
resources, and social actors, drawing from the notion of the interactions of institutions and collective 
actors. Neo-institutionalism has developed from the coming together of the old and a new 
institutional perspective (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In this respect, the neo-institutionalism 
identifies different procedures in organisational structures, such as reproductions, modifications, 
variations or maintenance (Oliver, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Lawrence et al., 2011; Ocasio and 
Radoynovska, 2016). For instance, Yoshikawa et al. (2007) analyse the diffusion of governance 
innovations in Japan. In their investigation of the convergence-divergence propositions in corporate 
governance in this context, they argue that Japanese systems of corporate governance neither fully 
converge to, nor completely diverge from, the Anglo-American model. Their results reveal that the 
investigated entities rather decoupled the corporate governance reforms and tailored them to fit their 
own situations in generating governance innovations (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Accordingly, as Oliver 
(1991) contends, when confronted with institutional pressures, organisational acquiescence may take 
alternative forms, which include habit, imitation or compliance. Strang and Soule (1998) claim that 
diffusion arguments are easily typically segregated from other causal dynamics. Diffusion prototypes 
often treat the adopter as a reflective decision-maker (Strang and Soule, 1998). As such, this notion, 
inevitably, on the one hand, upholds the inclination of the diffusion process towards models of 
individual choice (Strang and Soule, 1998). On the other hand, it tends ‘towards a broader class of 
contextual and environmental processes, where conditions external to the actor are recognised to 
shape behaviour’ (Strang and Soule, 1998: 267). To this end, the diffusion debates could be considered 
as being two-sided; while actors’ innate tendencies are identified, the effects of field level 
contingencies towards diffusion of practices, are also contended.  
2.3.3.2  Institutional reproductions and the neo-institutional perspective  
 Neo-institutional theory enables the elaboration of isomorphic diffusions and the 
understanding of the adoption of innovations and new practices across different organisational 
contexts (Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Zahir-Ul-Hassan, 2017). The neo-institutional perspective 
emphasises three levels of analysis: societal (global) institutions; governance structures; and actors 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Thus, the perspective has increasingly been employed in explaining the 
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diffusion or innovations of new practices, at the macro or field level (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Chizema and Buck, 2006; Thornton et al., 2012). Regarding the diffusion of corporate 
governance practices, the mainstream view of institutional theory has normally been associated with 
institutional inactivity, stability or conformity (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), where organisational 
reforms imitate existing social order. In contrast, the diffusion of new organisational practices is 
identified as the proposition for change or reorganisation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). As such 
exploitation is not isolated from the socio-institutional context within which these entities are 
embedded (Tost, 2011), thus, the continuous advocating for the clarification of the consequences of 
institutional constituents in the attempts at organisational transformations, within the neo-
institutionalism concept (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012; March and 
Olsen, 2006b; Greenwood et al., 2008; Scott, 2008b). As Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) cited, one of 
the major limitations of institutional theory is the view that organisations assiduously conform to 
institutional prescriptions conveyed to them. Thus, recognition of the repercussions of social interplay, 
in this regard, tends to be de-emphasised. Within the perspective of institutional theory, the 
interpretation of the roles of human agency and the cognitive features of the institutional 
environment have focused primarily on the organisation (George et al., 2006). Likewise, the traditional 
focus of accounting and auditing research has typically disregarded the contextual richness within 
which governance structures are developed (Cohen et al., 2008).  
 From the perspective of complexity theory, institutional environments embody ‘populations’ 
that contain a range of genetic profiles (Tenbensel, 2018). Thus, within a governance field, change and 
stability are shaped by the ‘nesting and abrasion’ of alternative combinations (Tenbensel, 2018). 
Organisational studies most often articulate the interactions of different interests or factors and thus 
are heavily reliant on the activities of institutional agents and social exchanges (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Giddens, 1993). Further, the diffusion of governance innovations essentially involves multiple 
actions and perceptions of other social actors/agents towards institutional prescriptions across 
different domains (Seo and Creed, 2002; Thornton et al., 2012; Hoefer and Green, 2016). The neo-
institutional theory has attempted to promote the understanding of institutional change or 
reproduction against this backdrop. This is the perception that organisations shape and are shaped by 
their social and institutional constituents, which gives meaning to social realities (Giddens, 1984, 1993; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). From this viewpoint, this scenario would emphasise the eminence of 
those relational factors that encapsulate organisational functions and equally occur as the 
consequence. While neo-institutional theorists do not disregard the possibility that institutional 
entities can resist change or conform to the status quo (Oliver, 1991), they however, in addition, 
acknowledge the likelihood of divergence in the incidence of reproduction (Dacin et al., 2007). Boolaky 
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and Soobaroyen (2017) suggest in their findings that the efforts by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and other international agencies to implement auditing standards need to 
recognise the relevance of a broad set of institutional factors, rather than merely narrow economic 
ones, in the development of audit policymaking, practice and regulation worldwide. Thus, beyond the 
conformist position depicted by the traditional institutional perspective, neo-institutional theory 
advances the varying dimensions from diffusion of practices.  
2.3.3.3 Institutional process and receptivity in organisational reproductions: Understanding actors’ 
 dynamics  
 Within the neo-institutionalisation of organisational transformations, organisations are 
established within the boundary of institutional structures, values, pressures and forces that define 
their constructions (Friedland and Alford, 1991). This boundary, referred to as logics, delineates the 
characteristic features which spell out the distinctiveness of each organisational field (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). This configuration defines the behaviours and reactions of 
organisational structures and, in turn, the mode of institutional innovations. Institutional logics 
promote the debate that these responses would nonetheless depend on the result of the alignments 
and/or alliance of these logics, across institutional contexts, at any point in time (Goodrick and Reay, 
2011). In this regard, the concept of institutional logic represents the institutional context which 
organisations affect and which also confer organisational prescriptions. As Martin et al. (2017) 
contend, ‘organizations – and specifically the way organizations instantiate relationships between 
multiple logics – contribute crucially not just to the availability of logics, but also to the manner in 
which they become available: the degree to which the appearance of a logic constrains or enables 
autonomy’ (p.122). Institutional logics are therefore defined as, ‘socially constructed, historical 
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space and provide meaning to their social 
reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804). More importantly, as ‘social prescriptions’, institutional 
logics admit the impact of social actions on prevailing organisational forms, within a given institutional 
field. Along this line, institutional logics provide an alternative explanation to variation in or creation 
of practices, by its highlighting of human-managerial cognition in decision making (Zahir-Ul-Hassan, 
2017). 
 Further, the literature on institutional entrepreneurship emphasises how creative 
entrepreneurial forces bring about change to organisational processes and institutions (Garud et al., 
2007: 958). Hence, the deliberate efforts of social agents, as persons professed to have an intended 
stake in such process, are indicated (Dacin et al., 2002; Seo and Creed, 2002; Szabó, 2017). Institutional 
change thus reflects the influences and interests of actors, hence being political (Fligstein, 1997; Seo 
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and Creed, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004). Although, from the definition of institutional logics, as 
‘providing meaning to social reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804), the actions of social actors are 
also assumed within these boundaries. In this regard, the emergent or reproduction of institutional 
practices are contested as not merely the consequential evolution of institutional structures (Dacin et 
al. 2002). Having acknowledged the idea promoted through institutional logics that institutions involve 
social structures, scholars attempt to expound the influence on the manner in which these changes 
occur (Seo and Creed, 2002). Expanding the views of the institutional contexts (field-level factors) for 
institutional reproduction, the institutional entrepreneurship expands the implications of agents 
(entrepreneurs) in organisational advancements (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). Correspondingly, not 
only are the institutional templates important – as institutional logics affirms – institutional 
entrepreneurship instigates the deliberate change to the institutional prescriptions through 
endogenous sources (Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Thus, by advancing 
the understanding of institutional change and emergence, institutional entrepreneurship contributes 
to institutional theory (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). In this respect though, from the assumed 
homogeneity in the diffusion of corporate governance reforms, studies have specified the different 
approaches to achieving corporate governance modifications. Along this perspective, institutional 
entrepreneurship seeks to elaborate on the way actors affect the contexts in which they are 
embedded. In other words, social actors are embedded within institutional structures crafted through 
myriad conducts. This advocates not just the view that changes are driven within institutional 
boundaries, but how those modifications are brought about. In this light, institutional entrepreneurs 
are thus described as interest-driven, organised actors, who advance the interest they value highly by 
creating new institutions (DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). A major focus of scholars, 
in this regard, is to explain the manner by which these actors enable changes to those institutional 
contexts by which they, as actors, are also shaped (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), i.e. “the paradox 
of embedded agency” (Seo and Creed, 2002: 226). Within this debate, scholars have attempted to 
forge the understanding of how ‘agents’ lead conformity to social convention or initiate non-
isomorphic action by challenging the institutional fabric (Dacin et al., 2002; Chizema and Shinozawa, 
2012). Accordingly, reinforced by the prevailing diffusions of governance practices, a research trend 
has emerged in the quest to elaborate these incidences, across institutional contexts.  
 Against this background, beyond the perspective on the activities of agents, as in institutional 
entrepreneurship, institutional work expounds the interplay of organisational actors and the 
dynamism of institutional fields. Institutional work draws on the ideas from political science and 
sociology to enable insights into the role of individuals, in the emergence of institutional structures 
(Dobbins, 2010). “The concept of institutional work highlights the (perhaps controversial) notion that 
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individuals actively engage in processes of institutional creation, maintenance, disruption, and 
change” (Lawrence et al., 2011: 53). As Giddens (1993) posits “The production and reproduction of 
society thus has to be treated as a skilled performance on the part of its members, not as merely a 
mechanical series of processes” (p. 168). In this sense, rather than the focus on the entrepreneurial 
activities of individuals, as declared by institutional entrepreneurships, the attention here is drawn to 
collective actions. Institutional work therefore involves the physical or mental effort aimed at affecting 
an institution or set of institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011: 52). In this respect, institutional work 
attempts to promote the understanding of how the transformational (or otherwise) actions of agents 
are achieved in relation to the construct of institutional logics. By such insight, considered missing in 
original institutional theory perspectives, institutional works strengthen the general understanding of 
the significance of the interlace of social actions in organisational innovations (Lawrence et al., 2011). 
Basically, and disregarded by traditional institutional theory, is the lived experience of organisational 
actors, especially the connections between this experience and the institutions that structure and are 
structured by it (Lawrence et al., 2011). The perspectives espoused in institutional entrepreneurship 
highlight the role of self-interested agents in driving organisational change (Misangyi et al., 2008). 
Specifically, the centrality of a firm's entrepreneurial identity, as it interacts with the national 
governance logic, is highlighted to jointly create corporate governance discretion (Aguilera et al., 
2018). Unlike the underpinning ideology of stability and preservative nature of institutional 
frameworks promoted in institutional theory, institutional work promotes an extended position 
(Lawrence et al., 2011). Institutional work directs attention at not only the continuity of institutional 
structures, but the multi-dimensional implication of these social actions, thus, stimulating an attempt 
at promoting the understanding of social dynamics.  
 In spite of the foregoing, social actions are enabled within the boundary of social 
interpretations and meanings – norms, schemas and customs etc. (Misangyi et al., 2008). From this 
view, scholars have continuously engaged in investigating the implications of the organisational 
contexts for the outcome of innovations. For instance, Kim (2016) found that changes in reporting 
quality, as measured by value relevance of information, are a function of the type of isomorphic 
pressure within a country. Likewise, the practical influence of western banks 
on corporate governance reforms was perceived to be ineffectual in most cases, in the emerging 
context of China (Nolan, 2010). As revealed, normative institutions, including a 'who you know' or 
guanxi credit culture, represent a prevailing procedure consistent with the path dependence models 
of institutional change (Nolan, 2010). Thus, rather than ontological actors, frozen in space, time and 
isolated from the social and cultural context, social relationships represent a fundamental unit of 
analysis, within institutional spheres (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Social behaviours are explained by 
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institutions which embody cognitive, normative, regulative structures and activities (Scott, 1995). Yet, 
as Suddaby et al. (2010) posit, ‘instead of casting institutions as relatively contingent creations of 
human cognition, emerging research has tended to identify universal properties of institutions and to 
study them and their organizational impacts in realist, if not outright functionalist, terms’ (p.1234). By 
implication, within the contextual confine, institutional factors play a more prominent role in the 
existing organisational form (Möllering and Müller-Seitz, 2018; Pemer and Skjølsvik, 2018). 
2.3.3.4    The contextualisation of corporate governance: Institutional variances and reproductions 
 Neo-institutionalists promote the significance of the ambience of organisational structures in 
institutional reproduction or change (Powell, 1991). This is a central idea, illustrated in the 
perspectives advanced in the cited notion of institutional logic, entrepreneurship and work. As 
Filatotchev et al. (2013) state, ‘national institutions represent important contingency factors that may 
influence the adoption and effectiveness of firm-level governance practices, contrary to the 
universalistic framework that until recently dominated agency-grounded research’ (p. 979). Neo-
institutional theory jointly explains the diffusion of new practices and the strategic responses to such 
innovations across organisational fields (Szabó, 2017; Zahir-Ul-Hassan, 2017). These definitions share 
the key notion that institutions make social order possible by reducing uncertainty, thus providing a 
framework or structure for interactions (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). The assumptions of the convergence 
view of governance practices and the declared isomorphism of corporate governance innovations 
portray the uniformity of adoption across contexts. However, the scholarship continues to promote 
the underlying implication of institutional field influences. ‘The challenge remains to conceptualize 
cross-national diversity and explain the differences, in spite of the rich description found in corporate 
research literature’ (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In this respect, the basic principal-agent relationship 
is modified by institutions in such ways that require specific contextualisation (Filatotchev et al., 2013). 
Along this line, Kusi et al. (2018) find that instead of the expected shareholder and stakeholder value 
maximization, corporate governance structures, such as CEO duality, non-executive members and 
large board size, lead to a reduction.  
 Thus, although there have been a growing number of attempts by agency theorisation to 
appreciate the differences in cross-national corporate governance, these have, however, remained 
problematic (Filatotchev et al., 2013). For instance, scholars have emphasised the role of power in the 
elaboration of logics within organisational fields (Joseph et al., 2014). In a similar thread, Oliver (1991) 
asserts that, although organisations commonly consent to institutional pressures, such submission 
may take different forms, such as ‘habit, imitation, and/or compliance.’ Lee and Taeyoung (2008), in 
their analysis of the French case of corporate governance reforms, discover that the converging and 
diverging forces of institutional change coexist. They further suggest that while the adoption of the 
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shareholder model is necessary for resource acquirement from the global capital markets, the 
implementation of a stakeholder model is, however, motivated by the resource allocation objective 
(Lee and Taeyoung, 2008). To this end, scholars have admitted patterned variations from the diffusion 
of practices across dissimilar institutional contexts (Thompson, 1967; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2001; 
Scott, 2003; Filatotchev et al., 2013; Talaulicar et al., 2017; Pemer and Skjølsvik, 2018; Tenbensel, 
2018). 
 
2.3.3.4.1      Institutional rubrics and field structuration  
 Organisations are enclosed within an internal and external environment (Selznick, 1949; Cyert 
and March, 1963). The external environment consists of the interfaces and pressures from other 
institutional factors (Granovetter, 1985). While the internal environment, on the other hand, is 
depicted as systems, those myths, views, practices etc. which consist of the logics by which the 
functions are understood and executed (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Each institutional domain, 
however, are characterised by the discrete recommendations of common goals and how this context 
is structured to achieve such goals (Greenwood et al., 2014). For example, institutional work submits 
to the view that the actions of actors within an institutional field, may not only uphold an attempt at 
maintaining, but could also impede improvements to such a structure.14 Likewise, the suggestion of 
institutional complexity by scholars is precipitated by the perception that there is a coexistence of 
multiple, dominant logics within institutional fields (Martin et al., 2017; Tenbensel, 2018). As Giddens 
(1993) states “the reproduction of modes of domination, one must emphasize, expresses asymmetries 
in the forms of meaning and morality that are made to ‘count’ in interaction” (p.165). Möllering and 
Müller-Seitz (2018) show how practices dealing with uncertainty, though, do not eliminate the basic 
uncertainty, but nevertheless configure the field and institutionalise a common direction, which 
makes institutional work possible. Nevertheless, convergence of corporate governance is regarded as 
the increasing isomorphism in the practices of public corporations in different countries (Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009). Conversely, Besharov and Smith (2014) contend the dominance of institutional 
logics, whereby organisations are categorised in terms of logic compatibility and logic centrality. As 
such, this is suggested to espouse field that organisational and individual factors’ influence, which aids 
in explaining the varied implications of such multiple institutional logics (Besharov and Smith, 2014).  
 In like manner, an established corporate governance system mirrors the societal-level 
coordination. Organisational contexts are indicated to be encapsulated within multiple logics (Reay 
                                                             
14 ‘Structuration theory takes the position that social action cannot be fully explained by the structure or agency theories 
alone. Instead, it recognizes that actors operate within the context of rules produced by social structures, and only by 
acting in a compliant manner are these structures reinforced’. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/structuration-theory> 
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and Hinings, 2009). Endogenous variables, in addition to structural variances, also define institutional 
fields. Corporate governance legitimation is defined as practices and structures within a nation that 
result in corporate behaviour which satisfy the demands within such society (Judge et al., 2008). 
However, indications of the complexity of individual actors’ legitimacy judgment of organisational 
change have also been promoted in the literature (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Tost, 2011; Szabó, 2017). 
Thus, while corporate governance principles are internationally predicated they are, nonetheless, 
nationally implemented. In this respect, the need to understand how these mechanisms are 
instantiated within the framing of institutional configurations has become imperative. The features of 
institutional fields dictate the nature of multiplicity within organisational entities (Besharov and Smith, 
2014). As Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) posit, within institutional fields ‘constellations are 
constructed rather than given’ (p.1301). However, as argued, compelled by their individual values and 
ethics of organisational actors, firm might be steered to adopt practices that have no immediate or 
obvious benefit (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). In this regard, some scholars have promoted the 
understanding of multiple interests on the implications of variations in institutional structures for 
organisational reproductions (Edelman, 1992; Thornton et al., 2012; Joseph, et al., 2014).  
  The study of institutionalisation has attempted to explain the nature and variety of 
institutional processes, and the influences that such processes exert on the structuration and change 
of organisational fields (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1987; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Greenwood et 
al., 2014; Haxhi and Aguilera, 2017; Imerman, 2018). Institutionalisation often includes institutional 
orders and their transformations, which although can be emergent, but can likewise be the intentional 
product of actors within an institutional field (Misangyi et al., 2008). In illuminating the process by 
which new fields are created, Suddaby et al. (2007) draw on neo-institutional theory to examine the 
role of large accounting firms in the emergence of a transnational regulatory field in professional 
services. Their observation reveals a shift in regulatory logics in which historical efforts to separate 
rather than suppress professional practice from commercial interest are embraced (Suddaby et al., 
2007). Institutional diversity is noted to be contributory to the innovation and differentiation in 
products and services across different contexts (Clarke, 2016), where dominant institutional logic(s) 
can affect the establishment of new practice (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). In this 
sense, organisational forms are stipulated as the recombination of core organisational features of 
goals and authority relations involving organisation structures and governance arrangements (Rao et 
al., 2003).  
 Corporate governance reforms are intended to engender improvement to corporate 
governance mechanisms. Nonetheless, in many respects, the interdependence of corporate 
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governance on their institutional substances has been highlighted (see Fan and Zietsma, 2017; Haxhi 
and Aguilera, 2017). Li and Harrison (2008) examine how ownership structure and national culture 
influence the size and leadership structure of the corporate boards of multinational firms based 
in industrial countries. They found  that national culture has a dominant influence on corporate 
governance structure, thus indicating that corporate governance structures differ significantly 
across countries (Li and Harrison, 2008). Misangyi and Acharya (2014) in their configurational 
approach to examining governance mechanisms, articulate the interrelations of governance 
mechanisms. Their finding suggests that corporate governance mechanisms complement rather than 
substitute their internal structures. Further, their effectiveness is realised to be reliant mostly on the 
mechanisms mutually enhancing each other, in a complementary manner (Misangyi and Acharya, 
2014). For instance, Yoshikawa et al. (2014) explore the different combinations of governance 
practices, at a national level in China. Their study highlights the reliance of corporate governance 
practices on the institutional fabrics as significantly explaining the diversity and variation of 
governance structures across firms (Yoshikawa et al., 2014). 
2.3.3.4.2    Institutional legitimation and prevailing practices 
 Legitimacy is declared to occur as an emerging social entity gains a taken-for-granted quality 
that leads it to be perceived as an objective and natural reality (Tost, 2011). In a sense, legitimacy 
relates to the acceptability of a practice or conduct, based on the perceptions of individuals. In this 
regard, Suchman (1995) posits that legitimacy affects not only how people act toward organisations, 
but also how they understand these organisations. Legitimation is thus considered to be independent 
of individual observers but rather dependent on a collective audience (Suchman, 1995), whereby ‘an 
organization which deviates from individuals' values may yet retain legitimacy if such deviation draws 
no public disapproval’ (p.574). Accordingly, from institutional theorisation, taken-for-granted social 
norms, across institutional fields, stipulate that behaviours are patterned and reproduced 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Yet, the assumptions of what actors do, say and mean are 
problematic when studying the institutionalisation process (Yuan, 2017), where these three are 
distinct correlates of social reality which move from the micro to the macro level (Yuan, 2017). Thus, 
the legitimation of a course of action may inevitably follow a pattern that the major coalition of social 
actors historically considered as a norm. This then suggests, to a certain extent, the influence of the 
existing structures on organisational behaviours. As noted, agents’ actions can constitute key 
components of field-level, structuration, logics or processes (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; 
Lawrence et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). Nonetheless, they do this with regard to social 
composites, such as beliefs or obligations which present as the standard for such ratification. As Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) posit, societal elements of rationalised formal structure are deeply ingrained in, 
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and reflect, widespread understandings of social reality. As argued, the co-existence of conflicting 
signals regarding the spread of new institutional models needs to be acknowledged in a balanced 
approach to studying institutional change in corporate governance (Krenn, 2017). 
  Organisational legitimacy research in the institutional theorisation divide has emphasised the 
ways in which sector-wide structuration dynamics generate cultural pressures that transcend any 
single organisation's purposive control (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell, 
1991; Giddens, 1993; Suchman, 1995). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that “Coercive isomorphism 
results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon 
which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations 
function” (p.150). Accordingly, Giddens (1993) contends that ‘the realm of human agency is bounded. 
Human beings produce society, but they do so as historically located actors’ (p.168). Thus, if 
institutions retain some of their identities in the attempts at reproduction or change to institutional 
environments, then the centrality of contextual variables is definitely implied. Legitimacy remains 
sensitive to changing subjective perceptions and intrinsically relational (Imerman, 2018).  Legitimacy 
has been affirmed to represent a necessary component of institutionalisation, which is considered 
critical in institutional research (Tost, 2011; Imerman, 2018). Consequently, corporate governance 
legitimacy is described as one of the means by which a nation directs corporate power to create and 
distribute economic wealth (Judge et al., 2008). To this end, the uniformity of the outcome of 
corporate governance may merely be proposed. Past research has argued for the understanding of 
the complementariness among micro level governance practices in different organisational fields 
(Aguilera et al., 2008). But macro- and micro-level studies diverge in their approach to understanding 
the implications of institutional complexity for actor’s independence (Cohen et al., 2008). Most 
especially, these views differ in their identification of the basis for agents to resist, reinterpret or make 
judicious use of institutional prescriptions (Cohen et al., 2008). For instance, the concept of 
institutional logics provides an explanation to practice variation/creation, by extending human-
managerial cognition in decision making (Zahir-Ul-Hassan, 2017). In other words, the import of 
institutional elements for reproduction is prominent, despite the universal drive for homogeneity. 
Although institutional logics provide the guiding principles for organisational structures and practices, 
yet they fail to provide detailed template in implementation, thus rather allowing substantial 
variations (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008; Joseph et al., 2014; Humphries and Whelan, 
2017). According to the structural elaboration theory, broad and equivocal principles, often set forth 
within social laws, are subject to interpretation by organisational actors (Edelman, 1992; Joseph et al., 
2014).  
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 While “corporate governance legitimacy is defined as suitable practices and structures within 
a nation, they are also declared to result in corporate behaviour that is appropriate to meet the needs 
of society” (Judge et al., 2008: 768). Organisations incorporate institutionalised practices and 
procedures that are derived from prevailing rationalised concepts of organisational work (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). As such, institutions decide both formal and informal rules that bound social exchanges 
(North, 1990). The effectiveness of a practice, across institutional settings is fundamentally decided 
by its bearing on the societal needs (Fligstein, 2001; Aguilera et al., 2008). As such, institutional 
legitimation that also usually occurs in the form of pressures and influences, in turn, can impact on 
efficiency within an organisational field. For instance, Sobhan (2016) discovers that the significant 
over-statement of compliance with governance principles reported by public companies in 
Bangladesh, is positively associated with control by sponsor families. This suggests that 
legitimacy/efficiency of organisational practices can be affected by the dominant logics within the 
institutional environment. ‘Cultural–cognitive elements involve the creation of shared conceptions 
that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made’ (Scott, 
2003; 2004; 2014). Tost (2011) specifies the content underlying legitimacy judgments and provides a 
model of the process by which these judgments develop and change. In this regard, individual-level 
legitimacy judgments are typically based on evaluations that fall into three dimensions: ‘instrumental, 
relational, and moral’ (Tost, 2011).  
 As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proclaim, goal-oriented behaviour may be reflexive, in the 
sense that it reflects deeply embedded predispositions, scripts, schema, or classifications. Hence, even 
though it does not contribute to the achievement of a goal, behaviour oriented to a goal may still be 
reinforced (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Failing to account for active cognitive processing by the 
traditional approach of institutional theorists, is claimed to have hindered the explanation of how 
individuals form the judgments of legitimacy (Tost, 2011; Hoefer and Green, 2016). Predicated on the 
path dependence approach to institutional change, Nolan (2010) shows that normative institutions 
remain dominant influences in the inclination and capacity of Chinese banks to engage in changes to 
corporate governance mechanisms. Thornton and Ocasio (2008), assert that “Institutional logics shape 
rational, mindful behaviour, and individual and organisational actors have some hand in shaping and 
changing institutional logics” (p.100). Kim (2016) reveals that firms that adopted IFRS, and equally 
experienced significant improvements in their reporting quality, in the Russian Federation, are those 
that also experienced coercive, mimetic, and normative societal pressures. Similarly, as Oliver (1991) 
argues, certain institutional scenarios can limit the ability of organisations to conform to institutional 
requirements. These situations include basically: (1) inadequate organisational resources or capacity 
to meet the requirements for conformity, (2) conflicting institutional pressures that make unilateral 
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conformity unachievable, and (3) a lack of recognition or awareness of institutional expectations 
(Oliver, 1991: 159). Therefore, the process of institutionalisation can involve the legitimacy judgments 
of evaluators being subjected to social control to proffer an institutional stability loop (Bitektine and 
Haack, 2015). In turn, a cross-level positive-feedback process may evolve, which ensures stability of 
the institutional order through the persistence of legitimacy judgments (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). 
Although, as argued, the heightened attention given to institutional configurations has fostered a shift 
from the focus on the organisation as a centre of analysis (Meyer and Höllerer, 2014), such a stance is 
contended to encourage comparison across contexts based on a focus on the differences (rather than 
similarities) in their organisational forms (Meyer and Höllerer, 2014). Nonetheless, there is witnessed 
increasing advocacy for the effect of field-level constituents in the diffusion theorem. Recently among 
scholars, studies have increasingly pursued the relevance of organisational fields towards the 
explanation of organisational behaviours (Boolaky and Soobaroyen, 2017; Haxhi and Aguilera, 2017; 
Kim et al., 2017; Zhong et al., 2017; Möllering and Müller-Seitz, 2018; Tenbensel, 2018). Thus, 
undeniably, the need to foster understandings of the implication of varieties of institutional 
constituents for organisational innovations remains.  
2.4 Part D: Review of literature on corporate governance reforms in Nigeria: Research gap and 
 agenda  
2.4.1 Corporate governance and reforms in an evolving field: Perspective from the developing 
 countries 
 The global campaign for corporate governance reforms, as well as in the context of the 
developing countries, has generally been propelled by transnational agencies, such as OECD, ICGN, 
World Bank, IMF, AfDB (Coombes and Watson, 2001; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). However, 
these institutional bodies are professed to drive convergence in corporate governance reforms 
(Khanna et al., 2006; West, 2009; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009; Adegbite et al., 2013), in light of their 
actions being considered as propelling homogeneity in corporate governance practices. The 
propositions of the corporate governance reforms depict a governance model that typifies the 
advanced institutional settings of the UK and US (Coombes and Watson, 2001). This has considerably 
spurred developing countries in the direction of an Anglo-American model (Reed, 2002). An 
institutional perspective on governance is regarded as particularly applicable in the case of emerging 
economies, with the variations and effects that these contexts have on strategic choices (Peng, 2003; 
Young et al., 2008). In the developing economies, the definition of what GCG encapsulates has 
similarly followed these universal prescriptions, i.e., as a measure for promoting improvements to 
corporate governance mechanisms (Okike and Adegbite, 2012; Clarke, 2015; Qian et al., 2018). 
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 However, beyond this firm-level focus, the emphasis of good governance, in the developing 
contexts, encompasses a broadened significance for macro-economic functions and developments. 
These include such goals as curtailing institutionalised corruption and fostering viable economic 
environments for growth and development (Reed, 2002; Claessens, 2006). For instance, even though 
a range of isomorphic forces appear to be prevalent in Zambia, embedded corruption is likely to 
require addressing before any meaningful change can be achieved in corporate governance reforms 
(Chanda et al., 2017). Also, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) reforms program across 
African countries, in the last decades, has mainly focused on agendas that are crucial for accelerating 
economic transformation, including the improvement of the quality of life of the populace, across the 
continent.15 Nonetheless, developing countries are noted to lack the institutions and structures on 
which such organisational systems in the advanced contexts depend (Gugler et al., 2003; Paredes, 
2005; Uddin et al., 2017). The advanced settings, as a result of the established institutional structures 
in these contexts, represent mature fields (Maguire et al., 2004). Organisational field, represents those 
organisations that constitute a recognised area of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A 
mature field epitomises relatively well-structured configurations (Maguire et al., 2004). Such a field 
usually comprises participants who have a strong mutual awareness of which organisations occupy 
given fields and which do not, thus encompassing, stable, routinised interactions (Scott, 1994, 2001;  
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Likewise, in most comparisons, in corporate governance reforms and 
diffusion of practices, studies have usually contrasted two dichotomous models of Anglo-American 
and Continental European corporate governance16 (Cuervo, 2002; Kaen, 2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Cromme, 2005; Talaulicar and Werder, 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013). Nonetheless, organisational fields normally display considerable 
diversity in approach and form in the initial stages of their life cycle (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In 
this vein, the literature and research on corporate governance reforms has typically been inclined 
towards developed economies, particularly the US and UK (Jhunjhunwala, 2012).   
 Even with the proposed homogeneity of practices from globalised governance principles, 
multiplicities of institutional structures remain (Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016). The concept of 
                                                             
15 For instance, in November, 2017, the Republic of Cameroon financed the first phase of the government’s 
Competitiveness and Economic Growth Support Programme (PACCE), sponsored by the AfDB, in line with the bank’s 2013 - 
2017 Private Sector Development Strategy, among others. As “Ousmane Dore, Director General of the Bank’s Central Africa 
Hub said while presenting the project to the Board, “The program aims at preserving macroeconomic and budgetary 
stability and contributing to laying the foundations for robust, resilient and inclusive economic growth by improving the 
public finance management framework and strengthening the governance and competitiveness of productive sectors 
(transport, energy and agriculture),”. <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/afdb-supports-cameroons-economic-
reforms-with-eur180-million-loan-17589/>Accessed on 20-10-2017. 
 
16 Yet this classification of Continental European corporate governance only partially fits Japan and other East Asian 
countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
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isomorphism best captures such a process of homogeneity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism 
is promoted through the actions of organisations incorporating norms from their institutional 
environments for benefits such as stability and/or legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Chizema and Buck, 2006). Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in 
a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). In their rhetorical model of institutional decision making, Hoefer and Green (2016) 
argue that the level of contestation during the institutionalisation process can decide the evaluations 
of a practice. Accordingly, there is a lower risk of doubting the effectiveness or legitimacy of a practice, 
‘where such practice faces higher burden of proof in order to be institutionalised’ (Hoefer and Green, 
2016: 143). On the one side, the Anglo-American model of corporate governance deploys strong 
corporate governance mechanisms to protect investors (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Such a system 
usually embodies the most comprehensive and well enforced mechanism towards the protection of 
investors (Bhide, 1994). In this respect, shareholders are comparatively passive with respect to 
internal control mechanisms and instead rely more on external corporate controls, such as hostile 
takeovers (Bhide, 1994; Dharwadkar et al., 2000). However, in developing countries such a higher 
burden of proof can often be lacking. Corporate governance in developing countries reflects differing 
circumstances. Rather than the prevalent external control in developed countries, studies have 
indicated the monitoring role of large shareholders within the developing corporate governance 
structure (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Waweru and Riro, 2013; Oluyemisi and 
Ayoib, 2017). Filatotchev and Allcock (2010), posit that ‘in societies with strong egalitarian tendencies, 
powerful stakeholders and reputational concerns frame managerial behaviour’. As a result, the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms – such as executive compensation – may be limited, 
regardless of the specific organisational context (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010). In this respect, 
attempts to explain the variations of organisational fields are expected to offer insights into diverse 
consequences of multiple logics manifestation within organisations (Besharov and Smith, 2014).  
 Developing countries encompass evolving institutional contexts. As Feleagă et al. (2011) 
assert, competitiveness in today’s global economy is more difficult in developing economies. As Kamal 
and Deegan (2013), discovered, although the garment and textile companies of Bangladesh are 
disclosing more social and environment-related governance information than that required by 
corporate regulatory authorities such as the SEC, the disclosures are still found to fall short of what 
might be ideal from the perspective of the international community. Nonetheless, organisations do 
not simply extract legitimacy from the environment; cultural definitions determine how the 
organisation is built, how it is run and, simultaneously, how it is understood and evaluated (Suchman, 
1995). Hoefer and Green (2016) highlight the role of actors that act to persuade themselves and others 
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to adopt, maintain, or reject practices. Aside from this, field level factors matter in corporate 
governance reproductions. As Filatotchev and Allcock (2010) argue, national institutional 
environments may affect the nature and extent of agency conflicts at the firm level. In 
developing/emerging countries, formal institutions, such as laws and regulations regarding accounting 
requirements, securities trading, information disclosure, and their enforcement, are either absent, 
inefficient, or do not operate as intended (Young et al., 2008; Qian et al., 2018). Also, through the 
absence of widely shared convergent norms, emerging fields, in contrast with mature ones, are 
initially characterised by an absence of stable coordination (Maguire et al., 2004). For instance, in 
Romania, in order to institute GCG practices, improvements in the business environment and the 
accountants’ and managers’ education are disclosed as necessary prerequisites (Albu et al., 2012). In 
addition, in developing countries block-ownership in companies is commonplace (Lodh et al., 2014; 
Das et al., 2015). Although principal-agent conflicts may be less prevalent, large shareholding control 
can potentially result in the hijack of business management by family owners (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2010). Regardless, the investigation of the implication of family-controlled, publicly-listed firms has 
traditionally been in governance research (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). Along this line, the 
resilience of cultural and institutional diversities has impacted on the theoretical arguments for and 
against the inevitability of the convergence of corporate governance systems (Clarke, 2016; Szabó, 
2017; Möllering and Müller-Seitz, 2018; Pemer and Skjølsvik, 2018).  
2.4.2  RESEARCH GAP  
In spite of the aforementioned, theoretical propositions in organisational studies have been 
challenged, often tacitly assuming that the institutional conditions found in developed economies are 
also present in other economies (Young et al., 2008). Gonzalez et al. (2005) find a significant 
relationship between ownership structure and firms’ utilisation of corporate governance provisions. 
Concentrated ownership is discovered to align incentives and encourage monitoring, but weakens 
other corporate governance mechanisms and can impose significant costs (Berglöf and Claessens, 
2006). In emergent economies, due to the overbearing influence of large shareholders, the BoD is 
often found to mainly play an advisory role in public companies, rather than provide an oversight 
function (Agyemang and Castellini, 2015). Nonetheless, corporate governance reforms are basically 
grounded in the ideologies of agency theory (Krenn, 2014; Adnan and Tandigalla, 2017; Lee, 2018). 
The dominant agency perspective does not sufficiently explore how corporate governance is shaped 
by its institutional embeddedness (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Wei et al., 2017). Nonetheless, in 
analysing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organisational environments, an open 
system approach is proposed (Aguilera et al., 2008). This professes the interdependencies and 
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complementarities of different corporate governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2008; Tenbensel, 
2018). In developing economies especially, changes in institutional structures are likely to be more 
frequent than when compared with an advanced economy, where there is less disparity (Baig and 
Godley, 2016). Organisations operating in high velocity business environments, such as in evolving 
contexts, often face the challenge of making hasty strategic decisions in the face of rapid change, 
ambiguity of information and lack of ability to verify key facts (Oliver and Roos, 2005: 889). Within 
such evolving fields, the widely shared values associated with normative forces have yet to develop, 
while diffuse power makes it difficult for individual actors to coerce others (Maguire et al., 2004).  
2.4.2.1   Corporate governance reforms in the Sub-Saharan Africa context 
 In the Sub-Saharan Africa region, economic integration, globalisation and the need for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) have particularly influenced the quest for improvements in corporate 
governance (Reed, 2002; Claessens, 2006; Klagge and Zademach, 2018). In this respect, prescriptions 
for good governance generally contain similar recommendations to the global corporate governance 
principles (Abor and Fiador, 2013; Munisi and Randøy, 2013; African Corporate Governance Network, 
February 2016; Waweru and Prot, 2018). This notwithstanding, organisational practices and 
mechanisms are frequently largely affected by a range of competing contextual elements, basically 
disregarded in universal corporate governance schemes. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa socio-
wellbeing can usually considerably moderate internal corporate governance practices, whereby, in the 
endorsement of corporate governance, actions towards wellbeing, such as corporations’ corporate 
health accounting practices, often impacts on firm value significantly (Ntim, 2016). Likewise, 
corporate governance in this region can rely on investment opportunities as the main factors 
influencing quality (Waweru, 2014); for instance, the level of dividend pay-out (or retention) by listed 
companies, in this region, can be significantly determined by the availability of or access to external 
funding opportunities (Abor and Fiador, 2013). Also, factors such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
and the political environment such as the level of governance, can determine corporate practices in 
terms of the volume of corporate social disclosures (Kühn et al., 2018). Likewise, the majority of Sub-
Saharan Africa stock exchanges are institutionally weak, small and illiquid, although there is an 
increasing number of them (Klagge and Zademach, 2018). Thus, there can be huge constraints on the 
effectiveness of corporate internal structures as a consequence of the interference from these 
contextual structures. However, companies sometimes have to vary their corporate governance 
practices to make up for the deficiency in external mechanisms. For instance, differences in the 
disclosure levels, among listed companies in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, are generally attributed to 
the different levels of corruption in these countries, as companies can often hide corrupt practices 
through minimal disclosures (Agyei-Mensah, 2017).  
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 Further, in the developing/emerging contexts, improvements in the enforcement 
environment, and the adoption and implementation of public laws, are often prevented by political-
economic constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics (Berglöf and Claessens, 
2006: 123). While legitimacy evaluation encompasses sense-making of collective actors who act upon 
some collective, macro level legitimacy judgment (Daft and Weick, 1984; Bitektine and Haack, 2015), 
efficiency in corporate governance, on the other hand is hypothesised to be determined by its fit 
within institutional contexts (Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Roberts and 
Greenwood (1997) portrayed this as a constrained-efficiency framework within institutional fields in 
the process of adopting new organisational designs. Within the developing context, poor governance 
standards are often considered to be some of the most difficult to mitigate, among the risks associated 
with investing (Governance Newsletter, 2014). Often, in making decisions, individuals and groups (in 
high velocity business environments) tend to use rules of thumb (Oliver and Roos, 2005). Although 
companies in Sub-Saharan Africa can potentially enhance their performance by adopting GCG 
practices, many publicly listed companies typically comply with just over half of the global ‘good 
corporate governance practices’ (Munisi and Randøy, 2013). It is particularly revealed in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, that country-specific fundamentals, institutions, policy, as well as governance and fiscal 
reforms, represent the key drivers of structural transformations in the region (Mensah et al., 2016). 
In this respect, Feleagă et al. (2011) discovered that due to cultural, economic and social factors, when 
compared with developed countries, the emerging economies are yet to develop a comprehensive 
approach to the implementation of principles of corporate governance.  
2.4.2.2   Nigerian institutional configurations and corporate governance reforms  
The prevalence of dysfunctional institutions, dearth of infrastructures, less developed financial 
markets, etc., portrays a challenging institutional context17 for corporate governance in Nigeria 
(Yakasai, 2001; Okpara and Kabongo, 2010; Amaeshi et al., 2016). As in other corporate contexts 
across the globe, gross inefficiency and unethicality involving corporations’ boards in their oversight 
functions have also been reported in Nigeria18. However, in Nigeria these issues are associated with 
contextual factors, such as general level of illiteracy in the country and endogenous or attitudinal 
challenges; and impunity, greed and connivance among company directors and consultants 
                                                             
17 The following are identified from past studies and extant survey of the literature, as institutional variances (peculiarities), 
in the distinct context of Nigeria:  Ownership structure; (Lack of) shareholder activism and low protection of minority 
shareholders rights, principal - principal conflicts,  endemic and institutionalised corruption; (Lack of) supporting 
institutions and enforcement framework; (weak) financial/capital market; (inadequate) legal and regulatory system; socio-
economic factors; (high level of poverty; high level of illiteracy/low level of education); cultural factors; (varied views, 
opinions, values, beliefs, norms, schema, mores) (Aoki, 2001; Ahunwan, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2012; Nmehielle and Nwauche, 2004; Okike, 2007; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Adekoya, 2011; Adegbite et al., 
2012).  
18 For instance, corporate frauds, such as the Cadbury Nigeria and Halliburton Scandals, in 2007 and 2008 respectively were 
reported. Also, in 2009, The CBN sacked eight bank executives on allegations of fraud and other corporate misdemeanours. 
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(Ahunwan, 2002; Yakasai, 2001; Bakre, 2007; Owolabi and Ogbechie, 2010; Adekoya, 2011; Donwa 
and Odia, 2013; Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014; Adegbite, 2015). Bakre (2007) specifically reported the 
lack of appropriate disciplinary action against erring company external consultants in Nigeria. Further, 
the absence of a large pool of qualified candidates to act specifically as independent directors or 
members of audit committees in Nigeria, is also indicated (Adegbite, 2012b). Nonetheless, these 
institutional mechanisms which constitute significant complementarities for effective corporate 
governance reforms are commonly predominant in the developed countries (Cuervo, 2002; Dore, 
2005). 
 The BoD usually serves as an instrument of strategic control within corporate governance 
infrastructures (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Dalton et al., 1998; Keenan, 2004; Mahadeo et al., 
2012). In developed countries, the emergence of institutional investors and shareholder activism has 
substantively influenced the board and executives in the discharge of their duties (Charkham and 
Simpson, 1999). However, such a condition is nascent within this context. Specifically, shareholder 
activism is discovered to still be at the developing stage in Nigeria (See Ahunwan, 2002; Amao and 
Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite et al., 2012). Moreover, Adegbite et al. (2012) state that shareholder 
associations in Nigeria are often ineffective in protecting the minority shareholder, as their members 
sometimes compromise on their responsibility. These shareholder groups often accept bribes, take up 
appointments on company boards and collude with company executives, thus exposing minority 
shareholders to expropriation (Adegbite et al., 2012). In this regard, Sanda et al. (2005) find that there 
is no significant relationship between the appointment of outside (independent) directors and firm 
performance in Nigeria. Their study suggests the need for regulatory agencies to reassess the 
functionalities of outside (independent) directors, in Nigeria. Ojeka et al. (2017) investigated the 
impact of the revised Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (2011) on the market performance of 
selected firms in the Nigerian capital market. Their study, however, shows that as presently captured 
in the code, the non-executive and independent directors tend to guarantee more the independence 
of the audit committee and the larger board. Therefore, it is suggested that to stabilise the system 
and reinstate the confidence of investors, there is a need to strengthen the implementation of every 
recommendation contained therein (Ojeka et al., 2017).  
 The Nigerian corporate governance model mainly evolved from the British – outsider19 
(shareholder oriented) – corporate governance system (Ahunwan, 2002). However, studies have 
                                                             
19 Some of the features of the outsider (Shareholder) system of corporate governance include: dispersed ownership, 
separation of owners from control, little incentive for outsider investors to participate in corporate control, highly 
sophisticated and diversified financial market, low commitment of outsider investor to long term strategies of firm (Corbett 
and Mayer, 1991 in Clarke, 2007: 10). 
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revealed features of the insider system20 of corporate governance in developing countries (Claessens 
et al., 1999a; Coombes and Watson, 2001). Studies by Amao and Amaeshi (2008) and Adegbite (2012a) 
also reveal the presence of large shareholders constituting the majority of investors in Nigeria. As La 
Porta et al. (2000) argue, large shareholders might often be instrumental in aligning the interests of 
management with those of shareholders. However, this shareholder group can also sometimes resist 
corporate reforms, where they perceive that such change can militate against their control and 
influence in corporate management (La Porta et al., 2000). Nonetheless, it is suggested that in Nigerian 
listed companies, block-holders can constitute significant monitoring mechanisms (Oluyemisi and 
Ayoib, 2017).  Along this line, Nakpodia and Adegbite (2018) examine the relationship between elitist 
interventions and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, they argue 
that elites can invent, circumvent and corrupt institutions, in the presence of institutional voids. In this 
respect, as against the institutional change widely viewed as needed in developing countries, Adegbite 
and Nakajima (2012) propose that the institutional maintenance of norms, practices and structures, 
largely exists. Further the study argues that if corporate governance models, especially in developing 
countries, were not institutionally based, they could have limited applicability (Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2012). In this respect, a previous study, which evaluated the ability of the various corporate 
codes in Nigeria to provide intended reforms, indicated that conflict among the codes reduces 
compliance (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Equally, the implementation of corporate governance 
reforms in Nigeria is noted to be challenged by the proliferation of codes, which created 
implementation and monitoring difficulties for both the related firms and the regulatory agencies 
(Bello, 2016). However, beyond the launch or implementation of corporate governance codes, the 
need arises to improve knowledge about how intended good governance reforms are achieved. Along 
this line, Daodu et al. (2017) propose a thorough understanding of the interrelationship among the 
institutional variables as a necessary precondition in establishing an effective corporate governance 
structure in Nigeria. 
 In light of the budding research in the neo-institutional sphere of organisational studies, 
diffusion theory, institutional reproductions or innovations, mapping the inference of peculiarities of 
the developing contexts, are necessary. Nonetheless, perspectives on the elaboration of the 
institutionalisation of organisational changes, other than the mainly reported outcome or impact, 
within the Sub-Saharan Africa organisational fields, is found to still be relatively uncharted. Thus, to 
the extent of the review of the literature, a lacuna is revealed. First is regarding the theorisation of the 
                                                             
20 Some features of the insider (stakeholder) system include: concentrated ownership, association of ownership by control, 
control by interested parties (banks, related firms), high ratio of bank credit to total liabilities, low level of sophistication 
and diversification of financial markets, and stewardship of business (Corbett and Mayer, 1991 in Clarke, 2007: 10). 
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establishment of new organisational practices within this evolving context. Second, particularly, with 
the increasing universalities (and externalities) of corporate governance principles, scholars have 
called for definitive explanations of the contextualisation of these institutional reproductions. Studies 
have advocated for a better understanding of the complementarities (or otherwise) of institutional 
structures with corporate governance innovation agenda (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Filatotchev et al., 2013; Cuomo et al., 2016; Talaulicar et al., 2017; Tenbensel, 2018). To this end, a 
case is made for the elaboration of the procedure of corporate governance reforms within the 
organisational field of the developing country. Given the variability of these developing contexts, such 
investigation represents necessary advancements in adaptive corporate governance reforms or 
practice. In particular, this investigation proposes significant efforts towards understanding the 
transition – beyond the diffusion or launch of codes – to the eventual actualisation of governance 
(organisational) innovations. This study therefore attempts to bridge this knowledge gap, using 
Nigeria, a central Sub-Saharan Africa country, as a typology. Considering the affirmed variance 
between the institutional domains of the developed and developing nations, this study enables the 
practicalities of these attempts at transformation, to equally aid policy making. While not postulating 
that a single study focusing only on Nigeria will be entirely generalisable in this respect, nonetheless, 
the study enables vital insights with respect to the subject of inquiry. Consequentially, the 
investigation engenders transferability of the outcomes to other similarly developing settings, 
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Chapter 3 – Research Methodology  
3.0 Introduction 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. The first part discusses the methodological 
approach. Within this section, the research approach (paradigm) and design are described. In this 
respect, the section reviews the ontological and epistemological perspectives adopted in the research. 
It explains the research sampling techniques, methods and data gathering techniques. Access to data, 
sample selection, ethical consideration and the limitations of the methodology, are also discussed. 
The second section outlines the interviewing and data collection procedure adopted to gather the 
necessary data employed in fulfilling the objectives of this research. The third section relates mainly 
to the analysis procedure that the study adopts to make meaning of issues emerging from the data. 
This follows a grounded theory methodological position through an interpretivism/inductive analytical 
approach.  
Section 1 – Methodological Framework 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
 The research paradigm (approach) involves the overall decisions made regarding the 
procedure for an inquiry into the topic of interest (Creswell, 2013). Rather than the methods 
employed, the paradigmatic lens of the researcher guide the whole research process (Avramidis and 
Smith, 1999). The overall research approach is usually determined by the different ontological and 
epistemological views on the social world and how it can be studied (Matthews and Ross, 2011). Along 
this line, the constructionism (interpretivism) perspective provides a fitting basis (see Guba, 1990), 
complementary to the research agenda of investigating the process of instituting corporate 
governance reforms within the context of choice (Kuhn, 1962). Correspondingly, in obtaining and 
evaluating social/organisational actors’ opinions, this study adopts a qualitative approach for the 
execution of the research purpose. This methodological approach to the research is not random. The 
choice of the qualitative approach was informed by the cited ontological and philosophical stance 
(assumptions) adopted by the researcher in achieving the research objective(s). It is also steered by 
the existing conceptualisations in the literature or theoretical perspective (Guba, 1990). In accordance 
with this research paradigm, an inductive approach to data analysis is employed, for the analysis of 
the data gathered. Such an inductive proposition aligns with the qualitative technique which forms 
the basis of the interpretivism philosophy adopted in this study (Guba, 1990). Moreover, rather than 
a positivist (deductive) position that aims to assess theoretical propositions, the inductive approach 
helps to promote the development of theory. This intent is fostered through a grounded theory 
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framework, which usually embodies such a qualitative research technique (Glaser and Strauss, 1999). 
In the succeeding segments of this section, each aspect of the research paradigm is discussed in detail. 
3.1.1 Research Ontological and Epistemological (Philosophical) Perspectives 
 Ontology and epistemology perspectives can be viewed as two sides of a coin. Ontology in 
social research refers to the way the social world and social phenomena are viewed (Matthews and 
Ross, 2011). In other words, it is the distinction between the way the world is and the meaning and 
interpretation of that world by individuals (Ritchie et al., 2013: 5).  Epistemology (philosophy) on the 
other hand is concerned with how we know and learn about the world and what forms the basis of 
our knowledge (Ritchie et al., 2013). Ontological issues are mainly concerned with the nature of reality 
– either in a subjective or objective view – and what is to be known about the world (Saunders et al., 
2012; Creswell, 2013). Research Philosophy (epistemology) on the other hand, relates to the 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline or field of study (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 2012). 
In social research, the research paradigms or philosophies typically dictate the methods for collecting 
data, and analysing and interpreting those data (Grbich, 2013). The research philosophy adopted 
contains assumptions that will underpin the research strategy and the methods chosen as part of that 
strategy (Saunders et al., 2012).  
 Such a qualitative research technique is adopted in this study, which involves researchers 
embracing the notion of multiple realities (Creswell, 2013). This notion of multiple realities is reflected 
in the ontological view embodied in social constructivism and the interpretivism epistemology (Schutt, 
2011). The researcher’s perspective involves the assumptions made concerning the relationship 
between ontology, epistemology and human nature (Holden and Lynch, 2004). In this study, the social 
constructionism/interpretivism position adopted views reality as being “socially constructed” 
(Saunders et al., 2012). This is because this study identifies that ‘realities in this social inquiry derive 
from the meaning of the phenomenon for the participants’ (Matthews and Ross, 2011). This position 
assumes that knowledge is not independent of thinking (Grbich, 2013). Hence, reality is viewed as 
socially embedded and existing within the mind (Grbich, 2013), whereby, ‘social actors, may place 
many different interpretations on the situations in which they find themselves.’ (Saunders et al., 
2012).  
 In this respect, the perspective in this investigation identifies the concept of language as a 
symbolic action, which suggests that language, whether written or spoken, both shapes and reflects 
the assumptions (e.g. attitudes, values, ideologies, etc.) of social actors within a given community 
(Burke, 1966; Harmon et al., 2015). Multiple realities are therefore presumed, with different people 
experiencing these differently (Walle, 2015). Accordingly, in the social constructivism approach, the 
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goal of the research is considered as reliant, as much as possible, on the views of participants 
(Creswell, 2013). This study relates to assessing the views and perceptions of the subjects of interest. 
The central position of the study is that individuals’ views and experiences count and can be explored 
as multiple realities in social research. This thus mirrors the fundamental idea depicted by the social 
constructionism (interpretivism) research philosophy, which this research adopts. 
3.1.2  Research Conceptualisation 
 In addition to the ontological position, the theoretical framing of the study – (neo)-
institutional theory – also has a bearing on the research approach. Theoretical orientation explains 
the viewpoint of the researcher in the choice of the research methodology (Corbin and Strauss, 2015).  
The use of theoretical frameworks from previous studies provides the ideas and insights for 
developing the current study (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). While not being constrained within the 
existing conceptualisations in the literature – as this study opens itself up to varying outcomes in the 
investigation, towards possible theory development – the research approach however is guided by 
the notion of the ‘embeddedness’ within the institutional theorisation of corporate governance (Aoki, 
2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Scott, 2004). The idea of the ‘embeddedness’ of corporate 
governance posits that corporate governance practices are enshrined in their institutional contexts, 
and reflect such social constructions as values, schema, norms, traditions, beliefs etc. (Aoki, 2001; 
Scott, 2001; 2004; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Judge et al., 2008; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). This 
study explores the views of corporate governance stakeholders in the context of Nigeria, thus, 
similarly, this investigation relates largely to these endogenous factors.  
3.2     Research Technique - Qualitative Research Technique 
 The study employs a qualitative research method as this research technique supports the 
overall research position. Quantitative research typically aims to test assumption(s) (Flick, 2011), and 
often controls for predetermined criteria (Walle, 2015), which do not complement the cited 
constructivism philosophy of this study. On the contrary, the very essence of qualitative research is to 
gain insights that can be afforded through the in-depth examination of a phenomenon, normally 
adopted in the technique (Simons et al., 2008). In addition, qualitative research is naturalistic in 
nature, whereby the researcher intends to make sense of phenomena in view of the meaning people 
attach to them (Newman and Benz, 1998). The study investigates datasets, which requires an in-depth 
approach to data gathering, offered through the qualitative research technique. Thus, the adopted 
qualitative research approach aligns with the cited conceptualisation of this investigation. 
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 Further, a qualitative technique entails an interpretative research procedure (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994, 2011). The interpretivist (epistemology) research philosophy contends that the truth 
about a phenomenon of study can only be understood through subjective delineation (Taylor et al., 
2015; Corbin and Strauss, 2015). Qualitative research tends to provide a platform to identify issues 
from the perspective of the study participants (Hennink et al., 2011). By providing participants own 
meaning to issues, and interpreting viewpoints and stories, qualitative research permits a holistic 
procedure to lived experiences (Tracy, 2013: 5). Such research agenda requires the researcher to 
investigate views and issues in their natural settings (Hennink et al., 2011). Such a research technique 
thus aids the identification of how peoples’ behaviours and subjective meaningful experiences are 
shaped by the social, cultural, economic or physical context of their lives (Snape and Spencer, 2008; 
Hennink et al., 2011). This relates to the exploration of multiple realities underlying the constructivist 
ideology, which addresses the processes of interaction among individuals (Creswell, 2013). This social 
research approach usually involves a form of flexibility that is not typically availed by the strict 
scientific procedures involved in quantitative research (Flick, 2011; Walle, 2015). The foregoing – 
theoretical and philosophical attributes – conforms to the fulfilment of this investigation, thus a 
qualitative research method was adopted. 
3.3   Research Methods   
 A qualitative research technique includes a specific set of methods, such as ‘in-depth 
interviews, focus group discussions, visual methods, direct observations, ethno-methodological, the 
life histories or biographies’ (Hennink et al., 2011; Berg and Lune, 2012) and archival records, 
document and textual analysis (Yin, 2010). In order to ensure research validity, a mixed qualitative 
approach to data collection is adopted in this study. This includes two main sources of data: interviews 
and documentary (archival) dataset. This ‘combination of multiple methods in a qualitative study 
depicts the researcher’s intention to add rigour, breadth and depth to his/her investigation.’ (Flick, 
1992: 194).    
3.3.1  Interviews 
 Berg and Lune (2012) assert that interviews provide rich, detailed and insightful accounts of a 
phenomenon. Thus, the interview method becomes imperative for data gathering in social research 
when the research’s objectives centre on understanding experiences, opinions, attitudes, values, 
processes or predictions of research participants (Rowley, 2012). Qualitative research interviews 
usually include unstructured and semi-structured interviewing (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The use of the 
unstructured or ‘non- directive’ interview (Whyte, 1953) in research usually allows the respondents 
much freedom, which can often risk the interviewees’ responses being tangential to the research 
objective, which may question the reliability or validity of the data. The semi-structured interview 
 
Page | 69  
 
however, while allowing the respondent plenty of freedom, also seeks to provide some focus (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). This study thus employs the conduct of in-depth semi-structured (one-to-one) 
interviews.  
• Semi-structured in-depth interview 
 The semi-structured interview is used in this study, because the study aims at understanding 
how participants make meaning of issues (Tracy, 2013). The interview technique allows a vivid picture 
of the participant’s perspective on the research topic (Milena et al., 2008). It also facilitates in-depth 
exploration of issues, by enabling follow-up questions or probes (Yin, 2010). These benefits are 
significant in order to be able to explore endogenous issues involved in this study. The semi-structured 
interview usually involves a list of questions on the subject under investigation, known as the 
‘interview guide’ (Bryman and Bell, 2011). However, the interviewee is given some leeway in 
responding (Yin, 2010; Bryman and Bell, 2011). This allows more flexibility for the interviewee to 
express his/her points of view, i.e. 'telling the story as it is’, in accordance with the interview 
guide/direction (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 467), which engenders rich and detailed insights (Berg and 
Lune, 2012). Aside from this, the semi-structured interview used in the study helped to give direction 
around the aims of the study, through the interview guide. 
3.3.2 Documentary (archival) analysis 
 Documentary (archival) analysis was employed as an additional research technique in the 
study. This includes the collection of contents of other printed materials, graphics, archival records 
and physical artefacts (Yin, 2010). In qualitative research, data are also regarded ‘as representations 
of human acts and utterances’ thus documents are seen as data (Sarantakos, 2012: 365). This research 
method helped to substantiate and increase the authenticity of data obtained through the interview 
process (Flick, 2011; Grbich, 2013). This usually enables a reliable and rich source of data in social 
science research (Cowton, 1998). The use of interview in social research is usually considered a highly 
subjective type of data collection method (Schutt, 2011). In this study, the use of documentary data 
provided an unobtrusive method of extracting data, thus helping to reduce researcher’s bias (Payne 
and Payne, 2004). Thus, using such additional means of data gathering for corroborating the 
interviews technique helped to increase the validity of this research’s data. Documentary evidence 
accessed in this study includes both private and public documents, such as official gazette, circulars, 
internal memos, manuals, company annual reports, articles, newspaper reports and other archives.  
This method also helped to triangulate the interview data. The documentary analysis thus added 
sufficient breadth and depth to the research study, as it helped to inform the issues raised during the 
interview in a complementary manner. 
 
Page | 70  
 
3.4 Participants’ Selection process  
3.4.1        Sampling Technique  
Purposive (judgment) and snowball sampling are commonly used sampling techniques in qualitative 
research design (see Marshall, 1996; Tracy, 2013; Walle, 2015). This study adopts both of these in the 
selection of interview participants, as they are considered a realistic means of addressing the research 
questions.  
3.4.1.1  Purposive or Judgment Sampling  
 This involves a process where the researcher purposively chooses data respondents that fit 
the parameters of the project’s research, questions, goals and purposes (Tracy, 2013). Qualitative 
research involves in-depth analysis of issues under investigation, thus samples for qualitative 
investigations tend to be small and chosen purposely (Marshall, 1996; Hennink et al., 2011). This study 
realises that some informants are 'richer' than others and that these people are more likely to provide 
insights and understanding for the researcher (Marshall, 1996). Thus, in this qualitative research, the 
researcher selected participants and integrated cases according to their significance (Flick, 2011). 
Sampling is therefore purposefully focused on a structured or predetermined group of participants 
(Tracy, 2013: 135).  In this light, the purposive sampling technique adopted in this study provides the 
basis for the researcher to target the respondents that are relevant to the study. 
 
3.4.1.2   Snowball Sampling 
 “This represents another method for reaching ‘difficult-to-access’ or hidden populations.” 
(Tracy, 2013: 136). Snowball sampling techniques offer an established method for identifying and 
contacting hidden populations and, potentially, for their enumeration (Atkinson, 2003).  “Researcher 
begins by identifying several participants who fit the study’s criteria and then ask these people to 
suggest a colleague, a friend, or a family member” (Tracy, 2013: 136). In this study, the snowball 
sampling approach was applied through the recommendations and referrals of respondents, which 
included relevant stakeholders in the Nigerian corporate governance context. This provided an 
invaluable means of accessing more relevant stakeholders, especially those that were not easy to 
contact by the researcher beforehand. 
 The study adopted a multidimensional approach to data gathering by targeting varied 
categories of key stakeholders in order to obtain data triangulation – triangulation of sources – 
(Hennink et al., 2011; Flick et al., 2004). This provides validity, richness, reliability and valuable insight 
into the issues under investigation.  
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3.4.2    Categorisation, Criteria and Access to participants 
3.4.2.1    Categorisation of participants 
 In order to ensure triangulation of data sources (See Flick, 2004), which also affords a holistic 
view, respondents from the three categories of key stakeholders identified in the corporate 
governance sphere of Nigeria (Okike, 2007; Adegbite, 2012b; Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014) were 
interviewed. The process includes participants being selected based on their relevance to the research 
objective. In this regard, for the purpose of this study, the study classified the relevant stakeholders 
as persons that were involved in, have contributed to, or whose activities/interests are deemed to 
have been influenced directly and are adequately informed about corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria. This also involved affiliate and representatives of such persons. The key stakeholders are 
identified based on the past research and literature on corporate governance in Nigeria (Okike, 2007; 
Adekoya, 2011; Okike and Adegbite, 2012; Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014) and other parts of the world 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Aguilera et al., 2008). These stakeholders are relevant 
as they are recognised as having adequate understanding about corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria and are able to provide expanded insights into the issues under investigation. Within this 
study, these stakeholders fall into three main categories as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Triangulation of respondents: Key Corporate Governance Stakeholders in Nigeria 
 
The constituents of these categorisations include; 
 
Page | 72  
 
• Corporate governance Regulators and Policy makers 
• Listed corporations and affiliated Companies 
• Other Corporate Governance contributors 
3.4.2.2      Selection of participants and Access to Data (participants) 
Selection of targeted respondents, within each of the above classes, was based on their perceived 
significance to the study as analysed. The specific stakeholders relevant to this research were 
identified as: 
1) Regulators and Policy Makers in Nigeria 
Government agencies, parastatals and institutions, in the capacity of administrators and 
regulators of the corporate governance matters in Nigeria. National agencies responsible for 
enacting standards in corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria. These include 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), SEC, Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), CBN, PENCOM, 
NAICOM, FRCN, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN). The representatives of all 
the above-listed regulatory and policy making agencies constitute respondents in the study, under 
this category. 
• Access to Data (participants) 
 The above identified agencies were contacted initially through email. Out of the 20 agencies 
contacted via email only two responded initially. The researcher then had to visit the premises of 
these parastatals physically. A letter of introduction relating to the study and the researcher was 
submitted to these agencies. An overview of the research questions was also provided. The 
researcher was then contacted by the agency to schedule the interview date, time and the 
designated person(s) to grant the interview. The designated officials were the relevant persons in 
charge of corporate governance best practices or compliance within these agencies. Ultimately 16 
officials participated in the research. 
 
2) Listed and public interest corporations and affiliates 
 These include all listed companies in Nigeria. These represent entities that are mandated to 
comply with the provisions of the corporate governance codes in Nigeria (SEC codes, 2003, 2011). 
They are also companies that are regulated by the Nigerian SEC. This also includes affiliates or 
associates of these listed companies. Participants within this group include Chairmen, CEOs, 
Executives, company secretaries, legal counsels and other Executive Officers of these listed 
companies, such as board committee members and other management staff.  
 All listed companies in Nigeria were open to selection, in order to engender fair dealing and 
spread. Companies were randomly selected under the industry categories in the NSE listings. This 
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includes the two major classifications of listed companies as indigenous and foreign affiliated 
companies. The sample included a mix of companies from the 12-sector categorisation of the NSE 
listings: services, utilities, oil and gas, conglomerates, natural resources, information and 
communication technology, industrial goods, healthcare, financial services, consumer goods, 
construction/real estate and Agriculture. Three companies were selected from each of the 12-




 The 36 companies were initially contacted through email sent to the company secretariat 
stating the object of the study; 20 responses were received from these companies indicating 
interest in participating and identifying the corporate governance personnel that would grant an 
interview. However, ultimately, 12 corporate participants were able to make the interviews, with 
eight unable to keep their appointments. The participants were designated by the company based 
on their responsibilities/roles and as anchor persons in charge of corporate governance matters. 
These include persons that are involved in corporate governance affairs, policies, agenda, best 
practices and codes of conduct in these companies. 
3) Major corporate governance contributors  
 These include persons or organisations that have significantly contributed to corporate 
governance and/or corporate governance reforms in Nigeria in the last decades. These 
categorisations thus involve professional bodies [e.g. The Society for Corporate Governance 
Nigeria (SCGN), The Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria (CITN), The Chartered Institute of 
Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN), Institute of Directors Nigeria (IoD)], consultants or auditors of listed 
companies, corporate governance rating or censorship bodies, academia in corporate governance 
discipline, persons who have been members of committees inaugurated with regard to corporate 
governance matters or reforms (e.g. the SEC code 2003, 2011 steering committee, FRCN corporate 
governance reforms’ committee), consultants on corporate governance matters and watchdogs 
in relation to corporate governance issues in Nigeria. 
 
• Participants 
These groups of participants were selected based on the listed criteria above. Those individuals 
that were identified within this category were contacted for participation in the study. In total, 30 
persons and organisations were contacted for interview via email. The research overview was sent 
to the individuals, 12 persons indicated interest to participate in the study initially. Out of these 
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12 persons, three could not fulfil their appointment, making it nine participants that were 
eventually interviewed for the study, under this category. 
3.4.2.3    Demography of respondents 
 The analysis of the stakeholders who participated in the study, as per the three 
categorisations, is shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1:   Demographic Analysis of Participants  
Category 
 
Demography of Participants Number 
   
Regulators and Policy makers Directors 5 
(SEC, CAC, NSE, CBN, FRCN, 
ICAN, PENCOM, NAICOM) 
Deputy Directors 
Heads of Departments 
  6 
5 
   
Companies and Affiliates 
(Listed and Public Interest 
Companies) 
Company Secretaries/ Legal 
Counsels 






   
Other Corporate Governance 
contributors 
 
Rating Agents 2 
Contributors/Observers 









Participants:  Regulators 16; Listed Companies: 12; Other Contributors: 9   
 
 In order to protect the identity and fulfil the confidentiality ethical obligation in the research, 
the interview respondents were anonymised using Alpha-Numeric representations (see Appendix 1 
for the tabulation of the interviews as per the three categories). The prefix letters denote the 
categories of the interviews, for instance, the prefix R = Regulators and policy makers; C = Listed 
Companies respondents; O = Corporate Governance (CG) Contributors and independent observers. 
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The remaining letters depict the alphabetical sequence for the respondent. The number of each 
interview is then stated following these numeric configurations. For instance the interview RCM 03 
denotes a respondent – Regulator or a Policy maker – with the corresponding interview number 03. 
SECTION 2 - Data collection  
3.5      Data gathering process 
3.5.1  Format of the interview     
 Rowley (2012) outlines the processes usually involved in social research interviews, which 
depict the phases similar to the interview procedure adopted in this inquiry. These include: 
• The determination/selection of the relevant respondents. 
• The determination of the sample technique, e.g. purposive sampling. 
• Obtaining access to the targeted respondents. 
• The actual interview, the conversation and engagement of the interviewee. 
• Using prompts and probes (Rowley, 2012). 
 
The fieldwork was carried out between December 2015 and March 2016. At the commencement of 
the data collection process, the earlier interviews helped to ensure that the intents of the research 
were properly construed through the interview guide. This was done by trying to review the responses 
and reactions of some of the early participants to the interview questions. This process helped to avoid 
complex and poorly worded questions that were found difficult to answer during the earlier phase. 
Also, throughout the data gathering process, this procedure was adopted to ensure that the interview 
reflected the objective of the study and any new developments.  
 The interview guide/question was sent in beforehand. This enabled the respondents to 
familiarise themselves with the objectives of the study and the research (see Appendix 2 for the 
format of the interview guide/questions). The research involved a face-to-face approach to 
interviewing. This form of interview is recognised to have the ability to provide the best insights into 
respondents’ opinions and better analysis of background issues. According to Creswell (2013: 20), 
interpretivism research philosophy has the advantage of interpreting the social world from the 
perspective of the subject under investigation. This can only be achieved by getting as close as possible 
to the subjects (Creswell, 2013). Thus, telephone or mail interviews usually lack the face-to-face 
nonverbal cues that researchers use to pace their interviews and to determine the direction to move 
in (Berg and Lune, 2012: 3). The one-to-one interview in this study helped to achieve such benefits. 
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Body language and expressions from respondents offered added dimensions to the responses, which 
enabled greater insight into the data.  
3.5.2 The Interview Procedure 
 The one-to-one discussion procedure adopted in the study also helped to build trust between 
the interviewer and the respondents. Prior research in Nigeria indicates the importance of establishing 
trust in investigations involving top public sector officials and company executives (Uche et al., 2016). 
The discussions started with a brief introduction of the researcher, the research project, followed by 
the aims and the objectives of the interview and the major categorisation of the interview questions. 
The respondents were also assured of their confidentiality, as many were initially concerned about 
the use to which the data will be put. The respondents however became relaxed and comfortable 
when they were guaranteed the protection of their identities and the anonymity of the interviews 
(data).  
 The average time for each interview was approximately 70 minutes. The interviews were kept 
within this range to prevent interviewees/subjects from becoming disinterested (Rowley, 2012). This 
also ensured that sufficient time was allowed for the detailed information and the scope of the 
research/interview questions to be adequately covered. These discussions were audio recorded in 
about 90% of the cases; about 10% of the participants objected to being recorded. In this case, note 
taking was primarily adopted by the researcher. The data collection process followed a three-month 
period in Nigeria.   
 The interview procedure was designed in such a way as to ensure high quality data were 
gathered. Although the research guide/questions served as a direction for the overall process, the 
respondents were however given leeway to discuss at length. Probing, follow-up questions and 
prompting were used during the interview process in order to add necessary depth to the research 
(see Bryman and Bell, 2011). Follow-up questions to earlier discussions enabled the researcher to gain 
a deeper insight into emerging issues. In some instances, questions were reframed to obtain 
confirmation of responses on similar issues. The use of probes and follow-up questions also enabled 
the researcher to corroborate the responses from interviewees. This enhanced the authenticity and 
credibility of the data. Prompting ensured that the interviewees were appropriately guided in 
answering the interview question, where ambiguity was suspected. However, prompting was done to 
the barest minimum to avoid undue interference from the researcher (Emerson, 1983). As much as 
possible, the researcher tried to conduct the interview in a conversational manner, to allow an open 
discussion. The interview process was specific to each respondent with each person given the leeway 
to direct the ‘mood’ and trend of the process. As the survey involves qualitative open-ended 
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questions, this enabled the researcher to gain a more naturalistic account of participants’ experiences. 
The interview guide was modified to capture emerging issues and, in some cases, to ensure more 
clarity of inquiry. The modification was continuous throughout the data collection procedure. The 
interview procedure was repeated throughout the data gathering process until data saturation was 
reached. In all, 37 interviews were conducted.  
3.5.3 Data saturation 
The data gathering spanned across the 3-months period until data saturation was reached. Data 
saturation was considered to be achieved as similar themes and information (information 
redundancy) began to emerge from the process (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This usually indicates 
that adequate depth and breadth have been covered in the data gathering process (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). The number and type of data collected within the inquiry indicate depth in a qualitative 
research (Russell and Gregory, 2003). On the other hand, attention to multiple perspectives and 
vantage points, in relation to the area of inquiry, enhances breadth in qualitative studies (Russell and 
Gregory, 2003). Specifically, during this data gathering process, this stage was realised to have been 
reached when the interviews did not convey additional new information. Also, the documentary 
analysis began to reveal redundant data and no variation in the information that was emerging (Fusch 
and Ness, 2015). Further, the type of respondents and the documentary analysis involved in this study 
represent the most relevant populations (see criteria for selection in preceding section 3.5.2.2), which 
provided the best opportunity for the researcher to fulfil the purpose of the study (see Burmeister and 
Aitken, 2012). In addition, the length of time allowed for the interviews provided the required in-depth 
knowledge of participants’ experienced. Also, the structure of the interview guide (questions) 
provided an avenue for the researcher to extract all information relevant to the subject of inquiry 
(Fusch and Ness, 2015). All this enables sufficient depth in the data gathering process. The breadth in 
the data collection relates to the necessary scope being covered in the research. This objective was 
achieved in the study, as participants constitute all the relevant key corporate governance 
stakeholders which span a range of the different corporations, disciplines, professions, parastatals, 
responsibilities, industries, across the Nigerian corporate sector. Thus, the 37 interviews generated 
are representative of the general opinions about corporate governance reforms within the context. 
These allowed multiple perspectives in the investigation. 
3.5.4 Negative Obtrusiveness and researcher’s bias  
In a qualitative study researcher’s bias can normally arise through the overlap between the 
researcher’s own perspective or personal lens and the participant’s views (Denzin, 2009). This might 
create concerns in qualitative research with an underlying interpretive epistemology (Jackson, 1990). 
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In this study researcher’s bias was mitigated by ensuring that the interpretation of the information 
represents completely the views of the participants and not that of the researcher (Holloway et al., 
2010). In this study, the researcher’s personal bias regarding the subject of inquiry was identified early 
on at the inception of the study. In this respect, deliberate effort was made to prevent infiltrations 
and interferences of personal viewpoints with the data collection and analysis (Dibley, 2011; Chenail, 
2011). In addition, for instance, participants’ responses were transcribed verbatim and the exact 
expressions and views of participants were retained, as evidence in the study.  
SECTION 3    Data Analysis Approach 
3.6.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 In relation to the qualitative methodological approach to the research, a qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) procedure is considered a fit. Qualitative methodology targets societal issues, problems 
and questions, thus helping to understand the world, its societies and institutions (Tracy, 2013; 
McNulty et al., 2013; Hsieh and Shannon, 2016). The literature indicates some approaches that are 
available for the analysis of qualitative research. Amongst these are: Ethnography, Life history, Case 
study, Participant’s observation, Phenomenological study, Descriptive Interpretive research, Action 
research, Narrative research, Symbolic interactionist study, Constructionism or Interpretive analysis, 
Discourse analysis (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Schutt, 2011; Ritchie et al., 2013). The theoretical 
framework, the research questions and the overall research interest usually dictate the data analysis 
approach (Weber, 1990). Thus, in line with the ontological (constructionism), the epistemological 
(interpretivism) and theoretical (institutional) viewpoints, this study adopts an interpretive 
(constructionist) framework for data analysis. “Interpretive (constructionist) analysis explores the 
meaning and significance of a relevant experience to given participants, in order to gain insights into 
their psychosocial processes.” (Ritchie et al., 2013: 18).  
  “The logic that the qualitative researcher follows is inductive, from the ground up, rather than 
handed down entirely from a theory or from the perspectives of the inquirers.” (Creswell, 2013: 22). 
The (conventional) qualitative content analysis forms one of numerous research procedures used to 
analyse text data and to interpret meaning from the context of text data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
In this respect, a qualitative content analysis procedure is employed to analyse the data gathered in 
this investigation. In this study, ‘qualitative content analysis is defined as a research method for the 
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and Shannon, 2016: 1278). Such ‘content analysis 
describes a family of analytic approaches ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses 
to systematic, strict textual analyses’ (Rosengren, 1981; Hsieh and Shannon, 2016).  
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 Further, previous qualitative social science scholarship has employed such an ontological basis 
in analysis relating to various investigations within the neo-institutional theorisation (see Giddens, 
1979; 1984; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Reay and Jones, 2016). For 
instance, the conceptualisation of endogenous variables within the institutional logics domain is 
stated to be deduced through the constructionist research framework (Ocasio et al., 2015; Reay and 
Jones, 2016).  Reay and Jones (2016) highlight three different categorisations of data analysis 
techniques that scholars employ in presenting neo-institutional study investigations: pattern 
deducing, pattern matching, and pattern inducing. This study submits to the “pattern-inducing” 
technique (Reay and Jones, 2016: 449). In this data analysis procedure, researchers usually follow a 
grounded theory set within the ‘interpretivist tradition based in the assumption that meaning is tightly 
intertwined with context’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Myers, 2013; Reay and Jones, 2016). Under this 
‘pattern-inducing technique’, “analysis is based on the development of categories (induced from 
themes) through reflective engagement with the data which relies on framing arguments in 
conjunction with extant theory to provide new insights” (Reay and Jones, 2016: 449).  
3.6.2   Data Analysis Procedure 
The process of QDA in the study involves the multifaceted procedure outlined below. Figure 3.2 shows 
an illustration of the QDA procedure. 
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Figure 3.2: Data Analysis procedure 
The stages involved in the data analysis procedures are described below; 
3.6.2.1 Preliminary/interim data analysis: This involves the data collation and analysis during the 
data collection phase of the research (Pope et al., 2000). This allowed the researcher to 
engage with the data during the process of data collection in order to summarise the 
emerging issues and to use this to seek direction in the further data collection process 
(Lofland and Lofland, 1995). This could serve as a roadmap for the main analysis (Weitzman, 
1999). This approach was adopted because it has the advantage of allowing the researcher 
to constantly refine the data collection procedure in order to pursue further depth in 
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3.6.2.2 Data Transcription and Engagement with the Data: The data analysis involved a manual, 
line-by-line transcription of data from the recorded interviews and related archival 
data/documents (Grbich, 2012: 189). The manual approach to transcription was preferred 
over the use of data transcription software. The themes emerging from the data were 
initially recognised and patterns or trends in the data were identified as the transcription 
was being undertaken. This approach to data transcription allows the researcher to become 
immersed in the data and therefore engendering utmost familiarisation (Weitzman, 1999; 
Pope et al., 2000). The transcription generated several pages of data. The researcher read 
through these documents to identify the different themes emerging from the data, in the 
first instance. This provided the researcher with insights into patterns manifesting within 
the data, thus providing the background for subsequent analysis procedures. 
 
3.6.2.3 Thematic (coding) content analysis: The study adopts a thematic coding approach to 
qualitative content analysis (Pope et al., 2000). “A coding scheme includes the process and 
rules of data analysis that are systematic, logical, and scientific” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 
1285-6). Thematic content analysis is a qualitative content analysis that is usually chosen, 
on the basis of the content (as opposed to form), to reflect the search for themes across 
datasets (Simons et al., 2008: 123). This form of analysis includes the identification of a set 
of conceptual categories into which to sort the data (Weitzman, 1999). In this study, in 
order to recognise thematic categorisations, based on the transcribed data, similar words 
or phrases identified as codes, were collated and these constituted emerging themes. 
Similar themes, in turn, were clustered into broad classifications as categories. In this 
regard, an inductive analytic process helped to distinguish these stated categories. These 
categories either represented explicit statements directly derived from the text or 
meanings inferred from the data through the analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).  
 
 
Page | 82  
 
 
Figure 3.3: An illustration of a coding frame for analysis of data into codes, themes, sub-
categories and categories 
 
• Coding Frame and Themes: The thematic data analysis was principally carried out 
manually using a Microsoft (Ms) Office Word package. The use of Ms Word for the 
data analysis, enabled greater immersion and engagement with the data (see 
Matthews and Ross, 2011; Reay and Jones, 2016). This provides an in-depth 
understanding and identification of emerging issues, which buttressed the derivation 
of themes and categories. In conjunction with the use of the Ms Office Word, QDA 
software (NVivo 10) was also employed. However, in this study, the researcher 
appreciates that ‘the investigators do the analysis as they create the keywords, 
categories, and logical relations used to organise and interpret data’ (Russell and 
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investigator judgments, which cannot, as yet, be programmed into software packages’ 
(Russell and Gregory, 2003: 38). Thus, this study employed the use of the QDA 
software only as a means of codification and classification of the data (Wiedemann, 
2013), which provided an additional systematic means of organising, reorganising and 
discovering exceptions within the QDA (Pope et al., 2000; Russell and Gregory, 2003; 
Firmin et al., 2016). This data analysis software also provided verification for the 
themes and categories inductively generated through the Ms Word analysis.   
 
3.6.2.4 Analytic Induction(iterative)Approach: “Qualitative research is highly inductive, as 
qualitative research and data analysis attempts to develop concepts, understanding, 
insights from the pattern in the data rather than collecting data to attempt to assess 
preconceived hypotheses, theories or models” (Taylor et al., 2015: 8). Thus, the main goal 
of qualitative research is usually to ensure that theory or concepts evolve from the data 
and not vice versa. Coding was based on the combination of insights derived a priori from 
the conceptual framework (Weitzman, 1999) and codes emerging independently from the 
data, using an iterative induction procedure. In this study, iterative analytic induction was 
applied as a process of continuous sequence of data scrutiny and analysis in the data 
codification phase, to establish linkages among themes and classify them into categories 
(Simons et al., 2008). This enables the researcher to constantly refer back to the data to 
modify the coding scheme and to relate it to the phenomena in the script accordingly as 
issues emerge. This process was repeated until saturation was reached, indicated by the 
stage where there were no new themes or categories emerging from the data (Simons et 
al., 2008). 
 
3.6.2.5 Grounded theory (inductive) approach:  Grounded theory has been defined simply as the 
theory derived from data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Bryman and Bell, 2011). The two 
central features of grounded theory are that it is iterative and involves the development of 
‘theory from data’ (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 576). Within this study, the data codification or 
iterative induction process opens itself up to the techniques involved in the grounded 
theory data analysis framework (Taylor et al., 2015; Firmin et al., 2016). Thus, in this study, 
the underlying idea of grounded theory was applied to understand and explain the evolving 
relationship between identified categories (see Grbich, 2012: 19; Firmin et al., 2016). This 
basically refers to the inductive theorising that is associated with qualitative research 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Taylor et al., 2015). Where a theory may be said to be ‘grounded’ 
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due to the fact that it is based on and derived from the data (Taylor et al., 2015). The 
aforementioned, with respect to this research, thus means that the possibility of the 
emergence of supposition (or themes) for theory building is considered in the analytic 
inductive approach to data analysis. Qualitative research, as a type of exploratory study, 
normally aims for the development of theory (Kothari, 2004).  
In this respect, as stated by Berg and Lune (2012: 19) “One purpose of social science is to 
find the meaning underlying various patterns, by creating, examining and refining 
concepts”. Consequently, theories are simply defined as explanations (Berg and Lune, 2012: 
19). Thus, in this study, the application of the grounded theory framework, basically 
involves the explanation of associations or interrelationships amongst categories. This also 
entails sensitivity to the contrast between the emerging categories (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). This procedure is related to a “grounded inductive approach developed through a 
focused iterative process” (Simons et al., 2008: 128). ‘In qualitative research, analytic 
induction process and grounded theory are often described as iterative’ (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). The use of these combined procedures brings a deeper understanding and 
investigation of the subject in qualitative studies (Simons et al., 2008). In this study this 
iteration describes the constant repetitive cycles of operations during the collection and 
analysis of data, to inductively locate new themes and categories, towards explaining their 
relationship and implications. 
 
3.6.2.6 Interpretive (analysis) presentation: Following the above stages, the relationship and/or 
connections discovered among the evolving themes and categories were highlighted to 
explain their implications, in line with the interpretive epistemological stance, which 
constitute the findings. Verbatim transcripts: The presentation of themes, categories and 
findings also involves the input of excerpts from the interviews. This includes verbatim or 
line-by-line quotes from the transcription to convey and support the emerging account of 
respondents’ experiences. 
 
3.6.3 Documentary (archival) data Analysis: Documentary data include evidence extracted from 
the relevant documentary sources. These data were also analysed using the aforementioned 
thematic iterative and grounded theory approach (See Grbich, 2013). The analysis also 
involves the above phases. Emerging themes, in relation to the research objective, extracted 
from documents constitute findings and categories. Extracts from the consulted archives, 
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which include quotations where necessary, constitute documentary evidence to support the 
findings and analysis. 
 
3.7  Limitations of the Research Methodology 
 Researchers employing social constructivism recognise that their own background shapes 
their interpretation and they “position themselves” in the research to acknowledge how their 
interpretation flows from their personal, cultural and historical experiences (Creswell, 2013). As 
Ritchie et al. (2013: 6) argue;  
“When so called inductive researchers generate and interpret their data, they cannot approach 
this with a blank mind. Even if they are not testing a hypothesis, the kind of data they have 
generated, the questions they have asked and the analytical categories they have employed 
will have been influenced by assumptions deductively derived from previous work in their 
field.”  
Thus, a pure inductive technique in QDA is regarded as impossible, as qualitative research still 
operates within theoretical frameworks (Ritchie et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2015).  
 Further, “qualitative approaches developed in studies of particular conditions and populations 
often translate with difficulty to different circumstances.” (Simons et al., 2008: 120). As stated by 
Thompson (1990), accounting qualitative studies are usually susceptible to the problem of being 
isolated from their original or social-historical background, referred to as the fallacy of internalism’21 
(Ferguson, 2007: 913-4). As further suggested, in order to avoid such a problem, a constructivism 
research agenda should, as much as possible, be considered within the original contextual framing 
(Thompson, 1990), i.e., alongside their cultural and social boundaries. 
 Additionally, there is the inherent danger that qualitative content analysis might fail to 
develop a detailed understanding and recognition of all the major themes or categories in the data 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). This may result in findings that do not sufficiently represent the data 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Another major concern in qualitative research is the tendency for the 
analysis to be subjective. Respondents may be evasive and not answer the queries truthfully. 
However, the use of different complementary datasets and triangulated sources of data (stakeholders 
and methods) provide essential verification. 
                                                             
21 “Drawing on Thompson (1990), the extant studies of accounting discourse are noted to have one major limitation: they 
assume, or speculate upon, the likely effects of accounting texts, without thoroughly investigating how these texts are 
interpreted by the individuals who encounter them in their everyday lives, or considering, in any specific detail, the social-
historical contexts of text production, transmission and reception.” (Ferguson, 2007: 913-4). 
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3.8  Data validity and reliability 
 The mixed-qualitative analysis process employed, in terms of interviews complemented with 
the documentary data, provided triangulation and the required rigour to the study (Flick, 1992). The 
QDA procedure employed in this study allowed themes/categories to emerge directly from the data 
themselves rather than the use of preconceived categories (Kondracki and Wellman, 2002; Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005). Cited as one of the main advantages of qualitative analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005), in this investigation, this approach to data analysis involves the prolonged engagement with 
data and persistent observation in order to establish emergent trends (Ritchie et al., 2013). In this 
study, the use of a sequential procedure of analysis (as indicated above) enabled the usual concerns 
about authentication of findings in QDA, to be addressed. The utilisation of a combined approach in 
this study, through the use of Ms Word with a combination of the QDA software for data classification, 
ensures that the emerging themes (codes) are adequately accounted for during the analysis (see Reay 
and Jones, 2016). This allowed for this data analysis to account for the inherent disadvantage of 
trustworthiness or internal validity stipulated in QDA (Folger et al., 1984; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In 
this study, the in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted within the corporate governance 
context of Nigeria. The researcher was part of the investigation from inception to culmination, 
therefore forming a substantial aspect of the research. This aids a better understanding of 
participants’ opinions and sentiments, as opposed to the mere dependence on textual or discourse 
analysis indicated to be prone to stated internalism concerns (Thompson, 1990; Ferguson, 2007). To 
this end, the foregoing helped to mitigate the earlier noted research limitations to a large extent.  
3.9      Ethical consideration 
 Participants were given detailed information about the study beforehand. Informed consents 
of participants were obtained; hence, only those willing to participate in the study were included.  
Respondents were given the option to withdraw at any time before, during or after the survey. The 
anonymity of participants was adequately assured, where there were concerns about this, during the 
study. In order to further enhance the anonymity of participants, the recorded interviews were coded 
with alpha-numeric representation to sever any connection to respondents. No names of individuals 
or relating descriptions were included in the study. Subjects’ utmost confidentially was upheld, as the 
data collected are only for the purpose of research. The recorded interviews and datasets were not 
transferred to any other person apart from the interviewer, to prevent undue access and breach of 
respondents’ confidentiality. The study did not involve children under the age of 18 and vulnerable 
persons. In addition, an appropriate ethical standard was strictly adhered to and any other ethical 
issues were fully taken into consideration during and after the study. 
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3.10 Findings, Analysis and Discussions Chapters 
 The data categorisations within the chapter form the basis of the findings and are presented 
in this section of the research thesis. The findings section involves the emerging findings, analysis of 
these findings and discussions in light of the literature, theoretical framework and past studies. As a 
result, the thesis developed into four chapters of findings, analysis and discussions, based on the 
evolved categorisations from the data. The three research questions which are – as stated in the 
introductory chapter of the thesis:  
• What are the motivations for corporate governance reforms in Nigeria and how can 
institutionally driven corporate governance reforms be achieved?  
• What are the challenges (implications) of the Nigerian corporate governance system for the 
attempts at corporate governance reforms? 
• How are corporate governance reforms ratified and regulated within the Nigerian 
institutional context? 
are attempted to be answered within the four findings chapters of the thesis, as follows: in order to 
attain the research objective, the first question was answered in Chapters 4 and 7, while Chapters 5 
and 6 address the rest of the research questions.  
 Each of the chapters starts with an introductory section. The main body of the chapter is 
divided into sections and sub-sections in relation to the emerging themes, sub-categories and 
categories from the data analysis. Also, within these chapters, quotes and paraphrases from the 
transcribed interviews and fieldnotes are inputted into different sections as evidence to reinforce the 
discussions. The analysis integrates the relevant literature, documentary evidence and data from the 
study into the discussions. At the end of each chapter a conclusion section is provided to summarise 
the findings and implications. Lastly a further discussion section provides the synthesis of the findings, 
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CHAPTER 4:  Motivations for corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
4.0 Introduction 
 Historically, institutional structures are claimed to attain a high degree of resilience together 
with associated activities and resources (Selznick, 1957; Scott, 1995). Thus, as the emphasis of this 
perspective is on conformity, institutional pressures are typically maintained to enhance isomorphism, 
which is stated to provide meaning and stability to institutional structures (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2003, 2008a). However, other perspectives on the nature of institutional structures 
suggest the reverse. For instance, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) state: 
“Institutions inevitably involve normative obligations but often enter into social life primarily 
as facts which must be taken into account by actors” (p. 341). 
Multiple structures are argued to interact to influence the legitimacy of organisational practices within 
a nation (Judge et al., 2008). Specifically, these structures are noted to involve varied institutional 
factors which characterise different national contexts (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al. 
2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013). Thus, beyond the mainstream notion of conformity and adherence of 
institutional elements, emerges the neo-institutionalist notion of institutional processes, interplays 
and their implications (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1993; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 
2011). Against this background, specifically the structuralist notion along with the institutional logics 
perspective (both embodied in the institutional theorisation), highlight the implication of the 
interfaces among institutional structures and logics (Giddens, 1993; Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016). 
As Giddens (1993) cites: 
“All organizations or collectivises consist of systems of interaction and can be analysed in terms 
of their structural properties: but as systems, their existence depends upon modes of 
structuration whereby they are reproduced” (p. 165).  
  
 In this light, Institutionalisation is described as the processes by which structures, practices 
or actualities become infused into social status and values, in reinforcing institutional framework for 
conformity, reconstruction or change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio, 1997; Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006; Thornton et al., 2012). Past studies have also highlighted the significance of the 
interdependence of institutional factors in institutional change and/or behaviours (Dacin et al., 2002; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Despite this recognition, considerable external influences on corporate 
governance practices across institutional contexts have been identified (Judge et al., 2008; Adegbite 
et al., 2013; Filatotchev et al., 2013). Scholars have cited that such argued universal inspirations limit 
peculiar insights into the role of contextual factors in organisational processes (Aguilera et al., 2008; 
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Filatotchev et al., 2013). Consequently, studies have sought to advance the theorising of the 
complementarities of corporate governance mechanisms with their national institutional contexts 
(Aguilera, 2005; Chizema, 2008). Thus, extending these perspectives, the neo-institutional theory 
examines generally, a broader view in the interaction between society, organisational structures and 
social actors (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013); in essence, seeking wide-ranging interpretations of the 
interactions among varying institutional factors, whereby understanding the associations, rather than 
the continued fostering of institutional stability, are emphasised (see Lawrence et al., 2011; Besharov 
and Smith, 2014).  
 Although both developed and developing countries seemingly portray similar institutional 
factors, their configurations, however, actually vary (Coombes and Watson, 2001; Chizema, 2008; 
Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Developing countries are discovered to exhibit the largest number of 
institutional diversities, relative to developed economies (Scott, 1995; Young et al., 2008). Corporate 
governance reforms have, nonetheless, mainly been broadly applied (Dore, 2005; Krenn, 2016), 
whereby these are principally propelled by universal propositions (Cuervo, 2002; Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed, 2009). The proliferation of these reforms across countries is driven by noted rationales of 
efficiency and legitimation of practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; 
Okike and Adegbite, 2012). The inferences of this for specific national inclinations in organisational 
innovations are still widely speculative within the literature. Thus, the challenge remains to more 
specifically relate corporate governance reforms’ discourse to the explication of the interactions 
between organisations and their institutional settings (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014; Young et al., 
2008). Against this backdrop, this study brings to the fore insights into such phenomenon in the 
developing context of Nigeria, where the institutional structures are still largely evolving. 
 In essence, from these perspectives the chapter, thus, advances understanding in this respect, 
by outlining the emerging themes, findings and discussion in answering ‘What motivates corporate 
governance reforms within the institutional context of Nigeria?’ In this regard, an advancement of the 
motivations for a corporate governance reforms agenda within the institutional specificities of Nigeria 
is outlined. The findings reveal that the corporate governance agenda in Nigeria is driven by the 
institutionalised exigencies (institutional logics) rather than the efficiency or symbolic rationales. 
Beyond external pressure for compliance, the directions for corporate governance reforms are 
compelled more by the internal constituents, in terms of prevailing practices, infrastructures, 
institutional priorities and organisational structure.  Through these findings, a particular implication 
of the configuration and complementarities of the national institutional logics, for attempts at 
organisational reproduction, is thus enabled. The emerging findings from this study are organised as 
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follows; first the nature of the Nigerian organisational field is outlined, to reveal the institutional 
framework for corporate governance practice in Nigeria. Following this, the emerging themes 
highlight the influences on corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Lastly, the corporate governance 
reforms agenda with respect to the noted institutional logics is indicated.   
4.1. Nigerian organisational field and corporate governance reforms  
    4.1.1  The Nigerian corporate structure 
In Nigeria, corporate governance and company law has historically been informed by external 
pressures (Ahunwan, 2002). While the UK and US epitomise the market-based corporate governance 
structure, the bank-based structure is typified by the German or Japanese governance model. Nigeria 
typically presents a corporate governance model that technically mimicked the market-based system 
(Nmehielle and Nwauche, 2004), as the Nigerian corporate governance ideology was largely inspired 
by the UK (Ahunwan, 2002; Nmehielle and Nwauche, 2004). As noted, the system of corporate 
governance of a country is usually epitomised by the prevalent institutional structure (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In this vein, the organisational field of Nigeria is similarly characterised by such 
structures as publicly listed companies, the NSE, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and 
other infrastructures, such as company law in the form of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA). Also, as shown below, an analysis of the NSE Q4 Fact Sheet (2016) reveals the capital market 
capitalisation to constitute largely equity against other securities. 
Table 4.1:  LISTED SECURITIES (Nigerian Stock Exchange Quarter 4 2016 - Fact Sheet)22 
Category Number Listed Market Capitalization 
(NGN) As at Dec 30, 
2016 
Market Capitalization 
(USD)* As at Dec 30, 
2016 
Equities – Premium Board 3 3,548,225,397,593 11,633,525,894 
Equities - Main Board 162 5,698,697,421,790 18,684,253,842 
Equities – AseM 9 8,957,153,629 29,367,717 
Exchange Traded Products 8 4,798,651,125 15,733,282 
FGN Bonds 17 6,101,548,318,713 20,005,076,455 
Corporate Bonds 23 281,973,226,960 924,502,383 
                                                             
22 Nigerian Stock Exchange Q4 Fact Sheet, 2016: <http://www.nse.com.ng/market_data-site/other-market-information-
site/NSE%20Fact%20Sheet/Q4%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%202016.pdf> 
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State and Municipal Bonds 22 516,579,469,400 1,693,703,178 
Supranational Bonds 2 24,950,000,000 81,803,279 
Total 247 16,185,729,639,209 53,067,966,030 
 
As highlighted in Table 4.1, the total equity against other securities listed on the NSE shows that equity 
constitutes a substantial portion. That is to say, a total of $30,347,147,450 against the total market 
capitalisation of $53,067,966,030, reinforces the fact that the Nigerian corporate structure notably 
indicates a market-based system. In this regard, the corporate governance system in Nigeria should 
reasonably be expected to complement such an organisational structure; however, emerging themes 
from this study reveal the reverse. As stated by a corporate executive respondent: 
CLD16: “The Nigerian corporate governance is noted as a market-oriented system, like in the 
United Kingdom. But in reality, does it actually conform?” 
Also, as another company executive noted:  
CLL31: “You cannot classify the corporate governance system in Nigeria as clearly a market-
system. Though it possesses the features but it does not really function as one.” 
However, this investigation further on identifies that although the corporate governance environment 
of Nigeria mirrors similar structures as obtains within other market-based corporate contexts, it does 
not do so in reality. As a regulator stated:   
RCL21: “We have two distinct structures of corporate owners here; we have these dispersed 
owners and the large shareholders.” 
Emerging themes reveal a combined form makes up the Nigerian corporate ownership. Thus, in spite 
of the stipulated market-based corporate governance model in Nigeria, the corporate structure of 
Nigerian listed companies differs. In the main, as opposed to the stipulated single system, in the 
market-based outsider model, indicated in past studies (Nmehielle and Nwauche, 2004), the Nigerian 
organisational field reveals a pluralist structure, in a combination of market-based (outsider model) 
corporate governance and bank-based (insider model). As a corporate governance consultant stated:  
OAI37: “Our own corporate governance system is discrete in Nigeria to the type in other 
developed contexts like UK. The system replicates a market-based structure, but the corporate 
ownership portrays a remarkable departure from this.” 
Even though such pluralist structures exist in variations across corporate governance contexts 
(Cuervo, 2002), such as Germany, nonetheless, they usually exhibit a clearer differentiation towards 
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either of these two systems (Dore, 2005). With no such explicit distinction in Nigeria, there is no true 
classification of the prevailing corporate governance model. This illustrates one of the key 
exceptionalities of corporate governance systems in the developing African countries, cited to defy a 
definitive categorisation (Rwegasira, 2000). This feature is also declared to affirm some of such 
institutional specificities of developing countries which distinguish them from the more developed 
economies, such as the US, the UK, Germany and Japan (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Claessens et al., 
2002).  
4.1.2 The institutional configuration  
 Institutionalised structures are basically considered as systems of controlled activities 
embedded in complex network of technical exchanges serving as visible symbols of compliance 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Joseph et al., 2014). However, evidence from this study reveals a 
predominantly evolving nature of corporate governance performance within Nigeria. As a regulatory 
agent stated:  
RCK20: “Corporate governance performance in Nigeria is not yet established. We still have a 
 long way ahead.” 
Also, as another company official stated: 
CLA10: “We still don’t have a solid structure for corporate governance in most of the Nigerian 
corporations.” 
 
The discovery that the Nigerian corporate governance performance, like that of other developing 
contexts, is embryonic is however not a new phenomenon. Past studies have portrayed the corporate 
governance system in Nigeria to be, comparatively, developing (Yakasai, 2001; Ahunwan, 2002; 
Adegbite et al., 2012). Nonetheless, in Nigeria, there have been several attempts at corporate 
governance reforms (Ahunwan, 2002). Alongside such efforts is the issuance of the first code of 
corporate governance, followed by other corporate governance principles in Nigeria in the past 
decades (Okike, 2007; Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Given these stated attempts at good governance 
advancement, the yet evolving nature of corporate governance reforms presents as unrepresentative. 
Obviously, the corporate governance reforms in the context of Nigeria reveal a slow pace of 
progression, as indicated by the emerging data above. However, most importantly, beyond the 
discovery that the corporate governance environment of Nigeria is evolving, the evidence from the 
study reveal the rationale for this. In line with this, as a listed corporate governance consultant stated: 
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OAD26: “So many companies are not listed within the corporate context. The corporate 
governance environment in Nigeria is still mainly unstructured, in comparison with the 
developed countries.”  
Organisational fields represent clusters of organisations and functions whose features and 
interactions are specified and stabilised by shared institutional logics (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2001). Correspondingly, in line with the corporate governance performance, the Nigerian 
organisational field is likewise found to be rudimentary. Along this line, one notable configuration of 
the Nigerian corporate context is that it embodies mainly unlisted companies. A documentary analysis 
of the number of listed corporations in Nigeria, in comparison with the ratio of the total companies 
incorporated in Nigeria, as highlighted below, also reinforced the above position.  
 
Table 4.2: Listed companies on the stock exchange listing compared with the total incorporated 
entities in Nigeria 
Category     Number of Companies 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Listings (15-08-
2017) 
247 listed companies as at date 
Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) About 6,000 registered companies in Nigeria 
 
 In this respect, the Nigerian corporate governance context depicts the existence of a large 
volume of private ownership (companies). As corporate governance codes mainly apply to listed 
companies, in Nigeria, as in many other settings (SEC codes, 2003, 2011), 23 thus, these private 
companies do not fall under the categorisation of corporations that are required to comply with the 
codes of good governance. These private businesses are not mandated to adopt codes of best practice; 
they are only encouraged to establish sound corporate governance, by way of good practice. Thus, 
the Nigerian corporate environment constitutes largely unregulated corporate entities. In the core 
explanations of isomorphism and reproduction of organisational structures, the significance of the 
institutional environment is underscored (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). Consequently, 
such structure impacts on the achievement of a holistic corporate governance scheme in Nigeria. Thus, 
governance reforms are not extensive but rather limited. As stated by a policy maker in this respect: 
                                                             
23 The code of corporate governance is mainly expected to be complied with by listed and multiple stakeholder companies 
– see The Nigerian corporate governance code (SEC code, 2003, 2011). 
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RCG07: “It is not as if we don’t canvass for substantial corporate governance advancement, 
but with many unlisted companies in the environment, it is difficult for the effort to be 
widespread.” 
These unlisted companies, equally, lack robust corporate governance mechanisms. As a regulator 
cited concerning such private businesses: 
RCD04: “If you look at some of the companies, there is no proper corporate governance 
structure. The same person that is the director is also the managing director. Thus, proper 
coordination is problematic.” 
As cited by Ahunwan (2002), such companies represent one of the four major categorisations 
(Categories A-D) of the type of companies within the Nigerian corporate context, in an earlier 
classification of the ownership structure in Nigeria. In response to environmental complexities, 
structural compliance usually reflects the elaboration of administrative realities, within the 
organisational field (Meyer et al., 1987; Oliver, 1991). Accordingly, as noted, concerning such 
corporate establishments in Nigeria; “A majority of them are small companies, owned and operated 
by families and friends and lacking business sophistication.” (Ahunwan, 2002: 272). Thus, in Nigeria, 
corporate governance mechanisms, broadly across the organisational context, are largely emergent.  
 The state of the corporate governance mechanism among listed companies is usually 
operationalised based on such parameters for evaluating good practices such as Board composition 
(Solomon, 2013). For instance, a dynamic BoD normally signifies one of the major indicators of 
corporate governance efficiency (Coombes and Watson, 2001). However, the evolving state of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is also reflected in the board of many corporations. To this extent, 
board composition in most listed companies includes merely the basic structure. Along this line, as a 
company corporate governance official stated:  
CLF19: “In Nigeria, most companies usually don’t see the need to have most of the board 
committees e.g. the corporate governance committees. So, you only find the very basic 
corporate governance structures.”  
In addition, in many dispersed ownership or shareholding structure, NEDs are intended to provide the 
needed check on the corporate executives (Blair and Stout, 2001). However, in the context of Nigeria, 
these constituents are largely lacking in the corporate governance mechanism of many companies. As 
a policy maker and a member of the corporate governance reform’s steering committee stated: 
RCH13: “In this environment, many companies don’t have the number of Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs) that are required by the code. They usually state that they are small sized or 
medium sized entities and they therefore do not require such numbers.”  
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Thus, the Nigerian corporate context depicts a higher degree of the encroachment of less established 
corporate governance structures. As stipulated, rather than a deterministic top-down process 
involved in the evolution (DiMaggio, 1983; Ranson et al., 1980), organisational field structuration 
sometimes involves the preclusive period where neither the templates nor the structures are yet fully 
formed (Suddaby et al., 2007). In turn, the cited emergent stage of corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria stems largely from the aforementioned conditions of the corporate governance structures. As 
a regulator cited:   
RCP36: “In my opinion, the developing nature of the corporate environment has prevented 
significant effect of these reforms. We have many odds against us and it is indeed challenging 
to get things done as quickly as is desired.”  
In this respect, the finding reveals the corporate governance environment of Nigeria to entail a 
rudimentary state of best practice advancement. Also, such a circumstance regarding the Nigerian 
corporate context is found to curtail the spread of corporate governance best practices.  
4.1.3 The Institutional alignments  
 As Aoki (2001) identifies, two major forms of perspective embody the understanding of the 
nature of institutions in diverse contexts:  
1) The complexity and diversity of institutional arrangements across different economic 
contexts, and  
2) The mechanism of institutional evolution, which allows for the possibility of innovation.  
Consequently, the alignment and dominance of institutional logics in Nigeria reflect the state of the 
Nigerian corporate context. 
 RCN32: “There are certain peculiarities in the available corporate governance structure in this 
country that one can relate to as a regulator operating in a developing country. The state of 
our mechanisms, especially the external controls on corporations, are very limited and mostly 
weak.”  
These were the words of a regulator regarding corporate governance (external) mechanisms in 
Nigeria. The above statement exemplifies the central theme (consensus), regarding the state of the 
institutional framework for corporate governance administration in Nigeria. Existing evidence has 
shown that the institutional structures of developing contexts are grounded in organisational fields 
encompassing social, political and economic contexts that depict a high degree of volatility (Coombes 
and Watson, 2001; Reed, 2002). For instance, Arun and Turner (2004), find that supervisory bodies in 
developing economies typically the lack political independence necessary to coerce banks into to 
complying with prudential requirements. Major corporate scandals in Nigeria, such as the notable case 
 
Page | 96  
 
of the Lever Brothers24 and more recently the Cadbury fraudulent financial reporting case (denoted 
as the ‘Nigerian Enron’)25 have been basically linked to the inability of regulatory bodies to properly 
monitor the activities of listed companies in Nigeria (Ahunwan, 2002; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). A 
company auditor stated, in this respect:  
OAI37: “In this environment, highly sophisticated techniques that are enough to prevent any 
form of subservience are lacking. This makes it very difficult for meaningful oversight. Many 
companies even get away with not paying taxes.” 
 An organisational field is described as a composite of entities constituting a recognised area 
of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Unlike in developed countries, the organisational 
fields of developing countries are identified as mainly embodying dysfunctional and amorphous 
elements (Rossouw, 2005; Yakasai, 2001), i.e., such structures that contradict normative prescriptions 
and/or functionalities. In this vein, the corporate governance contexts of developing countries are, 
likewise, characterised by non-adaptive institutional mechanisms. As a consultant legal practitioner 
stated:  
OAH35: “When you talk of corporate governance regulation, in this environment, there are 
infrastructural issues. The regulators can mainly depend on their manpower to regulate, but 
they don’t have sufficient pool in this respect. So, there is limited coverage and the regulators 
here are relatively disadvantaged compared with the situation in the advanced countries.” 
This claim is also upheld by a company executive, thus: 
CLE18: “And when you also look at the regulators most don’t have the resources to enforce, 
and that becomes a problem. Only those that have the capability to enforce are performing.” 
In line with a previous study in Nigeria (Amaeshi et al., 2016), findings from this research reveal that 
the institutional environment of developing countries exemplifies void institutional fundamentals. 
While the organisational context of Nigeria is not depleted of institutions, the corporate governance 
setting, however, indicates a preliminary nature of essential infrastructures. The institutional 
structures are, thus, weakened in their operations. Likewise, Africa is stated to lack an equitable and 
balanced socio-economic situation that could guarantee political stability and hence development 
(Rwegasira, 2000). However, not merely the inadequacy of infrastructural support, but principally the 
alliance of these institutional factors recognisably impacts on corporate governance reforms in 
                                                             
24 <file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/CorporateFraudinNigeria-ATwo-CaseStudy.pdf> 
25  This financial fraud case involves a deliberate overstatement of the company's financial position over a number of years 
to the tune of between N13 and N15 billion. Cadbury, Nigerian Enron 
<http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/babsajayi/121406.html> Accessed on 14-12-2018.                    
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Nigeria. Societies fundamentally emerge through the active constituting skills of their members, 
drawing upon resources and conditions which they are unaware of or perceive dimly (Giddens, 1993). 
Notably, the prevailing infrastructural situation in Nigeria shapes the corporate governance 
administration in Nigeria, to a large extent. Specifically, the terrain of the Nigerian corporate 
governance structure, challenges the promulgation and a nationwide coordination of corporate 
governance reforms. In this respect, as stated by a policy maker: 
RCI14: “We actually do not have such integrated systems that can facilitate synergy and self-
validation of corporate governance functions. This is why holistic corporate governance reform 
is being seriously challenged in Nigeria.”  
 
4.2  Influences on corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
4.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
 Organisations may be coerced to adopt new practices, even if they do not improve efficiency, 
essentially as a fulfilment of the legitimacy needs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) argue, organisational change seems less stimulated by the need for efficiency; instead 
it is as a result of structuration processes that make organisations more similar without necessarily 
making them more efficient. As prior studies (Okike and Adegbite, 2012; Waweru, 2014) in the 
developing contexts of Sub-Saharan Africa suggest, while the need for legitimation accounts for the 
macro level drive for corporate governance best practices, efficiency rationale is cited to spur reforms 
at the micro (organisational) level. In this vein, emerging themes from this study similarly reveal such 
motivation for corporate governance reforms. As stated by a company executive: 
CLD16: “If you don’t have good corporate governance, people will not want to do business with 
you. Best practices will help to promote the image and reputation of the country, which should 
promote investment.” 
Although the above evidence seemingly supports the universally acclaimed drive for best practices 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), however, beyond this, the implications of the economic 
circumstance of the developing contexts and Nigeria, suggest a new dimension to organisational 
reforms, which this study reveals.   
 In recent years, the emerging markets have become a major destination and source for FDI, 
accounting for over half of the total world FDI inflows (International Monetary Fund 2014; Clarke, 
2015). According to the World Bank Report, FDI flow into the Sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the 
most important forms of cross-border capital flow into the developing countries (World Bank Group, 
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2017)26. As Rueda-Sabater (2000) contends, the availability of a broad range of business practices is a 
likely decisive determinant of the destination of FDI flows. In this vein, corporate governance normally 
represents an important basis for inward foreign investment in developing countries, as the corporate 
governance practices significantly strengthen their “bargaining power” in attracting foreign 
investment (Rueda-Sabater, 2000). Equally, the nature and impetus for governance reforms in 
countries depicts factors such as economic changes and the historical experience of these countries 
(Reed, 2002). Nigeria in recent times has initiated several economic development initiatives27. This 
study found such economic investment goals to constitute one of the main drivers of good governance 
in Nigeria. This position is explained by a regulatory agent thus: 
RCF06: “Any sound investors will do their due diligence before they invest, and corporate 
governance is one of the critical areas, that they will look at. So, if there are red flags for the 
investors, and if they feel that this environment is too risky to invest, they will not invest.” 
Along this line, although studies have specified global external pressures towards legitimation to 
largely stimulate global diffusions or national adoption of corporate governance best practices (see 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009), as this study suggests, in Nigeria, 
investments needs are the main motivations. Also, in the view of one of the respondents (company 
executive) regarding this:  
CLG22: “And when you have the necessary structures other entities will want to do business 
with you. It is a challenge for… especially when you don’t have the necessary structures in 
place, to get loans or work with foreign partners etc.” 
 
4.2.2 Foreign aid and Economic policies  
 Within developing countries such as Nigeria and in similar contexts, the demands for foreign 
finance have heightened in the last decades. Specifically, such requirement is triggered by the 
insufficiency of internally generated revenue and a governance void within this context. As Aguilera 
and Jackson (2003) state, in market-based systems, such as the UK and US, households expand the 
size and liquidity of capital markets. This is done by investing in publicly issued equity (stocks and 
bonds) and the monitoring role is left to institutional investors or other shareholders (Aguilera and 
                                                             
26 World Bank Report on Foreign Direct Investment (2017), 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/505071468203651135/Foreign-direct-investment-flows-into-Sub-Saharan-
Africa> 
27 Some of these developmental programmes include: International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank 
Countries Partnership (WBCP), Africa Development Bank Group country strategy (AfDBG), United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID). <http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/approaches/tags/nigeria> 
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Jackson, 2003). However, in Nigeria, such means of internal revenue are generally absent. Essentially, 
these factors have hampered the mechanisms for corporate funding in Nigeria. As cited by a company 
executive: 
CLL31: “This is a consumer economy; unfortunately we almost don’t have institutional 
investors here – people don’t invest. One direct outcome is that it impacts on internally 
generated revenue.” 
Further, governance participation in developing countries is relatively low. Government actions, or 
inaction, usually decides the focus of fiscal policy and pattern of economic development (Claessens et 
al., 1999b; Klapper and Love, 2004). As Evans and Dadzie (1998) reveal, developing countries are 
typified by low savings attributed to the high default risk, as a result of lack of credit history, collateral, 
seasonal or variable income, rates and low gross national products. Historically this situation has 
resulted in less developing countries (LDCs) being unable to meet their credit shortfall. Similarly, inter 
alia, such a situation accounts for the participation of foreign aid agencies in the Nigerian economy. 
Accordingly, this has also prompted compliance with best practices. As one of the regulators specified: 
RCK20: “For example they say he who pays the piper dictates the tune. When we go out to 
source for fund/support from abroad, they ask that we have to exhibit sound corporate 
governance mechanisms before they can support us, then we have to do that. Because if you 
don’t meet their requirements, then you don’t get their fund.” 
 Therefore, the capacity of the governments of developing countries to provide the required 
interventions for developmental strategies is limited, yet the drive for conformity with external aid 
regulations are necessities. This situation has placed these countries under the direct influence of 
international financial bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank (Reed, 2002). As a condition of 
renegotiating loans, these international financial bodies have typically imposed a series of liberalizing 
measures, commonly referred to as structural adjustment programmes on involved companies within 
the developing countries (Biersteker, 1990; Reed, 2002). Consequently, foreign sponsors such as 
USAID or the World Bank, typically establish credit programmes to provide these Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) with monetary assistance to promote industrial production (Evans and Dadzie, 1998). 
Specifically, in Nigeria, the need to fulfil the economic growth agenda has also prompted different 
initiatives that have evolved remarkably through various developmental policies in recent decades.28 
Noticeably, this situation has correspondingly prompted the actions and engagement of different 
                                                             
28 Some of these developmental programmes include: International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank 
Countries Partnership (WBCP), Africa Development Bank Group country strategy (AfDBG), United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID). <http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/approaches/tags/nigeria> 
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economic agencies. While such actions have been noted to precipitate convergence in the practice of 
corporate governance in the developing region (Adegbite et al., 2013; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 
2006), the emerging data present partly divergent views regarding corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria.  
A regulator stated in this regard:  
RCJ15: “We need economic improvement, we cannot just continue to do things anyhow like 
before, so we need to standardize our processes.”  
In this regard, rather than canvass uniformity or convergence, the standardisation of the corporate 
governance procedures or practices by many partnering organisations in Nigeria is discovered. For 
instance, as stated by a company executive:  
CLB11: “Through the activities of international bodies such as the UNDP, IMF, USAID, AfDB, 
DFID, Nigerian companies are striving to structure their corporate governance in a way that 
boosts the confidence of these foreign partners and others.”  
Also, as stated by a corporate auditor/consultant:  
OAF30: “These companies are often regularly required, by their foreign partners, to file 
disclosures about their corporate governance mechanism and internal control procedures. 
However, I believe it is more about protecting their funds, as these agencies don’t instruct the 
companies on how to do it. They mainly require that these companies have sound corporate 
governance practices in place.”    
Along this reasoning, as Berglöf and Claessens (2006) similarly disclose: 
“While enforcement is a general problem of development, it particularly affects firms seeking 
external financing. Financial contracts, after all, involve the commitment of the firm to adhere 
to certain obligations, in particular to pay an appropriate rate of return to the providers of 
external financing. A weak enforcement environment makes it more difficult for firms to make 
such commitments” (Berglöf and Claessens, 2006: 2). 
Thus, beyond the need for homogeneity in the launch of best practices, corporate governance reforms 
are revealed to be triggered more, in the Nigerian context, by internal necessities. Thus, in this case, 
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4.2.3 The Nigerian market for corporate control 
 Basically, the capital market provides the avenue for trading corporate shares, bonds or other 
securities. Additionally, in the event of the breakdown of the internal control mechanism, the market 
for corporate control provides an external control mechanism whereby the shareholders' interests 
can be served (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Such an external mechanism has normally served as a 
measure to check the internal governance of public corporations. Situations in developing countries, 
such as lack of a market for corporate control (Reed, 2002; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007), have 
been found to largely hamper corporate governance advancements (Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Emerging 
themes provide the alignment of such a mechanism for the institutionalisation of corporate 
governance reforms in Nigeria. 
 First, the transition stage of development normally presents distinct implications for 
corporate governance modifications (Joseph et al., 2014). For instance, Le et al. (2010), examine the 
impact of institutions on a number of Corporate Governance Mechanisms (CGMs) at different stages 
of the transition process. They discover that CGMs will usually display different levels of effectiveness, 
depending on the transition stage (Le et al., 2010). Equally, as earlier noted, such a transitional state 
affects the administration of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Besides other explanations, 
this has profound implications for corporate governance mechanisms, such as the Nigerian capital 
market. Along this line, the capital market in Nigeria is basically recognised as a minority market. In a 
director of a regulatory agency’s opinion: 
RCP36: “Nigeria could actually be strongly termed as the minorities market. Because when you 
look at the trading pattern, in many companies, the number of shares that is available for 
trading is usually very small.” 
As indicated in the earlier section of this chapter, generally, corporate governance in Nigeria is 
budding, but many listed companies still lack a robust corporate governance mechanism. As a 
corporate governance consultant noted: 
OAH35: “Many of these companies are usually unable to satisfy the conditions for engaging in 
active trading on the floor of the exchange as a result of their level of sophistication. For 
instance, the required amount of capital base and the amount of collateral/guarantee 
demanded by the exchange.”  
 
 Furthermore, as discussed in the earlier section, in relation to the outlined structure of the 
corporate governance context, Nigeria presents a pluralist corporate structure. The structuration of 
the Nigeria corporate entities, with largely concentrated shareholdings and widely dispersed minority 
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shareholders, impacts on the advancement of the stock market.  Historically, developing countries are 
characterised by a relatively weak capital market (Arun and Turner, 2004; Udayasankar et al., 2005). 
The capital market in Nigeria is largely underdeveloped, even in comparison with other developing 
countries’ capital markets (Ahunwan, 2002). Emergent findings from this study identify the underlying 
rationale for such a situation in Nigeria. In Nigeria, many of the companies listed on the capital market 
are generally not disposed to active participation on the stock exchange. As a regulator stated in this 
respect: 
RCC03: “I find that many companies are not listed because they want to trade. They are listed 
on the stock exchange primarily because they want to go public. There is a certain status that 
is associated with the image of a listed company here and this is not actually about the 
functionality of sourcing for funds or stock exchange.” 
In this respect, this investigation finds that concentrated owners in most Nigerian listed companies 
are still largely averse to trading on the capital market. Essentially, this reaction is found to result, in 
part, from the reluctance to dilute shareholdings, in order to retain corporate control. As stated by a 
corporate governance consultant (rating agent): 
OAD26: “These concentrated shareholders basically don’t want to sell shares because they fear 
losing control and their management influence. They are unwilling to diminish their corporate 
control.” 
As noted, the concentrated-ownership model characterized by controlling shareholders, commonly 
engenders less disclosure and transparency, thus resulting in weaker securities markets and often with 
banks having stakes in the company and a monitoring role (Clarke, 2015). Accordingly, a larger 
percentage of companies in Nigeria are unlisted on the stock market, though they satisfy the specified 
requirement by CAMA. As a regulator cited: 
RCN32: “There are many companies that are public companies but are not listed (many 
companies, e.g. power sector, telecommunications). They are mainly classified as public 
companies because they have more than 50 shareholders. Also, you find that there are some 
public listed companies who have been delisted. The financial market is still rudimentary in 
Nigeria. We have a paucity of instruments, so it is just developing.” 
As one of the respondent policy makers highlighted: 
RCE05: “Companies in Nigeria that are listed on the stock exchange, are not active. Even if you 
look at the newspapers, you can hardly find more than 25 or 40 companies that are vibrant 
participants. This has equally affected the functioning of the capital market.” 
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A review of the Nigerian capital market capitalisation and trading pattern from the LISTED SECURITIES 
(NSE Q4 2016 – Fact Sheet)29 as shown above in Table 3.1 also affirmed this. From the market 
capitalisation, the total value of exchange traded product compared with the total value of securities 
reveals a value of $15,733,283 against a capitalisation of $52,067,966,030. This depicts a very low 
trading activity in this respect, i.e., in spite of the huge market capitalisation, only a small amount of 
just about 0.03% is lubricating the market (NSE Q4 2016 – Fact Sheet). Also, as hypothesised, in order 
to maintain absolute ownership and control rights, in developing countries the controlling 
shareholders of poorly governed firms are likely to prefer debt (Haque et al., 2011). In Nigeria, under 
such corporate management conditions, an alternative source of funding, other than the capital 
market, is also usually sought. Companies have a general affinity towards the demand for debt rather 
than equity financing; consequently, dependence on other sources of funding, such as debt or external 
aid, have become increasingly popular. As a regulator noted: 
RCN32: “Bank loans are very common. Thus, businesses prefer the use of debt for financing 
company undertakings, rather than the issuing of shares or public offerings. Many of these 
listed companies (or the owners) rely on bank facilities. This is preferred by them.” 
By implication, such practice undermines the advancement of the capital market. According to the 
opinion of a corporate governance consultant: 
OAA08: “A sizeable volume of investments does not go through the equity market in Nigeria 
which has rendered the capital market to lose some of its significance. Large volume of shares 
is also held by few individuals who are neither willing to sell nor trade, hence, the very 
 limited number of shares being traded determine the vibrancy of the market.” 
 The foregoing situation largely renders the Nigerian stock market inactive, and resultantly, 
contributes to the stipulated underdevelopment. This also curtails the capacity of the market to 
provide necessary external controls for corporate governance processes. The capital market, in this 
vein, reflects the cited pluralist structure of the organisational field, i.e. the market-based and the 
bank-based structures. Regarding the cited underdevelopment of the capital market in a developing 
country – as stipulated in previous studies (see Arun and Turner, 2014; Hopper et al., 2009) – this study 
recognises the effect of the prevailing institutional logics (such as the corporate structure, attitude 
and perception of owners of companies, and state of the corporate mechanisms) in Nigeria, to actually 
explain the basis for this condition. In this regard, with respect to the effectiveness of those 
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governance mechanisms, the Nigerian capital market is notably weak. For example, the significance 
of such macroeconomic structure, particularly for developing economies, is highlighted by the World 
Bank thus: 
The development of capital markets is critical to promoting economic growth and financial 
stability, to creating jobs and to reducing poverty. Up to $4 trillion of annual investment is 
needed for developing countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 
2030. Capital markets play a key role in the provision of long-term financing for strategic 
sectors of an economy, and risk-management tools for both financial-sector participants and 
end users. In this way, capital markets contribute to economic growth, which in turn can have 
an impact on the reduction of poverty and the creation of shared prosperity. At the same time, 
well-developed capital markets can serve as a “spare tire” for the financial sector, enhancing 
an economy’s financial stability (World Bank Group, capital market, June 28th, 2017). 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003), in highlighting cross-national diversities in corporate governance 
practices, affirm the interconnectivity in the configurations of institutional factors and their 
interactions within national contexts. In the case of Nigeria, the NSE is relatively less vibrant and 
central to the Nigerian organisational field. 
4.3 The Nigerian institutional logic and corporate governance reforms’ agenda 
4.3.1 The Nigerian institutional exigencies  
 A major business case for embracing a dispersed (market-based) ownership structure is 
usually the availability of an efficient financial market (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). However, financial market information about stock prices in a developing country 
rarely integrates accurate information (Governance Newsletter, 2014). In Nigeria, as a result of noted 
antecedents of the capital market efficiency, generally, disinterest towards investing in the financial 
market is commonplace within the Nigerian corporate context. The NSE has historically not provided 
the required level of protection to investors. An example of such past incidence of the Nigerian stock 
market failure which substantially exposes the vulnerability of minority shareholders and investors is 
as Ahunwan (2002) cited thus:  
“The Nigerian Stock Exchange slammed the stock price down. Unfortunately, however, there 
was no bid for the shares or takeover. The minority shareholders lost in two ways from the 
operation of the invisible hand in the Nigerian context. They lost both from the decline in 
corporate growth resulting from the mismanagement and from the reduction in share prices. 
Thus, while the market protects widely diverse minority shareholdings in the American system, 
it does the opposite in Nigeria (p. 280). 
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Accordingly, in this study as a respondent stated with respect to this:  
OAG34: “People lost lots of money in the past through a capital market crash. This has made 
it difficult to get people interested in investing in the Nigerian capital market again.” 
Also, as an investment analyst stated in this respect: 
OAA08: “Since the incident of 2008-2009 when people lost most of their investment in the 
Nigerian capital market as a result of the fall in share prices, private investors and individuals 
now either save their money in the bank or partner with banks in other business ventures.” 
Emergent themes specify the significance of banks and other financial institutions to the Nigerian 
economy. Even though banks are important to most economies, these financial institutions occupy a 
more crucial position in developing economies (Arun and Turner, 2004). As a wider implication of the 
identified lack of affinity for investment in the stock market, the bank has become highly imperative 
to the Nigerian economy, with respect to funding and investment. Legitimacy rationale has generally 
been stipulated as a most prevalent motivation for the spread of the global attempts at corporate 
governance reforms (Cromme, 2005; Nakamura, 2006). However, in institutional reproductions, when 
confronting legitimacy-related postulations, in the event that organisational decision makers are 
uncertain of the implication, they might often initiate decoupled actions (George et al., 2006). 
Evidently, banks constitute a significant part of the corporate governance infrastructures in the 
developing context of Nigeria. Such integral position of banks in the economic domain has also been 
highlighted in past studies (see Adegbite, 2012a). In extending this finding, this study has specified 
that the vital position that banks occupy in Nigeria stems from 1) the noted deficiency of the capital 
market and 2) the relevance to the economic/developmental agendas in this context. As a company 
chief executive stated: 
CLC12: “Most businesses are not keen on investing in the Nigerian equity market. Nigerians 
now entrust their excess funds unto banks (and other financial institutions) to invest such 
money for them.” 
As an audit consultant cited: 
OAC17: “When the foreign business partners bring their funds, they partner with banks. These 
banks usually provide the avenue to invest these funds and also monitor the investments.”   
In this respect, in Nigeria, the retrogression in the stock market has necessitated the advancement of 
an alternative source of funding, i.e. the banking institutions. Banks within this context provide a ready 
source of finance for companies as a result of the underdeveloped nature and attitude to investing in 
the capital market (affinity to debt). Organisational actors often cope with manifold institutional 
pressures by adopting both substantive and symbolic measures (Westphal and Zajac, 2001; George et 
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al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). The financial sector in Nigeria thus compensates by augmenting the 
inefficient capital market. Correspondingly, banks not only fund but also act as an external control for 
corporate investors, in terms of providing security of funds and monitoring of investments. Thus, the 
financial sector occupies a pivotal position in the macroeconomic domain of Nigeria. Rather than the 
stock exchange, corporate activities and performance in Nigeria now naturally evolve around the 
financial sector. 
 With her (economic) vision 202030, Nigeria also joined the group of economies aiming for 
substantial economic development by 2020. Being a central economy in Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 
2014), Nigeria no doubt represents a focal point for developing countries, especially in this region. As 
the promotion of the Nigerian developmental agenda and the GDP growth are noted to be strongly 
linked to the ability to increase investment (Osinubi and Amaghionyeodiwe, 2010), Foreign Private 
Investment, Domestic Investment Growth, and Net Export Growth, thus, statistically correlate to 
significant variations in Nigeria's economic growth (Osinubi and Amaghionyeodiwe, 2010). 
Nevertheless, past economy policies of the country constitute one of the key challenges to this growth 
agenda, as they have not adequately addressed the economic development requisites (Ajogwu, 
2016)31. Differences in value creation and in value capture often result from institutional pluralism and 
complexity, and this can generate opportunities for strategic choices (see Durand, 2012; Ocasio and 
Radoynovska, 2016). Thus, along these inclinations, motivations towards investment security become 
pivotal. As noted in this study, this serves as one of the bases for the financial sector maintaining a 
central and strategic position within the Nigerian economy i.e. in meeting the investment goals. For 
instance, as the then Governor of the CBN, Prof. Charles Chukwuma SOLUDO, stated in the preface of 
the address to the special meeting of the Bankers’ Committee, held on July 6, 2004, regarding the 
major formal bank reforms of the (2006) – “CONSOLIDATING THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY TO 
MEET THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY”:  
“We strongly believe that the ultimate three beneficiaries of this policy shift would be the 
Nigerian economy ---- the ordinary men and women who can put their deposits in the banks 
and have a restful sleep; the entrepreneurial Nigerians who can now have a stronger financial 
system to finance their businesses; and Nigerian economy which will benefit from 
                                                             
30 “The Vision 2020 which is essentially the actualization of a 7-point Agenda focusing on power and energy, food security, 
wealth creation, transportation, security, land reform and education is closely related to the UN MDGs.” (Professor Fabian 
Ajogwu, SAN). A lecture on “Nigeria Vision 2020 and a Challenging Economic Situation: Is Good Governance a Panacea?” 
delivered at the 2016 Annual Conference of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators of Nigeria at the 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, April 27, 2016. <http://icsan.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Nigeria-
Vision-2020-Good-Governance-as-a-Panacea-180416.pdf> Accessed on 26/03/2017. 
31 Professor Fabian Ajogwu, SAN, has prepared this lecture on “Nigeria Vision 2020 and a Challenging Economic Situation: 
Is Good Governance a Panacea?” delivered at the 2016 Annual Conference of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators of Nigeria at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, April 27, 2016. <http://icsan.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Nigeria-Vision-2020-Good-Governance-as-a-Panacea-180416.pdf>Accessed online 22-09-2017. 
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internationally connected and competitive banks that would also mobilize international capital 
for Nigerian development. This measure is about the Nigerian people. It is about meeting their 
NEEDS.” (pp. 2-3)32. 
Admittedly, the banking corporate governance reform agenda has been motivated mainly by the 
needs within the Nigerian context. In this respect, such direction of the corporate governance reforms 
in Nigeria reveals a disposition towards incorporating these demands. Ocasio and Radoynovska (2016) 
posit that strategic organisational choices are shaped by available institutional logics and theorise that 
greater institutional pluralism leads to increased heterogeneity—rather than isomorphism—in 
business models and governance strategies. Nonetheless, little is known about the rationale for 
varying corporate governance legitimacy perceptions across nations (Judge et al., 2008). One 
indication of this is that internal situations within the Nigerian nation have largely directed the drive 
for good governance.  
 
4.3.2 Instituting corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
 Institutional logics provide vocabularies of practice and historically contingent organising 
principles that shape individual and organisational values, beliefs and behaviour (Thornton et al., 
2012; Joseph et al., 2014). These institutional logics are described as ‘resilient social prescriptions 
usually taken-for-granted and sometimes encoded in laws specifying the boundaries of a field, its rules 
of membership, the role identities and appropriate organizational forms of its constituent 
communities.’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Lawrence, 1999; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton, 2004; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). It is without question that logics interact. The literature has noted 
relationships between logics and organisational functions. For instance, (Besharov and Smith, 2014) 
propose variations in logic multiplicity within organisations as a major indication of logic compatibility 
(or otherwise, incompatibility). From this study, some of the interdependence between the 
institutional elements in Nigeria and the corporate governance advancements are likewise 
highlighted. In Nigeria, the institution of best practices in corporate governance is reflective of the 
institutional ambience, in the form of the prevailing institutional logics (such as the corporate 
structure, attitude and perception of owners of companies, and state of the corporate mechanisms) 
and the exigencies. These preconditions, evidently, shape corporate governance reforms within the 
developing Nigerian domain. As cited by a policy maker: 
                                                             
32 CONSOLIDATING THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY TO MEET THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY. 
Address by Mr Charles Chukwuma Soludo, Governor of the CBN, at the Special Meeting of the Bankers’ Committee, Abuja, 
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RCI14: “I find that the Nigerian corporate governance reforms are being targeted at the 
peculiarities and priorities in our context. For instance, they are to help us attract investments 
and promote development. I think these are our major needs at this time. Obviously, the 
reforms are largely being informed from the issues within Nigeria and are not just keeping up 
with the global trend.” 
Accordingly, another respondent also corroborated this statement thus: 
CLB11: “If your standard is poor, the imported product will beat you, you will go out of 
business, you will lose your money. We have to make it work, so that we can even have good 
standards and business here in an environment where the infrastructures/ institutions are not 
developed.”  
For instance, in the corporate governance reforms scheme in Nigeria, as a compensation for the 
identified deficiency in the corporate governance infrastructure as the capital market, the financial 
sector has emerged more prominent. As Giddens (1993) posits, the structuration of institutional 
processes often represents an interplay of meanings, norms and power. In Nigeria, the financial sector 
(banks and other financial institutions) has the most robust corporate governance reforms procedure. 
Against these priorities, the banks and other financial sector have inevitably incited the corporate 
governance reforms agenda in Nigeria. Specifically, the Banks, the Pension Fund Administrators, 
insurance companies and other similar institutions drive corporate governance reforms in Nigeria and 
have remarkably encouraged the scheme.33 As a respondent (corporate governance consultant) 
reinforced: 
OAA08: So, in the financial services, issues of corporate governance seem to have taken root 
quite longer than for instance other (quoted) companies on the capital market or private 
companies. So, if you look at the financial services industry you can say that corporate 
governance has been a major issue.” 
 
Consequently, the evolution of vibrant corporate governance reforms in Nigeria has been traced to 
the financial sector. In this regard, a company executive buttressed thus: 
CLE18: “You dare not flout the rules in the (financial) banking sector. It is the most regulated 
sector in Nigeria.”  
                                                             
33 These two sectors of the economy presently have the most prominent codes of good governance in Nigeria. The 
corporate governance administrations are also the most actively regulated. For instance, aside from the general corporate 
governance code by SEC, the CBN inaugurated a code of corporate governance in Nigeria in 2006, following the nationwide 
bank consolidation. 
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The financial sector in Nigeria has also normally been involved in a constant review of its corporate 
governance practice under the oversight of the CBN. For instance, following the initiation of the SEC 
code (2003), a banking reform exercise emerged in Nigeria in 2006. This aimed to generate a separate 
and more detailed code of corporate governance specifically for banks.34 This provided additional 
reinforcement to the corporate governance performance of banks in the wake of the mergers in the 
banking sector at this time. Since then the banking reforms have been perennial. These include 
requirements such as the mandatory corporate disclosure about corporate mechanisms to the CBN 
alongside other measures to guarantee the security of investors’ funds35 and effective performance 
by banks. For instance, also, as stated by a company secretary:  
CLF19: “Although codes are meant to be persuasive, but even at this, I am sure that no bank 
will be ready to contravene the provision of the code. They file returns to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) on this consistently. In Nigeria, the financial sector is very particular about 
corporate governance.”  
Corporate governance operations basically reflect the focal position of economic or fiscal pursuits (La 
Porta et al., 1999, 2000). The trend of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria essentially is illustrative 
of the national macro-level agenda as a whole. Along this line, the significance of banks to the 
developing economies is also reflected in the pattern of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. 
Notably, this focus arises from the realisation that such prioritisation could enhance economic 
aspirations. As one corporate executive stated: 
CLA10: “These rigorous corporate governance reforms in Nigeria can be said to be generally 
stimulated by the banking sector reforms, in line with our situation. We need funds, we need 
investments, we require growth and developments. We need to make our practices good 
enough.”  
Also, as stated by another of the respondents: 
CLD16: “To a large extent, in this respect, the corporate governance reforms agenda, 
constitutes a reference point for foreign corporations (and their agencies in Nigeria). These 
procedures are very significant to our domain, as a growing economy. We just have to make 
things work well.”  
 
 Further, as La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) state, a widely-dispersed shareholding structure, such 
as obtains in the US, usually emerges as a result of the availability of good protection to minority 
                                                             
34 This code of corporate governance in the aftermath of the bank consolidation exercise is known as the “Code of 
corporate governance for banks in Nigeria post consolidation”, 2006. 
35 Among other things, in the regulatory capital requirement, banks are required to maintain a minimum regulatory capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) of 10%/15% on an on-going basis. 
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shareholders. This assertion seems to posit that the form of ownership structure is consequential on 
the degree of protection available to minority shareholders. In view of the foregoing, the reality in the 
developing Nigerian corporate governance environment presents an opposing view. As the findings 
indicate, the major implication of the state of the capital market is the effect on the level of protection 
of investors and the corporate governance performance in Nigeria. In this respect, the capital market 
has not usually provided adequate market control in Nigeria, despite the noted significance. As a policy 
maker stated: 
RCI14: “The market for corporate control in Nigeria is not effective to compel accountability 
from company management. So, in this environment, the minority shareholders are mostly at 
the receiving end. That is why we focus on being mainly responsible to them. The large 
shareholders are not as vulnerable and they can also protect themselves better.” 
Correspondingly, corporate governance reforms in Nigeria are considerably targeted at providing 
greater levels of protection to minority shareholders and boosting investors’ confidence. This study 
reveals that, on the contrary, the prevalent concentrated ownership structure, in Nigeria, rather 
informs the level of attention that minority shareholders receive. As such, the protection of dispersed 
shareholders, as revealed, becomes necessitated. In institutional theory, a key assumption is that as 
social actors seek legitimacy, isomorphism, or similarity of structure and action are created through 
the convergence of constraints and forces within institutional environments (Judge et al., 2010). 
Sometimes, the pursuit of institutional and organisational change can be propelled by illegitimacy 
(Tost, 2011: 686). Hence, there arises a need to offer more protection to minority shareholders, which 
is reflected in the Nigerian corporate governance reforms agenda.  Also, as a policy maker stated: 
RCE05: “There is lack of external control in this environment, there is thus need for the 
regulators to do more to protect these minority shareholders and investors. Our attention is 
focused on securing the dispersed shareholders (and investors), the majority shareholders are 
able to protect themselves to a large degree.” 
Also, as stated by one of the directors of the regulatory agencies: 
RCB02: “Protecting the minority shareholders is our major concern. We are going to give you 
the names of the Independent Directors, so that you as a minority shareholder can see how 
independent those Directors are. We are looking at the independent directors’ qualifications, 
experience and contact with the company to verify if they are actually independent. What are 
we trying to do? We are trying to protect the interest of minority shareholders because there 
is a wide concentration of ownership in most companies, so you need to do more to protect 
the interest of minority shareholders.” 
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 Against this backdrop, this finding not only indicates the varied institutional arrangements, 
but also underscores the significance of the interactions among national institutional factors in the 
Nigerian corporate governance reforms. Field-level dynamics, notably arrangement and relationship 
among logics, are significant (Martin et al., 2017). Such structuration, decides the repertoires available 
to different actors, as they help explain how action can both be constrained and enabled within the 
organisational sphere (Martin et al., 2017). Accordingly, as Besharov and Smith (2014) propose, field, 
organisational, and individual factors within an organisational context may influence organisational 
logic centrality – an understanding that seemingly corroborates the significance of structuration of 
field level logics in organisational reforms. The attention given to the initiation of different logics 
within an organisational field would, however, differ to reflect the overall pattern of purpose in such 
a context. Against all propositions, corporate governance reforms in Nigeria are found to be 
prioritised. Against this backdrop, such priorities of corporate governance reforms emanate evidently 
from the cited institutional condition, prevailing logics and practices in relation to the power 
differential between shareholder groups. These in turn determine the level to which the interests of 
the minority shareholders are protected vis-à-vis those of the large shareholder. Rather than other 
principles emphasised in corporate governance reforms in the market-based economies of developed 
countries, e.g. the UK, US,36 the corporate governance reforms agenda in Nigeria is observably 
modified in line with the contextual exigencies. Rather than the drive for efficiency, corporate 
governance is indicated to have been motivated by the realities within the Nigerian context. With the 
need to account for the economic agenda, the deficiency of the capital market infrastructure and the 
protection of the investors/dispersed owners in turn, a selective approach is revealed in this regard 
towards the financial sector. 
                                                             
36 For instance, some of these universal propositions of corporate governance principles include: Chairman Duality, 
Internal Control, Board efficiency, etc. 
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Figure 4.1: A representation of the direction for corporate governance reforms within the Nigerian 
institutional context 
 
One way or another, the diffusion theory of good governance codes assumes the homogeneity of 
corporate governance motivations in countries. Nonetheless, with regard to the relevance of the 
universal best practice to the Nigerian corporate governance situation, the modalities of 
implementation are, however, found to be directed not only by the logics but rather along the 
prevailing field alignment. Along this line, although studies have disclosed the major basis for the 
global diffusion or adoption of corporate governance codes as legitimation and/or efficiency reasons 
(see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009). As this inquiry suggests, the reform focus is not merely 
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determines such focus. Thus evidently, the attention and direction of the corporate governance 
reforms agenda in Nigeria are also found to follow the pattern of the demands and priorities within 
Nigeria. Further, as a respondent reiterated in this regard: 
 RCB02: “If we copy the system from the developed country and it is not working    
 properly here, a reform should be to address the deficiencies in our system.” 
Thus, the subject of corporate governance reforms within the context of Nigeria is not merely to 
acquiesce to the external global pressures towards conformity. Indicatively, the administration of 
governance reforms within this environment also reflects the distinct pattern of the representation of 
the varied institutional factors. 
 
Conclusion 
Within the neo-institutional debates on the drivers for institutional reproductions, the idea of the 
generic inclination of organisational reforms has been promoted; however, this study suggests that 
the Nigerian corporate governance agenda is principally given to contextual pressures. In this regard, 
and in line with the findings, the focus of the corporate governance reforms in Nigeria is decided by 
the compelling institutional circumstances (the institutional structuration (structure and 
configurations) and logics). In terms of the structuration of the Nigerian corporate governance 
context, the nature, state and ownership structure of the Nigerian organisational field constitutes 
largely unlisted and thus unregulated corporate entities. The logic is revealed to represent the 
corporate ownerships’ inclinations within this context. The Nigerian corporate structure reveals a 
hybrid. This is a dichotomy of highly dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership structure, with 
a prevalence of concentrated owners. Owners are unwilling to dilute their share and thus affect the 
operation and efficiency of the market control and the infrastructure of the capital market. Thus, 
Nigeria depicts an unsophisticated and preliminary stage of corporate governance structure. 
Institutional structures are thus weak in their operations. Consequently, these institutional realities 
are reflected in the state of corporate governance mechanisms, such as capital, which is weakened. 
Nonetheless, in Nigeria, as a developing country, there are dominant economic priorities regarding 
the growth and developmental goals agenda. This reveals a major focus on the macroeconomic 
agenda and other fiscal policies, such as FDI, Foreign aid and Economic policies. As noted, a weak and 
grossly inactive capital market emerges in Nigeria. This weak market denotes weak central control for 
corporate governance regulation in Nigeria, which is unable to provide adequate support for the 
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corporate governance performance. The foregoing triggers the need to impel corporate governance 
reforms in line with these goals and limitations. 
 In this respect, emerging findings reveal the motivation and direction of corporate governance 
reforms to align with incorporating the institutional complexities towards actualising the economic 
priorities in Nigeria. Such a focus inevitably arises to cater for the exigencies in the context as a 
consequence of the structure and logics. This demonstrates some extent of relativism in the approach 
to the implementation of the corporate governance principles. Thus, in instituting corporate 
governance reforms in Nigeria, a focus on banks and other financial institutions is revealed in the 
reforms agenda. This centrality, in line with the internal exigencies, emerges as a result of, 1) Internal 
demands: meeting the needs of the Nigerian economic (growth and developmental) agenda regarding 
funding as an alternative to the capital market, and 2) To make up for the structural challenges: i.e. 
for the investors protection, and laxity in the central monitoring and control in corporate governance 
resulting from the weak capital market. These constitute critical drivers of observable responses and 
actions in corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Against this backdrop, one major contribution in 
this chapter with respect to the neo-institutional theorisation of institutional reproduction is that the 
significance of internal pressures to attempts at innovation, is emphasised. While previous studies 
(see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Adegbite et al., 2013) have argued that corporate governance 
can largely be determined by external aspirations and expectations, this study reveals that, especially 
within the evolving institutional context of developing countries, such as Nigeria, structural 
configurations, dominant logics and national priorities, constitute pre-eminence in organisational 
innovations.        
 In order to accommodate these factors, the attention to corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria is disclosed as not being (universal) predetermined, but rather informed by the realities within 
this context. In this respect, with the concentration on banks and the financial sector, a selective 
approach to corporate governance reforms in Nigeria is discovered. This motivation largely relates to 
the need to improve the standard of governance practices, in selected sectors, in order to attract 
investments and protect investors in fulfilment of the economic developmental intents. Thus, rather 
than the uniformity or convergence or hybridisation of practices, the corporate governance reforms 
in Nigeria reveal a form of standardisation of processes, whereby, the standardisation of corporate 
governance procedures is aligned with the institutional and economic exigencies. Thus, this suggests 
that corporate governance reforms in this context follow different levels of adaptation rather than 
the spontaneous adoption of codes, as inferred in previous studies within the diffusion theory. 
Correspondingly, the findings reveal the codes in the financial institutions – such as banks and other 
financial institutions – to be the most developed. As a consequence, in contrast to a generalised 
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approach, the Nigerian corporate governance transformational agenda is indicated to be internally 
compelled and the innovations, in turn, prioritised. To this end, as this study submits to the neo-
institutional literature on diffusion theory, the various attempts at instituting good governance 
practices in Nigeria are not merely triggered by conformity with the global trends. In essence, beyond 
the universal efficiency or legitimation of practices, the need to realise the institutionally compelled 
priorities is indicated in the Nigerian corporate governance reform scheme. These realities within the 
Nigerian organisational field, however, are not without their inherent challenges, which the following 
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Chapter 5: The Challenges of Corporate governance reforms in a developing institutional field 
5.0 Introduction 
 A core debate in neo-institutionalism is that diverse institutional factors frequently interact, 
coexist, and compete for dominance, and how these affect organisational practices and individual 
behaviour (Martin et al., 2017). In highlighting the importance of the differentiation of field logics in 
organisational reproductions, George et al. (2006) suggest that organisations facing seemingly similar 
events may respond with isomorphic reaction in some cases, and non-isomorphic in other instances. 
Such insight indicates the likelihood of contradictions across organisational contexts. Relating this to 
perspectives on the embeddedness of organisations (Dacin et al., 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Lubatkin et al., 2005), pressure towards isomorphism – which in the case of this study is the universal 
‘best practices’ – is likely to generate dissimilar responses across institutional contexts. However, 
whether such an outcome is as a result of efficiency seeking, conformity to universal acquiescence to 
best practice, or mere submission to the restraint of prevailing institutional ambience, is unclear.  
 
 The structuration of an organisational field is defined by the prevalent institutional logics 
which differentiate it from another (Giddens, 1993; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
Likewise, the reproduction of institutional logics is argued to be shaped by multiple interactions 
(Sewell, 1992; Misangyi et al., 2008). Logics interact with contingency factors to shape organisations, 
on the field level (Meyer and Höllerer, 2014). Thus, institutional logics provide particular 
interpretations of why organisational attributes cluster into distinct configurations or archetypes, 
across different institutional contexts (Greenwood et al., 2014; Meyer and Höllerer, 2014). As the neo-
institutional theorists advocate, the outcome of organisational innovations could be traced to socially 
desired factors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Here, institutional structures produce the ambience 
which dictates the established framework within an institutional setting (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Aguilera et al., 2008; Greenwood et al., 2008). Nonetheless, the 
homogeneity of an organisational system is inferred by the launch of the global corporate governance 
codes of best practice. Although, the implementation of an innovation by companies could be led by 
either the need to gain competitive advantage or the aversion to being regarded as outliers (Bhimani 
et al., 2016), nonetheless, the drive for efficiency and legitimation denotes the acclaimed rationales 
for the worldwide diffusion of corporate governance principles (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
 The universality of approach to corporate governance reforms presents a case for 
understanding the realities across institutional contexts. Significantly, an indicative dimension is also 
added by the characteristic nature of developing organisational settings. Mixed forms of societal 
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pressures – coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) – may be responsible for 
the adoption of practices by firms in developing economies (Kim, 2016). Along this line, Rwegasira 
(2000) cited difficulty in specifying a definite categorisation for the corporate governance system of 
the developing Sub-Saharan Africa countries. In accordance, Adegbite et al. (2013) indicate that the 
understanding and practice of corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa is multi-directional. As 
Mahadeo and Soobaroyen (2016) discover, corporate governance developments in developing 
economies do not portray mere response to the professed principal-agent problem.  In this regard, 
Ahunwan (2002) queries whether corporate governance reforms in Nigeria are significant towards 
fulfilling the political, economic or social aspirations of the Nigerian people. To this extent, the 
adequacy of the Nigerian governance mechanisms, in comparison with the global corporate scene, is 
also debated (Okike, 2007). Thus, the need to distinguish the corporate governance structure and its 
implications for corporate governance reforms in the developing contexts, becomes imperative. 
Against this backdrop, the chapter highlights the emerging findings and analysis in relation to 
answering the research question: What are the challenges (implications) of the Nigerian corporate 
governance system for the attempts at corporate governance reforms? 
 The findings essentially portray the challenges (realities) in the Nigerian corporate governance 
reforms agenda. In this regard, given the revealed institutional specificities, the study suggests the 
incongruity of the prevailing corporate governance system in Nigeria with the supposed market-
oriented model. The findings indicate that the Nigerian organisational field constitutes a maturing field 
with its attendant contextual variables, which largely shape the corporate governance structures and 
reforms thereto. Along this line, the corporate governance performance in Nigeria illustrates path 
dependency towards the prevailing institutional logics and the existing practice in this context. In 
essence, with the stakeholder and/or relationship-based system disclosed in Nigeria, the prevalent 
corporate governance performance indicates a complexity for the arm’s length propositions of the 
universal principles in corporate governance reforms.  
The chapter is organised as follows: first the emergent themes highlight the corporate 
governance system and performance in Nigeria. This represents a framework within which the 
outlined challenges in the corporate governance reforms in Nigeria are contrasted. The chapter 
proceeds by discussing the interface of the predominant organisational rubric with the established 
corporate governance structure, in light of the effect on the practices and proposed innovations. 
Lastly, the implications of the prevailing institutional logics for the corporate governance reforms’ 
agenda are outlined.  
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5.1 The Nigerian corporate governance system and corporate governance reforms 
5.1.1 Corporate ownership structure: A dominant enclosure  
 The reforms of corporate governance in Nigeria are noted to be characterised by similar 
prescriptions, as in the market-based contexts. The code of corporate governance in Nigeria (SEC code, 
2003, 2011) also outlines the best practices in Nigeria to include such provisions as board composition, 
board committees, executive remuneration, duties of the board, NEDs, independent directors, etc. 
For instance, specific emphases were placed on the BoD, its duties and responsibilities, similar to the 
recommendations in the dispersed ownership (shareholder) model of the UK and US economies 
(Dedman, 2002; Weir et al., 2002; Baums and Scott, 2005; Solomon, 2010). In a similar vein, the system 
of corporate governance in Nigeria has normally been recognised as a shareholder model (Ahunwan, 
2002; Nmehielle and Nwauche, 2004). However, the Nigerian corporate governance system reflects 
two distinct forms of ownership structure, in the dispersed and the concentrated ownership structure. 
Although, a hybrid form of ownership structure is indicated, nonetheless, as this study stipulates, the 
Nigerian corporate governance notably proffers more a prevailing concentrated ownership structure. 
As a corporate consultant stated: 
OAD26: “Apart from the minority shareholders you will still find large shareholders as main 
owners in nearly all the listed companies in Nigeria.” 
Also, as stated by a regulator: 
RCL21: “Listed companies’ ownership in Nigeria is not actually dispersed. They consist of highly 
concentrated shareholdings. This is a primary feature of listed corporations here.” 
  
Also, as another respondent, a corporate consultant, corroborated: 
OAG34: “Listed companies here are different from market-based economies such as the USA. 
They consist mainly of a concentration of shareholders.” 
In this respect, although the prevailing corporate governance system in Nigeria reflects a hybrid 
structure, however, large shareholders are predominant in listed companies in Nigeria. In this regard, 
the Nigerian market-based corporate ownership noticeably depicts the existence of block-holdings. 
Previous analyses have shown different factors that may be responsible for organisational change 
and/or stability across different institutional contexts (Hatch, 1993; Oliver and Roos, 2005; Shipilov et 
al., 2010). In the developed countries, in such a market-based system, the separation of ownership 
and control, typified by the dispersed ownership structure, constitutes major monitoring (or agency) 
issues in corporate governance (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Similarly, in 
developing countries ownership structure often presents a concern for corporate governance; 
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however, this issue emerges from a different dimension. A study in Ghana, an identical Sub-Saharan 
Africa developing country, shows that managing owners on the board tend to exert extensive control 
over the activities of corporations (Agyemang and Castellini, 2015). Whilst, this situation is stipulated 
to have the tendency to address the agency problem (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), it is also found to 
pose challenges with regard to disproportionate involvement in the decision-making processes 
(Agyemang and Castellini, 2015). Correspondingly, this study reveals some actualities of corporate 
governance mechanisms in Nigeria that tend to explain such control within a developing SSA context. 
Along this line, not only is the corporate ownership in Nigeria specified to be predominantly 
concentrated, such a structure of governance also presents a distinction. As stated by a corporate 
governance consultant: 
OAD26: “There are so many dispersed minority shareholders, but obviously with small 
holdings, in Nigerian listed companies.” 
Also, as stated by a company independent director: 
CLB27: “We have issue with ownership structure, even among the listed companies here in 
Nigeria. You can have few individual block-holders having up to 60% or 70% of the total 
company shareholdings, leaving only 40% or 30% to so many dispersed shareholders.” 
An emergent theme from this study shows that while, on the one hand, there are very few controlling 
block-holders, on the other hand, there are widely-dispersed minority owners. Thus, the composition 
of ownership within the Nigerian corporations does not merely involve concentrated owners but, as 
indicated above, the distribution of holdings indicates a clear lopsidedness. In this vein, this 
investigation stipulates two major bases and expressions of this situation (i.e. the causative and effect) 
in Nigerian corporations: 
• First, wealth disparity largely exists in Nigeria, with a few individuals dominating the upper 
echelon of the wealth hierarchy and these equally constitute founders of corporations. This type 
of situation often occurs, especially in developing economies, where there is no fair distribution 
of wealth and economic assets (Deere and Doss, 2006). Thus, in Nigeria, large corporate shares 
are mainly held by these rich individuals or ‘elites’37, whereby the block-holdings are most often 
spread among this class of persons. As a respondent (consultant) stated:  
OAI37: “In this environment these large corporations are owned by the few rich people. They 
constitute the founders and the majority shareholders. Many others have the resources to buy 
                                                             
37 Revealed through a review the corporate governance and ownership structure of listed companies, through the analysis 
of the final accounts and statements of these companies on the listings of the NSE.  
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small holdings. They can only also acquire the remaining shares and thus they are merely the 
minority shareowners.” 
 
• Second, these few block-holders also embody individuals having the ability to wield a huge 
influence on the system of rules – formal or informal – in this context. As such, this cluster includes 
highly influential individuals, with significant economic and political power, and thus inevitably 
those who also decide corporate positions. As stated by a corporate governance consultant: 
OAE28: “Although the corporate governance system in Nigeria is being modelled after 
internationally recognised structure, as in the UK, we still have strong shareholder groupings 
that will still be manipulating the systems.” 
 
As stated by another respondent - a company official:  
CLI24: “Corporate ownership is clearly for the “well-to-dos” in this environment and it remains 
like that because wealth is also rotated among these individuals and their families. So, it is 
really difficult for those other shareholders that are not in that class to have a major influence 
on businesses here.”  
 
 Furthermore, an emerging theme highlights the implication of such conditions, exemplified 
above, for the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. Companies represent strong societal actors 
(Judge et al., 2008); equally, the above manifestations constitute a significant impact on corporate 
activities in Nigeria. The Nigerian corporate ownership, in the block-holders, embodies significant 
pressures, not only within the organisational but broadly the institutional contexts. These block-
holders significantly inform the corporate governance procedures, thus determining, to a large extent, 
the prevailing institutional logic within the corporate governance reforms structure in Nigeria. For 
instance, as a respondent – regulatory agent noted: 
RCC03: “Corporate governance and the reforms in Nigeria involve very big and influential 
segment of society, who can operate without much restrictions. Nobody can regulate what 
they do and how they do it. These people are very strong.” 
Likewise, as stated by a company executive: 
CLI24: “In Nigeria, in these corporations, it is easy to retain influence and control among few 
persons, because the ownership mainly includes highly concentrated holdings.”  
Essentially, within the Nigerian organisational environment, these block-owners are not just corporate 
owners but rather have a far-reaching effect on the sustainability and functionality of companies. 
Notably, from the perspective of institutional entrepreneurship, (as cited within the literature review 
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section of this thesis) “the notion of centre and periphery embraces both the capacity of central actors 
within a social structure to establish and sustain an institutional logic favourable to their interests, and 
the relative embeddedness of elites and non-elites” (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 28). Therefore, 
corporate governance in Nigeria is identified as the ‘elite’s business’ (Interview, RCG 07). Another 
respondent (a company Non-Executive Director) stated thus:  
CLJ27: “Corporate governance is the business of the elite. The powerful and the mighty occupy 
this hierarchy in Nigeria; it is not for the common people. These people can influence things 
and they will normally consider their own interest first.”   
Consequently, such individuals have strong networks and lobbying positions within the socio-political 
domain. Thus, they have influence on policies that affect the company’s financial and economic 
position. For instance, “they influence the corporate contracting; design and deliverance of contracts 
beyond only the micro-level governance environment” (interview OAA08). The extent of this influence 
is additionally revealed through linkages with a larger network of social actors that enables wider 
macro and micro dominance. As a policy maker stated: 
RCE13: “The individuals that own these companies are also the ones in charge of the affairs of 
the country. They are the financiers of most of these political aspirants. They are highly 
connected. They use their influence to get contracts for their companies and even control the 
economy of the country, to a large extent.” 
As, Ocasio and Radoynovska (2016), contend: 
“It is particularly during such transition periods that contradictions among logics are likely to 
be exposed and to contribute to experiences of complexity. Here, strategic organizational 
commitments to logics become subject to reinterpretation and (re)framing. In fact, we argue 
that under conditions of complexity, organizations adopt particular interpretations of the 
contradictions among logics to which they previously made a commitment.” (p. 290).  
Against this backdrop, the study presents a prevailing governance structure and practice in Nigeria. 
Other than this, such a governance system represents a recognisable pressure which largely shapes 
the Nigerian organisational framework. As indicated, new practices may emerge and develop without 
an extensive change in the dominant institutional logics (Zahir-Ul-Hassan, 2017). Thus, while good 
governance recommendations in Nigeria also target a wide range of other mechanisms, such as 
improving the BoD, CEO duality etc., as in other market-based contexts (Dedman, 2002; Dewing and 
Russell, 2004), evidently, concentrated ownership presents a focal institutional logic in the corporate 
context of Nigeria. Nonetheless, this significance emerges as a direct consequence of the pattern of 
holdings in these listed companies. In this regard, the composition of such an organisational factor – 
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i.e., the percentage of the large shares to that of the minority shares, which portrays as a misalignment 
– rather than the actual factor itself, prompts such distinction. 
5.1.2 Corporate governance model: Issues and realities  
 Alongside the identified predominantly concentrated corporate ownership, the Nigerian 
corporate governance structure reveals a stakeholder model of corporate governance. More 
importantly, the resultant system of ownership and control replicates the consequence of wealth 
distribution, influences and power differentials among distinct classes of social and economic players. 
As emerging themes reveal, the constituents of such a governance model reach beyond the corporate 
context, encompassing extensive social circles. Besides the corporate block-holders, the Nigerian 
corporate governance system involves an assemblage of other parties. This constitutes key players in 
the society, which equally mirrors the stated economic and social stratification. A company executive 
stated, in this respect thus: 
CLA10: “It is a collectivist society here. Corporate governance in these listed companies 
involves a broad circle of influencers. Minority shareholders only constitute a minute portion 
of this.  The influence of society on governance here is substantial. The system here is not at 
all comparable with what obtains in the more developed countries.”  
While stakeholder corporate governance reflects the situations in some other institutional settings 
(Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Berglöf and Claessens, 2006), however, in Nigeria, such a stakeholder 
governance model encompasses a different configuration. For instance, one typical feature of German 
corporate governance is the principle of ‘codetermination’ in company management (Von Rosen, 
2007). Codetermination represents the compulsory requirement for the inclusion of employees in 
participation in decisions at the strategic level of interaction between the management board and the 
Supervisory Board (Von Rosen, 2007). The majority of large-scale companies have Supervisory Boards 
made up of equal numbers of members from management and labour; almost all listed companies 
are subject to codetermination (Von Rosen, 2007). Second, in other contexts (such as Germany), such 
large ownership also normally constitutes institutional investors (Bordean and Pop, 2012; Von Rosen, 
2007). However, in Nigeria, employees and institutional investors are virtually non-existent in such an 
ownership structure. Analysis of the key components of the Nigerian stakeholder model constitutes a 
distinction and departure, as outlined:   
• First, notably Nigerian corporations mainly involve individuals as block-holders. An analysis of 
the corporate annual statements of the companies on the NSE listings shows 80% of individual 
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family founders38. Conversely, past study (Ahunwan, 2002) has outlined the categorisation of 
companies in Nigeria, to additionally include government owned companies, foreign owned 
and family ownership. However, from this investigation, the corporate ownership in publicly 
listed companies in Nigeria reveals clusters of family ownership as constituting mainly the 
noted concentrated ownership. As stated by a company executive: 
CLH23: “Most of these block-holders in the listed companies are mostly the founding family 
members.” 
 Aside from the family block-holders, the prevailing stakeholder structure in Nigeria also 
involves parties such as financiers (banks or other financial institutions), the public sector, central 
governance or political affiliates, religious groups (churches or mosques), ethnic and social circles, 
traditional rulers (e.g. Obas, Emirs, Obis), as illustrated in Fig 5.1. Within this system, the major 
compositions and their roles are analysed below. 
                                                             
38 See Nigeria Stock Exchange Listings <https://www.african-markets.com/en/stock-markets/ngse/listed-companies> 
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Figure 5.1:  An illustrative view of the Nigerian relational stakeholder corporate governance system 
 
• Banks and other financial institutions: The influence of banks and other financial institutions 
have been noted in the corporate context of Nigeria. These constituents of the stakeholder 
(relationship) structure usually represent the financials. “They provide and guarantee funds 
(bank guarantees) and are also involved in the contracts sourcing, joint implementations and 
monitoring of projects in Nigerian corporations” (interview RCK20). The identified extant 
dependence of Nigerian businesses on these institutions (see the preceding chapter of this 
thesis for this analysis), depicts Nigeria more as a prototype of a bank-based economy.  
• Political parties: This group constitutes a recognisable section of the stakeholder structure in 
the Nigerian corporations. These individuals typically use their influence in facilitating 
contracting or joint business ventures in agreement with corporate family block-holders in 
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of political engagements and also for other personal interests (interviews RCO33; CLK29; 
CLJ27). 
• Public sectors or government officials: This segment of the relationship-based corporate 
governance structure often involve public sector employees, such as directors, deputy 
directors, public officials, consultants, other civil servants, etc. ‘These organisational actors aid 
companies with business procurements or other procedures, as liaisons between the private 
sector and the state. These officials help to foster the smooth running of these companies’ 
activities usually beyond their normal job responsibilities, and often in exchange mainly for 
agreed reward’ (interviews OAF30; CLL31). 
• Socio-cultural Circles: “These include traditional rulers and social cultural leaders or religious 
leaders. These individuals usually act as private motivators. They provide advisory services to 
company owners and normally act as patrons to these corporations. They normally proffer 
‘moral and spiritual’ support, especially the religious leaders. They also act as community 
gatekeepers in places where access is needed to their local communities. Some of the 
members of these groups also have shares in these companies, thus constituting part of the 
block-holders” (Interviews OAH35; CLG22). 
 
 In this respect, the study reveals the Nigerian stakeholder’s system of corporate governance 
to exemplify a relationship-based corporate governance model (see Clarke, 2015). This involves 
organisational structures that provide shared meaning (Selznick, 1949; Scott, 1995). In this respect, as 
Agyemang and Castellini (2015) affirm: 
“A high concentration of corporate ownership and control of corporations by families in some 
emerging countries has led to governance structures that enable the dominant shareholding 
families to make key decisions on their own.” (p.55). 
Also, as cited by a policy maker:  
RCA01: “Ownership composition is a major issue in the corporate governance reforms and 
oversight in the listed companies in Nigeria. Because, if we are to describe the corporate 
environment of Nigeria, it is still majorly family block-holders rather than corporate 
shareholders.” 
As cited in the preceding section, the concentrated ownership in listed companies in Nigeria, could 
typically involve a percentage of block-holdings ranging from between 60% - 70% of the total company 
shares. As a respondent stated in this regard: “Even where you have a ratio of 70% and 30%, they are 
still counted as public companies.” (OAC17). Although the Nigerian corporate governance provisions 
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prohibit such a percentage position or percentage of shares to be held by a single39 individual or family, 
nonetheless, these founding owners still find a way to circumvent this provision. This is attained 
through relational ties of the persons involved (ownership). As a regulator cited: 
RCD04: “These family shareholders obtain the block-holdings through their friends, associates, 
cohort and extended families, such as cousins, aunts uncles, etc. that do not bear identical 
names with them. This grouping is lightly referred to here as HOMOPHILY.” 
The above situation exemplifies the governance structure which also depicts the prevailing 
environment for the reform’s agenda in Nigerian listed corporations. 
 
5.1.3 The prevailing rubric and the inference for corporate governance reforms 
 The actualisation of governance practices in Nigeria depicts an interlace of multiple actors’ 
interactions and interpretations. Within the specified Nigerian corporate governance relational 
system, families and cohorts are primarily involved in the management of companies. Against this 
backdrop, management of companies are frequently based on personal understanding, rather than 
legally binding contracts. Also, as a company auditor states: 
 OAI37: “Oftentimes things get done just because of the long-term associations that corporate 
executives or managers have with someone or businesses.”  
According to a company legal counsel: 
CLG22: “Generally, we have a lot of business transactions that are consummated merely 
through mutual trust/agreements among the parties involved.”  
Along this line, Hatch (1993) contends: 
“Within the cultural dynamics framework, I assume that individuals cannot be conceptualized 
apart from their cultures and that cognition cannot be separated from social processes. In 
other words, the processes of cultural dynamics are simultaneously cognitive and social (as 
well as perceptual, emotional, and in some cases aesthetic), and individuals and their 
interrelationships are not usefully distinguished within this frame (p. 683).” 
 Organisational fields are described as a set of institutions, both formal and informal (North, 
1990). To a large extent in Nigeria, corporate governance performances are more strongly realised 
through social interfaces than being officially enacted (i.e. a form of relational contracting). 
                                                             
39 According to the SEC code (2011) section 7.1. “To safeguard the independence of the Board, not more than two members 
of the same family should sit on the Board of a public company at the same time.” p.12 
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Institutions usually modify the basic principal/agent relationship in ways that require specific 
contextualization (Filatotchev et al., 2013). The Nigerian corporate governance model depicts strong 
interpersonal linkages. In turn, the organisational field is found to be profoundly shaped by fluid 
institutional constructions. The practice of corporate governance principally follows a more unofficial 
approach. As one policy maker states: 
RCH13: “In Nigerian companies even, many official undertakings are based on verbal 
agreement and mutual trust.” 
Also, as stated by a company secretary:  
CLF19: “Preferably Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) are more common among parties 
in Nigerian companies than legal agreements.”  
Thus, within the Nigerian corporate governance structure, the specification of procedures is more 
inclined towards implicit rules rather than explicit detailing. Evidence from this study shows much 
dependence on the informal rubric of organisational processes rather than formal procedures.  
Consequently, this is recognised as an implication of the cited relational corporate governance system 
and practice. Institutionalisation is, however, identified as submitting to the existence of formal 
regulated, routinized and structured factors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). In this respect, this study suggests such informal procedures present 
complexity for corporate governance reforms in Nigeria, resultant from the noted interplay of social 
subtleties and corporate functionalities. As a respondent noted:  
OAG34: “But in our environment, there is only a face appreciation of these corporate 
governance principles and the benefits of implementing. They say; ‘It’s my company, it’s my 
money and it’s my loss.’”  
In turn, this largely presents a situation where the development of the corporate governance external 
control mechanisms is substantially subdued. The emergence of predominant informal rules, as 
stipulated in Nigeria, results in institutional systems and, in turn, organisational procedures being 
significantly exploited. Notably, this condition emerged as a reflection of the aforementioned 
relationship governance system. For instance, as cited by a regulator;  
RCL21: “For instance, in many Nigerian family owned firms, the CEO hijacks the Board 
activities. When the Board of some governing regulatory committee on corporate governance 
reforms are to be convened, the CEO will be asked to send his representative. That in a way 
does not seem very transparent, for example.”  
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To this extent, in Nigeria, formal structures are found to typically involve less substantive techniques. 
Indicatively, this portrays a high degree of limitation to the formal framework of operations deemed 
necessary in organisational reproductions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Maguire et al., 2004). A strong 
and reliant institutional base represents a necessary prerequisite for corporate governance reforms 
internationally promoted on the market-based model of corporate governance (Dore, 2005). In this 
vein, Oliver (1991) identifies the different strategic responses that organisations enact as a 
consequence of institutional influences. Depending on the institutional pressures toward conformity 
(which normally include, normative, coercive and mimetic), organisational responses may vary (Oliver, 
1991). Accordingly, in Nigeria institutional logics are largely unstructured in nature, due to the 
prevalent informal structures. In such instance, the greater likelihood for the potency of institutional 
pressures (Oliver, 1991) to become undermined, emerges. Likewise, organisational processes within 
the domain of the developing countries are basically exposed to field-level social influences (Lodh et 
al., 2014). Consequently, in Nigeria, a major presentation of this scenario is the weakened framework 
of enforcement among the regulated entities. Organisational agents (directors of companies, board, 
top managers, owners) are more resistance to change and tend to maintain a set approach to 
organisational reforms, based on established principles. As a regulator stated:  
RCF06: “They are not going to change overnight because they have what it takes to frustrate 
the system.” 
Also, as another respondent stated, a policy maker: 
RCI14: “Here, organisations and, generally, people are resistant to change. They don’t plan to 
give up their usual way easily.” 
As such, fundamentally, the structuration of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria is identified to 
not follow a fixed, definitive and/or predetermined format. 
5.2  Corporate governance framework of performance in Nigeria 
5.2.1 Socio-cultural interfaces in the Nigerian governance model 
 In the light of the existing relationship-based model, the Nigerian organisational logic reflects 
a system of meaning defined by the prevalent corporate governance ideology. In this respect, 
corporate governance is usually characterised by interpersonal factors. In India, Lodh et al. (2014) 
discover that ‘family firms’ in this emerging country, typically have good relationships with the major 
pillars of the local economy. As asserted by Berglöf and Claessens (2006), “many, if not most, corporate 
governance systems in developing countries and transition economies are heavily tilted in favour of 
controlling owners” (p.124). Corporate governance in Nigeria largely adopts a larger socio-cultural 
ethos. In this vein, in spite of corporate governance reforms envisioned to engender parity, corporate 
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ownership in Nigeria is still largely characterised by relational ties. As stated by one of the interviewed 
regulators: 
RCB02: “Can I separate ownership from management? And where you cannot separate 
ownership from control it becomes a big problem. I am an owner and I am also management. 
Am I trying to appropriate value as management or do I depend on what shareholders get? 
So, there is bound to be an abuse, as there is a problem of conflict of interest.” 
Along this line, as stated by a respondent corporate governance consultant:  
OAB09: “The Big Man syndrome is prominent in Nigeria. If not, why are people not obeying 
the law, why are companies contravening the law and no one can bring them to book.” 
 Evolving organisational fields are characterised by the absence of clearly defined and 
dominant subject positions (Maguire et al., 2004), whereas formal organisational structures are 
contested as emergent only in “highly institutionalized” contexts in modern societies (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 340). As Clarke (2015) asserts “insider relationship-based systems (governance 
framework) are typified by highly concentrated ownership that is closely connected to managerial 
control of the enterprise (Clarke, 2015). This governance system, usually, is characterised by a close 
relationship with other stakeholders who are often represented on the boards of major corporations 
(Clarke, 2015). In this respect, fields, such as the evolving corporate context of developing countries, 
usually deter routinized or regimented institutional procedures. As a result of this, a thin boundary 
exists between institutional techniques and actors’ attributes. For instance, it is difficult to separate 
the organisational practices from the social-cultural tenets and shared principles of dominant 
shareowners or key stakeholders in Nigeria. Indeed, even though publicly listed, in this environment, 
organisational cultures reflect largely the owners’ and personal preferences. Thus, most institutional 
transactions are usually built around an individual’s system of meanings, ideas and values. As another 
respondent stated:   
CLF19: “So, where you have a very strong personality at the helm of affairs, the institution 
takes on the personality of that individual.” 
Also, as a corporate governance rating agent stated: 
OAD26: “Here in Nigeria, establishments mostly reflect the personnel. There is usually no clear 
demarcation between a social image and professional status.”  
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 The above indicate the reality of the institutional underpinning of the propagation of 
corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Complementarity implies that an action implemented in one 
aspect of the organisational setting is refereed by the wider configuration of networks and national 
institutions (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014). Such ambience is found to generally stem from the 
broader inclination towards organisational techniques within the macro-economic level in Nigeria. 
Consequently, the nature of corporate governance performance and transformations in Nigeria 
substantially reflects established societal values. In this regard, in the opinion of a listed company 
executive: 
CLJ27: “Only very few organisations have a system where persons who are on the board do not 
have any business relationship in the company.” 
As cited by a regulatory agent:  
RCL21: “If I am a CEO of an organisation and you asked me to send a representative, I will send 
the one that is loyal to me, someone that can defend my interest. When he gets to the Board, 
he might not be able to do anything without referring back to me. This erodes independence. 
This can elongate the time that is involved in taking decisions. But, this would also improve 
decisions taking and accountability on an issue, on the other hand.”  
Accordingly, a major challenge of this situation is the creation of a culture of dependency and loose 
structures within the organisational field. In this respect, the study identified the Nigerian corporate 
governance system to be characterised by the lack of stabilised techniques. Further, this structure also 
portends the dynamics within the organisational fields in such developing contexts. As Thornton and 
Ocasio, (1999: 804) posit “Institutional logics are, the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organise time and space and provide meaning to their social reality.” 
Accordingly, despite attempts at instituting the global corporate governance principles that proffer 
arm’s length dealings40, governance of businesses in Nigeria is discovered to be grossly entwined with 
the contextual elements. Thus, the indicated trend, in pattern of behaviour or structural modifications, 
suggests a disposition towards established practices (a similitude of path dependence – Bebchuk and 
Roe, 1999). Such a position depicts the prescribed framework for corporate governance in Nigeria 
from past study (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). This situation is specifically symbolised by the cited 
prevalence of block-ownership and stakeholder corporate governance framework. As articulated by a 
respondent regulatory agent: 
                                                             
40 E.g. Chairman - Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, creating board independence etc. 
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RCP36: “Generally, Institutions of states have been weakened by this ‘Big Man Syndrome’. 
People at the top will tell people below to do this, bend this or that rule. Once you start 
compromising the institution, then you lose face, you lose relevance and the people that you 
regulate can do as they wish. Then, you find companies that you ought to supervise, driving 
the agenda.” 
In this respect, the corporate governance environment of Nigeria is revealed to constitute largely 
varied actors’ interests and interferences as dominant logics. In the instance of Nigeria, such a slack 
of institutional fundamentals, constitute restraints on the institutionalisation and, in turn, the 
advancement of corporate governance reform’s intents. 
5.2.2 A maturing organisational field 
 Institutions provide the requisite basis for corporate governance reforms (Aoki, 2001). The 
institutionally-based system of corporate governance is suggested to better align with the context of 
Africa, as a result of the peculiarity of the socio-economic and political structure (Rwegasira, 2000). 
Albeit, as organisational fields are argued to not be unilaterally assembled (Hoskisson et al., 2002), 
such modifications might not arise in a definite order. Organisational structures, which arise in 
institutionalized modern societies, involve rationalized elements that are entrenched, and reflect, 
widespread social reality (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To this end, a formal framework constitutes a 
necessary precursor to organisational improvement, the deterrent of which tends to pose challenges 
(Pache and Santos, 2013; Martin et al., 2017). Similarly, as Gatamah (2002) posits, within the 
developing organisational field, the weak enforcement of rules and regulations constitutes a continual 
problem. Nonetheless, the amount of necessary formal structure and the state of the infrastructure 
in the Nigerian context are disclosed as largely adaptive. As stated by a respondent: 
CLK29: “Everything in Nigeria evolves around the person in charge. When he or she leaves, the 
institutions lapse and essentially do not have a soul. Institutions should be stronger than an 
individual. The institution should be self-sustaining and independent; it has to have its own 
rules.” 
In this regard, while the dearth of institutional infrastructures for corporate governance has been cited 
in previous studies (Yakasai, 2001; Adekoya, 2011) to characterize the Nigerian corporate governance 
context, broadly, there is a consensus within this inquiry suggesting that the corporate context of 
Nigeria is not depleted of institutions (interviews CLK19; RCA01); however, the available institutions 
are cited as not self-propelling. Also, in relation to reinforcing best practices in Nigeria, they are still 
largely emergent. Thus, the Nigerian institutional framework is recognised as not offering the 
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necessary support for corporate governance reforms. This view is reiterated by a regulatory agent as 
thus: 
RCC03: “Do we have the functional infrastructures to know if someone has paid tax or has paid 
the correct amount? A company will evade tax and there are no consequences. Why are 
companies not paying the correct tax?” 
Also, as a corporate governance official in a listed company cited:  
CLH23: “In a developed country, there are strong Institutions, to support regulation and make 
one comply. Therefore, they have a supportive environment so they don’t force anyone.” 
In advanced economies, where the governance codes are initiated, internally the duty of company 
directors is to ensure that adequate financial controls are exercised, while companies are disciplined 
by a combination of market controls (Clarke, 2015). Some of these external controls include the 
following: strong capital market; hostile takeover; near perfect trading information (Bhagat et al., 
1990; Cuervo, 2002). However, such controls are either non-existent or relatively weak in the bank-
based economies. Thus, often internal mechanisms, such as board and managerial functions, and 
external structures, such as regulatory or legal frameworks, replace these structures in these contexts 
(Claessens et al., 1999a). 
However, unlike other advanced market-based or bank-based economies, the Nigerian corporate 
governance context embodies structures that present challenges in terms of regulations, not only 
externally but also in relation to internal organisation mechanisms. As a respondent stated: 
OAH35: “The Nigerian corporate governance environment consists of many other companies 
such as partnerships and family private businesses. These are largely not monitored.” 
As another corporate governance regulator stated:  
RCP36: “In corporate governance, what you are saying is that you want to manage these 
institutions in the best interest of all stakeholders, to deter people cheating or cutting corners. 
But in Nigeria there is a challenge in complementing the external regulations with the internal 
control in companies.” 
 In Nigeria, the stage of development of the institutional field constitutes a major basis for 
corporate governance reforms. A mature field has a strong common recognition of the organisation 
positions within the organisational field, while portraying routinized interactions (Scott, 2001; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Institutions serve as necessary antecedents for organisational 
change. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) assert, “Institutionalization involves the processes by which social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” 
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(p.341). Evidently in Nigeria the organisational field depicts the institutionalism of techniques. This is 
found to represent preliminary institutional structures that emanate from the lack of an adequate 
stable institutional structure and large proportion of unregulated entities.41 Also, in this line, as a 
respondent noted:  
OAG34: “Some companies, especially the private/small companies, still don’t appreciate 
corporate governance and this affects the whole system. Listed companies do not exist in 
isolation.” 
Accordingly, in Nigeria, as one of the sectoral regulators affirmed:  
RCD04: “For a private business, to have good governance principles in place, what you say is 
that they are adopting best practices. How unlisted businesses decide to run their affairs is 
mainly up to them.” 
In explaining the dynamics of variations within institutional fields, scholars have related, in part, to 
subject positions, shared system of meaning, diverse contextual ideology and implicit rules (Oliver, 
1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Maguire et al., 2004; Scott, 2014; Esharov and Smith, 2014). 
Essentially, corporate governance context and performance in Nigeria is portrayed as emergent. Such 
a stage of the organisational field normally constitutes less formal structures (see Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), uncertainties and a greater likelihood of unanticipated outcomes (see Selznick, 1949). When 
contexts are highly institutionalised, they could be specified to depict the existence of structures that 
are self-regulated, formal and regimented (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Maguire et al., 2004; Pache 
and Santos, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2014). In this respect, unlike the context of the developed 
countries that exemplify a mature organisational field, Nigeria depicts a maturing field. Subsequently, 
this complexity impacts on the prevailing corporate governance performance in Nigeria. In this light, 
the corporate governance framework in Nigeria is identified as representing a range of organisational 
structures that could ‘impede the spread of institutional consensus and conformity’ as noted by 
Oliver (1991: 171). As a corporate executive cited in this respect: 
CLC12: “In Nigeria, do we actually function within that corporate governance ecosystem? You 
will ask yourself, do we have the framework? We have so many private companies but what is 
the level of governance appreciation in these private companies?” 
5.2.3  Skills and infrastructure accompaniments to governance reforms  
 Corporate governance performance in Nigeria, as identified, embodies infrastructural 
challenges, however, besides this, human resources also constitute a related concern. Emerging data 
                                                             
41 The number of listed companies in Nigeria compared with the incorporate entities is about a ratio of 0.045:1 (i.e. 
275/6000). 
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indicate a shortfall in complementary skills and manpower, in line with the administration of best 
practices. 
In this respect, as contested by a company executive: 
CLL31: “I think the regulators lack the required coverage. They have limited resources in terms 
of personnel and infrastructures. They don’t have sufficient mechanisms compared with the 
number of companies that they need to oversee, so they have to prioritise.” 
For instance, as a respondent stated: 
RCK20: “Weak institutions are contributory to weak corporate governance oversight and vice 
versa.” 
This study partly agrees with previous findings indicating that most developing countries suffer from 
a lack of skilled human resources, so companies thus encounter difficulties in securing the right skills 
(Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009; Waweru and Riro, 2013; Adegbite, 2015). Although the availability of 
relevant professionals in the corporate governance sphere is found in Nigeria, nonetheless, obtaining 
the required level of skills to match the proposed corporate governance reforms is, however, 
stipulated to be lacking in Nigeria. In line with this, a corporate governance consultant stated thus: 
OAE28: “However now, the regulators have realised the importance of good governance, that 
it is essentially the foundation on which institutions rest. But understanding the importance 
and having the personnel to enforce it, are still different things. With limited personnel, the 
regulators can’t have a sort of impactful oversight. In some cases, there is a skill gap, in others 
it is personnel constraint.” 
Similarly, another respondent (a regulator) cited: 
RCJ15: “Because of weak institutions, enforcement is a big problem. And mainly because our 
enforcement institutions are weak. The functional systems, do we have these? The government 
institutions can raise an army of staff, but the capacity to enforce is not there.” 
In this respect, there is a general agreement that there is no satisfactory amount of manpower, 
specifically among key regulators. The ratio of the regulatory agencies to the size of the regulated 
entities is disproportionate for efficient monitoring of compliance. As indicated, the understanding of 
the institutional framework in which organisations operate will provide an explanation of the rationale 
and consequences of specific corporate governance models, as well as the likelihood for such to be 
adopted and effective (Globerman et al., 2011; Filatochev et al., 2013). By implication, “corporations 
in Nigeria are basically better empowered and equipped, specifically regarding manpower 
development, technological development and other corporate governance ‘state of the art’ than most 
of the regulators” (interview RCB02). These include for instance: ICT infrastructures, authentic 
 
Page | 135  
 
database system, a sturdy framework to provide checks and balances, among others (interview 
OAC17). Accordingly, attendant macro-level complexities for corporate governance reforms are also 
indicated. Thus, the regulators are somewhat disadvantaged in the fulfilment of their oversight 
functions. These systemic issues are disclosed as constituting major drawbacks to the pursuance and 
fulfilment of the expectations of corporate governance recommendations in Nigeria. This situation is 
in part viewed to be consequent upon the maturing nature of the Nigerian organisational field. As an 
evolving corporate governance environment, the nature of the organisational field as disclosed, 
precipitates a corresponding emergent phase of preparedness. This constitutes an impediment to 
proper surveillance and thus results in a selective approach in the corporate governance 
transformational pursuit.  As noted by a director of a regulatory agency, in this respect:  
RCA01: “Corporate governance regulation in Nigeria does not apply evenly. If you look at some 
sectors of the Nigerian economy, the corporate governance administration is not so strong. 
But, in some other areas, it is strong. This sometimes depends on the capacity of the 
regulators.” 
 
As expressed in a view of another respondent on this: 
RCN32: “To monitor and track people and see what they are doing is challenging. Even rating 
agents are lacking here. For instance, the FIRS cannot adequately enforce the tax code, when 
it does not have the personnel and infrastructure.” 
 
 In less evolved institutional contexts, the economy itself is likely to be undergoing more rapid 
change than in developed countries (Clarke, 2015). Thus, enforcement of contracts is more 
problematic due to the inexperience of regulators, information asymmetries being more severe and a 
general underdevelopment of standard practices (Clarke, 2015). The Nigerian infrastructural scenario 
instantiates the typical circumstances prevalent in the developing context, whereby the institutional 
structures are relatively underdeveloped, and as such, categorised by dysfunctional elements (Reed, 
2002; Rossouw, 2005). In this regard, as a regulator cited: 
RCF06: “Issues relating to weak institutions and enforcement, all hinder corporate governance 
in Nigeria.” 
 
For instance, a situation where the local Nigerian unit of Cadbury Nigeria Plc was involved in a major 
account falsification, was ongoing for four years from 2002 to 2005 before it was detected in 2006. 
Scholars have linked this occurrence principally to corporate governance oversight laxity in Nigeria 
(see Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). Nonetheless, this problem is also identified as reflective of the overall 
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situation of corporate governance mechanisms and performance in Nigeria. According to a report with 
respect to the Cadbury fraud, Reuters, April 11 2008 reports: In a statement issued by SEC Nigeria, 
“The company’s former managing director, in concert with the company’s board since year 
2002 used stock buyback, cost deferrals, trade loading and false suppliers stock certificates to 
manipulate its financial reports that were issued to the public and filed with the commission. 
The Managing Director who was fired shortly after the fraud was discovered, doctored the 
account books with the connivance of external auditors and the company registrars, the SEC 
added.”42  
The attempts at corporate governance reforms, notwithstanding, in Nigerian corporations, frauds and 
other malpractices among corporate executives are found to have mainly been made possible through 
noted inherent weakened and relational corporate governance structures. This also undermined the 
ability of even the regulators and other oversight agencies to detect and control such occurrences. 
Societal-level institutional logics often manifest within an organisation in a variety of ways that usually 
reflect the geographic, historical, and cultural context (Greenwood et al., 2010; Besharov and Smith, 
2014). Underlying such corporate governance circumstance is identified as the systemic implication of 
the subtleties within the relational corporate governance system in Nigeria. 
 
5.3 Realising corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
5.3.1 Shareholder activism in the maturing context 
 Shareholder activism is considered an effective way of holding the corporate executive and 
management accountable. Especially in the developing context, this represents an integral part of 
corporate governance and governance reforms (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). In the Nigerian corporate 
sphere, a previous study by Adegbite (2015) has specified an unprecedented emergence of 
shareholder groups within the Nigerian corporate governance sphere, in the past two decades.43 Thus, 
an increase in the level of shareholders’ activism in Nigeria is specified. In this same vein, as specifically 
noted by Amao and Amaeshi (2008), the shareholders of Nigerian firms can have the ability to 
positively influence corporate governance behaviour, only if they are able to exercise ‘meaningful 
control’ over management (p. 120), although, similarly to Adegbite (2015), their study reveals 
shareholders’ groups to be more participatory in relation to corporate governance reforms. Also, 
                                                             
42 Nigeria fines Cadbury unit for false accounting, Apri l  11  (2008 )  <https://www.reuters.com/article/cadbury-nigeria-sec/nigeria-
fines-cadbury-unit-for-false-accounting-idUSL1181158820080411> 
43 1) The emergent middle class (mainly young and middle-aged professionals), who do not necessarily belong to any 
shareholder association. This group is quite informed and ask important questions on several issues ranging from financials 
to employees’ relations (Adegbite, 2015: 6-7). 
2) The second classification is found to include the high-calibre reputable individuals. This group is stated to constitute a 
voice and is able to scrutinise the board and management during AGMs (Adegbite, 2015: 6-7). 
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particularly from this study, ‘shareholders’ associations have become predisposed to interrogating 
managements and boards more on governance matters’ (interview, RCH13); however, with respect to 
enforcing accountability, the evidence indicates a converse dimension to the earlier study (Adegbite, 
2015). In spite of the stipulated vibrancy, shareholders’ associations in Nigeria still basically constitute 
the ‘poodles’ of corporate executives or management. As one of the company regulators described: 
RCD04: “Ideally, shareholders’ associations, in Nigeria, should influence good governance, 
spurring companies to behave well, ensuring better disclosures, transparency and 
accountability, because they know exactly what is going on. For instance, they know there are 
related party transactions in companies and they could challenge this. But what tends to 
happen is that some of them are gradually becoming extortionists, whereby they only harass 
company secretaries and CEOs for gratifications as a means of keeping their mouth shut.”  
Thus, the above issues depict inherent attitudinal problems, in shareholder activism in Nigeria. 
Similarly, such concerns are identified in form of greed, self-interest etc. among the shareholder’s 
associations, in earlier studies (see Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite et al., 2012). However, 
evidence from this study indicates, that such challenges alongside the suggested attitudinal issues, 
principally stem from a noted right disparity between the large and minority shareholders, rather 
than the direct side-line of the minority group. For instance, in relation to the shareholder groups’ 
activities in Nigeria, according to a regulator who is also a minority shareholder in some of these listed 
companies: 
RCC03: They talk, they embarrass but do they have the power to enforce? The answer is NO. 
Because if they disagree with any issue and they are to have a poll, they will never win, because 
their shareholding is very very small. So, if there is a disagreement on any issue and a vote is 
required at the AGM, the majority shareholder will normally win.” 
Similar observations provide further support to the above view thus: 
RCL21: “There is real shareholder activism where you have a group of people saying we want 
this to be done. They might have representatives on the board, but as a group, there is no 
serious activism. The significant shares are owned by small individual block-holders, who have 
more influence on the board and determine corporate governance to a large extent.” 
 
From these positions, whereas the shareholder groups only represent minority shareholders, they do 
not have much influence in relation to corporate governance. Unlike in developed countries, where 
shareholder groups are composed of institutional shareholders that can hold board/executives to 
comply with their demands by threatening, for instance, to withdraw their investment, there is no 
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such thing in Nigeria, making shareholder activism weak in influencing corporate governance. In 
Nigeria, shareholder groups may merely ask for management to do one thing or the other, but are 
generally unable to enforce such demand. In other words, minority shareholder groups are rather at 
the mercy of the few dominant owners. In this regard, this further strengthens the influence that 
concentrated owners have on corporate governance in Nigeria. Therefore, the stipulated disparity in 
shareholdings is found to prevent the minority shareholders from having significant participation in 
corporate decisions. Although, as discovered, this does not represent the expropriation of minority 
interests – as postulated in extant studies in the contexts of developing countries (see Claessens et al., 
1999a; La Porta et al., 2000) – it does leave corporate decisions predominantly to the large 
shareholders. By inference, corporate governance reforms are primarily controlled by these dominant 
shareowners, thus leading to indirect marginalisation of the minority shareholders – a challenge that 
this investigation reveals to stem from the prevailing practice or the established corporate governance 
system. Also, as a contributor who is also a minority shareholder in a listed company stated:  
OAA 08: “Corporate governance is about who has the highest vote. The minority shareholders 
are rather incapacitated by the large volume of shares these majority shareholders have. They 
control decisions.”  
 
5.3.2 The Nigerian Boards: appointment, role and responsibilities 
 The improvement to the BoD of corporations constitutes a core focus of corporate governance 
improvement (OECD, 1999, 2004; SEC code, 2003, 2011; Aguilera, 2005). One of the explanations for 
this is the promotion of arms’ length dealings in companies (Peng, 2003), in order to promote 
accountability to shareholders (Aguilera, 2005), which is identified as an overall intent of the universal 
principles of corporate governance (OECD, 1999, 2004).  To this end, the BoD serves as a valuable 
mechanism in regulating corporate management (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Aguilera, 2005). 
More so, as a result of the highly dispersed constituent of the corporate ownership in the market-
based economies, such a mechanism as the board becomes imperative (Blair and Stout, 2001). Such 
propositions are also similarly requested to be applied in Nigeria. For instance, with respect to the SEC 
Code (2011) regarding the ‘Appointment to the Board’, section 13 includes these principles, among 
others: 
 Sub-section 13.1. “The Board should develop a written, clearly defined, formal and transparent 
procedure for appointment to the Board of directors.”  
 Sub-section 13.2. “The criteria for the selection of directors should be written and defined to 
reflect the existing Board’s strengths and weaknesses, required skill and experience, its current age 
range and gender composition.” 
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To further emphasise such propositions in the Nigerian corporate governance reforms agenda, the 
provision of the Nigerian corporate governance code (SEC code, 2011), Section 4 (composition and 
structure of the Board) sub-section 4.3 states categorically thus: 
“The Board should comprise a mix of executive and non-executive directors, headed by a 
chairman. The majority of Board members should be non-executive directors, at least one of 
whom should be an independent director”. 
Also, as noted by a respondent:  
CLA10: “The board is responsible for directing and controlling corporate governance. 
Management lives by the guideline set by the board. So, if you don’t have the right board 
compositions or if you don’t have the right calibre of people on the board, you will have 
problems, and it will affect corporate governance.”  
However, the prevailing corporate governance system and performance in Nigeria reveal a challenge 
to this. Osemeke and Osemeke (2017) discover that cultural inclinations affect corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. Their study finds that such proclivity is demonstrated in the form of abuse of 
power by top management and poor recruitment policies, among others, in Nigerian companies 
(Osemeke and Osemeke, 2017). Equally, in a survey of family-controlled businesses in Indonesia by 
Tsamenyi et al. (2008), corporate decisions such as recruitment, performance evaluation, and 
resource allocations are discovered to often replicate social and cultural values. The situation arguably 
counters the philosophy of the global governance transformation agenda, which is a departure from 
the promotion of transparency and effectiveness in a board. Viewed generally, such manifestations 
have typically been attributable to the evolving nature of the developing organisational context 
(Ahunwan, 2002; Reed, 2002). Organisational fields are postulated to mature (Scott, 2001; Maguire et 
al., 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). This then evidently depicts the existence of different stages 
of advancement of the institutional structures. The phase of the organisational field basically shapes 
the level of development vis-à-vis, the prevailing practice (Garud et al., 2002; Marquis and Lounsbury, 
2007). Despite this perception, however, there are other sides to this phenomenon from this research. 
The implications of the prevailing relational and concentrated (family) corporate ownership for the 
board and management of Nigerian companies present in two major ways; the selection or 
appointment and the functionality of the board. As a respondent (auditor) asserted: 
OAF30: “When it comes to appointing directors, the chairman says I want so and so persons 
and that is it. There is no formal nomination process, which states for instance the blueprint 
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for the board; like we have got some people who are retiring, we have to do some sort of 
searching, here are the criteria for selecting these people, etc.” 
Also, as stated by a consultant: 
OAC17: “The transparency of appointment is not there. If the chairman is having shares, then 
he is technically a shareholder, even if it is the majority shares. So, in board appointment, most 
shareholders are in actual fact rubber stamps. It is mainly on personal relationship than the 
right candidate is being chosen.” 
Thus, mostly the selection of the board members (especially NEDs) in Nigerian listed companies adopts 
a less structured approach. Management roles are normally considered as transferrable (heritable) 
among the family members of the majority owners, in the Nigerian context. The independent 
directors’ appointments are fundamentally determined by the majority shareholders, who basically 
influence the appointments, albeit, through their significant influences. Consequently, this inclination 
is also cited to impact on the performance of the BoD, as the independence of the Board emerges as 
questionable, as regards these realities. As stated by one of the company regulators: 
RCM25: “A strong board is a reflection of the strength of its committees, because the 
committees are the workers of the board. However, the person that is having the majority 
share is also the one that will appoint the independent Directors; what is the effect on the 
independence of these directors?” 
Also, in this line, a policy maker affirmed thus: 
RCK20: “But in Nigeria, apart from the fact that you should not be a contractor, you should 
have no interest in the company, etc…. However, even more critical is the modality for the 
appointment of these Directors. I give you an example, where the majority shareholders are 
the ones that nominate the independent director, how independent can that person be? And 
this is not on the personal integrity of the independent director. But the fact is that, if you 
recommended me it will be difficult for me to confront you.  Rather, I may think of a way to 
help you deal with that issue.” 
Invariably, the NEDs tend to be less independent than obligatory, as they most often pay allegiance to 
these majority shareholders. Whilst it is understood that prevailing logics affect the corporate 
governance system (Rao et al., 2003), clearly not only the logics but the social exchanges matter in 
articulating any scheme of organisational modifications in the developing context. As scholars 
contend, rather than being automatic, the propagation of institutional logics is shaped by social 
interactions (Sewell, 1992; Misangyi et al., 2008). According to insights from this study, such social 
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interactions are suggested to be even more pronounced in the weak infrastructural environment of 
the developing context. As Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) cite “The potency of institutional 
processes, in other words, whether normative or coercive, is a function not simply of their recurring 
strength but also of the receptivity of recipients” (p. 38). Specifically, in Nigeria, within the 
organisational sphere, such instance is indicated to largely reflect not merely interactions, but social 
influences. This lopsidedness in ownership and control is found to tilt major corporate decisions in the 
Nigerian corporations in favour of the controlling block-holders. 
 Berle and Means (1932) posit that, when ownership is separated from control, some problems 
are bound to arise. According to agency theorists, such problems – the ‘agency conflict’ – will usually 
result from managerial opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Consequently, agency conflicts prevail 
in the Anglo-American market-based economies, with the characteristic dispersed shareholdings. 
However, in the Nigerian corporate governance practice, the major issue emerges from the 
predominant, large shareholdings. “In the Nigerian context, majority shareholders have the votes to 
remove local management without much resistance” (Ahunwan, 2002: 274). This also aligns with the 
position of concentrated ownership in other developing contexts (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Equally from this investigation, large shareholders are often directly involved in monitoring company 
management, thus the ability to control corporate decisions and mitigate agency problems emerges. 
According to a regulator:   
RCF06: “The major advantage from these controlling share-holdings is that they help address 
the issue of mismanagement. Since the owners or their families are also involved in decision 
and monitoring of the company executives.” 
Accordingly, corporate decisions within these companies including, by extension, actions on corporate 
governance reforms usually represent the interests of the controlling shareholders. Nonetheless, with 
the characteristic dispersed shareholding and few block-holdings in public companies, the Nigerian 
corporate governance environment is portrayed to be beleaguered by the mix of two governance 
conflicts. On the one hand, a concentrated ownership structure presents an advantage in subduing 
agency conflict; on the other hand, in relation to the state of the board, it presents concerns regarding 
their answerability to outside owners in Nigerian corporations. 
5.3.3 Minority shareholders in Nigerian corporate governance reforms  
As the preceding section of this chapter stipulates, concentrated owners exert much control on 
corporate management and, as a result, impact on corporate governance reforms. Despite the 
attempts at reforms, corporate governance in Nigeria still reflects the overarching influence of the 
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controlling shareholders. As highlighted, a family concentrated ownership structure causes significant 
influence on corporate governance practice in Nigeria. As one of the directors of the regulatory 
agencies stated:  
RCF06: “Ownership structure is a major issue for us in the corporations, because you see in 
Nigeria, the tendency really is that whoever is in control will have to dictate”.  
 
From this study, the practicalities of corporate governance reforms regarding the right of minority 
shareholders in the Nigerian context, is indicated. One of the key considerations of the universal 
corporate governance principle (e.g. the OECD) is to align the interests of the managers with those of 
the investors (or minority shareholders). Evidently, within these realities, the dominant logics 
(infrastructure and interpersonal) present noticeable implications for the practice of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Claessens et al. (1999a) discover that the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by large shareholders constitutes a major challenge in the developing East Asian 
countries. Thus, in this respect, many studies have indicated that in a weak institutional context, 
minority shareholders are usually subjugated and consequentially expropriated (Claessens et al., 
1999a, b). Also, as La Porta et al. (1998) assert, exploitation of minority shareholders constitutes a 
fundamental problem in corporate governance, in countries with concentrated ownership. However, 
this study suggests the susceptibility of minority shareholders in Nigerian corporations. Thus, evidence 
from the study indicates that minority shareholders are technically accorded the necessary privileges, 
based on the holdings. For instance, minority shareholders are found to have the right to vote at the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) and/or to participate in corporate decision making. Within the 
Nigerian organisational context, proportionately, the equity of each of these minority stockholders is 
small and immaterial.44 Even where voting is undertaken at AGMs, the very small proportion of the 
minority rights count for little towards the overall outcomes. Hence, this is found to result in relatively 
trivial influence on corporate management and decision making, with respect to the outside 
shareholders.  As cited by a corporate legal counsel: 
CLH23: You find that when you get to an Annual General Meeting (AGM) and there are 
contentious issues, the majority shareholder can demand a poll, which automatically tilts the 
balance of the voting in favour of whatever position of the majority shareholders. 
                                                             
44 Whilst some of these block-holders are found to own over 70% of a company’s equity, held by few individuals, the 
remaining 30% are widely distributed amongst hundreds of thousands of other individuals.  
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This is also confirmed by a minority shareholder among the independent observer class of 
interviewees, who noted: 
OAB09: “The minority shareholders are actually allowed to vote in meetings and free to 
participate in any other corporate governance activities, but unfortunately our votes don’t 
usually have a significant effect.”  
Minority shareholders, in Nigerian listed companies are also, by no means, found to be directly 
exempted from decisions on corporate governance reforms, by inference, although controlling 
shareholders are disclosed to deploy corporate decisions to their benefit, albeit, this is within set 
regulatory or legal boundaries. In this respect, a condition which signifies right disparities, rather than 
direct exploitation, is disclosed. Although emerging themes indicate corporate governance to be 
directed by the large shareholders, such influence is largely due to the disparity of control between 
the two groups of shareholders (controlling block-holders and the dispersed minority shareholders).  
 Accordingly, as a result of their insignificant shareholdings, on the other hand, attitudinally, 
there is a marked lack of considerable interest on the part of outside (minority) shareholders, with 
respect to corporate governance matters in Nigerian corporations. This inclination further compounds 
the stated vulnerability of the minority shareholders. In essence, such disposition leaves decisions on 
corporate governance reforms largely to the majority controlling block-holders. According to a 
respondent’s observation of this scenario: 
OAC17: “How will they know their right as shareholders? How will they understand corporate 
governance principles? How will they know that if one is a shareholder in this company one is 
entitled to his dividend? And this dividend is a debt for the company for X number of years, 
that is why we have such a huge amount of unclaimed dividends problem. Some don’t even 
remember that they bought shares and are entitled to a dividend.”  
Against this backdrop, in contrast to the popular agency conflict, as a result of the dominant ownership 
structure, another type of conflicts emerges. As Young et al. (2008) affirm, this nature of conflict, called 
the Principal-Principal (PP) conflict, usually involves large owners and dispersed minority (Young et 
al., 2008). As stipulated, the study indicates that these minority shareholders are generally 
insignificant to corporate decision making and corporate governance reforms. Nonetheless, this is not 
explicitly accounted for as the noted principal-principal conflict in Nigeria, but as a result of the stated 
differences in ownerships and rights. In light of the foregoing, this study also reveals such peculiarities 
of the concentrated ownership structure in the Nigerian corporate governance performance. 
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Consequently, recognising such a condition emerges as a significant prelude to fostering corporate 
governance improvements in Nigeria. As a respondent corporate legal counsel stated: 
CLB11: “The Nigerian listed companies’ corporations consist of a lot of concentrated owners. 
It is very important that our corporate governance system substantially recognises and 
incorporates this matter, among other things.”  
Accordingly, as Besharov and Smith (2014) contend, the centrality of logics is also a reflection of the 
organisational form and not only determined at the field level. Thus, within the Nigerian corporate 
governance domain, the corporate ownership structure represents a noticeably dominant 
organisational factor. As a result of the concentrated/relational corporate governance system and the 
attendant institutional framework, issues specific to the Nigerian corporate governance performance 
are indicated. Equally, the need to account for these contextually impelled challenges, becomes more 
pivotal in designing a tailored resolve towards corporate governance advancement. 
 
Conclusion 
 The corporate governance system in Nigeria is identified as representing a hybrid system. This 
includes a combination of the shareholder (market-based) and the stakeholder (bank-based) 
structure. Hence, distinctly presented in this context, are two different orientations in corporate 
governance, indicating a dualism of the corporate governance system. Also, the dominance of the 
concentrated ownership structure and a resultant stakeholder corporate governance system are 
disclosed in Nigeria. Essentially, the corporate governance environment of Nigeria (and arguably other 
similar developing African contexts) portrays a stakeholder system rather than a shareholder system. 
Although, such large ownership structures exist in other corporate governance contexts, such as 
Germany, however, in Nigeria, the concentrated ownership consists mainly of family owners and 
individuals with relational status. This grouping also represents the elites that constitute significant 
socio-economic influences within the Nigerian corporate governance context. Consequently, the 
mixed/hybrid model, in Nigeria, exhibits distinct attendant features. Also, the Nigerian corporate 
governance is disclosed as a relationship model of corporate governance, characterised by noted 
relational contracting. Such relationship based corporate governance structure, epitomises the 
interlace of family business owners, cohorts and banks with other social influencers (political, cultural 
or religious).  
 The preceding chapter (Chapter 4) indicates the impact of the configuration and interface of 
the Nigerian organisational field and the prevailing institutional logic on the motivation for corporate 
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governance reforms. In extending these findings, this chapter highlights the repercussions of the 
noted prevailing corporate governance system – in terms of the noted dominant block-holding in 
Nigeria. Nonetheless, while in the preceding chapter this structure predominantly directs corporate 
governance reforms, the intricacies of such condition, in the attempts at corporate governance 
reforms, are further revealed, in this chapter. Here, from the neo-institutional perspective on 
organisational transformations, the resultant pronounced relational structure of corporate or 
organisational processes is found to spell difficulty for the global intentions of corporate governance 
reforms. The prevalence of an interpersonal framework of performance in Nigeria, significantly 
dampens the functionality of the shareholder-agency theory-oriented corporate governance 
recommendations.   
 Against this backdrop, rather than merely the predominant corporate governance form in the 
principal-agent structure, the governance mechanism in the developing context also posits the 
possibility of another type of conflict in the principal-principal structure (Young et al., 2008). However, 
although the presence of such principal-principal conflict is not explicitly disclosed in Nigeria, the 
enclave from the dominant stakeholder system, in conjunction with a lack of advanced mechanisms, 
makes the dispersed (outside) shareholders largely vulnerable and susceptible. Insights from the neo-
institutional perspective through institutional work explains how agents can ‘be actively involved in 
interpreting, reproducing, tearing down and/or creating new institutions’ (Dobbins, 2010; Lawrence 
et al., 2011). Likewise, the findings highlight the inference of such a stakeholder relationship-based 
governance structure in Nigeria. This includes the centrality of informal rules, infiltrations of social, 
cultural factors and the action of key social players in Nigeria. Along this line, social interfaces emerge 
as central to organisational reproduction within this maturing context. The corporate governance 
practice in Nigeria seemingly portrays a contradiction to such arm’s length propositions of the 
universal corporate governance reform. These perspectives, thus, reflect profound concerns for the 
establishment of the “universal best practices”, in terms of providing the best fit for such hybrid 
system. With the notion of the universality of codes of conduct, also is the assumption of institutional 
compatibility. However, as Judge et al. (2008) state, business corporations represent public 
institutions that are influenced by economic, political, and socio-cultural forces and influences. 
Emerging fields are found to depict the absence of clearly defined positions and show concentrations 
of resources associated with leading actors (Maguire et al., 2004). Likewise, as revealed, the Nigerian 
corporate governance context denotes a maturing organisational field. As within the neo-
institutionalisation perspective, organisational reproduction is argued to occur within regimented and 
formalised organisational structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This 
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condition thus presents peculiarities that challenge the institution of the universal corporate 
governance reforms in the context of Nigeria. 
 Further, in Nigeria, the dominant system and practice in corporate governance in the 
stakeholder and relational system of governance, as a result of the dominance of the block-holder’s 
structure, are inevitably reflected in the position of the resultant organisational reforms. Illustrative 
of this is the revealed inclination towards the established governance practices. The realities of 
institutional reproduction in the space of Nigeria are such that they depict a retention of existing 
practice – path dependency. In this vein, this result advances the findings of Adegbite and Nakajima 
(2012) that institutional maintenance is indicated in the Nigerian corporate governance performance, 
by expatiating the possible underlying factors for such a situation. On the one hand, this indicates a 
restraint on the drive for organisational innovations; on the other hand, this situation largely reflects 
the specificities of the Nigerian institutional context and organisational performance. An actor’s 
relative embeddedness can rather be defined as an indication of the awareness of alternatives, 
openness to alternatives and a motivation to change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 29). The 
prevailing internal structure and conditions of the organisational field evidently dictate the direction 
and attention of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Thus, this study suggests that it is 
imperative to account for these peculiarities in the Nigerian corporate governance system, in 
organisational reform propositions (agenda).  
 In light of the preceding discussions, the next chapter of the thesis evaluates how corporate 
governance reforms are thus rationalised, legitimised and ultimately regulated in Nigeria, in spite of 
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CHAPTER 6:  The Ratification and Regulation of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria  
6.0 Introduction 
 Rather than only organisational power and control, institutional explanations of isomorphism 
and reproduction emphasise the role of conformity, habit, and convention (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991). The organisational configurations of national institutional environments have 
traditionally been significant to corporate governance practice. The extent to which organisational 
processes are influenced by their institutional forces has long been debated within the organisational 
studies discourse (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2001; Garud et al., 2007; Fan and Zietsma, 2017; Martin et al., 
2017). Along this line, the literature acknowledges the existence of varying forms of legitimation of 
organisational innovations (Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Harmon et al., 2015; Imerman, 2018). 
Legitimacy enhances both the stability and comprehensibility of organisational activities (Suchman, 
1995). However, organisational behaviours rarely foster continuity and credibility, persistence and 
meaning, in equal degrees (Suchman, 1995). For instance, in bank-based stakeholder economies, a 
key issue in corporate governance is that the focus of bank shareholders to maximize value may 
conflict with those of regulators, who have their own agendas (Boot and Thakor, 1993; Arun and 
Turner, 2004). A related study on the adoption of best practices such as the IFRS, also highlights the 
complexity of the interplay between external pressures and internal pressures on public firms (Kim, 
2016). Equally, corporate governance reforms are noted to involve different groups of social actors, 
which ratify the procedures (OECD principles of corporate governance, 1999, 2004). However, as there 
is no explicit distinction of the realisation of such endorsements, there is thus noted an underlying 
assumption that these can be achieved simultaneously as the diffusion of these principles. Even in 
highly matured fields, institutional logics and structures are never frozen (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006: 28). As Aguilera and Jackson (2003), assert, to conceptualise cross-national diversity in 
corporate governance and understand the key factors explaining these differences remains 
problematic, globally. As such, core concepts of organisational studies—such as institutionalisation, 
institutional change, and institutional logics—have focused attention on the processes through which 
large-scale social and economic changes occur, that is, the macro-dynamics of fields” (Lawrence et al., 
2011).  
 The work of actors and social agents is considered in the emergence of new practices or 
conforming practices and the implications of these subtleties, drawing on the perspective in neo-
institutionalism – for instance, institutional logics and work (Lawrence et al., 2011; Ocasio and 
Radoynovska, 2016). Institutional work redirects attention to the purposive action of individuals and 
collective actors, in transforming or reproducing, creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions 
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(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011). However, some reciprocity is indicated in the 
level of control of such collective actions. Institutional logics represent resilient social prescriptions, 
specifying the boundaries of a field but are usually ‘taken for granted’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Lawrence, 1999; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton, 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Hence, 
organisational actors shape and change institutional logics, while institutional logics also shape 
rational and mindful behaviours and individuals (Thornton, 2004; Zahir-Ul-Hassan, 2017). In the 
corporate governance reforms in developing countries, the literature has noted variations in the 
implementations and regulations of corporate governance best practices (Adegbite and Nakajima, 
2012; Nakpodia et al., 2016; Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Nonetheless, how these phenomena 
translate within these largely evolving institutional logics is unclear, within the extant discussions on 
organisational transformations. Understanding the dynamics in institutional transformations across 
different contexts will allow a nuanced explanation of the diffusion or adoption of corporate 
governance best practices. 
 Drawing on this backdrop, this chapter provides the interactions between such institutional 
logics and the prevailing social actions or influences and consequence on corporate governance 
innovations, in an evolving organisational field. This attempts to answer the research question: How 
are corporate governance reforms ratified and regulated within the Nigerian institutional context? 
Thus, within the chapter, the emerging themes from this study highlight the endorsements, mode of 
implementations and administration of good governance practices in Nigeria. In the main, the findings 
stipulate that corporate governance reforms, within this institutional context, are inclined towards 
path dependency by the retention of historical ideology. Consequently, the administration of good 
governance in Nigeria is found not to align with the prevalent principle-based mode in the ‘comply or 
explain’ form of compliance. Resultantly, a rigid mode of implementation is revealed as a feasible 
alternative to disengage from the embeddedness in dominant prevailing practice. In this respect, the 
findings enable the implications for corporate governance reforms, in the light of the rationalisation 
of good governance principles, to be explained. Theoretically, such a context-defined approach 
indicates that national institutions might be more significant to organisational innovation processes 
than preconceived. The emerging themes within the chapter is thus organised in the following way. 
The emerging themes reveal the antecedents of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria, which sets 
the tone for understanding the background to such attempts. Following this, the regulatory context 
of corporate governance reforms depicts the social interface and the inferences of this for the 
corporate governance transformational agenda in Nigeria. Lastly, the implications of these contextual 
factors for the mode, approach and administration of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria are 
disclosed.     
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6.1  Antecedent of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
6.1.1 Institutional pressures and the Nigerian corporate infrastructure 
 Institutional pressures within an organisational field refers to those forces that spur 
organisational processes in line with intended purposes (Judge, 2008). These typically constitute the 
strategic, normative, mimetic and coercive pressures that should drive organisations towards 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The Nigerian corporate governance environment has 
historically been regulated by statutes and laws, primarily (Ahunwan, 2002; Nmehielle and Nwauche, 
2004). As the sole corporate Act, the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (1990) constitutes the 
main corporate legal framework in Nigeria. The CAMA (1990) also broadly includes corporate 
governance principles for companies in Nigeria. For instance, parts A-D and the schedules to this Act, 
set out the guidelines for directing the activities of businesses incorporated in Nigeria. Specifically, 
Part A outlines such provisions regarding:  
 
i) Corporate Affairs Commission, ii) Incorporation of companies and incidental matters, iii) acts 
by or on behalf of company, iv) membership of the company, v) share capital, vi) shares, vii) 
debentures, viii) meetings and proceedings of companies, ix) directors and secretaries of the 
companies, x) protection of minorities against illegal and oppressive conduct, xi) financial 
statement of audit, xii) annual returns, xiii) dividends and profits, xiv) receivers and managers, 
xv) winding up of companies, xvi) arrangement and compromise, xvii) dealings in companies 
securities and xviii) miscellaneous and supplemental.45  
Particularly prior to the inauguration of the first Nigerian corporate governance code (The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) code, 2003), the CAMA (1990) represented the single regulatory 
framework for businesses in Nigeria; however, the launch of the SEC code 2003 – and other industry 
regulatory measures46 – where the SEC code solely outlines corporate governance matters, the 
provisions of the CAMA, on the other hand, incorporate all aspects of the corporate functions. Thus, 
the CAMA remains as a focal reference for corporate affairs in Nigeria. Consequently, the legal 
regulatory mechanism in Nigeria has, evidently, produced prevalent dependence on statutes. 
 
 “The legal system is important for corporate governance not only insofar as it plays a role in 
the enforcement of company law, but also to the extent that it is charged with enforcing a wide range 
of contracts that corporations make with various external actors.” (Ahunwan, 2002: 276). Boundary 
                                                             
45 Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990: 
<http://www.nigerialaw.org/CompaniesAndAlliedMattersAct.htm> 
46 In Nigeria, industry’s codes of conduct and other industry regulatory frameworks have been significant in providing 
corporate governance guidance, even following the SEC (2003) corporate governance code for listed companies – e.g. the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) codes of conduct for banks, etc. 
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definitions in institutional logics normally involve meanings that are described to include elements 
encoded in law (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  Thus, 
in Nigeria, the CAMA represents a notable antecedent – as the coercive pressure (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) – to corporate governance reforms (CAMA, 1990). CAMA was enacted in 1990, from the 
former Companies and Allied Matters Decree (CAMD). Since the enactment of CAMA, there has not 
been any major revision to the Act; largely the same provisions have been carried on through the years 
to the present. Such lack of revision is cited to have historically impeded the advancement of 
corporate governance in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2012b). In a similar vein, from this investigation, such 
obsolescence of CAMA is noted to limit its consistency with the current corporate governance 
propositions in Nigeria. As stated by one of the listed company executives:  
CLB11: “CAMA is obsolete and cannot support the current corporate governance environment. 
The legislation that governs companies is CAMA; I tell you there is no provision for Independent 
Directors, Board audit committee, etc.” 
Correspondingly, the specified deterrent of CAMA presents a weak legislative framework for the 
Nigerian corporate governance performance. Hence, even though CAMA can be regarded as the 
principal form of legislative pressure, it does not offer the relevant support to the corporate 
governance reforms scheme in Nigeria. Besides the obsolescence, the lack of consistency between the 
CAMA and the SEC code also presents a form of regulatory contradiction, with respect to corporate 
governance reforms. One major indication of this is that the provisions of the CAMA and those of the 
SEC code differ in different respects. As stated by a policy maker:  
RCG05: “Currently the corporate governance practice is different from CAMA. For instance, the 
requirement of the code regarding audit committee membership is not covered in the CAMA.” 
The above statement is reinforced by a scrutiny of the parts A-D and the schedules to the CAMA47. 
Equally, as corroborated by one of the auditors/consultants to the listed company:  
OAI37: “There is something odd in the CAMA. For instance, the statutory audit committee is 
composed of the shareholders’ representative and the board members, so it is not actually a 
board committee, it is accountable to the shareholders, independently of the board, which I 
think is weird, because the board is actually accountable to the company’s shareholders and 
the audit committee should be subject to the board. The moment there is another committee 
sitting up there, then it is not normal. It is a sort of duplication and the statutory audit 
committee is instituted by CAMA.” 
                                                             
47 Ibid. footnote 46 
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Nonetheless, as the only legal apparatus for corporations in Nigeria, despite the limitations and the 
launch of various other guidelines for corporate governance48, CAMA remains pivotal in the corporate 
environment of Nigeria. As noted by a corporate consultant in this respect: 
OAF30: “CAMA still provides the only means of providing legal reference for companies’ 
activities and dealings in Nigeria. Whether it is adequately doing that is another question.”   
 Corporate governance change is argued as not constituting a linear evolution, although 
involving interactions across firm and institutional levels in response to both internal and external 
pressures (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Universally, corporate governance codes are intended to be 
complementary to legal frameworks across countries. Consequently, one of the stipulated main 
objectives of corporate governance principles is to make up for the deficiency(ies) in corporate legal 
or regulatory frameworks across countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009; Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2008). In this vein, as corporate governance codes are basically meant to complement legal 
frameworks, the deterrents of CAMA should not have been problematic; however, as the insights 
specify, in the case of Nigeria, there prevails a high degree of dependence on the legal infrastructure. 
Evidence from this study indicate that, as a result of such reliance, instead of the corporate governance 
principles to supplement the Act, they are rather expected to be affirmed (validated) by the provisions 
of the Act. As stated by a director of a regulatory agency: 
RCK20: “The lack of reviews of CAMA over the years, has created a gap in implementation. If 
CAMA had been reviewed, many things could have been straightened. People are still 
agitating, if CAMA is saying two directors, why are you saying eight. But if CAMA has raised 
the bar since, then they will not see the gap.”  
This view generally represents the perceptions of many organisational actors (respondents) in the 
study. As another interviewee also cited;  
OAC17: “In Nigeria, we have the dual audit committees (statutory and Board). People are 
confused asking; should they do the board audit committee or the statutory board audit? But 
if you are a public company you need to have the committees, which must have equal 
representation. These are the issues where the existing legislative framework does not support 
existing corporate governance principles. There is conflict between the CAMA and the 
provisions of the code.” 
 
                                                             
48 For instance, the SEC code of corporate governance, the banking reforms- code of corporate governance for banks post 
consolidation in Nigeria, (2006) and the proposed FRCN, National corporate governance code48 
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To this end, requiring a vibrant legal framework emerges as a core basis for compliance with good 
governance principles, among corporate entities in Nigeria. In this respect, the absence of such 
constitutes a major restraint to the attempts at corporate governance reforms in the Nigerian 
environment (Interviews, CLG22; RCF06; OAF30). For instance, as a corporate governance consultant 
affirmed:  
OAF30: “----- those companies who wants to delay implementation of these codes will always 
refer to CAMA.”  
From these perspectives, the antecedents and present realities of the corporate governance 
regulations in Nigeria portray the centrality of the corporate statutes (in CAMA). The process of 
legitimation sometimes denotes adherence to taken-for-granted societal myths and norms (Phillips et 
al., 2000; Sonpar et al., 2010).  Correspondingly, this study indicates acquiescence to laws or statutes 
to be pivotal to the drive for corporate reforms in the Nigerian corporate environment.  In this respect, 
as the institutional perspective explains, social validity, survival and passive acquiescence, as opposed 
to strategic adaptation, to the external environment can contribute to determining an organisational 
behaviour, in the context of external pressure (Oliver, 1991). As corporate actors still primarily refer 
to the CAMA to engender compliance, thus, the corporate governance reforms in the context of 
Nigeria suggest inclinations towards institutional antecedents (see Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012) as a 
form of ‘path dependency’.49  
 
6.1.2 Professionalism: A predominant enclosure  
 With respect to the preceding section, alongside the cited regulatory antecedent of corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria, the approach to corporate governance regulation is found to mirror 
the ideology of major organisational actors and entrenched institutional pressures within this 
environment. As scholars argue, instituting change across institutional fields may require as much of 
the efforts achieved through the collection of structures and processes, as well as the consideration 
of the organisational bearings (Greenwood et al., 2014; Meyer and Höllerer, 2014). In this respect, in 
the Nigerian corporate governance performance, the disclosed reliance on the legal infrastructure 
(CAMA), is discovered to be a natural course of an identified ‘normative pressure’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) underlying the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. ‘Normative pressure’, a 
source of isomorphic organisational change, stems primarily from professionalisation50 (DiMaggio and 
                                                             
49 “Path dependence represents a particular type of cause-effect relationship wherein institutions and collective actors find 
themselves in a temporal inertia-an inertia caused and heavily influenced by crucial decisions in the past” (Allen, 2010:416) 
50 Whereby, professionalization is delineated as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the 
conditions and methods of their work and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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Powell, 1983). The administration of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria reflects a precursor of 
the dominance of the law professionals (e.g. lawyers, legal counsels). As a corporate governance 
consultant stated in this respect:  
OAG34: “Even if you look at the profession of corporate governance in Nigeria it has largely 
been practised by lawyers. I guess this will have affected the mode of the discipline majorly.”  
 
As Harmon et al. (2015) suggest, social actors can contest or defend certain actions or ideas, 
depending on the structural level of dynamics within the institutional field. Equally, the cognitive 
conditions where institutional change is more likely to occur are reflected through the field rhetoric 
(Harmon et al., 2015). The state of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria thus reveals some level 
of path dependency towards the historical antecedence of corporate governance. Path dependence, 
as a major historical institutionalism theory, provides insights into the extent to which prevailing 
conditions permit outside actors to impose an institutional framework on a given society (Allen, 2010). 
As Giddens (1993) asserts, “The rationalisation of action is closely bound up with the moral evaluations 
of `responsibility' (p. 165). Thus, notwithstanding the present situation in corporate governance 
practice in Nigeria, in the introduction of codes (principle-based approach) in line with the existing 
normative pressure, the legal performance framework is noted to still dominate corporate governance 
reforms. As stated by a listed company consultant, in this regard: 
OAI37: “Mostly corporate governance practice in Nigeria is dominated by legal practitioners, 
it includes a lot of laws and statutes. This will surely affect the way people think about 
corporate governance in this environment. Even in companies and company registrations, it is 
the legal practitioners that handle most of these functions.” 
 
Also, as an independent observer (a corporate governance consultant) cited:  
OAG34: “I think corporate governance has usually been the business of lawyers in Nigeria and 
still is, predominantly.” 
 
Also, noticeably, during the course of this investigation, mostly the interviewees (i.e. designated 
officials in the regulatory agencies and listed companies) are found to either be lawyers or legal 
counsels. This observed trend is diagrammatically represented in the bar chart below (Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: Perspective on corporate governance Practice and Professionalism in Nigeria 
Institutionalism and Institutional Normative pressure ‘Form over Substance’ 
 The above representation mirrors a procedural approach confirming the general stance on 
corporate governance within the Nigerian organisational field. As observed, principally, persons in 
charge of corporate governance responsibilities/issues in organisations or establishments, in Nigeria, 
are observed to be principally from the legal profession. This draws attention to the effects of ethos, 
particularly professional (normative) ratification and their implications for corporate governance 
reforms across different institutional contexts. For instance, this perception is reflected in the general 
disposition to corporate governance principles and the reforms’ procedure, in the case of Nigeria. As 
revealed in the statement of a regulator reflecting the centrality of CAMA: 
RCG07: “Corporate governance is not a new thing in Nigeria, if you look at CAMA, CAMA has 
all the things that the organisations require. CAMA has all that they need to be properly run 
so that the interest of stakeholders is protected, that is the essence of corporate governance. 
CAMA gave some hints on how certain things should be done, board appointment, meetings 
resolutions; I think if CAMA had been reviewed regularly, there probably would not have been 
codes. Because in some areas, they are not clear, that is why the SEC Investment Protection 
Act (ISA) came up with their own SEC Codes, just to protect the investors.”  
In this light, by implication, in the implementation of the corporate governance codes, the ‘legal form’ 
of recommendations takes pre-eminence over proclivity towards the principled or accounting 
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‘substance over form’51. Consequently, the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria has followed 
a more legislative ideology, as a result of the legal antecedent (CAMA). The legal form of corporate 
dealings largely informs the adopted approach to corporate governance reforms processes in Nigeria, 
rather than the accounting principle or substance basis. In this respect, a stringent and regulated rule-
based environment for corporate governance naturally represents the procedure for endorsement, 
whereby a highly regulated environment and process of reforms emerges. 
 
6.1.3 The framework of control within the Nigerian corporate context 
 Organisations make commitments, to particular combinations of logics, based on the 
relatively stable hierarchies (logics) at the field level (Ocasio and Radoynovska, 2016). Emergent 
themes from this study reveal the hierarchy of control within the Nigerian corporate governance 
environment, illustrating the regulatory structure. The administration of corporate governance 
principles and codes of conduct (reforms) in Nigeria embody an array of regulatory agencies. This 
involves key agencies within the corporate contexts, such as; SEC, CAC, CBN, NSE, NAICOM, 
PENCOM.52 Also, in the last decade the FRCN, made the list as the central regulator in the corporate 
governance reforms scheme in Nigeria, specifically inaugurated to administer the National governance 
code53. In a previous study (Adegbite, 2012b), overlap in the responsibilities and authorities of these 
key agents, within the regulatory sphere has been reported. However, from this study, the 
structuration of these authorities is identified to decide the extent of their control within the Nigerian 
corporate context, and in turn their significance towards corporate governance performance. As an 
auditor of a listed company cited:  
OAF30: “Different regulators control corporate governance in Nigeria and the outcome of this 
reform is a reflection of the degree of their mandates and authorities, within the corporate 
environment.”  
Also, according to a company auditor: 
OAI37: “There are different levels of control within the corporate governance environment. As 
an entity, this will be based on the ranking of your regulator, as a result of your industry.” 
 
 The key corporate regulators in Nigeria present considerable influences on corporate 
governance within their industries. Beyond those industries, their influence on corporate governance 
                                                             
51 The ‘substance over form’ is an accounting convention that states that the economic significance, rather than merely the 
legal implication of transactions, should be considered in reporting the activities of a business.  
52 See Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016 for a detailed analysis of codes and corporate governance reforms in Nigeria.  
53 The National code of corporate governance was intended to provide a single framework of corporate governance best 
practices and oversight in Nigeria. See the FRCN website at <http://www.financialreportingcouncil.gov.ng/> 
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reforms, however, is broadly dictated by the regulatory hierarchy across the Nigerian organisational 
field. As such, this is recognised to constitute institutional complexity (Thornton et al., 2012)54 in 
regulating corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Within the Nigerian corporate context, the SEC 
has usually served as the principal regulator. Although the SEC code (2003) (Revised in 2011), is the 
first formal attempt at instituting corporate governance principles in Nigeria, it only applies to listed 
companies.55 However, also noted within the Nigerian corporate governance sphere, are other central 
regulators of corporations which constitute both listed and unlisted; for instance, within this framing 
are the CBN regulated entities, which include banks and other financial institutions. The position of 
the CBN as the apex regulator56 of the financial sector in Nigeria, has endowed it with considerable 
authority, given the centrality of the financial sector in Nigeria (see Chapter 4 of this thesis) (Arun and 
Turner, 2004). The influence of the CBN is thus inevitably prominent within the Nigerian corporate 
governance performance. Indeed, proactive measures in corporate governance reforms in the 
financial sector, by the CBN, such as the inauguration of the, “code of corporate governance for banks 
in Nigeria post consolidation” in 2006, has triggered considerable ripple effects, within the corporate 
governance context of Nigeria. As a company secretary and legal/corporate governance adviser 
stated:  
 CLF19: “The CBN has been at the forefront of corporate governance since 2003.”  
Also, as a policy maker cited:  
 RCI14: “The CBN bank reforms have pushed the limit in corporate governance in Nigeria; many 
 companies now use this as a benchmark.” 
 
Also, the FRCN was established by the Financial Reporting Council Act (2011) to serve as the Nigerian 
counterpart to the UK’s FRC. Among other financial responsibilities, it represents the only agency 
legally conferred with the authority to act as a principal administrator of corporate governance 
matters in Nigeria. As stated by a corporate governance contributor: 
OAD26: “The FRCN code is to provide basic principles which none of these regulators have the 
authority for, because the Act (CG reform ACT) does not give them that power. The only 
regulator that the Act empowers to regulate corporate governance in Nigeria is the FRCN.” 
While the FRCN constitutes a central authority, however, as noted, some other agencies have as much, 
if not greater, authority with regard to corporate governance. The above situation symbolises a 
                                                             
54 Institutional complexity is referred to as those situations in which divergent prescriptions from multiple institutional 
logics collide (Greenwood et al., 2010, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). 
55 See <http://sec.gov.ng/> 
56 See CBN <https://www.cbn.gov.ng/> 
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structural hegemony within the corporate governance regulatory framework in Nigeria.  In this 
respect, the centrality of regulators to the Nigerian corporate governance reforms arises, along the 
divides of their oversight functions, in three major categories: 
1) Those regulators that are constitutionally inaugurated (instated through an Act or Bill) as 
major regulators.  
2) Those regulators that regulate listed corporations (these entities are mandated to comply 
with the corporate governance codes).  
3) Those that assume such a position as a result of the economic significance of their regulated 
entities.  
 
6.2 Regulatory context of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
6.2.1 The Nigerian regulatory sphere structuration  
 In respect of the foregoing, the Nigerian corporate governance field portrays two major 
divides. At the one end are listed companies and at the other end are other entities that, though not 
listed companies, constitute major economic giants. For instance, many companies in this category 
are high turnover companies, such as Telecommunications, Energy (oil and gas), Power generation 
and distribution, Banks and other financial Institutions, Pension fund managers and Insurance 
companies, Manufacturing, Freight and shipping and companies.57 Some of these companies, though 
unquoted, nonetheless constitute significant drivers of the Nigerian economy. This relates to the scale 
of their income and the volume of their investment, within the developing organisational context. For 
instance, within this classification of corporations in Nigeria, Ahunwan (2002) describes this category 
(D) of companies as follows:  
“Some of these enterprises, however, are quite large, with a capital base comparable to many 
listed corporations. Banks, insurance and various industrial corporations come under this 
category. Both foreign and local entrepreneurs operate in this category.” (p. 272). 
Hence, inadvertently, this confers a broadly similar magnitude of authority on their regulators. 
Correspondingly, the regulatory lines of authorities and influence across the Nigerian corporate 
sphere follow these differentiations, in accounting for the peculiar structuration. As a respondent 
stated;   
                                                             
57 An analysis of the companies on the listing of the NSE.  
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OAG34: “How many listed companies do we have as against the number of private companies 
that we have? The telecommunications industry controls about 9% of the GDP of this country, 
but then they are mostly private companies.” 
 
 Organisations are more likely to endorse the values or requirements of an institutional 
environment when such an environment is highly interconnected (Oliver, 1991: 171). However, in the 
Nigerian corporate context, as the SEC oversight does not apply broadly, administrations of corporate 
governance are realised through respective industry regulators. Thus, the configuration of the 
Nigerian corporate governance context generates disparity, in the attempts at reforms. As such, each 
sector designs and fulfils its own governance reforms procedure, separately. Different agencies are 
thus responsible for corporate governance innovations in Nigeria. To this extent, the emergence of a 
different strategic position arises, which correspondingly promotes a noted degree of institutional 
contradictions (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Seo and Creed, 2002) within this dispersal of regulatory 
control.  As stated by a director of a regulatory agency: 
RCK20: “CBN is not ready and might not relinquish its authority to the FRCN with respect to 
corporate governance in the banking sector. CBN serves as a major regulator of the Nigerian 
economy and it will be impossible for any other agency to try to challenge its authority in this 
respect.”  
As Giddens (1993) states, “The reproduction of modes of domination, one must emphasize, expresses 
asymmetries in the forms of meaning and morality that are made to ‘count’ in interaction” (p. 165). 
Similarly, politically inclined environments are argued to portray characteristically less adaptive and 
often inflexible decision-making procedures (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Evidently, the overlaps in 
authority result in grey areas and blurred lines of authority within the maturing Nigerian corporate 
environment. Field-level dynamics, are significant to institutional transformation as they particularly 
impact on the arrangement and relationship among logics within the institutional field (Martin et al., 
2017). Equally, such structuration decides the repertoires available to different actors, as they help 
explain how action can both be constrained and enabled within the organisational sphere (Martin et 
al., 2017). Likewise, the tune and pace of transformation within the Nigerian organisational field 
considerably mirror the regulatory strength of respective sectors.  
6.2.2 Actors’ dynamics and power relation 
 Most field studies overlook the role of power because one of the consequences of 
institutionalization is a tendency to ‘naturalize’ the institutional structures that populate settings, so 
that power differences become apparent only to outsiders (Zucker, 1991; Fligstein, 1997; Suddaby et 
al., 2007). This study reveals the existence of power disparity and dynamics among major regulators 
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as a consequence of the structure of the Nigerian corporate regulatory setting.58 A hypothetical case 
involving a company BND Plc within the Nigerian banking industry is cited by a corporate regulator to 
illustrate this situation thus: 
RCD04: The company (BND Plc) as a listed company and also within the banking industry needs 
to comply with;  
1) SEC regulatory authority (as a key regulator of listed companies),  
2) As a company within the financial sector, the company is duly regulated by the CBN and is 
required to comply with the CBN codes of conducts, and  
3) Company BND is also subjected to the authority of the NSE as a key regulator of the capital 
market.   
 
A similar scenario is noted in a past study as having resulted in a multiplicity of codes within the 
Nigerian corporate governance sphere (Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). Within this study, from the 
perspective of the regulators, such a situation produces divergent interferences and interests with 
respect to corporate governance reforms. As noted by a policy maker: 
RCO33: “There was a case where a company contravened some of the SEC recommendations; 
however, the industry regulator stepped in and the company got away with it, whereas it was 
supposed to be brought to book. These are similar ways regulators interfere with one another’s 
authority.”   
 
 Further, as Besharov and Smith (2014) argue, though the prevalence of logic multiplicity tends 
to be treated as a homogeneous phenomenon, the consequences of logic multiplicity depend on how 
logics are instantiated. The regulatory context of Nigeria depicts a horizontal distribution of authority, 
i.e., the power and influences of key regulators, within the regulatory space, intersect in such a way 
that a clear distinction in the hierarchy of control is non-existent. Insights from this analysis indicate 
that, among other things, the need to incorporate the resultant myriad interests, in such a maturing 
context, presents a major complexity. This study reveals complexity in the interfaces in regulatory 
authorities in Nigeria. Such interfaces are reflected in the form of power dynamics among the key 
institutional actors arising from the noted intertwining of their duties and authorities. The corporate 
governance regulatory environment thus displays considerable subtleties, among the major 
regulators. For instance, since the investiture of the FRCN, the regulatory body has faced undue power 
                                                             
58 There are grey areas in the functions of the various regulatory agencies in Nigeria, whereby the FRCN is mainly 
responsible for the oversight of the financial aspect of corporate financial reporting, while the other corporate regulators 
are equally responsible for their respective industries. 
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tussles, resulting in litigations and unresolved conflicts of interest among key stakeholders.59 This 
situation arose as a result of the conferred authority, as well as the proposed principles, being opposed 
by concerned actors. In fact, the FRCN agency has been largely challenged in the discharge of its duties. 
As this investigation revealed, mainly the existence of other authorities within the corporate 
governance context of Nigeria also serving as major regulators within their industries, has made the 
exercise of such central coordination problematic.  It is noteworthy that the FRCN proposed national 
corporate governance code, since instatement in 2011, is however yet to be launched. The process of 
instatement has been clouded with law suits, diverse public hearings, and conflicts among regulators 
and different interest groups in Nigeria. The resulting myriad reactions and conflicts are represented 
by the disparate interests from organisational stakeholders depicted within the Nigerian corporate 
governance environment, since the investiture of the FRCN as the principal authority. As a respondent, 
a consultant from an accounting firm stated: 
OAI37: “They are trying to push through the FRCN code. The FRCN wants to impose it on every 
industry. They want to create themselves as super regulators that they don’t have the capacity 
for. Some of the elements that they put in the code/recommendations are just not practicable. 
They are a small agency, but they are saying that they are going to have to regulate everybody 
including CBN and corporations. The FRCN code as one code is going to be faulted. They have 
a draft out in July (2015), and there was so much criticism.” 
The above view exemplifies the general dispositions in relation to the relationship among regulatory 
agencies within the corporate sphere of Nigeria. Such dissension highlights the internal dynamics and 
power relations within the regulatory context, especially towards the primacy in the administration of 
corporate governance best practices in Nigeria. This also outlines the hegemony amongst the 
regulators, as each sectoral regulator wields considerable influence, within its industry and, 
consequently, the corporate governance context of Nigeria. 
6.2.3 The Nigerian corporate governance reforms’ procedure  
 In respect of the dynamism, the regulatory environment of corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria replicates a bricolage of control, which is also reflected in the emergent scheme. As stipulated, 
                                                             
59 “On Monday 9 January 2017, the federal government suspended the implementation of the Code. The suspension, 
according to the Nigerian Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment – Okechukwu Enelamah – was necessary in order to 
carry out a detailed review of its application after extensive consultations with stakeholders.” ------- “Several stakeholders, 
such as the Nigeria Employers’ Consultative Association (NECA) backed the decision of the federal government to suspend 
the Code, saying it was a product of unilateral decision by the FRC, as the organised private sector (OPS) was never 
consulted or its input sought by the council. NECA, like other key stakeholders, had accused the FRC of failure to secure 
their buy-in on such an important guideline.” Nigerian National Code of Corporate Governance: 
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the nature of the Nigerian organisational field largely epitomises detached (unlisted) entities, which 
makes integrated oversight difficult. In this respect, as a company executive stated:  
CLE18: “You will discover that the only question is that if you are not listed on the stock 
exchange and you are not trading on the floor of the stock exchange, how will SEC control your 
affairs?  
Thus, as this investigation further reveals, a unified approach to the administration of corporate 
governance principles in Nigeria emerges as impracticable, largely as a result of the organisational 
field structuration. As Besharov and Smith (2014) state: Actors’ practices and ways of being can both 
reinforce and challenge the assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules considered appropriate within a 
particular realm of social life. Alongside the nature of the Nigerian corporate governance 
environment, is the noted power dynamic among regulators. In part, the segmented procedure of 
corporate governance reforms in Nigeria is also induced from the indicated power relations among 
the key actors. A noted consequence is the emergent attributes of the Nigerian corporate governance 
reforms scheme, which tend to restrain an integrated approach. For instance, an auditor stated in this 
regard thus: 
OAF30: “When it comes to accounting, FRCN has the jurisdiction. When it relates to the 
financial sector, CBN has what they are requesting the banks to provide. But it is the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) that will confirm, whether the accounting aspect of the 
reporting complies with International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). But they have 
normal returns that the bank must send to CBN in that aspect, that is CBN’s jurisdiction, they 
check it and ensure that they comply. The same with NAICOM, PENCOM, etc. So, I think if all 
the agencies can work together it would be a better environment for corporate governance to 
thrive in.” 
Through the proposed launch of a national code of corporate governance, via the FRCN, a unified code 
is cited to still be unfeasible. Mainly, the challenge is attributable to such stipulated dispersed 
framework for corporate governance administration in Nigeria.  
 Hence, in Nigeria, instead of centralised corporate governance reforms, for instance through 
the Stock Exchange, a detached regulatory approach is revealed. This reflects a challenge to 
administration and indicatively the homogenisation of best practices within this institutional context. 
To this extent, the practicality of implementing a single corporate governance scheme, for instance 
through the national code in Nigeria, is challenged. Consequently, while the above scenario generates 
a fractionalised corporate governance reform procedure, on the other hand it equally poses a 
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challenge to the intended implementation of the universal principles, which predominantly canvass 
the uniformity of good governance practices. Thus, rather than an integrated approach in Nigeria, 
management of corporate governance best practices are sectionalised. As one of the regulators noted: 
RCG07: “We agree that FRCN cannot have a code that fits all, especially small companies. Thus, 
each regulator can come up with something more, the national code should be the minimum. 
So, I feel that is the angle from which FRCN is looking at it. The code is not cumbersome, 
although we understand that some small companies may find it difficult to implement all, e.g. 
the issue of Independent Directors.” 
While respondents affirmed that a single code or centralised system would be beneficial as a point of 
reference for the corporate governance reforms scheme in Nigeria, the possibility of a single corporate 
governance code, given the circumstances of Nigeria, is presently noted as unlikely. As stated by a 
director in one of the regulatory agencies: 
RCC03: “----- a single code is not going to work now. CBN is not going to change its code to 
align with the FRCN.  I prefer one code, myself.  I think we can have one code, but the way 
FRCN is going about it, they won’t achieve it. I can’t see banks wanting to comply with the 
FRCN code as opposed to the CBN code.” 
The wider implication of the cited pattern of best practices implementation in Nigeria, is the lack of a 
unified framework for good governance. Similarly, the attention and direction of the corporate 
governance reforms agenda within this environment also follow such an order, tilting towards the 
resultant power trajectory. Whilst this generates notable power play among the regulators, on the 
other hand, a consequential power dependency from amongst the regulated entities inevitably arises. 
As Misangyi et al. (2008) argue, a fragmented social situation engendered by institutional logics of 
ethnic identity, generates a range of competing authority structures and social network practices. 
Ultimately, resultant upon the aforementioned backdrop of the regulatory environment, is a 
prevailing complexity and disjointed corporate governance procedure in Nigeria. Thus, each industry 
or regulator undertakes and prioritises the implementation and enforcement of its corporate 
governance best practices within its jurisdiction. 
6.3 The administration of corporate governance codes of best practices in Nigeria 
6.3.1 Endogenous variables in corporate governance administration 
 The influence of endogenous determinants in corporate governance practices has been noted 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; George et al., 2006; Harmon et al., 2015). Basically, the overall legitimacy 
of business is cited to be derived from the perceived legitimacy of corporate governance practices 
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within a nation (Judge et al., 2008). Emerging findings from this study have disclosed that social actors’ 
cognition and perceptions form significant institutional logics in the administration of corporate 
governance reforms in Nigeria. Evidence from this research reveals that the general appreciation and 
perception of corporate governance practice among corporate actors and stakeholders in Nigeria 
impact on governance reforms directly. Although there is a mixed result on the level of illiteracy and 
its impact on knowledge about corporate governance matters, the level of enlightenment about 
expectations regarding corporate governance principles are, however, nascent in Nigeria. In this 
respect, as stated in a corporate regulators’ opinion:  
RCP36: “Many of the regulated entities are yet to come to terms with the recommendations 
and how to go about the fulfilment.” 
Equally, as another respondent noted: 
RCE05: “One of the major constraints is that the companies could not understand what we are 
doing. They think we are overdoing things.”  
However, the above situation is discovered to result basically from the general perception of the key 
players within the Nigerian institutional context. Institutions, though perceived as a possible pattern 
of social actors’ actions, are nonetheless considered as fundamentally the representation of human 
cognition (Giddens, 1984; Misangyi et al., 2008). One major illustration of such a perspective on 
corporate governance reforms, from this research, is the lack of understanding of the voluntary 
disclosure recommendations, through the comply or explain principle. As a listed company secretary 
stated: 
CLK29: “Companies still don’t appreciate these principles, they see them as cumbersome and 
unnecessary. Especially, having to disclose your non-compliance.” 
With regard to this, as stated by one of the regulators: 
RCO33: “Companies have to fully appreciate this corporate governance reforms procedure, for 
such voluntary compliance to work in Nigeria.”  
Consequently, there is no ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance best practices by 
companies in Nigeria. As a result of the stated lack of understanding among the companies, the 
execution of voluntary compliance becomes problematic. In Nigeria, the approach to corporate 
governance reforms, as well as the level of progression is noted to be affected by the level of 
awareness among the corporate stakeholders of the significance of governance best practices (or 
requirement of accountability).   
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 Against this backdrop, in Nigeria the imposition of codes, rather than a voluntary approach 
through understanding, appreciation or self-regulation, in light of ‘comply or explain’, typifies the 
approach to implementation. Though past studies have stipulated the level of compliance with 
corporate governance recommendations among listed companies in Nigeria as increasing (see 
Adewuyi and Olowookere, 2013; Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014), this inquiry discovers that this 
compliance is rather more of ‘a box ticking’ exercise. This position is attributed, in essence, to the 
mandatory (compulsion) approach to compliance with these recommendations. As this study reveals, 
organisational actors are yet to be attuned to the ‘comply or explain’ voluntary approach to 
compliance, as a result of their cognition or rationality of this subject matter. As ‘explaining’ in 
instances of non-compliance is argued to be less appreciated, a mandatory approach thus avails a 
practicable approach to implementation. As corroborated by an interviewee (a consultant): 
OAF30: “Comply or explain is not any easier. Explaining why you did not comply is not easy; 
people need to understand what explain means, that it is not just to tell any story that one 
likes, but that the explanation must make sense and that any reasonable company must have 
done the same thing or directors in that situation must have taken the same decision. Then it 
might not work in this context.” 
Furthermore, such disposition to governance principles is nonetheless indicated to stem from the 
noted antecedent of corporate governance practice in Nigeria; this is mirrored mainly in the cited 
reliance on the legal performance framework. As a corporate board chairman stated: 
CLJ27: “CAMA will always be a convenient excuse for some people not to comply with the 
corporate governance code. They usually state that, the law says this, so what is corporate 
governance code. If you really have a sincere appreciation of corporate governance, you will 
know that corporate governance is meant to enhance the legal position. It’s meant to make 
the company much more efficient, i.e. the elements that will ensure sustainability in the long-
term are there.” 
However, despite the dependence on the legal tenets of corporate governance, as affirmed earlier, 
the main legal framework in Nigeria (CAMA), does not provide adequate reference for the 
propositions of corporate governance reforms. Thus, in actuality, the Nigerian corporate governance 
environment presents a heightened normative pressure with regard to the prevalence of legal 
professionals in the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. Such inclination is reflected through 
the perception of corporate actors on corporate governance practices, in Nigeria, as revealed above. 
A weakened coercive pressure (legal structure) in the obsolescence of CAMA, however prevails. The 
willingness and ability of organisations to conform to the institutional environment, is reinforced by 
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the theoretical rationale underlying conformity or resistance to institutional rules and expectations 
(Oliver, 1991). Another, illustrative example of the importance of corporate governance by corporate 
actors is also highlighted in the corporate reporting. Although there is indicated an increase in 
disclosures by Nigerian companies in the last decade, in relation to their corporate governance 
engagements (Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014), this study finds that the actual true and fair views of 
such corporate disclosures are questionable. The lack of adequate comprehension of the significance 
of governance best practices among companies generally results in the mere duplication of these 
disclosures requirements from one year to the next. For example, a regulatory agent stated in this 
regard: 
RCN32: “In 2009 when we started the department in enforcing corporate governance 
reporting, then, we had about 29% compliance in filing returns – making information available 
to the public. If you open the Investment Security Act (ISA) there are provisions from sections 
60 to 66 that talk about filing returns so we evoke that provision and the penalty. So, what we 
have over the years is an increase in filing of financial statements to about 92%. Then we did 
an impact assessment and asked How does this filing impact on the market? That is the head 
point. Then we started going back to look again at the quality of their filing, that is why the 
issue of the scorecard came about, because people were duplicating things in the same 
question. But no two situations were usually the same.”  
Essentially, such behaviour reinforces the rationality of corporate actors, in relation to corporate 
governance best practices, i.e., this mirrors the impact of the prevailing or established practice in 
Nigeria, in terms of the legislative route to corporate governance, which historically obtains. The 
capacity for engaging in particular practices and sustaining the corresponding identities is sustained 
within the roles, schemas, and practices occurring within the institutional logic (Misangyi et al., 2008). 
Such stipulated attitudes of actors to corporate governance issues are largely demonstrated in the 
paucity of a corporate culture of governance principles in many Nigerian corporations. Consequently, 
the lack of expected complementarity among these institutional logics, thus, presents complexities. 
For instance, a regulator cited thus:  
RCK20: “You see in an ideal situation; it should be ‘comply or explain’. But in this part of the 
world, it is not working. Comply or explain is working in developed countries, such as the UK, 
because the market has a way to deal with any company/board that fails to do things the way 
they should be done. But here we have concentrated ownership. But where they have a widely 
dispersed ownership structure, it is easy for people to come together and say let’s discipline 
this board; they can come together and remove the board when they are not doing what they 
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are supposed to do. But here, X owner for example has 75%, the other 25%, which is lubricating 
the market, is owned by thousands of people. That is the challenge, that is why comply or 
explain may not work here, for now – in the future it may.” 
 Social systems include forces that guide or constrain legitimacy and these forces usually create 
isomorphism, when they converge, within institutional environments (Judge et al., 2008). Thus, as a 
consultant stated in this respect:  
OAA08: “Many people in Nigeria do not have any idea what a corporate governance principle 
really is. I guess this is also the reason why a lot of people don’t invest in it.” 
Ultimately, in cushioning the implication of the diverse influences on corporate governance reforms, 
audiences or evaluators often play significant parts in proffering legitimacy judgments, which borders 
on the role of cognition in the legitimation processes (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011; Hoefer 
and Green, 2016). For instance, as Parsons (1951) contends; 
“A system of action was said to be institutionalised to the extent that actors in an ongoing 
relation oriented their action to a common set of normative standards and the value patterns. 
As such a normative system becomes internalised; conformity with it becomes a 
needdisposition in the actor’s own personality structure. In this sense, institutionalised action 
is motivated by moral rather than by instrumental concerns.” (Parsons 1951: 37). 
These insights reveal endogenous indications for the prevailing corporate governance performance in 
Nigeria. Societies can emerge through the active constituting skills of their members, drawing upon 
resources and conditions which they are unaware of or perceive dimly (Giddens, 1993). From this 
view, in Nigeria, the general level of perception or appreciation of the corporate governance practice 
basically informs the state of the institutionalised rationalisation of the performance, within the 
Nigerian corporate context. This situation also shapes the actualisation of the compliance method.  
6.3.2 Mode of application of best practices 
 A code of corporate governance is usually adjudged as a non-binding attempt at the 
implementation of good governance principles (Weir et al., 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 
2009). Except in contexts such as the US, most codes of corporate governance are meant to be 
adopted on a self-regulatory basis (see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Likewise, in Nigeria the 
implementation of the codes was meant to follow a voluntary pattern (SEC code 2003, revised in 
2011). In this vein, equally, corporate governance code in Nigeria was originally meant to be  
persuasive rather than mandatory. As the introductory paragraph of the 2003 SEC code states; “The 
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code is just a rule of practice.” It further states that “this code is not intended to be a rigid rule.” (SEC 
code, 2003, 2011: 1). As a regulatory agent stated:  
RCC03: “Because it is a code of conduct, it is meant to be persuasive. That is why it has been 
in question whether the code could be made compulsory or mandatory.” 
Also, as one policy maker noted:  
RCG07: “These codes are supposed to be like minimal standards set to aid some of the extant 
provision governing the institutions that are involved in corporate governance in Nigeria.”  
More importantly, the global attempt at corporate governance reforms principally supports an intent 
for a voluntary approach, as most of the codes are intended to be freely complied with (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The central ideology of the global good governance principles can thus be 
basically considered to promote self-regulation. In particular are the OECD principles, the Cadbury 
report and other UK engendered recommendations that form the basis of the developing countries’ 
(and Nigeria) codes of corporate governance (see Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). Even though 
there is a consensus in Nigeria regarding the voluntary approach to corporate governance reforms, 
nonetheless the administration of corporate governance best practices is in direct conformity with the 
configuration and logics within the organisational field. Along this line, a respondent (a corporate legal 
counsel) stated thus:   
CLB11: “If you want to know how each industry in Nigeria is doing regarding corporate 
governance reforms, check the level of authority of the regulator and how strategically placed 
it is.” 
 As cited in the earlier section, the corporate governance reforms and codes of best practice 
are fractionalised and mirror social subtleties, based on sectorial divisions within the Nigerian 
corporate context. Likewise, the approach to corporate governance emerges in consonant with this 
position. As Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) posit, 
“Central to our model is that fields are not homogeneously structured, and they do not 
necessarily mature toward stability and equilibrium. Instead, they become stratified into 
specialized organizational communities, each with distinct network locations that result in 
differential exposure to field level contradictions resulting in different and unfolding levels of 
embeddedness.” (p. 42). 
 
Page | 168  
 
In accordance with the aforementioned, and as stated earlier, one of the major peculiarities of 
corporate governance reforms in Nigeria is the highly differentiated60 regulatory environment. This 
issue is seen to present itself through these main formats:  
o First is the ambiguity among listed and multiple-interest companies (regulated) about the 
primacy of the regulatory authority and the relevant line of authority.  
o Second is the need to define the power relation between the enforcers (regulators) about 
‘who regulates who’, i.e., the limit of each regulator’s authority and the embodiment. 
As a result of these, a lack of clarity arises within the corporate environment regarding the 
implementation and compliance with corporate governance recommendations. As one of the 
company executives stated: 
CLG22: “There are a lot of similarities among the codes. The question here is which of these 
codes should you adhere to, is it the SEC code or your individual code? You as the regulated 
entity, who are you going to listen to? Obviously, your regulator.”  
 
 Along this line, the regulatory environment of corporate governance in Nigeria follows the 
pattern that essentially mirrors the power and influence of the regulators in their respective sector. 
Each regulator defines the strength, compliance and approach to such compliance in its corporate 
governance reform scheme. As a corporate executive in one of the listed companies stated:  
CLE18: “The strength of corporate governance reforms in companies in Nigeria, essentially, is 
a reflection of the influence of the respective regulator.” 
Hence, equally guided, by means of their individual codes, the vibrancy of sectoral regulation dictates 
the robustness and corporate acquaintance with governance best practices. For instance, while some 
sections of the economy have very vibrant and well-developed corporate governance reforms, others 
are just developing and still at a rudimentary stage of corporate governance reforms. Many major 
industries such as the Manufacturing, Construction and Telecommunication, Health, Fast Moving 
Consumer Goods (FMCG), sectors of the economy, are still largely without sturdy corporate 
governance guiding principles. Where such companies are not listed, they are thus mainly regulated 
by their respective industry regulators or professional associations. For instance, in the case of the 
manufacturing industry, as a respondent cited regarding the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
(MAN):  
                                                             
60 Visibly there is a lack of collaboration amongst the main regulators in the corporate governance environment of Nigeria.  
 
Page | 169  
 
RCK20: “Manufacturing companies do not really have tough regulators; the main body 
overseeing the sector, i.e. MAN (Manufacturers Association of Nigeria) is an association and 
not a regulatory body. So, there is a limit to what that one can do, unlike the ones that have 
tough regulators, such as PENCOM, Banks and other financial sectors etc. These can monitor 
the Board composition etc. As in the banking sector, their board is mainly constituted of non-
executive or independent directors.” 
Unlike other regulators (such as the financial sector regulators) these bodies do not exercise a 
profound corporate governance reforms scheme, and this in turn reflects the level of advancement of 
good governance within their sector. This is portrayed in the expression of a respondent, as such:  
OAD26: “The banks and other financial institutions have no problems with compliance. The 
non-banks can be largely ignorant regarding some of the requirements. There are certain 
things that the bank does, but elsewhere you don’t see much of it. They ask why we need it – 
for instance, risk management.” 
In this instance, whereas CBN regulates both listed and unlisted companies, yet the financial sector’s 
codes of best practices are well complied with by both categories of companies, as a result of the 
approach and commitment of CBN to such endeavour. As a corporate executive stated: 
CLD16: “And I believe this is why most of these sectoral codes are mandatory and it also gives 
some level of authority to the regulators to enforce these codes. Unlike a ‘comply or explain’, 
however, because the regulators know the environment within which they are operating.” 
Similarly, this indicates the case of other regulators such as the PENCOM and NIACOM, etc. In this 
respect, a rule-based approach tends to be a more feasible and applicable regulatory mode for 
corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. This finding suggests a contradiction to the universal 
approach (self-regulation) to corporate governance reforms. As stipulated, the arrangement and 
likewise relationship among logics helps to explain how action can be both ‘constrained and enabled’ 
within organisational fields (Martin et al., 2017). Even though, generally, good governance codes are 
not meant to be legally enforceable (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), the prevailing antecedents 
of corporate governance in Nigeria seem to accede more to statutory regulation. As a result, a high 
level of compliance is recorded among companies with tougher regulators, whereas defaulters are 
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6.3.3 Establishing good corporate governance practices 
 The resultant lack of a homogenised implementation process, presents as a major form of the 
challenges to corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. As stipulated, rather than a form of central 
listing requirements, such as applies to the UK and South Africa, corporate governance best practices 
in Nigeria are unilaterally assigned. A respondent expressed, along this line, thus: 
RCH13: “The CBN, PENCOM, NICOM, codes are made mandatory. It is easy for these regulators 
to make the code mandatory, because they are primary regulators and they licence the 
companies to function, and they can withdraw the company licence if they don’t comply. They 
monitor their governance and make them comply. But if you look at the Nigerian economy, 
how many banks and insurance companies do we have? We have several other companies. If 
you look at the stock exchange, about 200 companies, banks are about 10%. So, there is a 
huge gap. So, that is why the government deemed it fitting that the FRCN should come up with 
a harmonised national code. But, it has faced a lot of challenges.” 
In the first instance, at the onset of the launch of the corporate governance code in Nigeria through 
the SEC code, the mandatory approach to implementation was restricted. Such approach only applied 
to large-sized companies that are not entirely listed and thus require alternative means of compliance. 
For instance, some of the entities mandated to comply initially include only companies under sectoral 
regulators such as CBN, PENCOM, NAICOM, etc. While originally the SEC regulated entities adopted 
voluntary compliance, following the universal trend, however, presently mandatory compliance is the 
general approach to implementation of corporate governance in the context of Nigeria.  Based on the 
commitment of regulators, the stipulated tough regulators, withhold or refuse companies a ‘licence 
to operate’ to engender compliance. As such, companies comply mandatorily in order to remain 
operative or gain entrance into the respective industry. As a company secretary and legal consultant 
stated:  
CLF19: “But if you recall the SEC code was voluntary until a couple of years ago, when SEC then 
made it mandatory. The PENCOM code and CBN code were mandatory and I think they have 
some of the strongest guidelines and oversight procedures.” 
This position is also supported by an auditor as thus:  
OAF30: “I think there is need for more sanctions, in companies. There is no real consequence 
for being a good or bad director in Nigeria, so people are not motivated.” 
As Bitektine and Haack, (2015: 63) posit, 
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“Under conditions of stability, evaluators are strongly influenced by the established validity, 
and judgment suppression factors are sufficiently effective to deter deviant judgment 
expression, which helps maintain the illusion of unanimity and isomorphism. In contrast, under 
conditions of institutional change, validity is eroded by the public presence of competing 
judgments, suppression factors are weakened or removed, and agency and strategic 
behaviours of individuals and collective actors play a prominent role in the legitimacy process”. 
Evidently, the analysis reveals the imposition of recommendations to be a more feasible and realistic 
basis for realising corporate governance improvements in Nigeria. While a previous study (Nakpodia 
et al., 2016) has advocated a mix of both soft and hard regulations in the Nigerian corporate 
governance environment, this study reveals only a rule-based approach currently applies in Nigeria. 
Although the Nigerian corporate governance reform scheme was originally implemented from the 
inception of the SEC code in 2003, on a voluntary basis, however from 2014, the administration of 
codes of best practice has adopted a more mandatory approach and, in most cases, such mandatory 
means are exercised through ‘licensing’. In this regard, as affirmed by a respondent, a listed company 
(corporate governance) official: 
CLK29: “Where you find that there is a tough regulator involved, such as CBN, NIACOM, 
PENCOM etc., these codes tend to be well complied with. These companies tend to pay a lot of 
attention to these recommendations because it will affect their licensing.” 
In this regard, in order to engender compliance, these best practices are hinged on each industry’s 
licensing requirements. This is found to form a means of ensuring good governance practices are 
adhered to by companies within the respective industry. As companies are left with no alternative but 
compliance, the level of compliance with these best practices is at its highest.  As stated by a legal 
counsel: 
OAE28: “They really have no option, because this is coming from the regulator, they just have 
to comply. They just have to play by the rules.” 
A schedule revealing the trend in the mode of compliance with the sectoral codes of best practices in 
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Table 6.1: A comparative analysis of the (past and present) modes of implementation of corporate 
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For instance, as a regulator also buttressed: 
RCH13: “These are our processes of approval; if you don’t have an independent director, we 
will not approve your board composition. So, they have no option but to comply. We must 
show directors that there is a personal benefit, beyond compliance with regulatory 
requirement. As far as Nigeria is concerned, until you (first) make it compulsory, when it is 
compulsory and they do it and see the benefit then it can now become part of them.” 
From the view above, the mandatory mode of application is deemed necessary in order to compel the 
appreciation of corporate governance principles. As noted in an earlier section, there is a lack of 
rationalisation of the principles of corporate governance. Such disposition motivates the rigid 
approach to governance reforms, which in turn is expected to forge the targeted appreciation of 
                                                             
61 This code was formally the CBN code for banks post consolidation. 
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corporate governance principles and possibly promote self-regulation, subsequently. As a corporate 
governance regulator, stated: 
RC114: “For us there are checks and balances. Before we licence you, it is compulsory that you 
send the names of your directors and this must have attached the names of the independent 
directors. You must attach their Curriculum Vitae. We must evaluate them, to know whether 
they are independent or not. That is one. Number two, every year, every board is expected to 
conduct an evaluation of its activities, and evaluate the conduct of each member of the board 
and send it to us with its corporate governance report. That corporate governance report will 
tell us all the material issues that have been discussed and reflect what the directors have an 
interest in.” 
In this respect, regulators viewed the mandatory approach as a more effective means of achieving 
compliance. This stringent approach also includes heavy sanctions. Fines and fees are levied on 
defaulters to coerce companies to align their practices with the expected requirements of good 
governance. Consequently, regulators and policy makers view the stringent (rule-based) approach 
that presently prevails in Nigeria as also having helped to address noted institutionalised corruption 
(Adegbite, 2015; Amaeshi et al., 2016), incidents of corporate frauds and collapses (Amao and 
Amaeshi, 2008) in Nigeria. As noted by a director (policy maker): 
RCM25: “Since we started, (the reforms) we have not had any main situation where standards 
have been compromised. Some companies have collapsed in the past because of poor 
corporate governance, but in our sector, we have not had any corporate collapses. We want 
to attribute some of these to the stringent requirements.” 
Equally, another regulator stated: 
RCB02: “We have always applied our code mandatorily. There is a very high level of compliance 
with our industry code and cases of fraud have been limited. None of our companies has gone 
down because of financial impropriety.” 
Depending on the institutionalized nature of the organisational fields, organisations can either retain, 
adopt or discard templates for organising their actions (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Thus, unlike 
the principle-based corporate governance environment, as in the UK, the analysis reveals a more 
statutory mode of regulation in the corporate context of Nigeria. As a noted consequence of the 
nature and inclination of the organisational field, the Nigerian corporate governance reforms 
predominantly encompass a rule-based approach.  
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Conclusion 
The antecedents of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria reveal that the Nigerian corporate sphere 
has historically been regulated by laws and statutes (see Ahunwan, 2002; Nmehielle and Nwauche, 
2004). To this extent, in Nigeria, the obsolescence of CAMA (1990) has constrained the corporate 
governance practice, as the sole legal reference for companies – CAMA is indicated not to provide the 
required accompaniment to the current propositions in corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. 
Nonetheless, this study reveals the prevalent dependence of corporate governance, in this context, 
on the legal framework (in terms of CAMA). Also, the dominance of the legal profession in Nigeria 
provides a legislative framing for corporate governance appreciation and rationalisation. Thus, 
corporate governance practice in Nigeria adopts a legislative perspective. With respect to the neo-
institutional perspective on the legitimation of transformations, as a result of the noted antecedent 
and dependence on legal precedence, there is basically a lack of appreciation of the principle-based 
approach in Nigeria, with organisational actors largely attuned to a legal normative framework. This 
scenario, nonetheless, presents a contradiction in the efforts at corporate governance reforms, as the 
obsolescence of the principal legal infrastructure (CAMA), presents a weak and conflicting referent 
with the code. A misalignment results between the legal framework and the codes of corporate 
governance (e.g. the SEC code) which results in complexities in compliance and administration. 
 Further, the Nigerian organisational field depicts a fragmented structuration and segregated 
regulation of corporate governance and the reforms. Such disconnections result in the isolation of 
functions and responsibilities, overlaps in authorities and consequently power dynamics, among key 
regulators. In this regard, a resultant disparate institutional framework for corporate governance best 
practice inevitably emerges within the Nigerian organisational field. Such fragmentation is revealed as 
a consequence of the developing nature of the corporate governance context. In this regard, as an 
evolving context, there are few listed companies in relation to the total number of incorporated 
companies in Nigeria. As a result of this, the employment of a centralised approach to corporate 
governance reform application is impracticable. Consequently, industry driven implementation and 
administration of codes and approaches to good governance have characterised corporate 
governance innovations in Nigeria. Thus, rather than an all-inclusive approach, unlike in other settings 
such as the UK and other developing countries such as South Africa, corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria follow a fractionalised mode. Hence, essentially, in Nigeria, corporate governance reforms fall 
under the jurisdiction of the regulatory bodies, with responsibility to ensure implementation and 
engender compliance. As such, industry regulators are entrusted with oversight function and control, 
specifically within their respective organisational sphere.  
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 The above situations constitute some profound implications for the corporate governance 
reforms’ agenda in Nigeria. Subsequently, against the foregoing, rather than a principle-based 
corporate governance approach, a more stringent environment is found to have emerged in Nigeria. 
First, given the complexities in the regulatory structure (as noted in Chapter 5), this provides the only 
realistic basis for the administration of governance reforms in Nigeria. Second, as there is no 
centralised approach to corporate governance reforms, this equally provides an avenue (power) for 
respective regulators to compel compliance. Thus, within the corporate governance environment of 
Nigeria, as a result of the resultant structure and logics, corporate governance best principles adopt 
mandatory rather than the acclaimed voluntary or principle-based approach. In this respect, in place 
of the more popularised comply or explain mode, the imposition of guiding principles applies in 
corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. In turn, this defies self-regulation and consequently 
compliance is enforced through such means as a requirement of the licence to operate from 
companies within respective industries. Such an adopted stringent approach also indicates a feasible 
means of mitigating the entrenchments of organisational actors, in the noted antecedence and path 
dependency, in the Nigerian corporate governance reforms scheme. 
 The neo-institutional perspective on corporate governance reforms has generally de-
emphasised the significance of localised influences on corporate governance best practices. In this 
regard, the symbolic inclination of good governance has been promoted as a major driver of 
organisational transformations (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Okike and Adegbite, 2012; Baig and Godley, 
2016). However, this study extends the discourse on the institutional transformation by arguing for 
the pre-eminence of interpersonal factors, such as endogenous variables and social dynamism, as 
against symbolic alliances, in the scheme of organisational reforms in a developing context. Thus, 
resultant upon the relational corporate governance structure in Nigeria noted in the earlier chapter, 
the findings in this section reveal the prevalence of the informal rule. Within the Nigerian corporate 
governance performance, in this regard, similarly to the noted interpersonal and social structure, 
power relations, cognitive rationality and actors’ perceptions primarily underscored the legitimation 
of corporate governance reforms. From the neo-institutional viewpoint, the impact of social actors’ 
efforts and intentionality in institutional reproductions have been reported in the literature (Rao et 
al., 2000; Lawrence et al., 2011; Hoefer and Green, 2016). In this vein, the situation in Nigeria reveals 
that formal organisational procedures are mandated mainly by the subtler and less promoted 
pressures conferred through a noted informal or social framework. 
  The study indicates that corporate governance performance and, by implication, the reforms, 
are disposed to and embedded in historical propositions, within the existing framework of 
performance, illustrative of path dependency. This stipulates the direction, mode and approach to 
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actualising the intended transformation agenda, which adopts a notably customised resolve. The 
insights from the study suggest that, other than the institutional factors themselves, more importantly 
their order, interfaces and interplays shape the derivatives and attendant outcomes of organisational 
reforms in Nigeria. To this end, the cited approach to good governance administration in Nigeria, 
prominently reflects the peculiarities of such a maturing organisational field. The controlling internal 
features, which constitute centralities to corporate governance reforms in Nigeria, broadly present as: 
1) The institutional antecedents and historical inclinations of the organisational processes. 
2) The nature and structure of the corporate governance context. 
3) Organisational actors’ interplays, perceptions and rationalisation of organisational processes. 
In essence, corporate governance reforms in Nigeria notably follow a context-defined procedure, 
evident in the cited specialised mode of administration. In sum, this situation is indicative of the local 
influences towards the legitimation, ratification and regulation of proposed organisational 
transformations. In this regard, as stated in earlier studies (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni 
and Cuomo, 2008), within the neo-institutional theorisation of organisational reproductions, 
corporate governance principles are adopted for legitimation purposes in civil or non-market-based 
economies. However, the insights from this study portend that contextual mandates in this developing 
organisational field largely determine the mode, approach and pattern of reforms, even though there 
are clear resemblances to such civil (stakeholder) systems in Nigeria. In light of the foregoing, the 
significance of the noted peculiarities in Nigeria, to the achievement of a tailored, institutionally driven 
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Chapter 7: Implementing an institutionally driven Corporate Governance reform in Nigeria 
7.0  Introduction 
Attempts at corporate governance reforms in Nigeria have ignored a fair challenge in terms of the 
right fit. As Filatotchev and Boyd (2009) argued, there is a need to ‘move from a “one-size-fits-all” 
template in corporate governance reforms’ into taking into account ‘organisational, institutional and 
national contexts. Equally, the role of social actors is highlighted to embody both physical and mental 
effort targeted at affecting an institution or set of institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011). On the country 
level, the corporate governance environment of Nigeria encapsulates the peculiarities of 
structuration, especially in depicting an evolving organisational field, lack of supportive institutional 
framework, etc. Scholars have suggested the description of this ‘fit’ requires providing the 
understanding of national peculiarities and how they align with corporate governance innovations.  
For instance, specifically, Adegbite (2015) outlined the antecedents and propositions of good 
corporate governance in Nigeria to include:  
 ‘Board independence, Board heterogeneity, board reputations, foreign institutional 
 shareholders, effective shareholder activism, board evaluation, performance related 
 compensation, independent audit committees, Transparent information disclosure’ (pp.  6-7). 
Within the frame of the research objective, the study does not repeat the features of good corporate 
governance (GCG) which the stipulated previous study (Adegbite, 2015) has investigated, rather it 
promotes the actualisation of such propositions in the light of the central aim of the 
institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. Sometimes central organisations do 
act as institutional entrepreneurs for change (e.g. Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001; Sherer and Lee, 2002; 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Although good governance replicates what is contextually 
acceptable, as well as achievable, the definitive role of organisational reformers (actors) towards 
institutional prescriptions largely remains elusive. Institutional entrepreneurship emphasises the 
linkage between interests, agency, and institutions (Maguire et al., 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006; Garud et al., 2007). Thus, drawing on the perspective of institutional entrepreneurs, the findings 
highlight the way institutional entrepreneurship can affect the issues within institutional contexts to 
promote effectiveness in corporate governance reforms.  
 Institutionalisation of any innovations is acknowledged to be profoundly political and reflects 
the relative power of organised interests and the actors who mobilize around them (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Misangyi et al., 2008). The ‘projective agency’ view of institutional work (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), 
acknowledges the place of future-oriented intentionality in consciously and strategically reshaping 
social situations (Lawrence et al., 2011). In this regard, examining the dynamics of institutional 
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entrepreneurship, Maguire et al. (2004) address three specific aspects – subject positions, theorisation 
and institutionalisation. They find that, in emerging markets, the subject position of institutional 
entrepreneurs, with respect to diverse stakeholders, (1) provides these entrepreneurs with legitimacy 
and (2) offers them access to dispersed sets of resources, by enabling them to bridge those varied 
stakeholders (Maguire et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the specific place for economic actors in good 
governance, has historically been de-emphasised within the developing context of the Nigerian 
corporate governance reforms. The findings outlined in this chapter of the thesis, provide an 
understanding in bridging the gap, in an attempt to answer the research question within this 
investigation: How can an institutionally driven corporate governance reform be achieved in Nigeria? 
 In this regard, the findings emphasise the resonant themes towards actualising efficiency in 
corporate governance reforms performance through the central institutional agents (reformers, 
recipients and influencers), within the Nigerian corporate context. In essence, emerging themes 
advocate the prospects of instigating institutionalised corporate governance reforms in Nigeria, 
through an ‘actor defined’ framework, particularly, by affecting the perception and patronage of key 
players, and consequently the interface of the institutional logics. The findings within the chapter are 
structured as follows: the first section highlights the propositions for promoting best practices in 
Nigeria through emerging macro-economic development themes. These include advancement of the 
institutional investment and capital market, promoting institutional investment, shareholder activism, 
and legal and regulatory reforms agenda. In the next section, insights from the study advance 
improving identified pivotal endogenous variables, through the education and enlightenment of key 
organisational actors, for attaining micro level reforms in Nigeria. Further, the chapter outlines the 
process by which organisational reforms can be refocused. Against this goal, the study offers an 
inclusive framework for salient actors, towards a related corporate governance reforms agenda, in 
the developing context of Nigeria. 
 
7.1 Macro-level reforms:  promoting best practices through economic development agenda 
7.1.1  Institutional investment and capital market advancement   
 Organised actors can spur the reproduction, reinforcement or change in institutional contexts 
when they determine and are able to foster their interest (DiMaggio, 1988). As the findings from this 
study indicate, such collective efforts are vital to corporate governance improvement in Nigeria, in 
light of the peculiarities in the Nigerian corporate governance context. First, the study proposes that 
the development of institutional investment, which induces large scale investment in Nigerian 
companies, will promote the emergence of institutional ownership. Such undertaking is expected to 
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check, among other things, the prevalence of a concentration of family owners and their overbearing 
influence. As represented in the opinion of a policy maker: 
 RCO33: “Attracting investment means diluting the ownership structure. So, the concept of ‘I 
want to own everything’ is disappearing. You can own everything in a cookie or own 20% of 
a big cake. So, with others coming in you can have the slice of a big cake and the slice of a big 
cake is far bigger than that of a small biscuit.” 
As stipulated, the level of corporate governance advancement depends, inter alia, on the corporate 
governance structures, such as the capital market development. For example, previous studies (Arun 
and Turner, 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2008) find that the underdeveloped capital market is responsible 
for the ownership structure prevalent in the corporate governance environment in developing 
countries. However, this study finds that, on the contrary, the concentrated ownership structure 
rather constitutes a major challenge to the development of the capital market in Nigeria.  For example, 
as stated by a corporate regulator:  
 RCB02: “If large corporate investors such as the pension fund administrators are on company 
boards, this could help to rectify, to a large extent, governance processes”. 
 
 To this extent, rather than undue family founders’ influence and conflicts of interest, 
engendering arm’s length transactions/contracts, as recommended in the principles, would moderate 
the predominant relationship-based corporate governance and the contending implications. This 
however, can mainly be achieved if the institutional supports such as the capital market are 
developed. In this regard, institutional investors are envisaged to constitute one of such agents of 
change. Similarly, as Maguire et al. (2004) professed, within an institutional field, actors that do not 
occupy dominant positions can nonetheless affect the advancement of such a field by acting as 
institutional entrepreneurs in ways that are advantageous to them. Accordingly, such advancement in 
corporate governance infrastructures is anticipated to inexorably foster the intended corporate 
governance reforms and vice versa. As a respondent cited in this regard: 
CLB11: “What drives the financial market? Trust and speculation. Fortunately, they have come 
up with an innovation. There is a rating scheme in place now. They are trying to rate companies 
according to their corporate governance structure. So hopefully it is for investors to see those 
companies that are well rated as good investment options.” 
The need to create a viable institutional environment for investors or investment has been central to 
corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. In this vein (as identified in Chapter 4), one of the major 
themes emerging from the data as a motive for corporate governance reforms in Nigeria, is economic 
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growth and development and thus the resultant attention, for instance, on the financial institutions. 
For example, as a consultant stated:  
OAD26: “The corporate governance in Nigeria should be targeting reinforcing investors’ 
confidence and risk management. What I would like to see is that the level of governance 
equates to investors’ confidence. The better the level of governance the better the investors’ 
confidence and this gives a reason for investment to come in, which is in line with our 
economic objectives of growth and development.” 
Also, as a company regulator cited:  
RCJ15: “Because these banks also have investors from outside and most of the funds that are 
coming into the country come from earnings of the banks, they have to be sure that the 
governance structure of the bank is also fine for them (investors) to do business with.” 
 In this regard, respondents’ views relate the rationale for the emergence of the codes of good 
governance in Nigeria to the development of a functional business environment. Especially, this is 
considered as an integral antecedent to the promotion of an atmosphere to investment. Thus, as 
implied, good governance principles in Nigeria are viewed as tantamount to basically embracing best 
practices, in order to realise such intended developmental goals. However, to achieve this good 
governance objective, the development of institutional structures, such as the capital market, is 
advocated as a necessary precondition. In this respect, boosting internal investments and revenue, 
with a view to relaxing the over-dependence on external funding, is equally suggested. This way, as 
anticipated, the concomitant advancement of the capital market, as the medium of exchange, should 
emerge.  As a regulator stated: 
RCN32: “Because for you to have a strong capital market, you must start by pulling funds 
domestically. When you are telling people to bring funds from abroad, it is also proportional 
to the domestic fund you can raise internally. That is why we spend a lot of energy in targeting 
and protecting minority shareholders/investors.” 
Aside from the internally generated revenues, developing Nigerian public companies is expected to 
stimulate the promotion of a more regulated and standardised corporate governance structure. This, 
on the other hand, will in turn, stimulate more compliance with good governance recommendations. 
In this respect, although the stipulated drive is for FDI in Nigeria, the promotion of indigenous 
investment is nonetheless intended to catalyse economic growth and development in this developing 
context. Such ventures as the need for the expansion of the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 
and an increase in the number of publicly listed/quoted companies, are considered as necessary 
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precursors for improvements to corporate governance performance. For instance, as a regulator 
stated:  
RCH13: “Maybe 10 years down the line, as times goes on, when the economy improves, we 
will have a lot of SMEs. These SMEs will find that they are competing for capital, then they 
will be forced to improve the level of transparency and control in their company. That is when 
corporate governance comes into place. It is not something you can force.” 
Also, as indicated by another respondent, in this respect:  
OAB09: “The level of awareness has gone up; people now realise that there is a need for good 
practices. Secondly, companies are aspiring to grow and even operate outside Nigeria. For 
them to operate outside Nigeria, they have to have some basic standard of corporate 
governance, because they are going into other countries. It will affect you business-wise, if 
investors bringing their money also specify that, ‘for me to invest in your company, you must 
have a good governance structure.” 
7.1.2 Promoting efficiency in shareholders group activism  
 Shareholder activism has generally been noted as an integral part of corporate governance 
and accountability (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Solomon, 2013). However, the corporate governance 
practice in Nigeria constitutes a significant effect on such mechanism, in line with the prevailing block-
holding. In this light, by implication, the minority shareholders exhibit dormant impact on corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Nonetheless, aside from the stipulated prevalence of the concentrated 
shareholders and other influences, such circumstance also relates in part to the cognition of the 
related actors. Sound cognition is stipulated as an imperative in corporate governance performance 
by engendering rationality in social actors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). For instance, shareholders’ 
groups are indicated as not having sufficient appreciation of their roles or their implication towards 
good governance in Nigerian listed corporations. Though there is recorded a seeming improvement in 
shareholder group activism (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite et al., 2012), this study, however, 
reveals that the execution of their duty and diligence is inadequate. Given the prevailing framework 
of performance in Nigerian corporations62, such stated improvement is yet to correspond with the 
ability to stimulate an effective corporate accountability, appropriate for the universal reforms 
agenda. As stipulated by a regulator: 
RCL21: “Though it is meant to be, but there has not been anything to show that there is a 
positive impact on firms, as a result of the shareholders’ activism in Nigeria. The reason is that 
                                                             
62 See the chapter 5 of the thesis for the detailed insights regarding the prevailing organisational procedures, as a 
consequence of the corporate governance system in Nigeria.   
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most of the shareholders’ associations that we have, because of the lack of understanding of 
their role, are not effectively carrying out what they are expected to do to enhance corporate 
governance.” 
In this regard, as emerging themes indicate, education is advocated as a vital technique in addressing 
this shortfall. As a respondent stipulated in this respect: 
RCE05: “The SEC tries to train them on their role, i.e. the impact they should have on 
companies. They are supposed to influence the company executives and not the other way 
around, but I feel they need to be informed. Lack of enlightenment and education are major 
issues affecting shareholders’ activism in Nigeria.”  
On the other hand, the effect of the overbearing position of concentrated owners is also intended to 
be moderated through this avenue. According to a policy maker (member of the corporate governance 
reforms steering committee): 
RCH13; “So we are trying to educate the shareholder groups that if they are actually 
representing the interest of minority shareholders – because that is what they stated they are 
representing – then they must ensure that the proper questions are asked at the AGM, not 
coming to ask doctored questions, which is not improving the health and wellbeing of the 
companies. We set objectives for the AGM, stating the to SEC and the stock exchange to ensure 
that it is conducted in the most ideal way.” 
In this regard, education and enlightenment of key players in the Nigerian corporate governance 
environment emerged as vital towards demanding and instituting enduring best practices. As 
mentioned by respondents, education in this respect, involves employing the use of direct training, 
seminars, meetings, instructional bulletins and public information systems (e.g. TV advertisement and 
radio jingles). Enlightenment on the other hand involves ensuring that the shareholders, especially 
minority, are made aware of other powers/mechanisms of control in companies, other than merely 
their voting right (Interviews RCK20; CLK29; CLE18). In this regard, if the key players, as shareholders, 
are knowledgeable about their role, then they can effectively deploy other alternatives, to request 
answerability, for instance, by creating bad publicity for companies that are badly governed. In the 
opinion of a respondent with respect to this: 
CLD27: “So if they want to be active, one way of doing this is, if they can impact on the 
reputation of the organisation. Where the organisation feels that bad publicity is detrimental 
to them, in terms of attracting investment, i.e. this can affect the image of the organisation, 
even the share price, they will do things rightly.”  
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7.1.3 Legal and Regulatory reforms  
Scholars have specified the significance of the institutional determinants on the performance of 
organisational processes. In Nigeria, past studies such as Amaeshi et al. (2006) and Adegbite and 
Nakajima (2012), highlight the prominence of culture and the belief system on corporate governance 
practice. Within this study one of such institutional determinants is the Nigerian corporate legal 
framework. The Nigerian corporate governance structure has been dependent on the legal framework 
(Company and Allied Matters Act, (CAMA)).63 Along this line, the proposed corporate governance 
reforms in Nigeria are noted to have been largely directed by this prevailing legal infrastructure. As 
stipulated in an earlier chapter of the thesis, through the dependence on the legal framework (CAMA), 
however, infrastructural challenges from the obsolescence of the legal framework are disclosed. 
Indicatively, this impact is demonstrated as a resultant incoherence between the coercive and 
normative pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in the current corporate governance reforms 
scheme in Nigeria. For instance, as a corporate director suggested:  
RCC03: “There is need to amend the CAMA. If you look at the provision of the corporate law, 
there is a lot of lacuna that need to be filled in terms of penalty. For instance, 50k penalty for 
the breach of some provisions. Such penalty is inappropriate and outdated and cannot serve 
as a deterrent.” 
The above situation, among other things, militates the consistency of institutional logics within this 
context, hence, the dependence on the rule-based structure, as the feasible or realistic alternative, in 
this respect, as cited in an earlier section (Chapter 6) of the thesis. Nonetheless, although the present 
stringent approach to the implementation of corporate governance best practices, however, 
respondents view it as a temporary measure.  
 Scott (1994) asserts that the increasing acknowledgement and significance of ‘meaning 
systems, symbolic elements, regulatory processes, and governance systems’ have increasingly 
depicted convergence across organisational research. Similarly, the implications of institutional 
substances and archetypes for organisational reproduction have come to be recognised and 
acknowledged (Suddaby et al., 2010). As Meyer and Rowan (1977) assert, the components of any 
organisational structure reflect the infusion of the values, myths and mores in such an environment. 
Developing countries clearly embody some distinct differentiations from their developed counterparts 
– as outlined in an earlier chapter of this thesis. As contended by respondents in this inquiry, ‘in order 
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to institute a more regulatory (rather than the prevailing legislative) system for the Nigerian corporate 
governance practice, such distinctions need to be accounted for in corporate governance reforms’ 
approach (interviews RCP36; CLE18; OAA08).  Thus, not only is the revision of the CAMA 
recommended, but also the need to make the key organisational actors, such as corporate governance 
officials, appreciate corporate governance principles is mostly advocated (interviews RCP36; CLE18; 
OAA08; OAC17).  As stated by a company accountant:  
OAC17: “If corporate governance reform is going to be widely embraced, it has to start from 
the approach to these reforms. It will be helpful to allow entrepreneurs/companies to 
appreciate why self-regulation is needed.” 
 Second, with respect to regulatory reforms, the study proposes that the procedure for the 
administration of the corporate governance reforms needs to be more formalised and explicit, rather 
than implicit. The prevalent rigid procedural approach is stipulated as an inevitable outcome of the 
lack of structured framework for best practices in corporate governance in Nigeria (interviews CLA10; 
OAB09). A stable structure is cited as imperative to provide the consistency required in the 
implementation of similar best practices across industries and sectors (interviews OAG34; CLH23). This 
ideally recognises such as necessary precursors to the institutionalisation of organisational 
reproduction or change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Essentially, this investigation reveals that the 
establishment of a more regimented or standardised procedure in Nigeria, in fostering an effective 
institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms, is imperative. As respondents argued, a lack of 
articulated procedures for corporate governance reforms in Nigeria impedes a lucid direction 
(interviews OAI37; OAE28; CLD16).  
 Although this study recognises that there could be continuous interference of socio-cultural 
artefacts on organisational activities within such a maturing field, nonetheless, the standardisation of 
these institutional prescriptions is proposed. In this case, the advocacy for a stabilised structure in 
Nigeria is, however, stated as not requiring interpolated measures from other countries, but rather, 
the regimented procedures for the implementation of context-specific recommendations, whereby, 
structured internalisations of the institutional peculiarities within the Nigerian context, are 
considered necessary to actualise unequivocal institutionalisation procedures for organisational 
reforms. Specifically, such procedures are expected to leverage on and incorporate the cultural and 
social variations in this setting, by designing a tailored framework. In addition, the explicit 
formalisation of such procedures is equally advised. This should provide an adapted referent 
regulatory basis across the Nigerian organisational field. It may also require documenting such 
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precepts in order to be incorporated as organisational guidelines. For instance, as stated by a company 
executive, in this regard: 
CLL31: “And mostly the challenge is that there is no formal structure. It is important for the 
cultural influences to be controlled. To a large extent, we can introduce some of the cultural 
practices, but we must have them documented and formalised. So that people will know that 
oh in my culture, for instance, it is acceptable to collect gifts but only up to a certain amount. 
Also, maybe it is acceptable to take clients out, but stating the limits. If it is normal to do it, 
then it will not mean you are compromised, as long as you acknowledge it, and due process 
and transparency are followed.” 
 Notably, in the light of the foregoing, the role of government in Nigeria is contested as pivotal 
in fostering a centralised framework for the administration of best practices, by providing necessary 
order, direction and control (interviews RCE05; RCP36; CLF19). This intervention is expected to foster 
coordination through, for instance, policy development targeted at such central mechanisms as the 
capital market (interviews CLL31; CLE18). For instance, as a corporate governance consultant noted:  
OAG34: “The capital market has grown over the years due to government intervention. When 
you look at indigenisation for instance, boosted our capital market, when they said banks 
should capitalise, it boosted our capital market. So, you see that it is mainly the policy of 
government that boosts the capital market. Government has to put on its front burner, 
incentives. For instance, if I tell company xyz, these are the incentives you will get, but before 
you get a certain volume of contracts, you need to be listed. But government is not doing that. 
Even companies that are listed, if not that they seek cheap loans abroad, they might not be 
listed.” 
In this light, in Nigeria the intervention for advancing corporate governance mechanisms is cited as a 
precursory base for such coordination. This could be in the form of giving incentives to be invested in 
the capital market. As the private sector is seen to be largely dependent on the public sector, 
promoting public sector reforms should thus create a more promotional interdependence. For 
instance, as one respondent posits in this respect: 
OAC17: “Government itself is going to be forced to look at the capital market. When there is a 
budget deficit, either they go to euro bond to raise funds or they go to borrow from 
multinational agencies. The government itself needs to be able to look at the capital market 
and develop it, because the government itself seems to have little interest in the capital 
market.” 
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Thus, in Nigeria, the place of central government in instigating acquiescence to best practices by 
proactive advancement of corporate governance structures, is emphasised. Such a mechanism for 
centralised regulation, as in the capital market, is identified to be imperative if a coordinated 
corporate governance administration and its improvement are to be realised. 
7.2 Micro-level reforms: Improving rationalisation in organisational reforms 
7.2.1 Engendering Boards’ independence, roles and responsibilities   
 As La Porta et al. (1997, 1999) posit, in corporate environments characterised by low 
protection of minority interest – such as indicated in Nigeria64 – the expropriation of minority 
shareholders is considered to be eminent. However, in Nigeria, rather than the typical agent-principal 
relationship, the principal-principal relationship (Young et al., 2008) is prevalent, due to the 
characteristic concentrated ownership structure. Nonetheless, this study finds that due to their small 
shareholdings, minority shareholders in Nigerian listed companies are largely marginalised, rather 
than expropriated. In addition, this issue is particularly compounded by the prevailing strain on the 
efficiency of the board of directors (BoD) in Nigerian corporations (see Chapter 5 of this thesis). In 
market-based economies, where there are highly dispersed shareowners, the BoD serves as the 
intermediary between the shareholders and company executives (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Blair and Stout, 2001). Nonetheless, in Nigeria, the appointment and selection of the BoD, as revealed, 
is hugely influenced by the controlling block-owners. Evidently, their independence is, in turn, 
impaired (see Chapter 5 of this thesis), whereby, the board tends to pay more allegiance to the 
controlling shareholders. To this end, their ability to perform effectively their role in protecting the 
dispersed/minority shareholder is impacted. Subsequently, as the study reveals, a bid to promote a 
more externally focused corporate governance mechanism, stimulating the awareness of the BoD to 
its responsibilities, is considered a priority (interviews CLG22; CLC12; OAF30). In this respect, in 
Nigeria, training the board to be more aware of its significance in corporate governance is advocated 
as an integral part of corporate governance advancement. It is believed that such training could foster 
a better understanding of the board’s role and responsibilities. For instance, as suggested by one of 
the directors of the regulatory body that was interviewed, “there is need for the Nigerian Institute of 
Directors (NIoD) to take up this challenge in organising direct training for directors” (RCK20).  
 To this extent, a ‘Board Evaluation’ scheme has evolved as one of the main resolves 
introduced into the corporate governance reforms in Nigeria in the last decades. The ‘Board 
evaluation’ involves an annual assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of each targeted (listed 
or public interest) company. This exercise is meant to allow an overall appraisal of the state of the 
                                                             
64 Such as in Nigeria - with the evolving or almost non-existent level of external corporate governance mechanisms 
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Board, its committees and the company’s general internal control system. Regarding this initiative, 
respondents in the study stated their views thus: 
CLI24: “One of the things that the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) advocates is 
an annual corporate governance evaluation, which hopefully should throw up most of these 
corporate governance issues, that is, things that are red flags that are underlying the 
numbers. Because a routine audit doesn’t throw up corporate governance issues, it just 
focuses more on the financials. It is not only numbers that tell the story of a healthy 
organisation. When companies go to the stock exchange and give the facts behind the figures, 
corporate governance is one of those facts. Corporate governance evaluators will highlight 
those issues where there are concerns and also highlight the positives as well. The strength 
and weakness and areas for improvement.” 
RCE05: “The companies have come to realise that it helps to focus on the board to improve 
the processes. They contracted this out to PWC, KPMG, etc. and are ready to pay, so that they 
can give them an independent assessment.” 
Along this line, as Martin et al. (2017) argue, the ability to selectively enact logics derives primarily 
from the organisational level and depends particularly on the way the logics are represented in 
organisational processes and personnel. In this regard, apart from the stated assessment, the board 
evaluation initiative also highlights the role of independent evaluators. From this perspective, the 
independent evaluators thus also emerge as central actors in the transformation agenda. Thus, these 
evaluators, alongside other key actors, transpire to be ‘institutional reformers’, fostering 
organisational transformation/change, in this context. In this respect, concerning the impact, with 
respect to the composition of NEDs, a director from one of the listed company stated:  
CLF12: “If you look at the non-executive directors, there is diversity on the board now. Gender, 
ethnic, etc. The whole idea is to improve corporate governance.” 
7.2.2 Legitimacy through information disclosure 
 Lack of necessary infrastructures in Nigeria, has been stipulated as one of the major 
impediments to corporate governance advancement (Yakasai, 2001). This weak infrastructural base 
has also affected the protection of minority interest, somewhat. For instance, the lack of an updated 
national database is noted as a major setback to the Board’s performance, to some extent. Especially, 
such situations are specified to have affected the recruitment or selection of qualified personnel for 
the Board, in the capacity of NEDs, to some extent. For instance, as stated by a regulator: 
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 RCP 36: “We don’t actually have a database. In developed countries like the UK, USA, they 
have the required databases through agencies such as the Institute of Directors (ID) and the 
ID also have the additional role of screening people, who need to meet certain requirements, 
before they can serve on the boards of corporations.” 
 
As a way around such complexities, emerging findings reveal an advocacy for corporate governance 
reforms in Nigeria to follow a fairly unconventional approach in this respect, unlike universal 
prescriptions. Information asymmetry between the executives and the outside shareholders has 
normally accounted for a form of agency problem (Berle and Means, 1932). As a noted hybrid 
system,65 corporate governance in Nigeria also, consequently, involves the outside dispersed owners 
and the company managers and/or controlling owners. Thus, as a result of the separation, corporate 
governance performance is also prone to some standard agency conflict (although minimally).66 
Consequently, the need to assuage these issues arises. As this emergent theme reveals, improving key 
actors’ (reformers) rationality represents a key emerging proposition in this regard. A major 
suggestion about the protection of the interest of minority stockholders, aside from the popularised 
approach67, is improving their general cognition about governance performance. For instance, as 
stated by an official of a regulatory agency: 
RCB02: “We are going to download the name, qualification and years of experience of the 
Board members. We are going to bring out the composition of the Board committees, the audit 
committee, the governance and nomination committee and risk management committee. We 
are going to give their names and the years of experience and the years they have gained in 
those committees. We are going to give you the names of the Independent Directors, so that 
you (minority shareholder) can see how independent those ‘independent’ directors are. They 
will look at the different criteria of the independent directors; the qualification, experience and 
contact with the company, if they are actually independent. What are we trying to do? We are 
trying to protect the interest of minority shareholders because there is a wide concentration 
of ownership in most companies, so you need to do more to protect the interest of the minority 
shareholder.” 
This therefore suggests that the sound comprehension of good practices, by outside owners will 
engender a better appreciation of their rights, resulting in active participations. 
                                                             
65 See Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
66 See the earlier findings in Chapter, 5, for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
67 Standard global corporate governance propositions, such as the OECD principles, the Cadbury Report etc., have normally 
eulogised the importance of the inclusion or increase of Non-Executive Director (NEDs) on the board of public corporations 
in order to foster accountability.  
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 As this investigation reveals, one means of mitigating this problem of apprehension of 
governance practice is by bridging the information gap between the executives and the outside 
owners in Nigerian corporations. Enhancing the availability of credible information, is stated as 
imperative in this respect. Also, such access to necessary corporate disclosures is anticipated to help 
mitigate the resonant disinterest in corporate governance matters, especially among the outside 
(minority owners). As the study affirms, having reliable information at the disposal of the minority 
shareholders or investors enables adequate awareness about the activities of the company (interview 
RCB02). From this viewpoint, disclosures are considered as vital in promoting the exercise of their 
rights and other powers to hold corporate managements accountable. According to another opinion 
of a respondent, regarding this: 
RCN32: “What are we trying to do? We are trying to ensure that the information that is 
released via companies gets to the market quickly in order to enable investors to take informed 
decisions.”  
Therefore, this pursuit of disclosure is anticipated as requisite to generally improve the cognitive 
rationality and backing of targeted parties, by expanding their perception of corporate governance. 
Along this line, as a developing country, with a revealed prioritised agenda for growth and 
development, this is adjudged to be a major way of fostering transparency, accountability and 
consequently, investment. Correspondingly, this undertaking to provide credible information is also 
intended to enable outside shareholders access the viability of their representations across different 
companies and demand answerability. In the bid to attain one of the targeted objectives of 
governance reforms in Nigeria, this is eventually expected to secure the protection of the vulnerable 
dispersed minority shareholders. As credible and timely disclosures should reduce information 
asymmetry, it is implied to also additionally promote a perfect market condition (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). This analysis equally suggests that such a drive for the presentation of reliable and accessible 
information in Nigeria, presents a way forward in the provision of internally generated revenues and 
economic growth, consequent upon the expected advancement of the capital market. Alongside this, 
the view of a respondent (policy maker) was: 
RCI14: “How are we doing this? When we first looked at the website of all the public companies 
in Nigeria, we discovered that about 40% of them are not functional, which means that 
investors going to the site of these companies cannot get information. So, we now want the 
market to determine the quality of information it has. What we have started this year is to 
start downloading on our platform, information that will enable the different stakeholders get 
an overview of how their companies are run. The first information we are giving you is basic 
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information about your company. We are also giving you all the information you need about 
the Board and its committees.”  
In essence, ‘transparency’, as signified by the increase in the level of disclosures of companies’ 
engagements, is considered salient in aiding development. Consequently, as inferred, this expectedly 
will show (investors) and/or shareholders, at the very least, that the Nigerian corporate governance 
processes are fair and open enough.  
 
7.2.3 Organisational actors: cognition and corporate governance reforms 
 As highlighted in the preceding findings chapters, among other issues, there is disclosed the 
dominant influence of concentrated ownership structure on the corporate governance system in 
Nigeria. One core reflection of their controlling interest is in the Board appointments in listed 
companies. As Maguire et al. (2004) argue, institutional entrepreneurship can help stabilise activity in 
a field by taking it from an emerging to a more developed state, thus connecting actors in more 
formalized, stable relationships, through the production of shared norms and understandings. By 
broader implication, the general perception about good governance practices in Nigeria tends to be 
just evolving and thus relatively nascent. Indicatively, this poses a challenge to the administration of 
corporate governance reforms. This circumstance is in turn found to inform the general approach to 
implementation. As Harmon et al. (2015) specify, communicative and cognitive mechanisms are 
fundamentals of institutional maintenance and/or reproductions. In line with the nature of the 
organisation field, as discovered, an imposition of principles through the rule-based approach applies 
in the administration of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. As a company regulator argued: 
RCG07: “What they do in the UK is different. The comply or explain works in the UK. But, our 
people don’t understand the comply and explain. This is the aspect we need to work on. 
Ultimately, it is important to improve people’s orientation in applying acceptable principles in 
their organisations.” 
In this respect, ultimately, despite the present approach, a principle-based corporate governance 
reforms approach is considered to be optimal. In line with this, improving the cognitive abilities of 
relevant economic actors emerges as an imperative. Accordingly, a company respondent cited: 
CLK29: “The general awareness, is more important, as opposed to literacy. You know there is 
something that is called being street smart. As for me, I would be more interested in how 
knowledgeable directors and managers are in terms of their responsibilities and background, 
not qualifications.” 
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Along these lines, findings disclose efforts to redirect these ideologies in line with achieving efficiency 
in governance practices in Nigeria.  
 Thus, as opposed to the prevailing rules and regulations, the need for education and 
enlightenment of business owners (managers) is promoted as a logical means of attaining significant 
appreciation of corporate governance principles in fostering a more voluntary approach. A regulator 
cited in his view, thus: 
RCF06: “SEC and CBN are always training the major stakeholders, like business owners. If there 
is no issue with funding, wherever we have opportunity in the world we are always going for 
training. The training is a continuous thing; we invited Dr King of South Africa sometimes. 
What are we doing? We are exchanging ideas and recent happenings within and outside our 
jurisdiction, to improve knowledge.”  
In this light, one key theme emerging with respect to creating a wholesome business environment is 
the need to re-orientate business owners, elites and other key organisational actors regarding the 
significance of good corporate governance (GCG) and its implications. This is expected to refocus key 
agents’ (reformers) perceptions, in this respect, derived as essentials within this maturing setting. As 
a regulator stated in this regard: 
RCL21: “Education and enlightenment are important. We need some form of coordination 
and standardisation of corporate governance practice across the board. Managers of 
companies must know that it is in their interest. It does not only help stakeholders, but also 
their companies. Owners of business should know that it is in their interest to have a better 
run organisation. Business should be at arm’s length. Conflicts of interest should be 
eliminated. We have so many codes, so we need to standardise.” 
Also, another regulator stated, thus: 
RCD04: “But we’ve seen that in order to change the existing culture there is need for people to 
be able to see and understand the cost-benefit analysis. There must be principles and good 
practices. No matter what happens you must follow the principles and best practices and that 
is the step we are taking now.” 
7.3  Rethinking corporate governance reforms in Nigeria  
7.3.1 Refocusing the approach to reforms 
 As revealed, the Nigerian corporate governance setting is largely encapsulated in informal 
framing, which represents less adaptive structures, thus, the requiring of more articulate 
representations of constituent lines of action for the proposed institutional reforms. Rather than 
organisational power and control, in reproduction and isomorphism, the role of conformity, habit and 
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convention, in fostering institutional continuity or resilience, is acknowledged (Oliver, 1991). In an 
earlier section of this thesis,68 the corporate governance in Nigeria is highlighted to reflect a high 
reliance on historical procedures (elaborated along the path dependence theorisation). In this sense, 
this study reveals the inclination towards existing structures, in the form of prevailing institutional 
logics and perspectives of organisational actors in Nigeria. This discovery suggests that the Nigerian 
corporate governance reforms efforts are reflective of the effects of ingrained conventionalities or 
traditions. From these perspectives, the adoption of the rule-based approach to the administration 
of reforms is evidently indicated to offer a resolve towards the intended restructuring. As a company 
regulator cited:  
RCL21: “If you tighten/strengthen the institutions in Nigeria, things will work, enhance better 
governance performance. Because that is one way of changing behaviour. Because it is not all 
of us that can think of behavioural change; we still need that carrot and stick approach. We 
are trying to change behaviour. In the initial instance, the sanctions should be tough enough.” 
Essentially, the above evidence could indicate a country level analysis of responses to external 
pressure for compliance with innovations in Nigeria. The contextualisation of corporate governance 
practices has been promoted. Scholars have called for a better understanding of the extent of the 
national characteristics on the effectiveness and legitimation of organisational innovations (see 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013). For instance, Filatotchev et al. (2013) argue the 
significance of institutions in creating different sets of resources for monitoring, as well as values and 
normative understandings, across different contexts. In this vein, this investigation reveals that 
adopting a mandatory approach indicates the preliminary stage in the implementation of corporate 
governance principles, in a maturing field such as Nigeria. Essentially, at this phase of implementation, 
as cited, the enforcement of these recommendations emanates as the only practicable option, given 
the state of the institutional field. As specified by a manager of a listed company who was interviewed: 
CLJ27: “If we are having such a conversation about corporate governance in Nigeria, our level 
of development is not proper enough to say that it is optional. Make it mandatory initially, 
so that all of us are moving in the same direction. All these, PENCOM, NAICOM, CBN codes are 
mandatory. As these regulators will state: If you want to operate with my licence, these are 
my rules.” 
 Despite the stipulated prevalent governance method of enforcement of rules and 
recommendations, the establishment of a self-regulated framework is nonetheless advocated as an 
                                                             
68 see the chapter 5 on the challenges of corporate governance reforms in Nigeria 
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ideal. From this analysis, the implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria stipulates an 
introductory stage. Alongside, the state of the institutional systems rationalises the adopted stringent 
approach to implementation, in this instance. Nonetheless, ultimately, respondents assert that the 
voluntary system of compliance will be more beneficial and preferred. As stated by respondents: 
OAH35: “With time it should be a voluntary code, investors will like to see companies do this 
because it is the right thing to do and not because they want to avoid sanctions or as a ‘means 
of securing their licence to operate.’ If it is compliance based everybody is going to tick the 
box. It could result in a ‘box- ticking’ approach. However, if it is principle-based, people will 
see the reason why they need and have to comply. In this case investors can say ‘I can see 
that company is better governed than this company’. So, investors can assess companies that 
are well governed. Like CalPERS, in California, they take over companies that are badly 
governed and put their own good governance structure in place.” 
CLG22: “Everything is very mandatory in Nigeria. In some other countries, it is voluntary, like 
moral principles. I think it is the way we are, but in the long run, it might be more flexible. It 
should be allowed to appeal to people’s moral principles.”  
Against the foregoing, a principle-based corporate governance framework is supported. This is cited 
as a means to engender a more fluid approach, necessary to galvanise conversance with imbibing the 
spirit/moral of corporate governance recommendations, rather than just the letter. The existing 
mandatory culture is also argued to promote the box ticking approach which defers the attainment 
of a self-motivated best practices framework. As stated, in this respect, by a rating agent and a 
company executive: 
OAA08: “I think for governance, you have got to make it a principle-based thing later. If it 
continues to be a regulatory thing, the companies are going to be ticking the box, as they are 
going to have fines if they don’t comply.”  
CLL31: “If I volunteer to comply, I comply willingly and it becomes part of my spirit and my 
DNA. It becomes something that I experience, I see the benefit. It becomes something that I 
want to take ownership of, unlike when I am forced. So, it is the two sides of the coin. Making 
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7.3.2 Instigating local mimetic pressure  
 Institutional entrepreneurship refers to the ‘activities of actors who leverage resources to 
create new institutions or to transform existing ones because of an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements’ (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Rao et al., 2000; Maguire et al., 2004). Along this line, 
research has also identified the possible effort of entrepreneurs (collective actions) in institutional 
reproductions beyond the proclaimed self-interest. Because they bridge organisational fields, which 
lowers their embeddedness, central organisations are more likely to come into contact with 
contradictory logics (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Thus, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) further 
argue that, rather than resist change, central agents, as institutional entrepreneurs, are actually more 
likely to instigate institutional reproductions (or innovations). Accordingly, this study also identifies 
the salient role of institutional entrepreneurs, in similar respect, particularly in developing countries 
in inciting best practices. Specifically, in Nigeria, this investigation recognises, among others, the 
intervention of ‘elite business owners’ as constituting the dominant institutional action for change. 
The findings suggest that such institutional pressures can be channelled to propel best practices 
generally within the Nigerian corporate context.  As intimated by a respondent from one of the policy 
making agencies in this respect:  
RCH13: “There are some classes of people that affect corporate governance. Corporate 
governance also affects a certain class of people (the elites). If these classes of people come to 
the conclusion that we have to hold ourselves to high moral and ethical standards in the way 
we manage the resources of the country and the people, then this will be achievable.”  
The above evidence upholds the position pronounced by Oliver (1991: 168) that “Institutional 
pressures and expectations may occur not only by legal coercion but also by means of voluntary 
diffusion.” Accordingly, multiple institutions arguably interact to influence the perceived legitimacy of 
corporate governance practices within a nation (Judge et al., 2008). Likewise, in examining the 
reinforcement or reproduction of prevailing institutional logic, scholars suggested that both 
environmental events and organisational contingencies may galvanise such opportunities for change 
(Meyer, 1982; Zajac et al., 2000; Thornton et al., 2012; Joseph et al., 2014). Organisations might 
become isomorphic within their contexts through certain social processes, one of which might involve 
mimetic actions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Mimetic pressure, which 
‘results from standard responses to uncertainty’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), normally involves the 
ability of an agent to mimic the attributes of another. “Organisations tend to model themselves after 
similar organisations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983: 152). Similarly, emerging themes from this study suggest the significance of mimetic 
 
Page | 195  
 
pressures in Nigeria amongst central organisational agents in stimulating adherence to good 
governance practices. For instance, as stated by a consultant: 
OAF30:  “In the UK, the FRC mainly regulates listed companies and the codes are part of the 
listing requirements. However, other sectors/companies that are not listed adopt it because 
they see that the recommendations are good. This is the type of initiative that the central 
actors here can bring to bear in the Nigerian context.”   
 In this line particularly, Misangyi et al. (2008) highlighted the corporate actions in instituting 
new organisational forms to address societal concerns. Their study illustrates how social actors, within 
an emerging context, functioning as institutional entrepreneurs, initiate new anticorruption 
institutional logic by incorporating ‘corruption-disabling identities, cognitive schemas, and practices’ 
(Misangyi et al., 2008). In Nigeria, actors or organisations established in strategic positions across the 
institutional field are found to constitute the central players. Such institutional actors are exemplifying 
institutional entrepreneurs, within this context. As they are less disposed towards established 
normative or coercive pressures (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), they are therefore likely to be more 
capable to precipitate such internal shifts from stipulated conventionalities (embeddedness), where 
necessary. This, as purported, is instrumental for instigating new practice, by stimulating mimetic 
pressure. As a regulator stated:  
RCK20: “Nigerian banks have moved into other countries, if you look at the entire banking 
industry, and that is why Nigerian banks have grown. They are now doing well and also setting 
examples for others.” 
Key corporate actors recognised as institutional entrepreneurs include multinational companies and 
foreign organisations, such as foreign subsidiaries/affiliates, banks, and other financial institutions, in 
Nigeria. These organisations are noted to possess, comparatively, a more developed corporate 
governance structure. These establishments equally have a more robust governance best practices 
framework. These companies are equally found to be at the forefront in the implementation of 
recommended governance reforms. They are therefore discovered to be more cognisant with 
instituting good governance principles, than their indigenous counterparts. For instance, as stated by 
a director of a regulatory body: 
RCA01: “In fact, before you can be a director in any financial services business, they will have 
to do what is called ‘the fit-and-proper-person’s-check’ on you. Meaning are you fit, looking 
at your history or your antecedents. The central bank will circulate your name to an insurance 
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regulator or pension regulator or SEC to say, do you know this person? Has he ever managed 
a company that has gone bankrupt? These are good practices that can be imitated by others.” 
Indicatively, these corporate actors, acting as central elites within this organisational sphere, are 
envisioned to be able to foster change and advancement towards the institutionalisation of best 
practices. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), within organisational fields, as well as societal 
cultural expectations, coercive isomorphism also results from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent. To this extent, as 
postulated, these actions could form possible motivations for other companies (such as private 
companies or SMEs) that are lagging in GCG culture, thus constituting mimetic pressure. As stated by 
the director of one of the financial institutions:  
CLI24: “Our companies instigate others with their corporate governance practices. Some 
executives of other companies even say that they would like to attend our briefings to know 
how we are achieving success.” 
 Further, as network location thesis posits, peripheral organisations are more likely to 
disengage from established (existing) practices (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Corporate actors 
such as SMEs, usually constitute these peripheral organisations. As implied, on the other hand, 
essentially, they could equally stimulate organisational transformations within the Nigerian corporate 
sphere. With a less established corporate governance structure, these peripheral organisations (SMEs) 
also tend to be less ingrained in existing practice. Thus, they are found to be more inclined to such 
mimetic pressure towards best practices, precipitated by the actions of the central corporate bodies. 
While, on the other hand, the multinational (central) organisations, as institutional entrepreneurs, 
could act as drivers of change, likewise, ironically, these peripheral organisations. As these are less 
ingrained in existing practices, they would be disposed to easily disengage. These small companies 
should equally be more prone to such proposed organisational innovations. As cited by one listed 
company official: 
CLE18: “You find that all the equity firms that comply, influence the governance structure of 
their portfolio companies. So, people are now seeing that it is in their own long-term interest, 
to have good corporate governance, otherwise you stay where you are. And if you stay where 
you are, your competitors will beat you in the market place.” 
Ultimately, within the context of Nigeria, such orientations for change among organisational actors 
would significantly be impelled by the necessity for conformity. As stipulated, such normative 
pressures should be motivated by the instrumental/business case – i.e., the need for competitive 
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advantage and/or sustainability. In this sense, such intent for mimetic pressures is also expected to 
foster an effective value chain within companies’ operations management. In this regard, according 
to the response of a Board Chairman: 
CLC12: “A governance issue depends on how the company sees it. For me it’s a sustainability 
issue. How can your business continue to operate? But, in every organisation, the tune at the 
top determines the working culture. No organisation will rise above its ownership. How do 
they live their values? There is no point saying these are our core values and you don’t live 
those values. How do you enforce them? There are companies who say they don’t take bribes, 
if you do they will fine you. Companies have gone to the extent that even in their codes of 
conduct, the suppliers sign an undertaking, that they cannot bribe the staff. You cannot give 
them a gift, the day you give them a gift, you are removed as a supplier. If the top is corrupt 
what will happen to the bottom; if the top is okay, then they can enforce those things. That is 
why if you have a code of conduct at the Board level, you should also have it at the 
management level and employee level. So, these are the issues companies are now battling 
with. So, more and more you find companies who do not have codes of ethics or codes of 
conduct for their staff, suppliers and Boards, are now creating them.” 
 
7.4 Strategic alliances for good governance: harnessing the informal space  
 Corporate governance structure and implementation within the context of Nigeria is revealed 
to depict its own distinctiveness. As Ocasio et al. (2015) propose, ‘the collections of communicative 
events distributed throughout organizations and institutional fields can converge on systems of 
categories to yield the meaningful and durable principles that constitute institutional logics.’ The 
corporate governance environment in Nigeria operates within a relatively informal space. This 
includes cognitive rationality, relationship-based (family concentrated ownership) structure, informal 
institutional structure, organisational actors’ dynamics, and social influences, among other things. 
Against this backdrop, in the canvass for an effective framework for governance reforms, an inclusive 
stakeholder model is disclosed. Emerging evidence indicates such an archetype, as being a precursor 
to harnessing and internalising the highlighted contextual specificities towards the institution of 
corporate governance reforms in such a developing context. For instance, as one of the corporate 
governance contributors argued: 
OAC17: “We need to look at all the peculiar factors in our environment. These are the things 
that we need to fine tune, understand and look at what suits our environment. Our 
environment is not the same as other (developed) environments. Even though we can either 
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use that as an excuse or use it to perform better. However, we should look at the corporate 
entities and ask what is good for these entities.” 
As DiMaggio (1988) posits, ‘new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see 
in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly’ (p. 14). In light of the foregoing, the 
analysis propounds an inclusive framework for engaging salient actors, towards corporate 
governance reforms pertinent to the specificities of the Nigerian context.  
 (A framework for salient actors’ inclusion towards institutionalised transformations) 
 
Figure 7.1: Framework for inclusive corporate governance reforms in a maturing organisational 
field:  the 3Cs of efficient actorhood (Consultation, Collaboration and Communication)  
 
This framework, particularised as the 3C’s framework for inclusive Corporate governance reforms in 
the maturing (Nigeria) field, is delineated by three major interfaces: Consultation, Collaboration and 
Communication. These social processes are described as the necessary focal points for the 
homogenisation of innovations within the disparate structures and influences of the Nigerian 
organisational field, and are outlined below. 
 
 
7.4.1 Consultation  
 The environment of corporate governance in Nigeria reflects the evolving nature of its 
systems. This is depicted in the lack of regimented formal structures (in consequence, the prevalence 
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of the informal rule), which typifies the institutional context. In particular, the prevalence of informal 
boundaries of corporate governance in Nigeria is indicated to offer a platform for a viable 
rationalisation of corporate governance reforms. To this end, the need for consultation among key 
actors (reformers, recipients and influencers) is suggested. Such social process primarily involves 
prompting deliberation in order to seek endorsements (buy-in) from the relevant and targeted 
stakeholders. From this perspective, Cohen et al. (2004) stipulated the usefulness of exploring the 
links between elements in the corporate governance mosaic. This is declared to synergise both the 
internal and external interrelationships between the various actors and mechanisms identified to 
affect governance systems (Cohen et al., 2004, 2008).  As a regulator proposed in this respect:  
RCC03: “The stakeholders that will use the code must be brought in to let them know how the 
code applies to them. Not for you to copy what we have in the UK. Wide consultation and rule 
of engagement must be adopted. So that at the end of the day, those that will use the code 
will not complain.” 
 Also, creating awareness about the importance and benefits of corporate governance and the 
understanding of such concepts are suggested as key. As stipulated in the earlier section of this 
chapter, one of the major themes emerging in the prospects for corporate governance reforms, is the 
need to attune the cognition of key organisational actors to the appreciation of good governance 
procedures. This will encompass enlightenment about the long- and short-term effects of the 
corporate governance reforms. This consultation should also engender understanding about the 
implication for the sustainability of businesses and the growth of the share/stakeholders’ wealth. 
Nigeria has notably been characterised in the recent past, by some degree of corporate 
misdemeanour with the resultant impediment to corporate governance advancements (Yakasai, 
2001; Okike, 2007; Adekoya, 2011). As Greenwood and Hinings (1996) establish, “a major source of 
organizational resistance to change derives from the normative embeddedness of an organization 
within its institutional context” (p. 1023). Accordingly, within the Nigerian corporate governance 
reforms attempts, the ‘consultation’ proposition is additionally considered to be necessary in fostering 
the cited voluntary self-regulated structure. In such instance, a change in the cognition and expected 
perception of connected social actors within this institutional setting is foreseen to permit a 
transformative process in Nigeria. Essentially, the involvement of salient social actors is professed as 
vital towards the efficiency of the organisational reforms agenda in Nigeria.  As a respondent 
(corporate solicitor) cited:  
OAE28: “The FRCN is trying because it wants to key us into the global scheme, but we need to 
have all the companies themselves, everybody having a buy-in and the regulators themselves 
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saying that we need to raise our game. We also need a buy-in from the companies. The 
regulators and the regulated have a role to play. Then, we will be able to improve performance. 
But when you as the regulator and the regulated are showing conflicting figures and books, 
there is no way it can work. There must be a passionate need from the regulated that they 
want to improve their level of performance.” 
 As disclosed in the previous chapter, the corporate governance reforms in the Nigerian 
context are segmented and sector driven. Even though respondents stated that the initiation of a 
singular national corporate governance reference would be better, however this is claimed to be 
unachievable within such a fragmented environment. Due to their intrafield linkages, as a result of 
being less ingrained into the traditional practices, central actors can be lowly embedded (Greenwood 
and Suddaby, 2006). As Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) further claim, with the combination of such 
low embeddedness and an inducement for change, central actors become institutional entrepreneurs. 
Basically, such an approach is expected to equally resolve the ascendancy issues revealed within the 
Nigerian regulatory environment and certainly facilitate the institutionalisation of these reforms. As 
stated within one respondent’s opinions:  
RCM25: “Also in terms of enforcing, you must first start by enlightening, orientation or 
encouragements. Show them why they need to. It is always better when someone volunteers 
to do something. My level of commitment, whether I voluntarily do something or if I am forced 
to do it, is different. If I am forced to do something especially if there is risk on the other side, 
essentially it will become a profit taking exercise.”  
Previous research has hypothesized such an approach as being beneficial to engendering impactful 
institutional reproduction or transformation. As Misangyi et al. (2008) noted, the institutional orders 
on the cognition and behaviour of social actors must be influenced in any attempt to understand and 
change a social world characterized, for instance, by corruption. As stated in the evidence above, 
consultations with key actors/agents in Nigeria are proposed as imperative towards the attainment of 
the advocated centralised corporate governance reform procedure. Such attempts will incorporate 
the views of prominent actors who will ultimately endorse such reforms within this environment. This 
in turn is predicted to promote the aspired growth and development priorities within the 
macroeconomic level. In line with this a corporate consultant commented thus: 
OAF30: “The current codes are good for now, but it will be better if there is a single code with 
principles as opposed to regulations. It should be recommended for companies to comply, not 
that if you don’t do it your licence will be withdrawn or you will get a fine. This will be an ideal 
situation, because investors from principle-based corporate governance environments that 
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want to come and invest in Nigeria are already used to this principle-based structure and they 
might not be comfortable with or be discouraged by too much regulation.” 
7.4.2 Collaboration 
Aside from the consultation phase in the promotion of a relational organisational reform framework, 
the study also unveils the advocacy for coordinated efforts within the Nigerian corporate sphere.  As 
revealed in the investigation, the Nigerian institutional environment symbolises a structural 
hegemony. As such, dominance among social actors within this corporate governance domain is 
indicated. Organisations, regardless of their formation, remain as political constructs – indicated as 
socially and legally constructed types of social order (Meyer and Höllerer, 2014). Also, as Oliver (1991) 
posits, ‘organizational response to institutional pressures toward conformity depends on why these 
pressures are being exerted, who is exerting them, what the pressures are, how or by what means 
they are being exerted, and where they occur’ (p. 159). As the study reveals, the Nigerian corporate 
governance reforms procedure is sectionally patterned, so also is the administration of best practices 
codes. Isomorphism involves a constraining process where one unit, under the same set of 
environmental conditions in a population, is constrained to resemble other units (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Nonetheless, powerful forces can emerge to coerce them to become more similar to 
one another, only when disparate organisations are structured into an actual field (by competition, 
the state, or the professions) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Regulatory agencies, such as professional 
associations, play a salient role in conceiving change, endorsing local innovations and shaping their 
diffusion (Greenwood et al., 2002). As stated by a regulator: 
RCP36: “Corporate governance generally in Nigeria is for the regulators to come together, 
collaborate and work together. For me that is the major way I think the corporate governance 
reforms, can work well. The central agencies, business owners and regulators come together 
to enforce it. Like I said, doing good thing does not come naturally to us in this part of the 
world. For any policy to work effectively there must be collaboration among the regulators. All 
the other stakeholders need to be identified and they also have a part to play. It is necessary 
to get their endorsement.” 
Evidently, this suggests the need for collaboration among key institutional and organisational agents, 
recognised principally as reformers or receptors.  
 Within the Nigerian institutional field, the significance of the central authority is identified. An 
overriding insight emanating from this study is the centrality of the government (and its parastatals) 
as the driver of such required control and coordination. In this regard, the place of governmental 
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interventions and involvement in instigating such synchronisation is disclosed as paramount. Along 
this line a respondent from the regulatory body mentioned: 
RCK20: “The environment and the scheme for corporate governance best practices 
implementation are too disconnected, presently, so more coordination is highly required. 
Government, other central agencies and organisational actors need to come together and 
develop sound policies. The truth of the matter is that we need to aggregate ideas and value. 
Wide consultation and engagement is needed to bring all the sectors together. The more 
people that can give their input into the reform processes in the Nigerian business 
environment, the smoother the procedure and the better the cooperation that we will get.”  
In this vein, in the Nigerian corporate reforms scheme, the optimum position is suggested as the 
initiation of a singular or centralised governance reforms scheme, at the minimum, thus the drive for 
homogeneity. Organisational change is conceived as sometimes a direct response to government 
mandate, which involves mediating pressures such as force, persuasion, or invitations to join in 
collusion (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, as the findings from the study further indicate, such 
pursuit is largely contingent on the level of sustained coordination among major affecting forces in 
the Nigerian corporate environment.  
 As emerging themes specify, such major actors within the subject of this research are 
indicated to include government, corporate governance regulators/policy makers, Banks and other 
financial institutions, institutional entrepreneurs (multinational companies, listed companies, elite 
business owners, minority stockholders) (interviews RCP36; CLD16). The neo-institutionalisation 
perspective has centrally upheld the significance of the collective actions in any effective effort 
towards institutional change, reproduction or variation of practice. Institutional entrepreneurs “lead 
efforts to identify political opportunities, frame issues and problems, mobilise constituencies” and 
“spearhead collective attempts to infuse new beliefs, norms, and values into social structures” (Rao 
et al., 2000: 240). Indeed, when organisations are highly dependent on the constituent exerting 
pressures, such organisations are argued to be unlikely to resist institutional demands and 
expectations (Oliver, 1991). In this regard, as Lawrence et al. (2011) emphasised: 
“The study of institutional work takes as its point of departure an interest in work—the efforts 
of individuals and collective actors to cope with, keep up with, shore up, tear down, tinker with, 
transform, or create anew the institutional structures within which they live, work, and play, 
and which give them their roles, relationships, resources, and routines.” (p. 53). 
Similarly, these collective efforts or intentions are acknowledged to engender conformity or 
homogeneity among the institutional substances (Rao et al., 2000; Lawrence et al., 2011; Greenwood 
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et al., 2014). Institutional entrepreneurship is understood to be closely associated with organisational 
innovations. DiMaggio (1988) asserts that ‘new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient 
resources see in them an opportunity to realise interests that they value highly’ (p. 14). These 
institutional entrepreneurs thus enable the linkage of the functioning of disparate sets of institutions, 
through the creation of a whole new system of meaning (Garud et al., 2002, 2007). This underscores 
the claim that institutional entrepreneurs, acting as a constellation of purposive actors can stimulate 
organisational transformation or reproduction. Also, as a company executive stated: 
CL:23: “But the main question is, how are we driving the coordination in this corporate 
governance reforms agenda? Talking of SMEs, how much have we been able to promote their 
interest and involvement, with respect to corporate governance best practice? This is very 
significant.” 
In relation to this, a regulator cited:  
RCA01: “There are core issues to focus on in best practices advancement, in Nigeria. I believe 
It is when such economic players, as the business owners and entrepreneurs are mainly 
engaged and they agree to collaborate with other actors in this transformation agenda, that 
things can work properly. In this country, it is not disputable, these entrepreneurs, constitute 
the major powers.” 
 
7.4.3 Communication 
 One aspect on which research has acknowledged the significance of communication in 
organisational studies relates to the provision of the understanding of its implications for the 
processes of legitimation (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Harmon et al., 2015). 
For instance, accordingly, such understanding is also affirmed by Millar et al. (2005) thus: 
“A common factor determining; the success of a corporate governance structure is the extent 
to which it is transparent to market forces. Such transparency is more than pure financial 
transparency; as it can also be based on factors such as governmental, banking and other types 
of institutional transparency mechanism. There may also be a choice for firms to adopt 
voluntary corporate disclosure in situations where mandatory disclosure is not established.” 
(p. 163). 
Investigation by Amahaki and Frynas (2016) in the emerging context of Brazil and South Africa provides 
support for the role of legislation on compliance with corporate governance principles. However, the 
findings indicate that legislation provides limited direct encouragement to fostering private 
shareholder engagement. Likewise, in Nigeria, this study reveals the limited role that legislation and 
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legal statutes have on the engagement of relevant parties or the public in the reforms process. For 
instance, the specific illustration is indicated in the public hearings organised by the overseeing 
regulator FRCN with respect to the national corporate governance code exposure draft. In the words 
of a corporate governance policy maker with respect to the above:  
RCD04: “I understand that there are public hearings that are being held on the code, but these 
should be spread. They can be regionalised, hold one in Abuja, Enugu, etc., so that more people 
can give their inputs. This will also help you as a regulator to understand the level of 
appreciation, and the level of understanding of corporate governance issues, so that when you 
are doing your orientation you know the level of understanding of the majority, i.e. at what 
level, basic, intermediary, or advanced. A lot of where there is contention about the FRCN, 
National Corporate Governance code, is that a lot of people don’t understand the code. 1) 
Some feel threatened and 2) a lot of people don’t have the appreciation of the code.” 
As cited earlier on, the study highlights the essence of improving concerned actors’ cognition in the 
advancement of corporate governance reform procedures. Especially, this is indicated as imperative 
in engendering the understanding of the significance of good governance practices and fostering a 
self-regulatory approach. Promoting key actors’ understanding and perceptions are particularly 
important in engendering actors’ participation in organisational innovations, in Nigeria. Hoefer and 
Green Jr., (2016) conceptualize presumptions as “the communicative and cognitive mechanism 
through which institutions organize actors’ communicative interactions and limited cognitive 
resources.” (p132). 
 Communications is an integral part of institutional creation. In particular, the issues of 
legitimation or endorsement of the reproduction are largely linked to the rhetorics of the system of 
social actors’ meaning making. The dynamics of the field level logics can be altered in the direction of 
the prescribed pattern of behaviour through the right communication procedure (Scott, 2008b). 
Accordingly, Oliver (1991) highlights how organisations respond when confronted with diverse 
pressures exerted on them towards conformity, within institutional fields; organisations usually enact 
as a consequence of institutional influences, different strategic responses (Oliver, 1991). When 
multiplicity, for example, is high and dependence, coercion, diffusion, uncertainty, and 
interconnectedness are low, resistant strategies could be adopted as a potentially effective alternative 
(Oliver, 1991). However, Hoefer and Green (2016), affirm that, within an institutional context, the 
communicative practices of decision makers both allow and constrain the way actors manage risk and 
uncertainty of their judgments and decisions. Emerging themes reflect that, substantially, many of the 
concerns associated with the compliance and implementation of corporate governance innovations 
 
Page | 205  
 
in Nigeria, are traceable to the disposition to the essentialities of these practices. This investigation 
suggests the diverse environment of corporate governance, as well as the fragmented contexts, for 
the proposed good governance reforms in Nigeria. Hence, effective communication among relevant 
constituents within the organisational space in Nigeria is anticipated to provide a synergistic interface 
among the variant field-level logics.  In this vein, a regulator stated:  
RCI14: “The e-dividend effort that we brought – which they fought – is to ensure that minority 
shareholders’ dividends will be transferred to those who have savings accounts, effortlessly, 
24 hours after the dividend is declared. This is all due to lack of understanding and 
communication. So, we strive to ensure that they have an idea of what is happening in their 
companies, we have produced leaflets on the capital market which an ordinary investor can 
have access to.” 
 Against this background, the guiding insight from the study is that applying the rhetorics of 
communication within the organisational sphere of Nigeria would improve the cognition and promote 
a more persuasive approach to the intended reforms. This, as envisaged, will enable a more self-
regulatory mode of change, without resort to stringent procedures, such as sanctions or penalties, 
disclosed to presently characterise the Nigerian reforms agenda.  Along this rationalisation, 
Greenwood et al. (2011), note that, in advancing one logic over the other, the propensity of a voice to 
be heard is dependent more on the influence of the field-level proponents of such logic. Accordingly, 
the insights from the study emphasised the significance of communication to the promotion of a self-
propelled approach to compliance with good governance principles in Nigeria. In relation to this, the 
response of an auditor read thus:  
OAI37: “More and more the governance should make people see that corporate governance is 
a way of life as opposed to abiding by these rules and regulations.”  
However, these disclosures are expected to be at such level of technicality that is commensurate with 
the cognitive ability of the targeted public/stockholder. Comparably, as suggested, in the developing 
contexts (such as SSA), specific efforts at enhancing boardroom practices, accounting transparency, 
and disclosure for shareholders are often pursued along with attempts at addressing the concerns of 
stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and communities (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  As a 
listed company’s executive stated:  
CLF19: “One of the driving forces for corporate governance advancement is not literacy but 
the level of exposure. I think Nigerian businesses should be made more aware of the 
importance of corporate governance.” 
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Also, according to a regulator: 
RCN32: “The shareholders’ associations need to go to the grass roots. You need to be 
innovative when you are in an environment like this. What you can do is to help those 
shareholders who are not as aware to be aware. Find a way to set out the awareness, even a 
radio jingle can also help. Even SEC can do this. Absolutely, there is a need for orientation and 
communication about corporate governance principles. Orientation at the level people can 
understand. Why can’t this be used?” Even explain to them why they should invest in the 
capital market and make it simple for them to do so.”   
In this vein, as stated in the earlier section, the significance of communication is also indicated to 
include the drive for credible information and corporate disclosures. This is expected to engender 
transparency and improved perception of actors, with respect to good governance practices. It is 
suggested that in the event that decision makers face ambiguity in their reading of the environment, 
they can initiate decoupled substantive and symbolic actions (George et al., 2006). Consequently, 
Ocasio et al. (2015) identify that within organisations and institutional fields, the collections of 
communicative events can converge on systems of categories to yield the meaningful and durable 
principles that constitute institutional logics. Similarly, George et al. (2006) indicate how patterns of 
institutional persistence and change will depend on decision makers’ views of environmental shifts, 
whether as potential opportunities or threats to legitimacy. For instance, the implication of this 
proposition for plausible communicative action in Nigeria is reflected through the response of a 
consultant thus: 
OAD26: “If you look at the activities in the corporate governance society now, they are 
educating Nigerians on what is required. So, I think there has been a sizeable appreciation of 
what governance requires. The level of awareness of corporate governance is a lot better.” 
 
Conclusion 
 Frequently, central organisations do act as institutional entrepreneurs for change (e.g. Phillips 
and Zuckerman, 2001; Sherer and Lee, 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). The study identifies 
corporate governance innovations in Nigeria as internally/institutionally promoted. The 
institutionalisation of such good governance performance is upheld to involve businesses or 
institutional entrepreneurs being recognised as major drivers of change. Thus, this analysis suggests 
that, principally, elite business owners, along with key organisational actors, such as government and 
its parastatals, institutional investors, private businesses shareholder associations, evaluators etc., 
 
Page | 207  
 
constitute major institutional reforms to drive corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. The 
propositions embody what needs to be done and how these can be achieved within both the macro 
and micro levels. The major areas of consideration towards a contextualised corporate governance 
reforms agenda are disclosed as: 1) The development of a sustainable/viable business environment, 
2) The Protection of minority shareholders’ interest and, in turn, boosting investors’ confidence, and 
3) Fostering key organisational actors’ alliances in corporate governance reforms.  
 “Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or 
actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 
341), i.e., the state whereby isomorphism within institutional processes is achieved (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). However, as opposed to the prevailing rule-based approach of the imposition of 
corporate governance recommendations in Nigeria, the analysis contested that a self-regulated best 
practice is necessary for such establishment of corporate governance innovations. Emerging themes 
outlined the prospects for such realistic corporate governance reforms, through some identified 
means of effecting good governance innovations and practices in Nigeria, i.e. a framework to mitigate 
the issues and challenges to the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms, as highlighted 
within the investigation. Corporate governance in the environment of Nigeria is ascertained to be 
embroiled in a socio-cultural framework of performance. As a complement, a relational approach to 
the instituting corporate governance reforms is proposed. Such good practices are advocated through 
an inclusion/engagement of key economic agents, by using a subtle approach, drawing on the 
prevailing stakeholder structure. In this respect, the findings within the chapter broadly outline two 
models regarding the effective accomplishment of a tailored approach to corporate governance 
reforms in Nigeria. These include a) improving the perception (cognitive ability) of major stakeholders 
in relation to the significance of corporate governance, on the one hand, and b) engendering effective 
interactions (relations) among the key actors on the other hand, i.e., improving key actors’ cognitions 
and promoting institutional agent’s relations. The core proposition is that, through such means of 
engagement, institutional entrepreneurs – which constitute a dominant player in this context – and 
related actors, will spur institutional change. Subsequently, these dominant organisational agents 
alongside the key institutional agents will engender tailored institutional reforms. 
 For instance, as Bitektine and Haack (2015) argue, through the process of institutionalisation, 
legitimacy judgments of evaluators are subjected to social control, which can ensure the persistence 
of legitimacy judgments and stability of the institutional order, described through an institutional 
stability loop – a cross-level positive-feedback process. From these insights, in relation to the outlined 
peculiarities of the context, this research suggests the importance of key institutional actors’ strategic 
alliance, in realising legitimation and effective corporate governance reforms. The broader implication 
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denotes attaining an encompassing, centralised and stabilised transformational procedure, 
recognised as a prerequisite for the aspired institutionalisation of best practices.  
 As Greenwood et al. (2002) posit, “Legitimation in professional settings, by contrast, is not 
simply a function of anticipated economic outcomes, but of professional appropriateness. What 
matters within a professional context is the demonstrated conformity of innovations with the values 
embedded in traditional beliefs. It is only when ideas are couched in such a way that they are perceived 
to be consistent with prevailing values that they appear compelling and legitimate for adoption” (p. 
75). In this regard, a transformational agenda for education, enlightenment and engagement is 
endorsed in promoting intuitive social actions towards corporate accountability in Nigeria. The 
findings underscore the reliance on other, atypical means of attaining lasting conformity with the 
intended innovations. Therefore, a case is made for information dissemination, corporate disclosure 
and training of identified central actors as the means to have good governance of corporations (e.g. 
Board improvements), in light of the dominant concentrated (relational) structure. This also mirrors 
the maturing nature of the organisational boundary, in this context, with respect to orientating 
organisational actors. Thus, the inclusion of the advocated social processes of collaboration, 
consultation and communication has affirmed the implication of the identified overriding informal 
(interpersonal) performance structure. Essentially, this inclusive framework revealed how such an 
informal structure can be leveraged in fostering a more adaptive corporate governance system within 
Nigeria’s institutional field, and as an archetype of other developing institutional contexts. 
 From the preceding chapters, the informal system in the Nigerian corporate governance 
practice and performance is pre-eminent. This is disclosed to comprehend the lack of a sturdy formal 
mechanism in Nigerian organisational performance. In line with this, the advocacy for institutionally 
driven, corporate governance reforms is notably based on this reality. In this respect, the study 
suggests that integration and engagement of key institutional actors are central to an efficient 
organisational reforms scheme in a situation where the organisational structures are largely directed 
by contextual variables, collective social actions and endogenous factors (as highlighted in Chapter 6). 
Thus, from the neo-institutional perspective, the findings of this chapter expand the institutional 
entrepreneurship position (Maguire et al., 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Baig and Godley, 
2016; Szabó, 2017). Family block-holders, as powerful organisational actors can instigate mimetic 
pressures by inculcating good practices that other corporate actors can mimic. These actions, 
alongside efforts of other corporate actors, present an assemblage of non-formal institutional 
reformers, towards institutionalising corporate governance advancements in an evolving context such 
as Nigeria. Thus, as a prevailing institutional logic – outlined in chapter 5 of this thesis – concentrated 
corporate owners, are identified as core corporate agents of change towards institutional reforms. In 
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essence, a key contribution of this study to the neo-institutional perspective is the insight that path 
dependence can still constitute a positive condition, in the transformation of organisational field.       
 
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS  
 Specifically, the investigation explores the institutionalisation of good governance practices 
within the boundaries of the Nigerian institutional field. A key proposition of this study relates to the 
understanding of the procedures of organisational transformations, from the perspective of the 
developing context. The developing countries embody institutional structures differently from the 
highly modernised advanced societies (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Young et al., 2008). Nonetheless, 
though developing contexts depict such discrete field-level features, it is notably not reckoned with in 
the canvass for the universality of corporate governance reforms. Efficiency and/or legitimation are 
cited as the major motivations for the global diffusions of corporate governance best practices and 
reforms. Whilst this position has not been outrightly disproven, the heterogeneity and institutional 
variances of organisational fields have, however, been indicated. The notion of universality, through 
the promoted governance principles, is nonetheless pursued.69 Essentially, the procedures for 
innovations, from these diffusions, are comparatively disregarded. Thus, an underlying assumption of 
the diffusion theory is the spontaneity in the realisation of these organisational transformations, 
across institutional contexts (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997; Strang and Soule, 1998; 
Strang and Macy, 2001). From this viewpoint the inertia notion of the institutional framework, i.e., the 
adoption of a limited range of socially approved organisational templates and the continuity in 
organisational behaviour are supposed (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). As the emphasis of this 
perspective is on the conformity of organisational processes to institutional pressures, cited to provide 
meaning and stability, institutional structures are typically expected to enhance isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2003, 2008a). While, legitimacy enhances both the stability and 
comprehensibility of organisational activities, however, organisational behaviours rarely foster 
continuity and credibility, persistence and meaning, in equal degrees (Suchman, 1995). As Filatotchev 
and Nakajima (2014), assert “best practice should be understood in terms of different combinations 
of practices, rather than as individual good corporate governance ‘drivers’ that are universally 
applicable.” (p. 598).  
 In essence, technically the corporate governance mechanisms and practices in developing 
contexts do bear a resemblance to the conventionalities across the globe; however, in actuality, the 
                                                             
69 This is reflected in the similarity of codes of corporate governance propagated worldwide (see Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009; O'Shea, 2005). 
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workings of these structures are differentiated. From the detailing of the establishment of corporate 
governance reforms provided in this study, dimensions on institutional transformations within the 
evolving organisational fields (specifically Nigeria), are provided. Along this vein, the institutional 
factors, structures, determinants and mandates for corporate governance reforms within this sphere 
are highlighted. As the findings reveal, the developing organisational environment of Nigeria 
embodies a lack of routinized procedures. As a result, the Nigerian corporate governance is situated 
within a rather unstudied context. Further, and significantly, the organisational/institutional 
mechanisms are evolving but dysfunctional. Consequently, a complementing environment for 
corporate governance performance is lacking within the institutional field. By implication, this 
unstructured institutional environment represents a maturing setting (cf. Maguire et al., 2004, 
Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), whereby the alignment of the organisational functions within the 
maturing context reflects a more entwined interplay of the artefacts of social processes. Legitimacy 
represents social constructions that reflect the relation between the behaviours of entities and the 
shared perception (Suchman, 1995). As noted from this study, the stakeholder- and/or relationship-
based corporate governance structure represents the predominant system of governance in the 
Nigerian context. Accordingly, as a consequence of the existing stakeholder (bank-based) and 
relationship-based systems, evidently diverse influences prevail on corporate governance within the 
Nigerian corporate boundary. As argued, in bank-based stakeholder economies, a key issue is that the 
focus of bank shareholders to maximize value, may conflict with those of regulators, who have their 
own agendas (Boot and Thakor, 1993; Arun and Turner, 2004). Institutional structures are influenced 
by interactions, and in turn, are modified by these interactions’ (Giddens, 1984; Schwandt and Szabla, 
2013).  
 Against this background, while in practice, social structure and agency are stated to be 
inseparable, however, such relationships are also mutually reciprocal (Giddens, 1984; Schwandt and 
Szabla, 2013). Aside from the noted dearth of institutional support for the establishment of best 
practices, a lack of collaboration amongst the main regulatory bodies is revealed. Also noted are the 
resultant complexities and overlap in the oversight functions towards corporate governance reforms. 
As disclosed, the power asymmetry amongst the key reformers (agents) in the corporate environment 
of Nigeria, constitute a hierarchy of power ascendency/dependency within this institutional space. 
Consequently, the corporate governance system is characterised by isolated oversight, power 
differentials, and weak central administration. The implications of this present as the stated 
fragmented corporate governance processes and an exacting reforms process. In essence, here in this 
analysis, the evaluation of the good governance practices poses a challenge in terms of administration 
across Nigeria and the drive for uniformity. To this extent, not only does this situation relate to the 
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evolving nature of the Nigerian corporate environment, but also as a result of the diverse institutional 
dynamics. As indicated, this situation largely constrained the implementation of the corporate 
governance propositions in Nigeria. Thus, the corporate governance environment fundamentally 
presents a challenge with regard to the advancement of such global corporate governance practice. 
Further, within the family concentrated ownership environment of developing countries, infiltrations 
of socio-cultural influences, random interests, and diverse interferences, are found to be instantiated. 
Basically, the Nigerian corporate governance mechanisms depict and are directed by a higher 
proportion of informal constituents than regimented elements. A major consequence is that the 
institutional structures are not self-propelled. The corporate governance environment of Nigeria 
exhibits a characteristically unstructured organisational field. Organisations operating in high velocity 
business environments are acknowledged to face the challenge of making quick strategic decisions in 
the face of rapid change and ambiguity of information (Oliver and Roos, 2005). Connecting the 
foregoing insights from this investigation, the analysis classified this scenario in the institution of good 
governance principles within the Nigerian corporate performance, as the institutionalism (see 
Greenwood et al., 2008) phase. Within this study, institutionalism, is delineated as:  
‘The way institutional factors interact and respond, towards the achievement of formalised 
processes, within the interfaces of myriad institutional and social structures.’  
 The noted institutionalism stage, represents a substantive level of transition in organisational 
actions and it is associated with unintended results. At this stage, informal structure overrides the 
quest for a formal regulative framework in this context. In the case of Nigeria, these informal rules 
embody associations or relationships among organisational actors, social interplays, power dynamics 
and/or relations, perception, and cognitive rationality, among others. These informal rules 
substantially override the formal structure within the maturing field. In this vein, the internal 
endorsement or local legitimation (ratification) of the proposed reform is highly central to the 
realisation of the corporate transformational agenda in Nigeria. Correspondingly, such legitimation 
(ratification) stems largely from the specific informal structure. The legitimation of practices within an 
organisational space will usually involve the affecting logics, i.e., the interaction of both the internal 
and external actors and mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2004, 2008). Maurer (1971) posits a hierarchical, 
evaluative narrative, asserting that "legitimation is the process whereby an organization justifies to a 
peer or superordinate system its right to exist." (p. 361). In this light, legitimacy is contended to be 
both vertically and horizontally focused. Professing from this investigation, legitimation is 
horizontally focused when it is targeted at justifying a wide range of interests that are in context 
similar, but external to an entity’s organisational field. On the other hand, legitimation could be driven 
by the need to satisfy the expectations at different levels within the organisation’s field (internally 
 
Page | 212  
 
inclined), hence, vertically (hierarchically) aligned. Nigeria, as a developing country, presents 
archetypal economic and developmental necessities. In this regard, within the institutional and 
structuration boundaries, the Nigerian corporate governance reform scheme is reflected as a function 
of the prevailing institutional exigencies. Along this line, the attraction of Foreign and Domestic 
Investments (FDI), and correspondingly, the need to protect investors (fund owners) becomes pivotal 
in the Nigerian corporate governance reforms’ agenda. Equally, as a result of the prevailing 
concentrated ownership, hence, the protection of minority interest emerges central to the reform 
agenda. Induced by the necessity for the realisation of these expectations, the financial sectors (e.g. 
banks and other non-bank financial institutions) emerged as a focus. Consequently, the establishment 
of the best practices are not reflexive (automatic). Nonetheless, as affirmed by the findings, not only 
are institutional configurations significant in organisational change (or conformity) but equally so is 
the alignment of the factors.  
 Further, the organisational environment of Nigeria portrays path dependence towards the 
existing established practices. As a consequence of the antecedent, corporate governance 
performance in Nigeria is largely reliant on the legal infrastructure as a major source of ‘coercive 
pressure’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This consequently underpins the normative framework 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in the form of a prevalence of legal professionals (rationalisations) 
within the corporate governance performance. In this regard, rather than the accounting ‘substance 
over form’, a form of legal ‘form over substance’ mostly describes the perception of actors regarding 
organisational dealings. This is, in part, accountable for a consequent low appreciation of the 
conventional principle-based approach to conformity with best practices. The Nigerian corporate 
governance context is characterised by fragmented structure and consequent sectionalisation. Both 
the ascendancy and strength of regulators dictate the robustness of innovations within that segment 
of the institutional field. Thus, a singularised reforms scheme is inapplicable.70 As such, in place of a 
voluntary compliance procedure, acquiescence to the institution of corporate governance innovations 
in Nigeria takes a more rigid regulatory approach. To this extent, good governance principles are not 
recommended but enforced by respective company regulators within their corporate governance 
context. The best practices objective in corporate governance is thus generally achieved by a 
mandatory prerequisite, such as a requirement for the ‘licence to operate’, i.e., companies are 
required to adhere to these principles in order to obtain their operating licence within the respective 
industry. In this respect, in place of the ‘comply or explain’ principle-based method, representing the 
widespread approach, the Nigerian corporate governance reforms follow a stringent mandatory 
                                                             
70 The Nigerian corporate governance context is discovered to consist of three major regulatory strata, in relation to the 
institutionalisation of best practices and reforms. These include: 1) Banks and other financial sectors, 2) Listed companies, 
and 3) Unlisted high turnover companies (telecommunications, oil and gas etc).   
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procedure of administration. By inference, such stringent rule is discovered to result as a consequence 
of (1) the nature of the corporate governance sphere, the antecedents of corporate governance 
practices, and a sectionalised corporate governance setting and performance, (2) the relationship or 
level of collaboration (or otherwise) of the system, and (3) the cognitive ability (rationality). However, 
where corporate governance universal best principles are relatively applied, the uniformity of 
practices could be adjudged to then be compromised. The stipulated legitimation and efficiency of 
practice notwithstanding, there is identified to be more of a symbolic alignment in the implementation 
of the global corporate governance practices, in the case of Nigeria. The existing framework across 
contexts could be indicated to mainly decide the relevance of the governance principle and in turn, 
inform seemingly ‘best conducts’.  
 In the main, a key insight is that Nigerian corporate governance reforms are at a transition 
state (the institutionalism phase). This indicates the lack of necessary infrastructural and institutional 
support for unified corporate governance reforms. At this stage, the need for the ratification and 
standardisation of procedures emerges as prominent. As such, the internal pressures emerge as more 
significant towards the intended organisational transformations. Against this backdrop, rather than 
external pressures, corporate governance reforms in Nigeria, are propelled by institutional mandates. 
By way of explanation, the focus, priorities and adopted approach to corporate governance reforms, 
as unveiled, are principally induced by the determinants (institutional logics, structuration and the 
social ratification) within the developing context of Nigeria. Even though corporate governance 
environments of countries are adjudged as different (Young et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013), 
similar best practices are nonetheless recommended. This portrays as a canvass for universality and 
possibly uniformity of recommendations, but could constitute, on the other hand, a misalignment. 
Thus, where the contextual (or national) factors do not permit a spontaneous alignment, a customised 
approach to implementation may emerge, as in the case of Nigeria.  In a similar vein, Clarke (2016) 
contested the recognised premium for governance, which is increasingly being considered in the 
context of a globalising economy. He challenges whether a universal corporate governance system is 
practical, necessary or desirable (p. 19). In addition, the stage of advancement within the corporate 
governance environment is preliminary (i.e., the Nigerian organisational field with respect to the 
establishment of corporate governance reforms is nascent). An evolving institutional context depicts 
a significant level of absence of controlled processes. Not only does this reflect superficial disparity 
but this research goes on to disclose that the outcome of their synergy cannot be entrusted towards 
the submission to generic conventionality. Within the institutional boundaries, such focus, 
approaches, and mode of organisational reproductions are less predictive. Specifically, the attempts 
at the institutionalisation of modifications in the enclave of the maturing organisational field, in the 
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case of Nigeria, entail a preliminary stage of such procedural engagement. In this regard, the study 
indicates that despite the external influence on corporate governance, the practice that is ultimately 
espoused would be that allowed within the institutional contingencies. For instance, this study reveals 
that, by implication, the functionality of the capital market is affected by the prevalent ownership 
structure and not the other way around. This condition is also reflected in other corporate governance 
mechanisms. For instance, the influence of the internal structures is disclosed primarily as the 
rationale for the lack of hostile takeover, the weakened BoD’s control, the inert shareholder activism, 
the underdeveloped role of the institutional investors, the ineffectual board and board committees, 
etc. in Nigeria. This can be traced mainly to the controlling block-holding pattern of corporate 
ownership in this developing context. Consequently, acquiescence with the structuration and internal 
influences, in line with the priorities, are found to be more pronounced. 
 Against the foregoing, the framework of organisational reproduction within the context of 
Nigeria stipulates the importance of key actors that can act as institutional entrepreneurs. These 
agents are espoused as drivers of change towards the emergence of a new institutional/corporate 
governance framework, due to their influence within the institutional field. Submission to institutional 
pressures can take alternative forms, such as habit, imitation, and compliance (Oliver, 1991). As a 
dominant institutional component, the role of central agents as institutional entrepreneurs in inciting 
social templates for change, is advocated in Nigeria. In this regard, this is stated as a more relevant 
basis in the drive for efficiency in corporate governance reforms, within these maturing institutional 
contexts.  From these stances, the mimetic (imitation) promotion of the advancement of corporate 
governance reforms is specified.  That is, the admittance that the action of institutional entrepreneurs 
(corporate actors) in Nigeria, with a more robust corporate governance reform agenda, elite business 
owners, and central organisational agents, constituting institutional reformers, can form a basis for 
organisational improvements, as an archetype. Albeit, such motivation towards organisational 
transformations might not be stimulated by self-interest goals, but by collective gains. In this regard, 
as the study promotes, the corporate governance transformation agenda incorporates atypical 
processes, in the developing context of Nigeria. The study offers insights for the understanding of the 
corporate governance and broadly organisational change in this maturing field. It thus submits to a 
global query: Does the uniformity of methods, practices and recommendations necessarily mean 
effectiveness in corporate governance reforms? (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev et 
al., 2013; Clarke, 2016). Thus, a perspective on the proposition for a universal corporate reform is 
provided. Within these insights, an inclusive framework for salient institutional actorhood towards 
corporate governance reforms, indicating this suggested synergy, thus emerges in Nigeria. Such 
affective framework, acquaints more with the quest for an operational corporate governance reforms’ 
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procedure, in this organisational context, due to the specificities. Hypothetically this should, in 
essence, advocate the path towards a lasting and relevant reform system for corporate governance 
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CHAPTER 8.   CONCLUSION CHAPTER: SUMMARY of THESIS and RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONs  
8.0 Introduction 
 To provide an overview of the research, the chapter first provides the major insights emerging 
from the different sections, involving the conceptual/theoretical background, findings, analysis and 
discussions chapters. This section provides the summary of the key propositions and indications of the 
study. The chapter then proceeds to highlight the contributions of the study to theory, the literature 
(corporate governance reforms and developing countries), practice and policy. Following this, the 
chapter culminates with the limitations of the study and recommendations for further study, in light 
of the findings and extent of the study.   
8.1 Part A: SUMMARY OF THESIS: KEY RESEARCH INSIGHTS 
 The developing contexts encompass evolving institutional environments, distinct from their 
developed counterparts (Young et al., 2008). Despite the burgeoning studies in institutional 
reproductions/change, attention has principally focused on the mature organisational field and/or 
developed countries. Basically, an understanding of the procedure for institutional reproductions is 
found to be lacking within the developing countries. However, some studies (See Krambia-Kapardis 
and Psaros, 2006; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Adewuyi and Olowookere, 2013) have investigated 
the maintenance, implementation and impact of the attempts at corporate governance advancement, 
specifically in the developing contexts. In this light, this study has taken a different stance, by 
examining the concept of organisational transformations in the developing institutional field. These 
corporate governance principles are identified to have principally evolved from the tenets of the 
shareholder governance system (Soederberg, 2003; Krenn, 2014). Also, the corporate governance in 
Nigeria reflects the features of the market-based system and equally cited to be modelled after the 
(outsider) or shareholder model (Ahunwan, 2002). However, the institutional field depicts a dearth of 
infrastructural support for the functionality of such corporate governance practice. In a previous 
study, Adegbite and Nakajima (2012) contend that the maintenance of the institutional structures (i.e. 
the suppressant of institutional change), is a consequence of the challenging context. Essentially, no 
insight is yet provided about how institutional reproductions are effected, within the developing 
contexts. In this respect, the study seeks to promote an understanding of the process of organisational 
reproductions, within the developing context, which has been unexplored. In this vein, this study 
offers an elaboration of the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms, in the developing 
context of Nigeria. In this regard, the thesis is in fulfilment of the main aim of the research, which is 
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to critically investigate the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms in the Nigerian 
institutional environment. 
 Against the foregoing, the research investigates the implications of the challenging 
institutional context of a developing country (Nigeria), for corporate governance best practices and 
reforms, towards promoting theorisation in line with related organisational studies, such as DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), Maguire et al. (2004), Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) and Harmon et al. (2015). 
The analysis provides that, in the maturing context of the developing nation of Nigeria, the structures 
are relatively less stable and structured than the developed contexts. Also, corporate governance 
reforms in this context follow more of a contextual prescription. Ultimately, the result of this 
transformation agenda is how and what these interactions spell for such attempts at organisational 
improvement. Within the Nigerian corporate governance system, internal factors (i.e., institutional 
elements, which consists of social, economic, political, legal, regulatory, etc.) and their 
interrelationships constitute more affecting determinants of the reforms process. The study indicates 
that these interplays significantly direct the transformational agenda. For instance, the noted mutual 
reliance between the concentrated ownership structure and the capital market are demonstrative of 
such an effect in Nigeria. Emergent findings reveal the prevailing practice and system (stakeholder 
and/or relational model) to suppress the vibrancy of the available institutional mechanisms in the 
corporate governance reforms efforts in Nigeria. In this respect, the study argues for dominant 
institutional logics to compel the outcome of organisational reforms, sometimes for unintended 
effects. In this regard, corporate governance innovations in Nigeria are noted to be adapted rather 
than adopted. Equally, the process of reforms follows a succeeding pattern, rather than being 
instantaneous. This study thus posits that corporate governance practice is not only embedded in the 
institutional environment, but the institutional factors are also defined, decided and shaped through 
this interaction. This means that the prevailing practices affect the predominant institutional 
arrangements, which in turn encompasses the institutional dynamics that inform the prevailing 
corporate governance practices (reforms). This position suggests that the interrelationship between 
the institutional context and the organisational processes, within the Nigerian organisational field, 
portray a cyclical reciprocity.  
 Here, the key assertion is that the whole institutional structure and its interfaces, mandate 
the consequence of corporate governance reforms. To this end, as opposed to the generic 
applicability of the agency theory perspective in corporate governance principles, the outcome of 
diffusion, in different contexts, could ultimately depend on the outcomes of these varying degrees of 
interdependence. In this respect, the study advances the perspective on the heterogeneous nature of 
organisational fields. However, this is not as much to claim the divergence or irreconcilability of 
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organisational practices, across institutional contexts, but to acknowledge the ascendancy of 
institutional logics and conferring fields’ structuration, vis-à-vis externalities, in organisational 
transformations. To this end, from this investigation, I identify three conditions that could have a 
significant impact on the drive for change in an institutional field. These encapsulate a prototype that 
describes the scenario, in an attempt at institutionalisation of reforms. Specifically, within a maturing 
institutional context, these represent the institutional dynamics and are identified to include:   
1) The external versus the internal structure/system (formal vs. informal logics). – highlights the 
ability of the propositions to align with, submit to, or override the established system.  
2) The degree of internal embeddedness. – the role of habit, cognition, conventionalities and 
frames of interpretation. 
3) The level of local legitimation of the proposed practice or innovations. – collective actions of 
institutional actors/agents or social interactions and prescriptions. 
Within a rudimentary institutional environment, such as Nigeria, the formal institutional structures 
are predominantly unable to support the corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, in this evolving 
context, informal rule prevails over formal procedure in determining the course of action, direction 
and focus of organisation modifications.  In this respect, the resistances or conformities to innovations 
mainly rely on the institutional dynamics (relationship among institutional logics). This means that the 
process of adaptation, implementation and mode of adoption of corporate governance reforms are 
primarily determined by the outcomes of the above outlined dynamics which constitute the 
institutional mandates. Corporate governance best practices are, consequently, those practices that 
are the optimal outcome of these mandates. Against this backdrop, the thesis posits that there are 
no global best practices. Global bodies may proffer normative recommendations in corporate 
governance, but the adaptation (or absorption) and utility of these principles will be the consequence 
of either the institutional challenges, specificities or exigencies. In essence, this thesis holds that, 
particularly within the largely unregimented structuration of the developing organisational fields, 
external influences might only drive best practices to the extent that the internal contingencies 
permit. Therefore, the universality of corporate governance reforms is contested.  
8.2 Part B: INSTITUTIONAL VARIANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORMS: THESIS’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
8.2.1 Contribution to theory  
 This study contributes, in essence, to the neo-institutional perspective on the 
institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms, providing insights from a maturing 
organisational field. In this regard, the research on the whole contributes to the institutional 
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elaboration of organisational structures (following DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Chizema and Buck, 2006; Aguilera et al., 2008; Misangyi et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2008; Young 
et al., 2008; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Tost, 2011; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Chizema and 
Shinozawa, 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Filatotchev et al., 2013; Esharov and Smith, 2014; 
Clarke, 2016; Hoefer and Green, 2016). Studies on the institutionalisation of organisational 
transformations or changes have tended to explain this phenomenon in relation to mature and 
developed institutional fields (see Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2007; Greenwood 
et al., 2011). To this extent, less understanding of the implications of the maturing organisational field 
of the developing countries, in this respect, abounds. This provides a gap in knowledge, which this 
research attempts to bridge. In light of the foregoing, an explanation of the institutionalisation of 
corporate governance reforms in the maturing field of Nigeria (a developing institutional context), 
which advances the theorisation of corporate governance reforms and diffusion practices, is enabled. 
 Typical accounts of institutional modification have tended to be considered as a top-down 
deterministic process in which free-floating social templates become imposed on actors (Ranson et 
al., 1980; DiMaggio, 1983; Suddaby et al., 2007). As this study indicates, within the maturing 
organisational fields of Nigeria, the major determinants in organisational transformations include 
institutional substances such as logics, structures and practices. An evolving institutional context 
depicts a significant level of less routinized and relatively unestablished logics, which embody 
preliminary structuration and subsequent lack of stable institutional constituents. Thus, institutional 
change, reproduction, or maintenance, as affirmed, is significantly determined by the resultant 
synergy(ies) against any externalities. These in turn primarily dictate the direction and the approach 
in the attempts at the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms. At this preliminary stage, 
processes (or the outcome) of organisational reproductions are less predictable and rather prone to 
higher likelihood of unanticipated consequences. The main propositions of these insights are that 
institutional fields are structured in peculiar forms. This structuration, in turn, assigns the hierarchy 
of influences and interfaces which produces peculiar synergy(ies) within varying institutional fields. 
In essence, the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms in the enclave of the Nigerian 
organisational field, posit an acquiescence to the contextual priorities. To this extent, the 
constellation of logics affirms a stronger internal influence towards institutional reproductions. 
Basically, from this study, the internal frames of meaning mainly decide the focus, direction and 
priorities of corporate governance reforms. 
 Against this backdrop, the institutionalisation of organisational reforms, within such 
organisational field of the developing context, is indicated to follow a sequence. As indicated by the 
emerging themes, I hereby conceptualise this in a model that articulates the procedure of 
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organisational translations within the maturing institutional contexts (i.e., how institutional change 
(transformation) takes place, within this context), as outlined below.  
 
Figure 8.1: Institutionalisation of organisational reforms in a maturing organisational field (Nigeria) 
 
The three-tier cycle describes the phases that are involved in the institutionalisation of 
organisational reforms within this maturing field in Nigeria. The multi-level model is elaborated as 
follows:  
1) The first phase of the institutionalisation cycle involves the establishment of the institutional 
logic. This involves the initialisation stage where the major focus is the design and 
arrangement of the institutional elements in the procedures of the organisational reforms. 
The necessity for this stage of the institutionalisation procedure is determined by the nature 
of the institutional context (or organisational field). Within the maturing field, in this initial 
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instance, there arises the need to align the institutional context, to accommodate the 
proposed changes. Here, the structuration of the institutional logics, within the maturing 
organisation field becomes imperative. At this stage, rather than direct institutionalisation of 
innovations for efficiency or legitimation rationale, the configuration of the institutional 
setting, is pre-eminent. Within the Nigerian institutional context, this phase entails corporate 
governance reform processes, such as the inauguration of the corporate governance 
principles, structuration of the regulatory context, the alignment of the legal and regulatory 
framework (e.g. The Nigerian Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and SEC code), 
definition of the regulatory lines of authority, instatement of the FRCN, etc. 
 
2) The second phase depicts the confirmation/rationalisation within the maturing field. At this  
stage, the rationalisation or legitimation of the proposed institutional change occurs. I label 
this stage the rationalisation phase. This stage draws largely on the neo-institutional works 
perspective, whereby the actions of organisational agents and/or social actors are highly 
significant in the realisation of organisational reforms. This phase involves the ratification of 
the transformation procedures. It embodies the following variables: path-dependence, 
interferences/influences – political, social, cultural –, best practices design and realignments, 
agents’ endorsement of the proposed reforms, organisational actors’ power dynamics, 
cognitive rationality, perceptions, skills, etc. Specifically, in Nigeria, some procedures at this 
stage include the various exposure drafts of the corporate governance national code and 
attempts at meetings with institutional stakeholders by the FRCN71, constitution of some 
committees on corporate governance reforms, and orientation of the shareholders’ 
association with electronic dividend process by SEC, etc.  
The findings within this research mainly relate to the above stages. The corporate governance reforms 
scheme, within the maturing organisational field of Nigeria, presently embodies the above procedures 
of the institutionalisation model, which are jointly recognised as the preliminary (institutionalism) 
phase.  
3) The final (third) stage – which is identified not to have occurred within Nigeria at the time of 
this investigation – relates to the idea of isomorphism (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). I 
argue that it is during this stage that such proposed homogeneity of practices (local or 
international) can be expected to occur. This stage is labelled the harmonisation phase. At 
this stage, convergence, uniformity, modification, formalisation (see Ramus et al., 2017) and 
stabilisation of the transformation procedures is expected to arise. Then trend setting and 
                                                             
71 See Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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comparability could be realisable in the scheme of reproductions, within a respective 
organisational field. Thus, the possibility for institutional change (compliance), maintenance 
(conformity) or hybridisation occurs. This is the stage at which the procedures are established. 
This stage then signifies the phase at which the actual institutionalisation will take place. The 
notion of isomorphism at this later stage of the institutionalisation process indicates the 
attainment of the unification of corporate governance codes, practices and reforms. Within 
the maturing institutional contexts, at this stage, homogeneity of intended innovations can 
then be expected. In this stage (which is recommended for further investigation in Nigeria) 
the stabilisation of the corporate governance reforms processes should be realised in Nigeria. 
In this study, this stage is proposed through the advocated inclusive framework for salient 
actors in Nigeria. 
 
The model presents a cyclical process of transformation or shift towards the institutionalisation of 
new practices. At the final phase, a methodised structure of reproduction, is expected to have been 
attained, thus the actual institutionalisation. The transformational loop returns to the initial stage, 
when further requirement for innovation(s) arises. This cycle continues until a stage is reached where 
there is no further need for organisational reforms or reproduction. This stage of complete equilibrium 
might be practically unlikely. Institutional transformation is a continuous process, even in mature 
fields stability is recognised to be transitory (Hoffman, 1999).  
 The study highlights the place of institutional dynamics and contextual factors within the 
maturing organisational field. The developing country of Nigeria is still at the precursory stage of the 
institutionalisation of organisational transformations, described as the institutionalism phase. The 
institutional processes portray a largely unstructured pattern at this transitional stage. Rather than 
regimented procedures, a fluid system of meanings and interpretations resultantly embodies 
corporate governance performance. In this respect, organisational reproductions, within the Nigerian 
context, reveal profoundly conforming attributes. Whereas, in a more mature context the 
rationalisation of corporate governance reforms depends on a formal framework (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Hoffman, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004), however, in such a maturing organisational field, in the 
absence of a structured system for regulative procedure, an endogenous framework applies. In this 
respect, instead of an explicit framework, implicit precepts such as interrelationships among actors, 
cognition rationality, social influences and prevailing practices, constitute key institutional elements 
towards reproductions.  
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 The actions of agents in informing, retaining, disrupting, or creating the framing of contextual 
logics have been acknowledged in institutional change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et 
al., 2011). Factors such as conventionalities, habits, traditions, imitation, etc. have normally explained 
homogeneity in diffusion theories (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Oliver, 1991). However, as this study 
reveals, institutional mandates (pressures) can also largely involve a social interpretive framework, 
interplays of institutional logics, actors’ ideological position and path dependency. In this regard, 
organisational functions are discovered to be through primarily unregulated or ‘rule of thumb’ 
techniques. This is also indicated as a consequence of the nature and phase of advancement, with 
dysfunctional, less predictable (volatile) institutional factors. Where there is prevalence of less 
extrapolative structures, reinforced by high embeddedness of existing practice, the ratification of 
organisational procedures might be largely contingent upon informal rule, such as cognitive 
rationality. Even though the outcome of diffusion can tend towards the pattern of existing practices, 
i.e. in the form of path dependence (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999), the ultimate outcome will reflect the 
ratification of such innovations. This can largely inform the perception, approach to 
institutionalisation and the mode of compliance within this maturing field. In essence, the ratification, 
mode or approach to institutional transformations might thus depend on the dynamics or synergies 
and alignments of the prevailing institutional logics. 
 A central proposition of this investigation is that organisational reforms are driven more by 
contextually defined frameworks of procedures, rather than external pressures or prescriptions. In 
advancing previous studies such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Djelic and Quack (2003), Fiss and 
Zajac (2004) and Suddaby et al. (2007), this investigation basically promotes the significance of the 
national institutional contexts in the attainment of organisational innovations. In contributing to the 
neo-institutionalisation perspective on the diffusion of corporate governance practices, alongside 
other studies such as Aguilera et al. (2008), Judge et al. (2008), Young et al. (2008), Aguilera and 
Jackson (2010), Adegbite and Nakajima (2012), Chizema and Shinozawa (2012), Filatotchev et al. 
(2013), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and Clarke (2016), the findings from this study emphasise, 
centrally, the interplay of the institutional determinants, within the Nigerian corporate context, as 
more salient to such intent. In this vein, this study suggests that the corporate governance 
transformations – especially regarding the generality of the principles – are more likely to be decided 
by the internal structures and dynamics within the maturing institutional fields. In terms of the 
dynamics, the actions and influence of actors, especially family block-holders and their cohorts, are 
noticeably resonant in Nigerian corporate governance reforms. To this extent, the achievement of the 
best practices across institutional contexts might not usually follow the generally expected approach, 
i.e., the likelihood of instances of ‘unanticipated outcomes’ are recognised from such efforts. One 
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institutional unit can superficially resemble another and yet maintain its relativity by adopting the 
practices and/or patterns of reproductions that are best enabled by its circumstance. This research 
indicates that the corporate governance innovations in maturing fields are not spontaneous. 
Specifically, corporate governance reforms in Nigeria occur in a gradation of procedures. These 
procedures reflect, in varying degrees, institutional structuration and logics, path-dependence 
(relativism), actions of collective actors (local legitimation) and symbolic alliance (universality). In 
accordance with the propounded institutionalisation model, this procedure will be repeated in an 
iterative format until formalisation or stability is achieved and then institutionalisation can occur. 
Until that level of formalisation, when homogeneity of organisational processes (see Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ramus et al., 2017) is attained, institutionalisation of 
organisational transformations might not be realised. The consequent transformation will present as 
outright conformity with internal pressure or outright compliance with external pressure or a mixed 
proportion of internal conformity and external compliance (hybridisation).  
 
8.2.2 Contributions to the literature (empirical Contributions) 
8.2.2.1  Corporate governance reforms 
 The Nigerian corporate structure portrays a hybrid that is a combination of a highly dispersed 
ownership and concentrated ownership structure. Such corporate structure also determines the 
strength of the external corporate control in the Nigerian organisational field.  With a high level of 
concentrated ownership, the capital market also reveals a system with a high retention ratio with 
respect to shares that are available for sale, due to the unwillingness of these block-owners to dilute 
their control. This logic affects the development of the market and consequently dictates the focus of 
the corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. With the low level of development and efficiency, the 
market for corporate control (capital market) is impacted upon and this resultantly dictates the need 
for an alternative source of funds and control. Consequently, the financial sector and minority 
interests take a pivotal role in corporate governance reforms. Thus, despite the generalised 
legitimation and efficiency rationales (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), as revealed in this study, 
the Nigerian corporate governance reforms do not acquiesce merely to these motivations. The 
internal structuration of the organisational field, the prevailing practice and the national exigencies or 
priorities, all drive corporate governance reforms in Nigeria. By implication, the study reveals that in 
this organisational field, the institutionalisation of corporate governance is customised. This involves 
a selective approach to the implementation of best practices. However, these procedures are 
modified by the priorities and internal dynamics in this environment. Hereby, conventionalities, such 
as the overwhelming impact of block-holding in Nigeria corporations, have significantly refocused 
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corporate governance reform schemes. Subsequently, a contextually defined mode and prioritisation 
of corporate governance practice in the Nigerian maturing setting is emergent, against universal 
pressures for compliance.  
 
 In this vein, the institutional logics and their complementarities (or otherwise) prescribe the 
processes, patterns and directions for the Nigerian corporate governance transformation agenda, 
above the alignment with universal good governance propositions. Although the Nigerian corporate 
governance system combines the features of the market-based and bank-based systems, the practice 
of corporate governance is, however, not found to reveal such attributes of the market-based 
economy. The corporate governance system in Nigeria largely portrays the concentrated ownership 
model. The Nigerian corporate governance system mirrors a stakeholder structure, as the prevailing 
practice, rather than the supposed shareholder system. Along this line, the practice of corporate 
governance in Nigeria presents a contradiction to the corporate governance performance that the 
universal principles reinforce. Besides this, as a result of the family-friends-cohort ownership form 
within the evolving context of Nigeria, the internal dynamics basically manifest as the prevalent 
‘relationship based’ (relational) corporate governance structure. One of the major implications of 
this, is that corporate governance in Nigeria defies the purposed arm’s length contracting. In this 
maturing organisational field, the structures are relatively weak and less developed, compared with 
more advanced contexts. Equally, the institutional structures present a noticeably unregimented 
performance framework. Hence, this results in the noted shift towards the existing practice and a 
situation which constrains the existence of highly formalised corporate governance mechanisms. 
Evidently, a complexity for the institutionalisation of corporate governance best practices emerges in 
Nigeria’s governance reform agenda. The ratification of any proposition of change or organisational 
reproduction, is required to moderate the complexity embodied in multiple institutional logics 
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). Fundamentally, the varied interests within these 
categorisations largely define the internal forces and pressures within the institutional context of 
Nigeria. 
 
 Within the corporate governance sphere of Nigeria, besides the institutional structures, 
agents’ dynamics are predominant. This is initiated by institutional factors such as concentrated 
ownership is underlain by a relationship form of corporate governance dynamics between the 
regulatory actors. Thus, despite the universal drive for best practices, internal rationalisation of 
corporate governance innovations, essentially involves accounting for all these variables. In this 
respect, the study suggests that (1) not only are the prevailing institutional elements important but 
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(2) the interfaces (alignments) of these elements are significant to innovations within this developing 
organisational field. In this regard, this investigation suggests that the internal complementarities or 
contradictions among institutional logics are more important in propelling or compelling the scheme 
for innovations (corporate governance reforms), within an organisational field. To this extent, 
although corporate governance best practices are identified as promoting symbolic representation of 
efficiency, however they are found to largely relate to internal logics. Here, the institutional logics 
within the Nigerian organisational field impact on the institutional structures, which in turn dictate 
the configurations and motivations for corporate governance reforms. Resulting from the prevalent 
national pressures, ultimately corporate governance reforms in Nigeria reflect a major reliance on 
internal dynamics. In this respect, drawing on the notion of institutional entrepreneurship, the study 
suggests that central actors (Suddaby et al., 2007) acting as institutional reformers will stimulate 
change that is tailored to the Nigerian maturing organisational field. These include central economic 
and institutional players identified as family/elite founders, corporate shareholders, representing 
institutional and/or private entrepreneurs, central government, government agencies, (regulators, 
policy makers) and other (economic) actors. As this study advocates, leveraging on such collaborative 
effort would proffer a more effective means of achieving corporate governance reforms. The findings 
indicate that these actors are able to stimulate the prerequisite institutional pressures needed to 
harness the associated advantages towards change. This informal interactive proposition is defined in 
terms of the interplays of social processes – collaboration, coordination and communication – 
through an inclusive framework of these salient actors. Against this backdrop, in the main, this study 
argues that the universality of corporate governance principles, practices or systems, as against the 
primacy of national institutional structures, localised mandates or established processes, is debatable. 
8.2.2.2  Corporate governance reforms in the developing countries  
 Institutions are identified to involve both informal and formal rules (North, 1990, Selznick, 
1996; DeJordy and Kraatz, 2015). Within the institutional field of Nigeria, the processes of 
organisational performances are largely unstructured. This is partly due to the evolving nature and 
partly as a result of a dominant relational (stakeholder) corporate governance system characterising 
the organisational field. Essentially, the performance framework includes social processes such as 
cognitive rationality, perception, social relations and interactions (among key organisational actors), 
regulatory power relations and other socio-political influences and interfaces. In this respect, the 
maturing organisational field in Nigeria exhibits a prevalence of floating (unregimented) institutional 
structure (see Selznick, 1949; Oliver, 1991). Organisational and corporate governance procedures are 
largely subjected to informal mandates than formal directives in the developing context of Nigeria. 
Against this background, the transformational scheme for corporate governance in Nigeria embodies 
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an atypical framework of performance, whereby, the effective advancement or change (or 
maintenance) to corporate governance is contingent on the stipulated informal structure. This 
condition creates a challenging scenario for the generalisability of corporate governance reforms. This 
situation will be particularly evident in evolving institutional fields where the structures are either too 
weak, or inconsistent or unstable to propel uniformity. Consequently, in Nigeria, this compels a shift 
towards the prevailing practice and structure in corporate governance reforms. At this stage, the 
implementation of the corporate governance best practices within the developing organisational field 
of Nigeria reflects path dependency. Consequently, there is still a general lack of appreciation of the 
principles, as a consequence of the cognition rationality and prevalent perception of organisational 
actors. Thus, compliance is usually achieved by a mandatory means, such as a prerequisite for a 
corporate ‘licence to operate’. To this extent, in Nigeria, an instrumental motive emerges as more 
feasible for the imposition of codes of good governance. 
 In the main, the mode, approach and priorities of corporate governance reforms are 
influenced by the resultant institutional dynamics from the informal systems, whereby, instead of a 
predetermined (efficiency or legitimation) rationale(s), this internal alignment informs what, why and 
how these innovations are administered. However, the worldwide diffusion of codes, the system of 
meanings and internal logics, is revealed to largely define the transformations within the evolving 
Nigerian organisational field. Conversely, corporate governance reforms’ procedures are not a priori, 
within this setting. Initially this process involves the ratification, rationalisation and unification of the 
procedures of implementation, before the institutionalisation is realised. Thus, attempts at corporate 
governance reforms notably, submit to, align with or override the existing internal logics and dynamics 
prior to the possibility of efficiency and/or (universal) legitimation action. To this end, the 
homogeneity of corporate governance codes and reforms presents a case for the consideration of the 
realities across institutional contexts. From this study, a dimension is added by the nature of the 
developing nation. A perspective from Nigeria presents a typology for the understanding of the 
relational positioning of institutional structures, in the quest for homogeneity. This illustrates their 
implication for the drive for the uniformity of corporate governance reforms, within this context. The 
result distinguishes the internal centripetal pull for conformity and the external centrifugal drive for 
compliance with uniform best practices.  
8.2.3 Contributions to practice (corporate governance and reforms) 
 The Nigerian corporate governance performance portrays an acquiescence to the informal 
framework (rubric) of corporate governance. In this regard, the institutionalisation of corporate 
governance within this environment is found to be determined mainly by such informal boundaries. 
Although this discovery may depict a challenge to the universal corporate governance agenda, it is on 
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the other hand considered as reflecting the relativism within disparate institutional contexts. Similarly, 
the role of organisational actors within this context is composed of significant parts of the institutional 
logic.  Especially, in the developing context such as Nigeria, these determinants differ from the 
developed contexts and are disclosed to largely include relational structures. Nonetheless, although 
acknowledging the predominance of a family block-holding corporate governance structure, the study 
does not find explicit support for the expropriation of minority shareholders. One side to this position 
is that such an interpersonal framework constitutes a buffer for the deficient corporate governance 
mechanism in Nigeria. This, in turn, is argued to complement the corporate governance performance 
within this context. Ultimately, in this respect, a case is made for the relativism of a corporate 
governance system, within differing contextualities, across organisational fields. 
  Institutional work describes the practices of individual and collective actors aimed at 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011: 52). The insights from the 
study indicate that the prevalence of informal rule within the corporate governance context of the 
maturing field of Nigeria can be leveraged on. Practitioners should take note of this. Based on the 
prevalent stakeholder- and relationship-based governance structures, corporate governance reforms 
in Nigeria can benefit from harnessing the synergy between these key agents, through an inclusive 
corporate governance framework. This is suggested as able to engender a more efficient procedure 
in enacting an institutionally inclined corporate governance reform. The role of informal rule in 
institutional reproduction has been suggested in the literature (Selznick, 1949; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). However, the explanation of their 
implication for organisational change has been ambiguous. In Nigeria, this informal framing notably 
provides a substitute for the lack of formal or stabilised corporate governance structures in the 
maturing organisational context. Likewise, professionalism, perception and cognition of actors within 
this context comprise a significant part of the institutional logic.  
 Second, the Nigerian institutional field is defined by embryonic structures and the consequent 
weak institutional environment. This is recognised as the institutionalism phase72 in the 
institutionalisation process; this process is propounded to indicatively precede the actual 
institutionalisation stage. Hence, the corporate governance reforms scheme in Nigeria is noted to be 
at the preliminary stage. Thus, the structuration, social mandates, and internal dynamics within the 
context of the maturing field, inform the state of the organisational field more than in the formalised 
matured societies (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Established corporate 
governance practices (path dependence) also affect and determine the prevailing institutional 
arrangements. These variables offer the institutional prescriptions and mandates which result as the 
                                                             
72 Also see Greenwood et al. (2008). The Sage Handbook of Organisational institutionalism, Sage Publications. London.  
 
Page | 229  
 
outcome of these interactions. In essence the study argues that these contextual and endogenous 
variables predominantly propel and compel the reforms and practices that become instituted as the 
“good or best”. In this respect, it is noteworthy to recognise that ‘best practices’ might only be the 
outcome of the interactions between these factors, within the maturing context.  
 
 Furthermore, path dependence (inclination towards historical practices), within diffusion 
theories (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999), has normally been associated with inertia, maintenance, and 
conventionality. Rather than these, the quest for relativism within institutional contexts is indicated, 
whereby insights from this study reveal that good governance principles are prioritised, along the 
constellation of institutional logics. In the light of these findings, corporate governance reforms in 
Nigeria follow a rather selective procedure. To this end, a key insight here is that, rather than the 
specified opposition to change, path dependence might reflect an inclination to the most applicable 
or conformable practice(s) within this maturing organisational field. For instance, in Nigeria, the 
stakeholder (relational) system is advocated to provide a plausible medium, for the procedure for an 
institutionally driven governance reform, in Nigeria73 (and arguably this should apply to similar 
developing contexts – particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa). Along this line, a major proposition is 
that internal factors and social influences and in the case of a developing organisational context, such 
as Nigeria, non-formal rules play very significant role in corporate governance reforms. Thus, rather 
than convergence, different levels of adaptation and descriptions of the procedures for best practices 
exist in different contexts. As a result, varying frameworks for the realisation of good governance will 
represent best fit in different organisational fields. In this regard, it will be beneficial for practitioners 
to note that effective corporate governance, across national or institutional contexts, could involve 
distinct blends of structures or mechanisms. 
 
8.2.4 Contributions to Policy 
 Corporate governance scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, Parmalat, 
Freddie Mac, etc. have refocused global attention on corporate governance practice. Alongside, these 
have driven the proliferation of corporate governance reforms, and thus, the diffusion of the global 
best practices, across different organisational contexts, in the last decades. The diffusions discourses 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Westphal et al., 1997; Strang and Soule, 1998; Strang and 
Macy, 2001) have implied that organisational innovations would follow diffusions. Thus, the debates 
are rather silent about the procedure for the absorption of new practices (principles) across different 
organisational fields. Essentially, the underlying expectations for universal best practices are equally 
                                                             
73 In terms of the ‘inclusive framework for salient actor’ – see chapter 7 of the thesis. 
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their simultaneous absorption across institutional contexts. Consequently, the significance of 
institutional and relational elements to the incidence or consequence of diffusions have been largely 
understated. Within the neo-institutional theorisation, various studies have emerged, along the lines 
of organisational transformations or variations or stability, to promote understanding in this regard 
(Selznick, 1949; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006). 
 
 Drawing on perspectives from the developing context, similarly this research contributes to 
the understanding of the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms. Against this backdrop, 
specifically this investigation presents findings from the largest SSA country, Nigeria, and consequently 
perspectives from the developing/maturing organisational contexts. The study enables a two-fold 
assessment of the implications of the distinct institutional arrangements for corporate governance 
reforms: on the one hand, the applicability of these codes of best practices (input) and on the other 
hand, the suitability of the reforms (outcome). Against the objective, the study found the widespread 
procedures of corporate governance reforms to be inapplicable within the Nigerian corporate 
governance reforms scheme. The stage of corporate governance reforms in the maturing corporate 
sphere of Nigeria represents a translational period. Processes and the approach to the reforms depend 
largely on the interrelationship of these different institutional substances. These either adapt, or 
impede or support such practices. It thus emerges impracticable for the implementation of such 
corporate governance principles to be administered through the stock market as in the more 
advanced contexts of the UK or US, as adherence to governance codes in Nigeria is not exercised as 
part of the stock exchange listing requirement. Consequently, the adoption of the stringent approach, 
instead of the prevalent voluntary approach to compliance with corporate governance principles, 
predominates.  Thus, rather than the comply or explain mode of administration of governance 
principles, the mandatory impositions of best practices are adopted. The wider implication of this, for 
policy makers, is that corporate governance reforms across all organisational contexts do not adhere 
to singular propositions or procedures. The approach to effective corporate governance may vary 
depending on the nature of the organisational field, the stage of advancement and the entrenchment 
of organisational actors.  
 
 One of the key contributions here is that globalisation might not equate to effectiveness. Thus, 
standardisation rather than globalisation or uniformity might be more realistic in corporate 
governance reforms, in the developing context where supporting institutional factors are generally 
limited and largely unstable. Corporate governance systems seemingly posit homogeneity in the 
 
Page | 231  
 
similarity of mechanisms; however, arguably, their functionalities occur in varying degrees. The 
pursuit or attainment of an effective corporate governance framework within the context of Nigeria 
does not conform to the homogeneity of universal principles or processes, as a result of its maturing 
nature. By elaborating the institutionalisation of corporate governance reforms in the maturing field, 
the research advances the understanding of organisational reproductions within this context. In this 
regard, the study contributes to diffusion theory/debate regarding best practices, which will be 
significant to policy makers. The study reaffirms that corporate governance reforms and principles 
might not follow a recommended approach and/or be consistent with expected outcomes, i.e., 
contextual directive for corporate governance transformation might, at times, predominate a 
universal agenda. In this sense, heterogeneity of organisational practices is acknowledged. 
Accordingly, corporate governance principles should reflect more of the exigencies within respective 
institutional boundaries and not a generic proposition (projection) or ‘best’ practices. The prevalent 
universal principles could be a misfit for some institutional contexts, such as the developing country. 
Thus, alternative recommendations for corporate governance reforms, in this respect, could be 
considered. 
 
 Against the foregoing, incorporating cogent institutional elements into the propositions for 
corporate governance principles should promote tailored ‘best principles’ and subsequently a more 
efficient framework of performance, whereby ‘a one size might not normally fit all’, especially in the 
transitory organisational environments, such as the developing countries. For instance, instead of a 
universal alignment, corporate governance reforms in Nigeria noticeably dictate their own peculiar 
approach procedure and determine ultimately their own ‘best’. As the insights posit, this is based on, 
align with or submit to the dominant internal pressures. It is extremely important that the dominant 
influence and significance of the family block-holders in corporate governance receive direct 
consideration in any recommendations that will be pertinent to Nigeria.  
 
  The core contribution here is that the mode of organisational reproduction might follow 
contextual rationalisations. A universal drive for diffusion innovations in an institutional field is 
unlikely to take place where the internal force towards path dependence (conformity) surpasses the 
external pressure for convergence (compliance). This understanding should enable transnational 
corporate governance policy makers to incorporate such perception in proposed universal principles 
(or reforms) and possibly regionalised corporate governance reforms. This should equally enable the 
national corporate governance regulators and/or policy makers to recognise the prominence of the 
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existing framework of corporate governance performance, within their organisational field. These 
would especially be significant to developing institutional settings because of their transitory nature. 
 
8.3 Limitations of the study 
 The study is largely data driven and the findings are thematic. The structure of the chapters 
and arrangements are based on the themes emerging from the data and the insights. The research, 
being an exploratory study, might be seen to lack a definitive perspective on claims. Exploratory study 
is usually meant to be a ‘ground breaking’ attempt in the respective area of interest. Thus, the study 
might be unable to present a conclusive position concerning the topic investigation. Also, the research 
is delimited, with the analysis mainly dependent on findings from data generated from a singular 
organisational field of Nigeria. Further, qualitative investigations (interpretive sociology) promote 
views that are largely endogenous. So, the assertions are usually subjective and could be prone to 
investigative bias. As Giddens (1993) aptly describes such concerns that arise in this respect, 
 “The social scientist of necessity draws upon the same sorts of skills as those whose conduct 
he or she seeks to analyse in order to describe it; generating descriptions of social conduct 
depends upon the hermeneutic task of penetrating the frames of meaning which lay actors 
themselves draw upon in constituting and reconstituting the social world” (p. 163).  
 Additionally, as in studies employing the interpretative data analysis procedure, the precision in the 
selection of themes may not be guaranteed. Generally, qualitative study (especially studies employing 
an interpretive model of analysis) could also have a relative lack of the benefit of generality of results. 
Nonetheless, following similar qualitative studies (Maguire et al., 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006) from the neo-institutionalisation of reforms, the research has endeavoured to heed such 
recommendations from the literature on ensuring data trustworthiness in studies where inductive 
logic has been adopted (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Reay and Jones, 2016). 
8.4 Recommendations for Further study 
 The study has explored the institutionalisation of organisational transformations in the 
maturing field of the developing context. This research also seeks the explanation of the processes of 
institutional reproductions, particularly in developing countries with unstable institutional structures. 
In this respect, the investigation has revealed a multi-level process of transformation. As such, drawing 
on the institutionalisation model (provided in the preceding section of this chapter), this present 
investigation relates mainly to the initialisation and rationalisation stages of the process. As these 
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transformation processes within the organisational field of Nigeria are still in the preliminary phase, 
the study has thus not provided conclusive results of the attempts at establishing corporate 
governance reforms, within the boundaries of the maturing field. In this respect, additional study 
should investigate the advancement of corporate governance in Nigeria beyond these initial levels. 
Future research can promote understanding by investigating the third stage, which relates to the 
formalisation, isomorphism of procedures and achievement of the intended institutionalisation of 
corporate governance best practices in Nigeria. Such study can advance this research in providing an 
account of this institutionalisation phase of the model, i.e., the point in this transformational agenda 
when the advocated institutionally driven corporate governance reform scheme is actualised, and the 
specific factors that trigger it in Nigeria.  
 Also, as this study is limited contextually to Nigeria, therefore, other study(ies) can seek to 
advance the findings from this study. For instance, a comparative study can relate the insights from 
this study to other developing institutional contexts, to expand the theorisation along corporate 
governance (organisational) reforms. Similarly, an assessment of the impact of these quests for 
organisational transformations can be undertaken in order to evaluate the bearings of the present 
reforms’ endeavour on the corporate governance performance or practice in Nigeria. In this respect, 
the review can also identify any further lapses and ways of improvement in the Nigerian governance 
reform scheme. An elaboration of the progression of these reform procedures will be worthwhile, as 
transformation is argued, herein, to be continuous. 
  In addition, this research is exploratory and relies largely on qualitative data, a quantitative 
or mixed research methodological approach can be adopted to investigate the emerging themes, 
which should, in turn, advance this field of inquiry. Lastly, this research also, broadly, seeks the 
explanation of organisational processes, within relatively unstable and volatile institutional structures, 
of the developing context. Thus, as the contexts of the developing countries are still largely evolving, 
it is imperative that future research continues to enrich knowledge on the developments in such 
maturing fields. Especially in the comparatively less investigated African settings, extending research 




















03 RCC 03   Director (regulatory agent; 
member of the corporate 
governance reforms steering 
committee) 
25 RCM  25   Deputy director (Policy maker) 
13 RCH  13    Head of department (Policy 
maker; member of the 
corporate governance reforms 
steering committee)  
14 RCI 14   Head of department (policy 
maker) 
15 RCJ 15   Deputy director (regulatory 
agent) 
01 RCA  01   Director (regulatory agent) 
33 RCO 33   Head of Department (policy 
maker) 
20 RCK 20   Director (regulatory agent) 
02 RCB  02   Head of department (regulatory 
agent) 
32 RCN 32   Deputy director (regulatory 
agent) 
04 RCD 04   Director (regulatory agent); 
member of the corporate 
governance committee) 
05 RCE 05   Deputy director (policy maker) 
06 RCF 06   Deputy director (regulatory 
agent) 
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07 RCG 07   Deputy director (policy maker) 
36 RCP 36   Director (regulatory agent) 
21 RCL 21   Head of Department (regulatory 
agent) 
27  CLJ 27    Company Board member (Non- 
Executive Director) 
11  CLB 11       Company legal counsel 
(corporate governance 
executive) 
19  CLF 19  Company secretary 
29  CLK 29  Company secretary 
31  CLL 31  Company (Corporate 
governance) executive 
22  CLG 22  Company secretary; Company 
legal counsel 
18  CLE 18  Corporate governance 
executive (legal counsel); 
Minority shareholder 
10  CLA 10  Company Secretary (corporate 
governance executive) 
24  CLI 24  Corporate executive director 
23  CLH 23  Company accountant 
16  CLD 16  Company (corporate 
governance executive) 
12  CLC  12      Chief Executive Director; Board 
member 
30   OAF 30    Company Auditor; Consultant  
26   OAD 26 Corporate governance 
Consultant; Rating agent  
34   OAG 34 Academia; Corporate 
governance consultant 
35   OAH 35 Legal practitioner; Member of a 
shareholder association 
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08   OAA 08 Financial analyst; Rating agent; 
minority shareholder) 
37   OAI  37 Company auditor; Consultant  
17    OAC 17 Auditor; Accountant 
28   OAE 28 Company solicitor 
09   OAB 09 Academia; Minority shareholder 
 
 
Appendix 2: Sample of Interview guide/Questions; 
1. Research interview questionnaires for companies/establishments 
 
SIX major categories include: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (INSTITUTIONAL) ENVIRONMENT, MOTIVATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION, 
IMPACT, RELEVANCE, PROSPECTS OF CORPOARTE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
 
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (INSTITUTIONAL) ENVIRONMENT 
• How will you describe the corporate environment of Nigeria? what institutional factors define 
your view of the corporate environment of Nigeria? 
 
• What in your opinion are the issues, challenges and concerns in corporate governance in this 
context? 
 
• Do these challenges interfere (impact) with the performance of corporate governance (CG)/ 
reforms, in Nigeria? 
 
• In what ways? 
 
• Any other contribution in relation to CG environment/ factors? 
 
B. MOTIVATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
• Can you state some of the corporate governance reforms that have been implemented in the 
last decades in your organisation? 
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• In your opinion, what are the main motivations/triggers in the launch or initiation of corporate 
governance reforms in Nigeria? And also, in your company? 
 
• To what extent do you feel these reforms have been driven by external (legitimation) 
influences or Internal (efficiency) factors? 
 
• In your opinion, what are the level of compliance or otherwise with these reforms among 
companies? Acceptability among companies. 
 
• Can you share your own experience with the implementation and compliance with these 
reforms? (Challenges, issues, difficulties with implementation or compliance? What are 
they?). 
 
• What CG factors in this environment impact on these implementation/motivations of these 
reforms? How? 
 
• Any other contribution in relation to Implementation/compliance? 
 
C.  IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
• What are the processes of implementing corporate governance reforms or best practices in 
your company/ sector. 
 
• Can you compare this procedure to that of other sectors/industries? 
• How are these reforms administered within your organisation/sector/industry and the 
corporate environment of Nigeria? 
 
• To what extent is the realisation or otherwise of these reforms in Nigeria comparable with 
other countries/contexts? 
 
• In what way has the Nigerian corporate governance reforms scheme helped to (or otherwise) 
actualise the good governance propositions? 
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• Any other thing in relation to these CG procedures? 
 
D. IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
• What are the situations before the initiations of these reforms in your organisation/ corporate 
environment of Nigeria? 
 
• What are the changes that have taken place on your corporate governance mechanism/ CG 
structure of your organisation? 
 
• What are some of the effects of these reforms on your corporate governance structure after 
the implementation? 
 
• To what extent has the realisation or otherwise of these outcomes/consequences been 
impacted by these issues (factors) in the corporate governance environment of Nigeria? 
 
•  In what way has the Nigerian corporate governance environmental factors in turn, been 
influenced by these outcomes? 
 
• Any other thing in relation to Impact? 
 
E. RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
• What are the priorities/concerns in corporate governance mechanisms/practice in your 
organisations before the initiation/ implementation of these CG reforms? 
 
• Were the outcomes of these reforms in accordance with your original expectations? 
 
• To what extent are the outcomes able to address the challenges or major priorities/ concerns 
in your CG structure and practice? 
 
• If applicable, can you discuss how OR in what ways these concerns were not addressed? 
 
• Any other matters concerning relevance? 
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F. PROSPECTS/SUGGESTIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN NIGERIA 
• What should be (are) the main priorities for corporate governance in Nigeria? 
 
• How can these priorities be adequately incorporated into corporate governance reforms? 
 
• What are the strengths/ shortcomings of these present reforms? 
 
• How can Nigerian corporate governance environmental issues be adequately accounted for 
in corporate governance reforms?  
 
• What are the suggestions/ prospects for establishing a more effective and suitable corporate 
governance framework in Nigeria? Tailored towards our peculiar needs? 
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